


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
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
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THE RECOVERY OF TRUTH



BOOKS BY

Count Hermann Keyserling

THE RECOVERY OF TRUTH

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(Two Volumes)

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


Count Hermann Keyserling

THE RECOVERY OF TRUTH

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
IN COLLABORATION
WITH THE AUTHOR

BY
PAUL FOHR



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Preface

TO THE German edition of this book was given the title *Wiedergeburt* (rebirth) because it is through rebirth that the world continually renews itself. Whatever is born must also die. Just as the Eternally-Real manifests itself only by renewed incarnation in the Transitory, just so the Eternally-True maintains its identity within the flux of time only by means of a continuous change of appearance in harmony with the spirit of the times. Thus the entire problem of life presents itself anew to every individual born into the world and every problem needs to be newly expressed, in keeping with the changing inner states of thinking man.

Rebirth does not necessarily mean progress, but it may do so if it be accompanied by the requisite amount of initiative. And there is no doubt that such initiative has been most conspicuous, within the last few centuries, in the sphere of intellectual activities. Accordingly, that portion of mankind which took an active part in this development can be fairly said to be more capable of *understanding*, in the proper and deep sense of the word, than any earlier class of human beings. But as this greater capacity of understanding depends on a new state of being, the men or women in question are no longer able to realize Eternal Truth in antiquated terms. Hence the lack of religious feeling, the disbelief in moral law, the universal scepticism of these days. Truth needs to be *recovered*; not until then will it be vital

truth. This explains the title of the English edition of this book. But at this juncture it is not a question of the recovery of truth in general, as it was at every turning-point in the history of spirit: owing to our generation's greater ability to understand, *the requisite restating of the old truth may*—according to the law of correlation obtaining between meaning and expression formulated and demonstrated in the second chapter of *Creative Understanding*—amount to an absolute improvement on former expressions. On the other hand, a restatement improved in the absolute sense is indispensable today if the old truths are to recover their vitality at all. Intellect will no longer put up with formulas the truth of which it can call in question on its own premises. And to the psychic organism of the new type of man, the intellectually unsatisfactory is unsatisfactory also in the vital sense. The age of blind belief is past.

In accordance with what has been said above, this book aims at three things: The new embodiment of the eternal problems in general; the better setting of these problems from the point of view of the intellect; and, finally, a translation of theoretical possibilities into practical life-tasks capable of fulfilment. But it pursues these aims exclusively from my personal starting-point: that is, of a spirit intent on the fecundation of other spirits. In my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*—a book not as yet available in an English translation, but already published in French under the title *Figures symboliques*—I have expounded at length my conviction that no man can do more for others than stimulate them to independent original thought, and that there are no higher ethics than those I call the ethics of fruitfulness. I have further shown that every progress was due solely to the

influx of the Lógos Spermatikós, the creative principle in its masculine aspect. Therefore, this book has been written with the intention to induce the evolution of new ideas in the reader's mind rather than to furnish him with a set of ready-made cognitions. And this again helps to prove the appropriateness of the title "Re-birth" of the German edition: what I believe to have discerned on my own account and what I think I know is intended to be reborn in the reader's mind as his own personal achievement.

I have, therefore, had a definite purpose that this book should not represent an architectonically articulate and closely knit whole, but should rather form a series of independent acts. Spermatic effect can be obtained in this manner only. The case is exactly the same as with fecundation on the physical plane. In the first part of the book this style is particularly conspicuous. It contains my lectures at the sessions of the School of Wisdom at Darmstadt during the years 1922, '23, '24, '25 and '27, which were, originally, parts of a more comprehensive whole. To that extent they are fragments. Yet, they can stand by themselves. In the first place, I mapped out for every particular session the whole plan from the beginning to the end, planning carefully the ground every other lecture was to cover, just as a composer plans the part each instrument is to play. The reader who wishes to know more of this particular Darmstadt art of spiritual orchestration should read or re-read what I have said in the introductions to *Creative Understanding* and *The World in the Making*. So it was that no lecture ever held a real surprise in store for me. On the other hand, my introductory lecture of each session invariably *implied* all the others, while the concluding

one not only gave a summary, but also a complete account of the meaning of the whole set of lectures envisaged as an indissoluble unit.¹ It is, however, not only for this reason that I feel entitled to say that my lectures, fragments*though they be, are sufficient unto themselves. They are so because they are likely to call forth creative responses—the one thing I aim at—precisely *because* of their fragmentary nature. A torso, a ruin is always more suggestive than a completed statue or building; all those thinkers who have manifested perpetual creativeness were essentially aphorists; think of Heraclitus, Socrates, Jesus, the great Hindoo sages, Lao-tse, and, finally, Nietzsche. On the one hand, in anticipating inwardly the elaborations provided by the subsequent lectures, and on the other, in leaving many things unsaid which the law of association naturally brings to the mind, my lectures practically force the reader to pursue by himself the lines of thought which I have started. I should like my readers to remember what I repeatedly said during my stay in the United States when declining to answer questions: I do not intend to say more than I have said. If the reader or hearer is really anxious to know he will ask no questions nor will he complain of the incompleteness of my statements, *but he will go on thinking by himself*. If this is my one real object, then I have been saying too much rather than too little. In any case, I have given the problems in question what I think to be the right setting; have, moreover, traced the general outlines.

¹ Those who wish to read the complete accounts of the Darmstadt sessions should procure (through Otto Reichl Verlag, Darmstadt) the corresponding volumes of the Yearbook of the School of Wisdom, *Der Leuchter*.

According to the idea of the book, as stated above, this is all I had to do.

I certainly have not, in this book, treated all the problems that require a restatement; I have not come to the end of my life-work. But I do think I have dealt with the most important issues. I have dealt with the religious, the ethical problems; with the future of Christianity; with the problems of life and death, of freedom, of love, of happiness. I have endeavoured to show to what extent man belongs to the earth and to what extent he does not. This book can be read independently of my other works. Still, I should advise every reader of *The Recovery of Truth* to study also *Creative Understanding* in case he has not done so already; for since the former book is likewise a record of inner experiences (compare its introduction with *Creative Understanding*), acquaintance with the foregoing experiences clearly facilitates understanding. The successive sessions of the School of Wisdom, the records of the first three of which are contained in *Creative Understanding*, represent, for me, an inner unity of evolution. Each session, as it succeeded another, was given its foundation by its predecessor.

Hermann Keyserling.

Darmstadt, *in the summer of 1928.*

Part First

PROBLEMS OF THE MIND

A. TENSION AND RHYTHM

I

Tension and Rhythm

IF MODERN natural science has attained a definite result, it is because there is no such thing as rest in the unequivocal and absolute sense in which this is conceived by unreflecting man, and because motion is the ultimate irreducible datum of all reality; the reason being that, not matter, but force in the widest sense of the term is the ultimate reality in nature. A body of the greatest apparent solidity is in fact a system of particles revolving and oscillating with frantic speed; which particles in themselves are only centres of energy. Motion which does not manifest itself transitionally, in a manner patent to the senses, is motion nevertheless; only it is inserted in this case in a closed whole and therefore manifests itself externally as tension.

What, then, is the reason that permanent states in the face of this irreducibility of motion (as such) are not altogether impossible? The reason is that Nature manifests herself articulated in closed systems and that, taken as a whole, she possibly herself represents in the last analysis a closed totality. This compression of every system makes for that quality of harmonious order which, as far back as antiquity, caused the wonderment of the Greeks when contemplating the starry sky. True, the inanimate world-process is not sense-directed; it is not to be conceived, in the manner of as late a natural

philosopher as Kepler, that the original chaos is striving toward the cosmos; for nature throughout is ordained in perfection; the great mechanical laws are implicitly obeyed everywhere, whatever the particular conditions may happen to be. Certainly, however, all forces primarily moving along their own lines and without sense-direction from the point of view of a closed system must, with their insertion in that system, at once co-ordinate themselves harmoniously, permanent conditions being inconceivable without previous unison. Thus, every single motion inescapably bound up with a closed system and incapable of translating itself into other motions finally is transformed into the state of *rhythmic* motion. Tension and rhythm, therefore, constitute the basic attributes of any sort of closed system in nature.

But every such system in so far as its own specific law determines, represents an end. Of its own resources it is incapable of change; for all its motions are caught once and for all in a harmonious circulation. The normal state of nature which mankind believes harmonious thus corresponds to what from the point of view of life is dead. Those who regard the harmony of the "celestial spheres" as an ideal state and hold it up to the living, therefore acknowledge death to be their life-ideal.

This view of things lifeless then furnishes, by way of a contrast, the adequate view of life. Life is a something-beyond-nature. It is related to nature as meaning is to expression, suggesting, from the standpoint of the latter, an ever-renewed miracle. It consists in the infusion of life into the phenomenon from out of a dimension essentially alien to it and extending, figuratively speaking, at a right angle to its own dimensions—that is, from the inside outward. This infusing of life, or vitalizing,

is, in itself, eternal motion, the ceasing of which is altogether inconceivable while life lasts, as inconceivable as in the analogous case of music; only this motion is not of physical, but of metaphysical, origin. And Life as life can never die, since it belongs, as a "meaning," to a plane of reality on which the ideas of coming into and passing out of existence are meaningless; if it comes to a stop, it has merely detached itself from the phenomenal world, just as a truth only becomes lost when estranged from the minds of men, but does not lessen for that reason its validity. But on the other hand, the temporal *expression* of life belongs entirely within the realm of nature. It is unconditionally dependent, in all its manifestations, on the materials and rules which govern this sphere, just as the poet is bound by those of the spoken language. Therefore, its phenomenology bears throughout the closest resemblance to that of inanimate nature, whenever its process can be conceived within the framework of a closed system according to the categories of mass and motion. Here, also, all is tension and rhythm; every organism, ranging from the amœba to the developed organ and to man and, finally, to the forms of mankind's social systems, denotes—looked at from an external angle—a particular system of gravitation which itself belongs to other more comprehensive systems: the periodicity of history corresponds to that of the revolution of the heavenly bodies and of the seasons; the power of leaders of men, the attraction wielded by nations, the sweeping force of ideas, are all phenomena of tension.

Only, in the case of life, the natural state of equilibrium never furnishes the ultimate position, nor does it ever mean a final goal; in the first place, its "meaning"

is never covered by the concrete facts which are invariably only its *means* of expression. In the second place this meaning creates, autonomously, connections—the specifically organic class—which constitute, as opposed to the inorganic, varieties of a superior order; in the third place, the destiny of nature can never, for this very reason, prejudice that of life. In principle, on the contrary, the very reverse obtains. Just as the materials and forces of nature receive their particular meaning and direction from the organisms into which they are worked, just so only life (to use the extremest case in point for the sake of elucidating the facts) can have given the primordial impulse to the motion of the world—provided it had a beginning; for the inanimate is without initiative. Thus only life, in a general sense, can transform from within conditions which have come to an end into new beginnings. It is in this respect the counterpart to inanimate nature, which is essentially inert. In the case of life, therefore, motion can, however long it may last and to whatever extent its elements may approach the state of harmony, never finally settle in a circular motion; for here motion is supplied from a metaphysical source with ever-renewed acceleration. Thus, death does mean, here too, the natural end of the evolution of every closed system (the form in which every materialization manifests itself). Only the end in this case means at the same time the threshold of *re-birth*. Rebirth, on the other hand, is never a mere repetition, but at the same time renewal: every birth of an identically fashioned body endows the world with a monad which has never existed before.

Life is essentially undying. In the empiric connection the primary phenomenon is, therefore, not tension

and rhythm in the general acceptation, but the infinite rhythmic process. If we now summarize these facts and those values which have from time immemorial served as guiding stars for the endeavours of striving mankind, and construct the idea of life in general on that basis, we come to the conclusion *that only states of perfection of a kind that are fruitful, that continue motion, that offer the promise of higher developments, are compatible with the "meaning" of life.* The life-ideal cannot by any means be defined in static terms. It can be defined in dynamic terms only, as an everlasting state of ceaseless increase, possessing direction and a meaning, but no limits.

FOLLOWING this brief train of thought we see the fundamental erroneousness of all life-ideals of a static character, whether they are called peace among the nations, or perfect serenity, or consummate balance in the individual, or by any other terms.

These are ideals of death, not ideals of life. It is true that an harmonious co-operation of all the parts constituting an organic totality should, however, be aimed at, and the harmony thus attained can, at times, bear the closest resemblance to a balanced system, the result of a compromise between conflicting physical forces. This kind of harmony, however, can never be conceived of as the ultimate position, but only as the best means of expression; and the more the means assume the character of an end in itself (as in the case of the lower animals and stereotyped professions) the more inferior will the manifestation of life become, for it will be lacking in vital quality. For with life, recurrence is by no means the essential phenomenon; the essential phenomenon is this,

that the unprecedented and the original continually manifest themselves through the medium of sameness. Therefore, in all the so-called states of perfection, embracing physical well-being as well as classicism, it is a question of anything rather than a state of equilibrium: what is at their root are states of tension pregnant with things to come and of a permanent quality. Therefore, throughout the ages, those civilizations and individuals have stood foremost in significance for progressive developments which, were they inwardly harmonized or no, while embodying the strongest tensions, knew how to communicate them to others. And this stands to reason: viewed from the plane of nature on which only changes or alterations can come to pass, every kind of progress is based upon the introduction of some new life-rhythm; and a rhythm of this sort will never take effect unless it be sufficiently potent to disestablish the settled equilibrium standing in its way. This statement needs to be augmented by another which, I think, strikes a deadly blow at the static ideal of perfection: To break up a settled equilibrium the forces called into play must not only be strong in themselves, but they must work eccentrically, that is, they should dart in, as a vagrant comet would into a well-ordered planetary system. Accordingly, every impulse to renewal originated in the Left—to use a political metaphor and more than a metaphor—for this very reason every impulse of that kind if its rhythm was completely ascendant and lost its life-accelerating virtue, ended in lifeless routine; its reacquired creativeness only when some new strong impulse from the Left drove the standard-bearers of the old into the position of the extreme Right.

It is sad, but true: The rational centre was at no time

creative. Now everyone, by instinct, avows ideals located as it were beyond the Right and the Left side and, when regarded merely from the external angle, bearing the closest resemblance to the liberal views of the centre—what then can be the solution of this antagonism? It is resolved in the following way: there is instinctively present to the mind of every individual, even in the field of historical events, a still higher state of tension credited with being able to unify the existing antagonism; such higher states of tension are presented by the states of health and classicism in their respective domains. But these very states go to prove abundantly that the unification of the antagonisms does not signify a compromise between them or an adjustment.

We have now reached a point permitting a perfectly clear-cut distinction between the living and the dead kinds of harmony: The equalization of conflicting forces in the domain of the inanimate is paralleled, in the case of life, by *counterpoint* effects. An organism, therefore, resembles anything rather than a solar system, since its life, seen externally, stands for the *labile and not the stable* equilibrium, a labile equilibrium in which a superior principle holds *unadjusted* antagonisms in suspense. Now this obtains for all kinds of life, the life of historical humanity and spiritual life included. A unification in the positive sense does not here amount to a compromise, but to a counterpoint effect. The idea of progress adequately understood implies nothing else than the demand that an ever-increasing range of connexions should be synthetized in the counterpoint style. And on the other hand, this claim can, on principle, be verified, since experience teaches (whatever the interpretation) that the psychic world is interconnected in the

same sense as our solar system is on the physical plane. Therefore here, too, every definite motion calls forth automatically its respective counter-motion, so that it is safe to say that radicalism breeds conservatism as the soft breeds the hard, the good the bad, and *vice versa*. Thus the upper and the nether worlds actually represent—in keeping with the old myths which psycho-analysis now verifies on a higher plane of cognition—a closed totality. This being so, there must be a universal and all-embracing rhythm in which the existing antagonisms would enter into mutual counterpoint relations instead of abolishing one another which may be striven for. It is precisely this which we all divine in so far as we really “will” perfection. But it is even here that our introductory observations on the physical world prove particularly fruitful: the more comprehensive state of tension can be brought into play only after the partial tensions succeed in harmonizing one another by means of superposition. And this, again, is only possible in a world which has attained maturity. Now it is indisputable that the world of spiritually conscious man still continues in a chaotic state analogous to that of sidereal matter before its integration into planetary systems. It is as yet too immature for the realization of the ideal of humanity. Accordingly, while from the beginning of time a few individuals may have attained to a certain degree of perfection, there have been as yet historically considered nothing more than elements. The rhythms they embodied were, one and all, excentric, particularistic, one-sided instead of all-comprising, and they had to be so, in so far as it was a matter of “historical” conditions: history as we understand it would be conceived as one-sided—a concept without meaning. The his-

tory of mankind would indeed take place in a region beyond all present-day one-sidednesses; but this history has not begun as yet. Wherever you turn your gaze in space and in time: you observe nothing else than one-sided conditions of movement. Progress, of whatever description, which has taken place up to now was brought about by what psycho-analysis designates as supercompensation; just as we moderns are one-sidedly intellectual and to that extent obviously superior to former types, but inferior in others, so precisely the same may be said of the Hellenic, the Roman, the Early Christian, and the mediæval worlds in their respective periods; as presumptive entities these civilizations have all misinterpreted themselves. And exactly in the same manner all the great innovators have been misunderstood, if as agents of history they were taken as symbols of perfection. Christ was one-sided in the highest degree, for He stood in conscious contrast to almost all the best of ancient civilizations. The same holds good for Buddha in respect to the Brahman civilization, not to mention the far more conspicuous one-sidednesses of men like Luther, Ignatius Loyola, Francis of Assisi, Mahomet, and the Jewish Prophets. There has, as yet, never been a genuinely universal civilization, nor can there have been one because the organism of mankind is still too young for such a development. What did the vaunted universality of the waning antiquity really amount to? It succumbed to the impact of numerically inferior barbaric hordes for no other reason than because it embodied no ideal tension, but the converse: that adjustment which stands for death. The same would, no doubt, obtain for the modern West (whose destiny would then certainly take an identical turn) were mechanistic

liberalism or, for that matter, social democracy—that last product of the senile spirit of the eighteenth century—to prove victorious within it; the life-philosophies of both stand for the idea of compromise. It is for the same reason that they both are no longer borne onward by any kind of vital impulse and no longer bring forth new ideas, new men of mark. As opposed to this, the alleged universalities of Catholicism, Brahmanism, and the Mahayana remain vital forces, because they are not adjusted inwardly, in their elements, but are living counterpointwise in a conscious state of tension with regard to what they are not. Now from all these particular reflections we gain a fundamental insight, a clear understanding which the universalists have never attained: *In the given conditions the shortest way to an all-comprising view and mode of being is not universality, but one-sidedness.* The spiritual world is always interconnected. But so long as its mobility remains in the confused and chaotic stage all that can be done is to carry on every one-sided movement with such a degree of energy as to compel the whole system to rise, *via* thesis and antithesis, to a higher rhythmic unity.

It is true that the one-sidedness in question presupposes youth and blindness; but it is precisely this premise which holds good throughout. From this point of view then, the ancient commandment enjoining loyalty to oneself above all receives a verification which at the same time modifies its meaning. Seen from this angle, it becomes evident in what sense it is precisely the present enmity of the nation which signifies—as all the more profound thinkers divine—the threshold of the coming solidarity of mankind; and how nationalism, from the

Pan-European viewpoint, is more auspicious than internationalism. But what is most particularly thrown into relief by these reflections is the profound justification of our Western conviction that, from the angle of progress, it is *we* who are the chosen people among all others. I said above, metaphorically, that every kind of progress invariably proceeds from the Left; well, we represent as it were the left wing of mankind. Accordingly, our ascendancy is not rooted in what we Westerners believe to be our universality, much less in our perfection—as though we were in the very least entitled to compare ourselves with the East on that score!—but in the one-sidedness of the movement embodied by us. Our civilization is the most one-sided and illiberal that ever was. But it is also the most stirring and dynamic. *Hence* our significance. We shake the world with the strongest tensions that have ever intervened in history. Our rhythm disturbs the equilibrium of the entire globe and creates forthwith those combinations the conscious existence of which is the primal condition for the coming solidarity of mankind. Owing to us, the Eastern civilizations that had, till now, remained secluded and self-sufficient, are acquiring significance for mankind at large. When, in our day, missionaries come to Europe from the Ganges and the Yellow River, this means, as it were, the reflux following upon the great flood we inflicted upon those peaceful lands. We stand, let us repeat, for the most one-sided and also the most percussive civilization that ever existed; therefore, *heroism* is the only principle of conduct in which we express ourselves; therefore, pacifist and pessimistic principles never produce with us anything remarkable.

But in what way are we entitled to consider ourselves

as the chosen of all people on the strength of our one-sidedness? For our "chosen-ness" does not necessarily follow from what has been set forth. The answer is: because our tension is so potent and our rhythm so dynamic that the latter *must, in the long run, bring about the unification of the whole, a consummation in which our one-sidedness would finally abolish itself. Through our one-sidedness, we bring about that very universality, that beyondness of right and left, the ideal state of mankind which all metaphysically conscious minds of the world have considered.*

FOR we cannot remain one-sided. Such a condition is fruitful precisely so long as the whole remains in a chaotic state. As soon as all the partial tensions attain a mutually-counterpointed state they merge into a new and, by this time, total state of tension; when all the particular rhythms have interadjusted themselves, a new and, by this time, universal rhythm will be the result. This, then, would be the ideal state of things on the historical plane, analogous to the connexion of the different organs in the organism, to physical health in the individual man, and to the classic quality of the works of art, present to the minds of all who yearn for something better beyond the right-and-left. There is no question here of the reasonable centre or of any ultimate state of compromise answering to abstract justice, which would necessarily mean extinction, but to a new and by this time no longer one-sided but universal state of tension. This state would no more mean an end to Life even if its purely natural expression were to find its last concrete form in it, than for the individual the state of bodily and mental health puts an end to his further goals.

Not indeed before this stage is reached is there a chance for such higher goals. Self-controlled man commands more and superior forces than does the chaotic. The universal rhythm into which the total state of tension was merged would thus leave the ever-new beginning characteristic of life unimpaired; it would but raise the basis for further progress to a higher plane, to a plane permitting the counterpointwise overruling of those very antagonisms, the seeming insuperability of which was the main basis of all human pessimisms.

Let us now, from this outlook, revert to what has been said about the beyond of Right and Left. Good and Evil are, on their own planes, equally insurmountable. To that extent an ultimate ascendancy of the good, as usually understood, is out of the question. The brighter the light, the darker the shadows that it casts. An inward standpoint, though, beyond both Good and Evil is indeed attainable, a standpoint which would maintain the expressions of either pole, by way of counterpoint relations, in a state of equipoise, and subdue them to higher ends. Every man who has conquered himself was a potential criminal. If such a man became good—that is self-denying—merely in the same degree in which he was self-asserting, he would have one-sidedly committed himself to the opposite pole, which explains how Dostoyevski's Starez Sossima could bow to the hardened criminal. Christ and Buddha had outgrown both crime and self-praise. In the same sense, enmity as such is indeed insuperable; for where there is friendship, there must be enmity also; attraction posits the force of repulsion. But a *befriending* of the inimical is possible; this is the true meaning of Christian love of his enemy. The ideal lies in the attainment of a state of tension in

which, on the one hand, one-sidedness would have disappeared, while it would, on the other, have encompassed the existing antagonisms instead of adjusting them.

Now this state is no other than the situation of the world-ascendant man described by me in my work, *Creative Understanding*, the phenomenon being, there, considered not in terms of "meaning," but of expression. It is also evident, now, why the ultimately conceivable external state of tension need not, in the case of Life, necessarily signify an end: the depths of meaning are unfathomable, the possibilities of sense-realization by means of the self-same world-alphabet are unbounded. It is true that the world-ascendant man is not faced with the problems which confront the inferior type. But he has to solve new problems of a higher order, problems which have been intuitively perceived since the dawn of history by the few world-ascendant individuals, and which have been acknowledged unconditionally by mankind as binding commandments, although they could not be lived up to. And now to history: In the sense in which it has been hitherto understood, it would vanish as soon as the partial tensions merged into the total tension; for one-sidedness has determined its meaning up to now. But this passing out of existence would not necessarily entail "*Fellachisierung*," as Spengler would have it; if, up to now, this phenomenon has regularly occurred, when an historical process had run its course, the reason is that until now there has existed only the alternative between one-sidedness and compromise, the latter never meaning anything but death.

The more general and comprehensive state into which history would then enter would not mean a compromise, but a new, higher state of tension. This might be called

super-history. The actual historical problems will no longer be set up within its sphere. But then only will the real problems of mankind be ready for discussion. I mean the problems which were present to the minds of men from time immemorial and yet which hitherto have withstood all attempts at solution. Then only could the right corresponding to the ideals of universal love, justice, and universalism be realized.

THE practical aim which all kinds of idealism often unwittingly pursue is, thus, not the attainment of some static ideal however man may see it, *but the realization of the universal state of tension*. This realization can only be achieved from the basis of a profounder grasp of the "meaning" of phenomena; for superiority means nothing else than the centring of consciousness within a deeper stratum of essentials. These last few propositions should have shown clearly why the foregoing arguments were issued from the tribune of the School of Wisdom. The School of Wisdom has, historically, no other aim than the clearing of the path for the universal tension; this, on the other hand, is its specific mission, compared with that of other similar institutions, because it is already ideally situated on the plane answering to that of the future state of things, and because that way can, as shown in *Creative Understanding*, be marked out by understanding only. If the School of Wisdom sides with no party, it does not take this stand on account of liberalism, but because it stands beyond all parties. If it extends the same sympathy to all genuine creeds, it does not blur their distinctive features, but it brings these creeds into counterpoint relations from out of the dimension of "meaning." If it

evaluates all types of mankind, as such, on principle on a basis of equality, this stand is not taken on account of scepticism, but because it makes a clear-cut discrimination between meaning and expression. In its peculiar essence, however, it furnishes a crucial test for the foregoing arguments. The School is singleminded in the midst of ambiguity. The state to which its spirit answers is not one of compromise, but of extreme tension; and it claims and engenders, on its part, a degree of extreme tension. Only the strongest are equal to resolve the contradictions it requires. And further: The authentic representative of its spirit must until it has conquered the world appear exactly as one-sided as any other determinate formation ever did. He must even produce the effect of excentricity; for from the viewpoint of the actual state of things he represents an element of disturbance. On the plane of phenomena even the greatest inward progress can never manifest itself otherwise than by the disestablishment of equilibriums. But the one-sidedness we stand for *means*, on the other hand, universality. Its rhythm is that of the universal to come.

The fundamental tones of this rhythm have been sounded to you. In the course of the next days you will hear manifold variations of the basic theme of tension and rhythm. The whole wealth of life will open out before you. But, if you bear in mind these fundamental tones, there will be revealed to you connexions you have not hitherto been aware of. You will experience personally that there exists a "Beyond" of all empiric determinations. And you will also, after this experience, drop the question I feel to be on the tips of the tongues of some of you: whether that universal tension does not, after all, signify—the end? Is not

the idea of it identical with that of the millennium?— That this world of ours will pass away is certain; man will not outlive the sun that warmed it. It even may come to pass that *the attainment of the highest terrestrial perfection* will coincide with the end of the human race. But life is essentially not a thing of this world; the latter represents only its means of expression. Its end does not mean absolute death, but only a withdrawing from the world of appearance. If, therefore, even the individual invariably sees his goal located in the future, though he knows how soon he shall die, it is, to say the least, unseemly for mankind to adhere to baser ideals, because the highest are related to death.

II

Universal Tension and World-Ascendancy

THIS world of ours is an interconnected whole oscillating in tensions and rhythms. In it there is no absolute rest; its characteristic feature is perpetual motion. It attains its highest degree of expression where the quality-beyond-nature, Life, manifests itself through the medium of its elements. Here there is no question of anticipating an ultimate settling of movement in a stereotyped circular motion; here the continual acceleration from within, which life essentially is, makes for unlimited change and increase. But every moment as such is, viewed from whatever angle, necessarily one-sided. In the early days of a system one-sidedness is the mark of the very trend of the parts with regard to the purport of the totality; here no synthetizing rhythm encompasses the particular; these only lead gradually up to the former, by way of mutual transactions. Hence the one-sidedness of all existing civilizations. Now our own would seem to be the most one-sided of them all. As, however, it is also the tensest and most agitated, it is precisely this which, by throwing into oscillation the whole of mankind and thus abolishing all states of isolation, clears the path for the ideal state of the universal tension. This does not denote a compromise between the conflicting forces, but their counterpoint arrange-

ment from a higher inner standpoint whose undisputed sway would convert history into super-history.

A more obvious and convincing illustration of these truths could hardly have been imagined than that furnished to us by Herr von Raumer (founder of the Central Association of Employers and Employed) in his lecture on the fruitfulness of antagonisms in politics and economics. He pointed out to us, using the World War as well as the post-war state of war-in-peace and, foremost, the class conflicts as examples, how it is precisely these antagonisms which, contrary to their own trend and by the pressure of conditions, make for new syntheses on a higher plane. Even though, for the time being, everywhere—and maybe for a long time to come—unreason should hold its sway: no judicious observer could, even now, doubt but that evolution necessarily leads up to the abolishment of imperialism (in the broadest sense, social democracy also advocating it, inasmuch as it strives against government by one particular class to the exclusion of others) and to the replacement of its idea by those of association and co-operation. Germany and France will, some day, *have to* come to a practical arrangement if they would avoid ruin to them both; and not much later the whole of Europe—nay, perhaps the whole of the White World—will find itself similarly constrained. In a like manner, the classes now at variance with one another in the nation will, some day, be *compelled* to combine in a new national union based on co-operation. For the actual lines of conduct will shortly clash with the interests of every single individual. Antagonisms are thus not conquered by compromises, on the present plane, but by making room for associations on a higher one.

I make a point of beginning this summary with a reference to Herr von Raumer's lecture, because progress in the processes he discussed resembles almost completely the process of harmonization of inanimate materials and forces, showing to what extent the spiritually meaningful corresponds to the nature of things. In the realm of politics and economy it is not anticipated sense, but exploded nonsense that leads to the ideal state of things; it is not because of their willingness, but because they cannot help it, that men, however blind, finally realize the superior order (a consideration that will, perhaps, help you to apprehend more clearly than before, why I am applying precisely to the leaders in the field of business, striving to bring deeper insight to their minds: here what is true to sense is primarily shown to be the practically reasonable, which serves to explain why it is also most readily understood; here sense-realization succeeds with greater facility than anywhere else because the amplest means are at its disposal). But sense *is* realized: is the decisive point. The most practical branch of practical life gives evidence for the truth of the fundamental assertions of the opening lecture. A pedagogue, Dr. Bojunga, explained to you, how, on the other hand, the normal ascent from the effervescence of youth to the classicism of the full-grown man's age (compared with the young man every grown-up person appears as a classic) signifies only the transition from partial to increasingly comprehensive tensions; the argument served to prove that the external processes of things, from the coming into existence of the heavenly bodies to the progress of the political and economical institutions, and thence to the maturing of man, were uniform. Up to this point, however, the initiative peculiar

to the spirit had not been taken into account, all tensions being considered as of a kind in which nature—that is urges and surrounding conditions—was the determinant. Rabbi Leo Baeck, confronting the ready-made world of antiquity with the perpetually growing world of the Bible, then explained to you how every kind of spiritual progress—ending with that which altogether transcends the finite and death and eventually leads to rebirth—consists in the sovereign engendering of or (which is metaphysically the same) in the resolute submission to tensions urging life, spontaneously, beyond the natural plane. The tension between God and Man, for ever unadjustable as such, posited by Israel, is the psychological bedrock basis for all existing Occidental dynamics, which are superior to all existing human dynamics taken together. Thus, in the realm of the spirit and of the soul more than anywhere else, what should be striven for is not compromise, in the sense of a relaxation of all tensions, but conversely, a maximum of tension. Now this tension, as Erwin Rouselle expounded to us, invariably requires a tension between Man and the World, wherefore tragedy is the typical fate of every hero, and whoever tries to make a new tension against all odds, inevitably wills heroism at the same time. Here, however, it becomes manifest to what degree one-sidedness represents the one true way to universality within a world as yet immature. Whenever a hero perished, his death came too late. For his very fall, the natural and inevitable result of the overstraining of the antagonisms he called for, worked for their abolishment, so that the one-sided, as it perished, lost its distinctive quality. Hence the significance of Christ's, of any saviour's death. This then proves that the hero's ethos and not that of

the champion of universal peace is the true ethos of sense-realization. It was with good reason, therefore, that after Baeck's lecture none was so elementarily convincing as that of the Warrior: in a world the essence of which is tension and rhythm, the soldier truly stands for the prototype.

THROUGH this instrumentation, the specifically intellectual components of which (Troeltsch, Flake, and Feldkeller) I need not here revert to, the true character of the symphony of life whose tensions are solved in no other manner than by their merging into a new and more comprehensive tension should have become quite clear to you. Still, you may possibly have heard too much about the problem in general. How does it present itself to each of you?—This is the way the School of Wisdom puts the question. It is in order to get an answer to this question that this monumental orchestra-work of the Spirit has been produced.

In my prelude to the session I had to speak in the abstract. So I can now wind up in the concrete. In order to answer the question for every one of you I need but refer to the two lectures that unquestionably represented the climax of the present session—that of the soldier and that of the rabbi. Major Muff is a soldier to the very marrow, and he refuses to be anything else; the warrior's ethos, the warrior's honour are all in all to him. He came to see me after Germany's breakdown in the hope that he might learn in what respect the German Army had proved unequal to its task, and on what lines its rebirth can take place. You have heard the result of his independent sense-experience—for I could only open up a general perspective to him. Even

the anti-militarists among you will now admit that it *is* possible to refer the unreservedly avowed and one-sidedly determined mode of being of the soldier of the Prussian school directly back to the World-Sense, and to fashion it as its means of expression. You already know, from your acquaintance with *Creative Understanding*, that real progress is possible only in the inward being; the world-alphabet in itself never stands in need of alteration; all depends upon what is uttered by its means. But you may not, perhaps, have expected to be presented with so impressive an instance of this truth. In Major Muff's way of thinking the sense of honour has developed honour-consciousness, the warrior's honour having thereby become the proximate expression of the entire meaning of life. Accordingly, his professional ideal deepened into the means for expressing the ideal of mankind; in the eyes of Muff the soldier who performs his formal duty down to the most insignificant externals is the freest of all men! . . . A profounder doctrine has never been set forth by any philosopher.—Now to the rabbi. My attention was called to Leo Baeck through the suggestion of a deputy of Orthodox Hebrews enquiring whether I would not ask, for once, a real Jew to lecture. Certainly, was my reply, provided there is among them a man entitled inwardly to stand for the Old Testament, that ethically grandest of all human productions. I was given to understand that there was at least *one* Jew of that description. You have heard him speak. I dare say not one of you who was really in earnest could have remained unmoved. . . . Now what was it that Leo Baeck achieved. He achieved the same as did the soldier: From a profounder depth of meaning he infused new life into ancient facts.

And by doing this he caused it to be reborn. I do not think I am guilty of presumption when I maintain that this lecture represents, in my opinion, one of the most momentous hours in the history of Hebraism since the death of Christ; for here for the first time full stress has been laid outside of the inner Hebrew circles upon the genuinely positive contribution of Hebraism, and solely on it—and symbolic treatment of this kind really shapes history. For the non-Jews, on the other hand, this same hour means the raising of a signpost pointing the way to the anti-Semitic goal, as far as a goal of that description can be affirmed—that is the goal of destroying *bad* Hebraism: for this can be brought about only through the victory of good Hebraism. The effort to shove the Jew out of the world is plainly doomed to failure: First, he represents an eternal type of *spirit*, being thus, so far, independent of heredity.¹ Second, he is, as a type, intellectually superior to the anti-Semite. Third, since it is precisely under oppression that his type has evolved, his persecutors have really helped him to evolve. But this only by the way. In the sense-connexion of the present session the rabbi first and foremost proffered the same teaching as the soldier: that abolition is not the goal, but only fulfilment. Now if you reflect upon the extreme one-sidedness of both types, and also on the fact that, in spite of their having spoken the one shortly after the other, they did not impress us as inimical antagonisms—you already have the answer to the question as to what all of us should do. *Wherever the emphasis is shifted back from the letter to the spirit, the external appearance of antagonisms loses its*

¹ Compare my considerations on the Jewish problem in *Europe* (Harcourt, Brace & Co.).

import and one-sidedness as such is for that very reason overcome.

On their own plane they none of them are superable. As a natural product, every individual denotes a definitely limited system of gravitation oscillating in a definite one-sided rhythm. In breaking loose from it he would simultaneously forfeit all his means of expression. From this argument we see that every man should recognize his particular rhythm and stand by it unswervingly. The warrior should be a warrior, the Jew a Jew, the German a German, and the European—some of them already exist—should be one-sidedly supernatural; for an all-comprising configuration is no less definite in its limits than a narrow one. Not only should everyone do exclusively what lies within his abilities, but he ought first and foremost, to refrain from trying to impersonate another man than the one he really is. Let everyone stick unreservedly to his limited mode of being, even in willing the universal—nay, most particularly then; for it is in contemplation only that the universal can be apprehended at a glance—its empirical conquest can be achieved only in the movement from one side.

And here follows the second commandment: let the one-sided adjust himself correctly within the cosmic relation of things. The fulfilment of this commandment is again dependent on a third: let every man endeavour to grasp the *meaning* which represents the vital basis of his particular mode of being, let every man endeavour to attain what Baeck and Muff have achieved. What, then, have these achieved? *No less a thing than the transformation of one-sidedness into the symbol for all-sidedness.* When a definite configuration succeeds in

understanding itself as such and installs itself accordingly—an automatic process, then—harmoniously within the spiritual cosmos, it is not only relatively but absolutely right. Muff's consciousness of honour is a direct expression of the World-Sense, precisely as metaphysical consciousness was in the case of Lao-tse. In this way everyone can transcend his limitations. In this way only can any man achieve this. *He transcends his limitations inwardly.* In this dimension exclusively genuine progress is conceivable; nothing but the shifting of the centre of consciousness through understanding leads to the deeps of Being. This, however, invariably lies beyond the individual person; he who is consciously rooted in it is at one and the same time his ego and its negative, the world. Hence the transmutation of all self-centredness into selfless radiation with the man at home in profundity; he literally stands, as a person, for the world-centre. And, accordingly, there comes to pass, as through the workings of a miracle, from within outward, a transmutation of all existing tensions and rhythms. When one-sidedness, antagonism, and enmity are taken for granted, they cease to exist as problematical. Then, through the agency of understood meaning, antagonisms spontaneously become solidarity, while the same could come to pass only by the strongest pressure, were the change to be brought about externally. Then all problems of one-sidedness drop out of existence. *Not as if they were solved: they are dismissed.*

Everyone is acquainted with this magic process in the example of the sinner suddenly overcome by grace, who is then sure that the past binds him no longer, however irresistibly the wheel of Karma may pursue its course. This "magic process" is indeed the only way in which

life-problems *can* come to a propitious end, for an overcoming of tensions as such is known to life only in the shape of death. One-sidedness is in every case transcended by man only by his rising inwardly superior to it, by his getting the upper hand against it, so that now he arranges and rules, counterpointwise, the antagonisms which, on their plane, would mutually abolish one another by destruction. Bearing this in mind, I said in my introductory lecture that our object was not the abolition of enmity—a thing utterly impossible—but the befriending of the inimical; not the victory of the good over the evil, but the attainment of a state beyond either; that, finally, the ideal man is not the perfectly-balanced man, but the world-ascendant type. This holds good for the problems of social life, the solution of which is at present so bitterly fought for. Is there a single one of them that can be solved? Not one. Neither will the problem of nationality ever be solved satisfactorily, nor the social problem. This applies in the first place to the conflict between capitalism and socialism. But they will be *dismissed* in their time; they will be consigned to oblivion as compared with bigger and more pressing ones. The partial problems which make up the substance of all present-day antagonisms, as opposed to those of the coming association of the peoples, will sink down to the level of importance of what is taken for granted. Here a homely illustration may prove serviceable. The conflicts waged in the digestive apparatus have never been solved; possibly there occur in the peristaltic movements, seen from a corresponding state of consciousness, tensions of a force equal to that discharged, in the historic world, in the European War. Still, only the worm's consciousness is rooted in the digestive system. So man-

kind in the future will look upon the most pressing problems of our day, such as anti-Semitism, the hatred between races and classes literally as intestinal concerns, the mention of which is avoided in polite society. The problems are not even meant to be solved—their unsolvedness is the very fact that keeps the life-process going. But they will some day cease to occupy the conscious.

THUS, satisfied with illustrations gleaned from life, we have reverted to the fundamental conclusion of the introductory lecture; this was to the effect that not the solution of problems, but the translation of partial tensions into the universal tension is the goal. You will by now have become fully aware why we produced this monumental orchestra-work of the Spirit, in spite of the fact that the School of Wisdom has, in the last analysis, the individual man for its exclusive object. You have now had a *personal experience* of how the adequate adjustment ruling the entire connexion of things transforms every one-sidedness into a symbol for all-sidedness; how the centring of consciousness on "meaning" on the one hand sanctions every formation in its unchanged particularity, while on the other it dismisses superficial conflicts. Thus adjusted, the soldier and the rabbi do not contradict each other; nor would the Catholic and the Protestant, the individualist and the socialist. They all would, in unison, function as counterpoint complements.

Our present session has thus produced for you, in the literal sense, a symbol of the world as it should be. But the School of Wisdom is not a theatre. However beautiful our production may have been—it was no end in

itself. It would have failed in its purpose if it had not influenced every one of you, or at least the greatest possible number, to proceed with the realization of this experience for and within himself. In my opening lecture I explained with somewhat other words that the School of Wisdom means less an institution for the imparting of knowledge than a fountainhead of forces; it aims at the birth of the world-ascendant man. And I called your attention to the fact that its activities, seen from the external angle of the settled existing state of things, must needs be felt as a disturbance, the more so because the world-ascendant man, as opposed to the normal type, does not represent the man of compromise, but the embodiment of a higher degree of tension. Let me, today, add this much. It will by now hardly be misunderstood by you. The type of man we aim to bring into existence will be felt as a disturbance; he will annoy continually the majorities *precisely in so far as he is wise*. The Chinese, who know more of wisdom than any other race, designate the wise by a combination of the ideographs for wind and lightning; wise, with them, is not the serene old man bereft of all illusions, but he who, like the wind, rushes headlong and irresistibly on his way and cannot be stopped nor laid hold of in any station of his career; who purifies the air in the manner of lightning, and strikes when there is need for it.

In this way only will the man within whom our impulse becomes life proceed on the historical plane. He will make his influence felt as the representative of the universal and, accordingly, of the highest form of tension ever realized, in the midst of the ripples of the modern state of things. Here, indeed, every single individual is wanted. Considered externally, this prop-

osition amounts to a truism. When a small minority sets out for conquest, none are allowed to stand aloof. But there is a deeper meaning in this; and it is from recognition of it that the School of Wisdom's appeal is, first and foremost, not to the many, but to the single and unique individual. What is the reason for the fact that all progress has invariably proceeded from a single man? The reason is, that every individual that struck Self in his deepening consciousness represents the hinge of the world. One-sidedness as such is insuperable. The superficial conflicts are unsolvable on their own plane; for nothing but a final compromise, in other words, death, could in this instance signify solution; for this reason the idea of any kind of final victory due to an external display of force is tantamount to a fundamental self-deceit; absolute and lasting ascendancy will never be secured by any party. But the externally weakest individual who has so deepened his consciousness that his particular mode of being has become to him the expression of the cosmic whole is thereby endowed with its super-empiric might. Thus, the pressure brought to bear on a single and infinitesimally small point of a closed system of forces suffices to change the trend of the whole and to translate the existing tensions into entirely new ones.

B. WORLD-CONCEPTIONS AND
LIFE-CONFIGURATIONS

I

World-Conceptions and Life-Configurations

U P T O the eighteenth century educated people took for granted the correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm. That which applies to great things applies to the small as well, was the idea; upper and lower, right and left, outward and inward stand always in the relation of reciprocal correspondence; but man, being a creature intermediate between nature and spirit, represents, it was thought, in his essence and destiny the mirror of the whole creation. In these early days the external, meaning objects, and the internal, meaning states of consciousness, were seen from one focus.

It was the astrological system which gave the fullest and precisest expression to this world-conception. It referred the worlds of nature and spirit, necessity and accidents, free will and fate to a connected whole reducible to an arithmetically precise formula; but on the other hand, it saw the *raison d'être* of this totality in its significance. The astrologer pictured the universe as a kind of clockwork; in this the primordial motion of the cosmos is represented by the spring, the dial, by the star-spangled heavens. Within it, myriads of reciprocally conditioned wheels gear into one another under a uniform compulsion; the individual's free will is of their number and figures as momentously as does cosmic destiny. The planetary orbits and the signs of the zodiac

are thus reproduced in the germinating soul. Inversely, whatever happens, and is about to happen, on earth may be read, concisely, in the heavens.

I would arouse in your memories this group of ideas which belong to the most ancient acquisitions of mankind for a well-defined purpose. From the course of this year's session, as from a point of vantage, we gain a new and deeper understanding of the relative positions and values of the different world-conceptions and life-configurations. It is intended to show to what extent *every one* of these is or may become replete with meaning. And the first and, thus far, least satisfactory answer to the question, in general terms, as presented here, was furnished by astrology. For astrology conceived every individual phenomenon, first and foremost, as *cosmically conditioned and, in so far, justified*. If there be a cosmic background to every human particularity, then also the particular mode of any definite being—even though it be a failure in itself—is chargeable to the firmament, and thus, all exclusive and narrow appraisals have to be dismissed on account of their meaninglessness. However inferior the fish type—I am using, of course, astrological terms—may appear to the ram type, it is indubitably as necessary and as truly entitled to existence; as a phenomenon, every individual must needs be exactly such as he was fashioned by the constellation ruling at his birth. Now can it be even questioned that man also, as a phenomenon, represents the product of interferences of cosmic influences, as indubitably all other phenomena do? Whatever opinion one may hold as to the special assumptions of astrology, its manner of viewing the particular from the universal aspect of things and thus warranting, for every form of life, its empiric justifica-

tion until further analysis, corresponds in principle to the universal meaning of things. This is pragmatically demonstrable by the fact that the period before the time of the so-called "enlightenment" (*Aufklärung*) possessed a much deeper intuition, as well as conception, of the different types of man in their necessary connexion than has any subsequent time. The modern era conceived man, his obviously material parts excepted, as wrenched from the natural connexion of things; and in this respect it seemed to be considerably more anthropomorphically-minded than its "unenlightened" predecessor; for it had lost sight of the indubitable cosmic determination to which spiritual man is also subject. It thus believed itself—with a presumption hitherto unknown—entitled to decree, from any point of view it happened to hold, which forms of life were to be held justified and which not. From that time onward a non-religious man might, without fear of ridicule, call religion nonsense, or one unmilitary or unintellectual might let all military matters and criticism go by the board; when women or artists in their essential essence failed to come up to an ideal standard, any man felt at liberty to reproach them with inferiority. The world-conception which prevailed before the "*Aufklärung*" represented a deeper understanding of the world than that of the ensuing scientific era.

Thus much holds good in principle and quite independently of the adequateness of the astrological world-picture: what is erroneous in point of fact may, nevertheless, prove useful as a working hypothesis. Nor is the accuracy of this world-picture in its general outlines any longer debatable if we do not listen to prejudice. Nativities cast on the basis of accurate dates by

adequately endowed persons fall so frequently true, as far as my personal experience goes, that the laws for the calculation of probabilities disallow the conclusion in favour of chance. We cannot, of course, explain this fact within the framework of current scientific concepts, least of all, on the basis of astronomical facts. In astrology the planets and signs of the zodiac are regarded as centres of relation of cosmic states of tension which take effect in the physical *as well* as in the psychic world; therefore, their existence being taken for granted, they must belong to a plane of psycho-physical reality which until now has remained unexplored and cannot be surveyed from other planes. But the facts as such are indisputable; and they certainly bear out the general assumption of the inner correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm. But this is not all: recent research has established a further fact of the widest import: that the analysis of souls to their original dispositions and complexes by means of the psycho-analytical method, whenever the experiments in question are made with sufficiently accurate data, leads to results which reproduce faithfully the "nativities" of the astrologer. It is a fact which has been demonstrated that the result is the same whether we consult the heavens in order to achieve a fundamental comprehension of a soul, or pry into the depths of the psychic. Since the validity of the results obtained by means of analytic reduction of complex psychic conditions to definite combinations of primary impulses is firmly established, the planetary scheme must needs express real conditions as well; and from this basis we can venture a preliminary interpretation of the connexion in question. The impossibility of explaining the facts themselves presents no enigma, since quality

belongs throughout to the irrational sphere; the rational alone can be understood; the qualities of chemical elements are as irreducible and, therefore, as inexplicable as the virtues of the astrological planets. The only problem is to explain how the inexplicable astrological facts—in case they are facts—are related to other equally inexplicable facts of nature. To this problem this statement based on experience furnishes the key: *nativities fall true if cast by adequately endowed persons*. It means that the rules of astrology appear to be reliable only when applied by such as know how to apply them. But the same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, in any kind of life-process. Every sense-experience—and life is nothing else—proceeds on lines from within outward. Wherever it leads to creation it invariably has to conform to the grammar and syntax of the world-alphabet. In the same way, all organic processes obey definite laws; but these take effect only when life calls them forth and directs them.

And the same is true everywhere. The poet's creation is incorporated in formal rhythm; but the mere acquaintance with this and its laws has never produced a poem. In the same way the best acknowledged laws of psychoanalysis yield results to such only as know how to apply them voluntarily. It follows from this that the specific facts of astrology nowise constitute a new enigma. On the other hand, they facilitate a deeper comprehension of the general relationship between necessity and free will—mankind's basic problem—than can be attained from any other starting-point. If, as we have seen, nothing can be deduced from the planetary data that was not contained in the soul itself, and if astrology's point of view is extra-human or cosmic, then the follow-

ing formula must express the meaning of the connexion: *the universe and man represent at every moment a unified cosmic situation.*

Man as a free agent is, as such, also an expression of cosmic growth; he is, at every moment, both fulfiller and originator. That which earlier times misinterpreted in respect to dependence on the planets and that which the period recently passed misconstrued in favour of human free will thus represents, in reality, a synthesis which cannot be dissolved. That this is really so can nowadays be demonstrated empirically within the limits in which such things are provable at all; the requisite means are furnished by the *I Ging*, the Chinese "Book of Transformations." This most remarkable book of the world's literature, as I would venture to claim, breaks up the wholeness of life into a definite number of situations of a general aspect which embrace at the same time both the human and the cosmic. It starts from the premise that every such situation bears within itself the law of transformation. It shows also how everyone can make sure of the particular process in which he is actually involved and of the specific transformation in store for him at a given time. And, as a matter of fact, whenever an adequately endowed and trained man consults the *I Ging* in the proper way he receives information as to his personal conditions and their evolutions to come; he also receives, through the commentary handed down to posterity, instruction on the broadest lines imaginable for the most efficient mastery of his fate. This is without reference to the temporal. Just as Kungfutse derived his best practical wisdom from the *I Ging*, so the "Council of the Ancients," the Genro, even in recent times has

received from this book in every emergency the general outlines to be followed in Japan's political moves.

Let us now revert to the particular problem of the justifiability of every particular form of life in so far as it is cosmically conditioned. Every individual expresses in his specific mode of being and doing at the same time a cosmic situation; he cannot be conceived as detached from this connexion. To this extent the underlying idea of astrology—whatever may be true of its particular manifestations—corresponds to truth. From this there follow some exceedingly interesting corollaries in the sphere of everyday existence. I will select one particularly instructive example. Psycho-analysis has failed, thus far, to accomplish what it might have done chiefly because it does not recognize the *universal* background of psychic phenomena. Although it had to recognize again and again, as its research progressed, that any creative mode of being on the plane of history has been tied up with definite complex-combinations, many of which cannot but be regarded as pathological (so that, to select two instances, without an hypertrophic "Œdipus-complex" Alexander the Great would not have conquered the world nor Dostoyevsky have written his novels), psycho-analysis persists in adhering to the superstitious belief in the "normal" type of man. From the cosmic correspondence of the psychic it follows that the complexes may be related to the fundamental substance of souls; they correspond, translated into terms of the planetary scheme, to definite planetary combinations. It might, therefore, be sometimes as ridiculous to attempt the reduction of a man's complexes as would be the endeavour to disestablish constellations in the heavens. Also the pathological can correspond, at times, to the

universal and the eternal, and not only to particular and transient cosmic situations, such as might manifest themselves in times of epidemic disease. It is for this reason that definite psychic malformations are typical of certain periods to such a degree that, were they eliminated, the historical process would be deprived of its meaning. This is why the spirit of the time seems to proceed so single-mindedly¹ and why, at times, only morbid minds can lead mankind a step farther: Nietzsche and Strindberg, had they been healed by psycho-analysis (provided this were conceivable) would have remained without significance; for in that case they would not have helped their fellow men to overcome a general and typical condition of the mind by lifting it into the sphere of consciousness. For the same reason a man who "knows" is averse to the analysis of his personality until the cosmic hour strikes, and never does he agree to such an analysis beyond a definite point. If this were done prematurely or too completely he might forfeit for the time being his best possibilities.

Thus, psycho-analysis will have to follow the path mapped out for it by Jung, one trodden before him by somatic medicine. Indeed, the doctrine of "the constitutional types" deliberately reverts to the antique-mediaeval type-doctrine. According to this school, "diseases in themselves" are discarded. Diseased states mean no more than borderline cases of normal states of inner balance; this view explains why every individual is liable to specific diseases to the exclusion of others; the first question should invariably be, *why* did a man get this

¹ Compare the essay, "The Correspondence of the Macrocosm to the Microcosm," by Baroness Olga Ungen-Sternberg, in the *Leuchter*, 1928 (*Werden und Vergehen*).

and not another illness? There is indeed no such thing as a universal standard of bodily and psychic health; in different situations different facts must be called normal.

I SHALL take the results of this first section as a first premise, however unproved the facts adduced in support of them may seem. The task of the School of Wisdom is not epimethean, but promethean; we may thus forecast in so far as we are convinced that the theories we postulate in advance—instead of obtaining them by abstraction from past experiences—endow the facts with a meaning more in accordance with their inward nature. Personally, I am satisfied that every word of the aforesaid will sooner or later be proved to be true. I thus presume the correspondence between the true knowledge to be derived from adequately cast horoscopes and from the knowledge furnished by analytic sounding of the psychic deeps to be a fact, whatever be the final scientific explanations.

Is there no ulterior, deeper meaning underlying the correspondence in question than the meaning we have found hitherto? There is indeed. To realize this we have only to compare the basic assumptions of astrology and psycho-analysis. In the heavens the type is determined by *constellations*, in the soul by the *adjustment* of the psychic connected whole. The two latter propositions again strike a deeper stratum of the correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm, which proves once more that both stand for the same in the last analysis, and also point to the same.

Every horoscope contains *all* cosmic elements, the location of the centre of emphasis being the only thing that

varies; it contains them not in the sense of simultaneity, but in the sense of succession. For man is evidently a unity not only in space but also in time. In the successive phases of man's life, exactly as in a symphony, new melodies and motifs strike in again and again, which later are invariably seen to have been integral parts of the whole, whereas they are a source of surprise when appraised as mere incidences. Thus, this process of an evolution through a series of different forms in the dimension of time is as natural to man as it is to the tapeworm or malaria germ. This applies to fate which comes from the outside: this too is tied up with the inner man; psycho-analysis has indeed established that man unconsciously calls forth himself even the events which are most painful to him—a fact which shows again that the external and the internal always present a unified cosmic situation. It is thus altogether beside the mark to draw a strict line between external and internal phenomena; man is no less responsible for what befalls him than for what he does.

Exactly as every horoscope comprises all the cosmic elements, so all manner of dispositions are alive within every man born; it is but the distribution of stress that varies. This proposition seems bold. Since, however, the phenomena of mediumism and of an artist's creative processes have been more closely investigated, and since analysis has found access to the abysmal deeps of the unconscious with the result that every personally unconscious element is linked with a super-personally unconscious which extends, in altitude as in depth (figuratively speaking), beyond all possibilities of individual existence, the assumption can no longer be disclaimed that there lives in the deeper strata of every man not only a greater

amount of spiritual realities than he is able to manifest, but that *literally all reality* forms his personal background. On the psychic plane the boundaries which separate being from being on the physical plane do not exist; here everything appears inwardly connected. Were it not so how could the fact be explained that a man can know what he had never learnt, and understand a being different from himself? How could the existence of uniform spirits of different races and times, of problems with which certain periods were faced, of historical downfalls, be explained? The truth is that there live in every man, in some stratum of his being, all conceivable types of man; which of them is to manifest itself depends on the adjustment of the all-embracing connexion.

This coexistence of implicit totality and overt particularity can be understood also by means of the following trend of thought: A spiritual connexion is always a sense-connexion; it is "meaning" which organically synthetizes the psychic, which, in itself, is but an evanescence. Now sense-connexion remains a total, however it be focussed or adjusted; since every "symbol" (sense-image—this is the true translation of the Greek word) has, at the back of it, all possible meanings, every one of which reflects every other, the connexion remains unbroken and identical however it may be viewed. Here, therefore, there can be no boundaries; and this is shown to be actually the case by the inward contiguity of minds which, in time and space, are entirely separate. On the other hand, the same sense-connexion furnishes a totally different outward picture according to the point within it on which significance is focussed. The same iceberg presents a different appearance according to that part of it

which emerges above the surface of the sea; in a sense-connexion the slightest shifting of the emphasis completely transforms the phenomenon. With the self-same words and sentences totally different things can be said; all depends on the emphasis. The same tone sounds entirely different according as it is introduced in one chord or another. The same original ability may lead to positive or negative phenomena; the individual may, according to the situation, play a remarkable or an insignificant part in history. Every new adjustment, which means a referring of the elements of the soul to some new centre of relations within the sense-connexion, supplies these with a new meaning; it does so to the extent that the same disposition may manifest itself in a divine and also in a fiendish manner. It is for this reason that men may become better or worse than they were; on that account only can they be amended and grow or shrink inwardly in accordance with outward conditions.

The sense-connexion which can thus manifest itself in various ways is *not* identical with what is usually called "personality"; it is a more comprehensive entity; personality represents only its means of expression. The sense-connexion in question forms, as it were, the background of personality, and this background literally includes all human possibilities. Now how may we define that doubtful Totality?—The answer to this question leads to the comprehension of the meaning in the broadest sense of all human variations. I can within the narrow compass of a single lecture only outline the reply with a few strokes, without furnishing explanatory details or proofs; these will, however, come of them-

selves in time to the minds of such as have understood what I mean. *The Totality in question is mankind.*

Its Reality is indeed invisible. From the point of view of thought it is a mere conception. But it exists, nevertheless; it proves its existence unambiguously by the correlation of the various types within space and time, by the fact that they serve one another as complements; it proves its existence by the interdependence of the different types, by the impossibility of understanding any one of them singly, in its limitations. It proves its reality in that no man was ever able to discover the meaning of his personal existence in his isolated self.¹ Just as the organs of the body are harmoniously related to one another, just as bees and clover are interdependent, in exactly the same sense those who understand and those who do the deeds—rulers and merchants, artists and the public—understand one another, not to mention the primordial correspondence of man and woman, who in their conjointness alone represent man from nature's point of view. And these reciprocally correlated beings always come into existence contemporaneously; everybody, in addition to being himself, is always also a part of an organic *Zeitgeist*-unity.

Every individual is inwardly tied up with some larger connexion in which his true existence is rooted. If this be so, then we can go a step farther and say: the different types are one-sided solely *on account*, and *just because*, of their representing different aspects of one single spiritual whole. Since Totality always forms the background of the particular, though outwardly never coin-

¹ Compare the chapter, "Man and Mankind," of my book, *Immortality*, 3rd ed. Darmstadt, 1920. (The book exists so far only in the German original.)

ciding with it, because it invariably manifests itself as multiplicity, the particular types *must needs be* one-sided configurations. They mean the same, in this respect, as abstractions do in the intellectual sphere. These never lead thinking man beyond the connexion from which they are abstracted; to that extent they are true to fact. It is only by abstraction that a whole can be viewed in such a manner as to make conceivable and manageable a definite aspect of it. But what is marked out by abstraction stands only for a piece cut out of the whole, devoid of meaning and consistence without it.

There exists then such a thing as a real cosmos of humanity to which all particular human beings belong in a mutually complementary way; they appear different from one another in accordance with their various adjustments to the whole. It is only because there is a cosmos of this kind that all earnest men instinctively believe in the duties of mankind; that they demand its progress; that is why we consider great minds as being of vital moment for mankind; why the personal problems of the individual represent a necessary stage of universal evolution. Whoever solves a problem for himself thereby solves it for every other man and for all times.

And now we have reached a point of vantage enabling us not only to form a conception, but also to draw a convincing picture of the facts in question. We have been led in all our approaches to the recognition of a correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm. The most significant expression of this reciprocal correlation is this: *the cosmos of humanity is mirrored in every individual human soul*. There lives in every soul a boundless multiplicity of potential forms. Every pri-

mary impulse is in reality the individual being; the associations, amalgamations, and sublimations to which they are liable make in every individual, without exception, for an inner growth the richness of which may rival all external manifestations; for every shifting of emphasis creates in the world of meaning new pictures. By far the greatest part of this multiplicity is excluded from the waking consciousness; it is with difficulty that it recognizes as its own that which is manifested in dreams, in mediumistic trances, and in artistic production. Yet it is really this multiplicity in unity which constitutes the individual; whatever manifests itself within him and through him represents a true part of his being.

Wherever the whole as such manifests itself, it does so in the form of complementary elements which are one-sided in themselves. This fact is illustrated by all dreams, by the images which emerge in the consciousness of every person with the gift of inner visions if these images are allowed to take shape at random; the manifold and different forms are always partial expressions of unified man. Manifestations such as the pathologic breaking-up of personality are only exaggerations of the fundamentally normal multiplicity. This multiplicity is the normal basis of waking consciousness in infants and with primitive peoples, both of which are lacking in homogeneous consciousness. In the case of cultured man, the same conditions are characteristic of the dramatic poet. His creative soul involuntarily expresses itself in a multiplicity. That there really is a unity underlying the latter is proved by the fact that the persons figuring in the drama complement one another; they are partial expressions of this unity. In this respect every drama represents an organism. The

multiplicity of a drama, as the expression of the poet's soul, mirrors faithfully the relation of the individual to mankind. Each single world which a man experiences as his personal world is really a drama composed by the spirit of mankind. For this reason each individual unit of it is allotted the well-defined part he should play. And since life is primarily rooted in the spiritual, and as mankind, being a spiritual unity, precedes the individual, the equation established above means more than a mere symbol. I personally believe that the physical organism represents not the primary, but an ultimate stage, the materialization and, finally, concretion of the spiritual. This is the only conceivable reason for the unimportance of all bodily barriers.

IF THIS be so, how does the image of mankind stand out in cosmic perspective? It would seem to be a uniformly interconnected multiplicity in time and in space, the members of which are represented by one-sided formations in the manner of abstractions. This multiplicity is empirically irreducible; the essential unity *can* manifest itself in a multiple form only. On the other hand, no individual can be understood except from the whole. This should prove, as it seems to me, conclusively that it is contrary to sense to deny the right of existence to any particular configuration whatever. Nothing can be understood on its own showing; the place anything belongs to in the general scheme of things can be ascertained only when the total connexion is taken as the starting-point. And we can also understand now why it is contrary to sense to demand of one type what only another is competent for: woman is organically incapable of possessing the specific virtues of

man, as the artist is to possess those of the warrior; again, the hypersensitive cannot have the qualities of the adventurer, nor does the man of strong will live by the guidance of emotion. Every particular type of man is the manifestation of a definite aspect of mankind, and every aspect of this kind must needs be one-sided. We are thus brought to admit that every single configuration of life is cosmically justified.

Of these one-sided forms of existence the fundamental types, such as the man of religious experiences, the warrior, the thinker, the doer of deeds, and the merchant, manifest themselves everywhere and at all times; they correspond to the fundamental functions of every soul without exception and, therefore, of mankind also. For in every individual, too, these different types live side by side, as individual beings. To these necessary forms of existence the malformations stand in the relation of diametrical opposition. They correspond to distorted and, therefore, in the long run, untenable adjustments of the whole; their expression is morbidity, derangement, monstrosity, madness; they create the impression of being accidental whenever they occur. From the empiric point of view their existence is as justified as that of the archetypes, except that the meaning of their existence lies precisely in the fact that they cannot last.

Most forms of existence fall between these two extremes. We can perhaps best explain their respective place and meaning by a survey of the different national types. What makes a cultural national type is primarily a question of inner adjustment, *not* of the surrounding world and racial inheritance; these only serve to fix and perpetuate a fundamental spiritual attitude which can

be achieved on earth only by the adequate earthly means for their embodiment. Thus the Frenchman—I am giving here only suggestive sketches, without going into details—is not primarily a Gallo-Roman, but the European whose basic adjustment accords, within the psychic framework, priority to the will-unto-form, sustained by a corresponding sensibility; the Englishman is not primarily the Anglo-Saxon, but the man in whom the will-unto-power represents the dominant, for which reason he is incapable of reflection in the German sense and must needs feel himself in the right, whatever happens. The typical life-mode of the Russian might be described as the animal's will-unto-God, the human-culture stage being skipped altogether; while that of the German as a will-unto-inner-experience, thanks to which peculiarity he is endowed with great pathos, but only a small share of ethos; he, therefore, thinks and feels more in the epimethean than the promethean style and appears more creative as the object than as the active agent of history.¹ It is just because adjustment is of the first importance that men of any race and country can be completely resorbed by any kind of cultural bodies; it is only because of this that such things as independent "culture-souls" can exist into which, at intervals of millenniums, biological units retaining their individualities become temporarily merged; it is only because of this that the character of particular peoples can be so easily transformed by spiritual influences. Thus the modern Englishman is, owing to the influence of Puritanism and Methodism, a type entirely different from that of his Elizabethan forebears.

¹ Compare the thorough analysis of the different European natures in *Europe*.

Thus the races represent also, in their particular modes of being, types of adjustment; to that extent, what applies to the fundamental types of humanity applies equally to them: they also represent different aspects of the same whole. This is the only explanation of the way they understand one another. Here then we reach the following conclusion: Since the same psychic state can be adjusted in any conceivable way, and since any adjustment which experience proves to be stable is cosmically justified, so all races also have the same right to exist; empirically speaking, they are all equal. It is absurd to place any one of them absolutely above others. The races, too, primarily *complement* one another in space and time. But, no cosmos of humanity can possibly appear complete. Being a part of the universal cosmos, mankind too is engaged in a continual process of becoming. This cosmic process is irreversible; in successive stages only, never simultaneously, can the whole become manifest in its entirety. No particular world of man can, therefore, ever be appraised, without presumption, as the best possible world; nor can it ever be considered complete. Whatever comes into being beyond the fundamental types is inevitably conditioned by time and space; there undoubtedly are such things as more or less propitious climates, better or worse times, richer and poorer pictures of the whole. Humanity poetizes even as poets do: every drama differs from every other; not all are good; none exhausts in itself the potentialities slumbering in the poet's soul. This applies to *Faust* as it does to the grandest productions of Shakespeare's genius. But every drama is, nevertheless, a complete unity in itself; it must consist of a multiplicity of harmonizing parts. And since we living men are

allotted our cosmic purport and place as so many parts to be played in a definite drama which we did not write, we are not justified—I repeat this—in condemning any phenomenal configuration whatever.

DOES it follow that there can be no question as to the value of definite life-configurations? It does so far as the empiric scheme of things is concerned. It is altogether impossible to decide in this connexion why any particular adjustment should be preferable to others. Absolutely everything can be proved to exist by virtue of a *raison d'être nécessaire et suffisante*; every single configuration must, to that extent, be precisely such as it is manifested. And this applies not only for the forms of life, but for those also of the spiritual domain. They also are cosmically determined throughout and, therefore, necessary. There thus corresponds to the constancy of the fundamental types an equal constancy in the domain of possible religions, political states, philosophies; there seem to exist here inner boundaries as rigid as those in the world of minerals which can crystallize within the framework of six systems and no more. There exist—whatever may be their respective values—a Catholic, a Protestant, a pantheist, an æsthetically-receptive, an ethically-tense, a symbolically-comprehending, a critically-determining, a monarchistic, and a republican fundamental attitude or adjustment, every one of which is to be found within every possible cosmos of spiritually-conscious men, and every one of which is cosmically justified as a possible attitude. Here also the particulars can be understood only from the whole: thus Protestantism is inconceivable without Catholicism for its background, while the latitude of the latter

postulates the narrowing tendency and tension of Protestantism, wherever it may be found.

In the spiritual field also everything particular is in its essence one-sided and to that extent meaningful. And here also the same rule obtains down to the smallest and ultimate items, nay, down to the pathological; given certain conditions, a hallucination actually corresponds to the empiric reality of a soul which through this very image adequately determines its warped adjustment in the cosmos. It may be proved ever so conclusively that certain conceptions of honour or forms of consciousness of guilt are irrational—they are empirically justified to the extent that the assumptions are valid in the particular cases from the point of view of personal experience. Here even what is wrong in theory cannot be discarded without making the one who discards it more superficial than he was before; this is proved with distressing frequency by the low spiritual level of the typical educated proletarian whose hypotheses belong as yet entirely to an uncritical stage, as opposed to the level of his naïvely religious comrades.

As long as we form our judgments within the astronomical-astrological scheme, we must needs be relativists even with regard to configurations of thought and faith. *Now it is of vital importance to realize that phenomena as such, whatever be their nature, cannot and, therefore, should not be divorced from that scheme.* I pointed out above to how much greater an extent the post-*Aufklärung* period had indulged in anthropomorphism than any previous age had done. What applies in the domain of life-configurations applies also in that of spiritual creations.

These also are, first and foremost, cosmically justified

facts. Honour is indeed due to the human mind and its laws. It is a matter of course that logic is paramount in its particular field and it is possible to decide objectively whether a theoretical error exists and where. But the intellect is only an expression, among others, of the whole of life, not a something above it. Intellectual disproof has never succeeded in putting out of the way things that are alive; and the formations of the Spirit are, first and foremost, things alive; and of these it is prejudices which have proved as a rule tenacious to such an extent that history is chiefly concerned with their effects—a consideration that would seem to furnish a sufficient basis for the belief that life is, primarily, always in the right when confronted with objections of the intellect.

Is it altogether beside the mark to raise the question as to the value of definite life-configurations in the broadest sense, the spiritual included? We may indeed raise it, and in as unambiguously-radical a manner as it has ever been put. The question need only be transferred to a dimension different from that in which our reflections hitherto have found their level. It should be raised with a view to an answer *as to the exact extent to which the particular expresses the whole*.

Let us bear in mind that everywhere and at all times, within the domain of known world-conceptions and life-configurations, there have existed great and small, profound and shallow minds. The very earliest ages have arrived at fundamental recognitions. In the scheme of all religious ideas ultimate insights into the nature of things have invariably found their expression. Within all nations the best and the worst qualities exist closely together. This state of things can be understood only if

we premise that there is inserted, figuratively speaking, into the astronomical-astrological cosmos which extends through the utmost infinity of spaces and times, into the dimension of pure inwardness, a spiritual cosmos compared with which the former represents only the means of expression.

Let us recall, here, the results of *Creative Understanding* to the effect that Life is "meaning," that every individual life represents a sense-connexion and belongs to others of a superior order; that there is essential progress, therefore, only in the direction towards the inward centre. Let us, then, try to arrive at a synthetic view of these results and the present views on astrology and the reality of the human-cosmos, remembering that all particulars, of both the physical and the psychic order, embody likewise a cosmic situation; then the picture of a real spiritual cosmos built into the external cosmos will presently become evident.

There is no doubt but that everything external in the domain of life has its "inside," and that this "inside" belongs to the plane of significance. If this is so, a phenomenon never means more than a potential *language* to be used by the essentially-inward. And in that case, all that really matters from this point of view is *the message delivered in the language in question*: whether and how it succeeds in expressing within the compass of its empiric potentialities—beyond which it can never reach—its spiritual essence. Here, then, the law of correlation between meaning and expression comes into operation.¹ The empiric participates in values precisely to the extent to which it realizes its meaning. And

¹ Compare the chapter dealing with this subject in *Creative Understanding*.

here again the world of values inserts itself into the phenomenal world. When unfortunate dispositions, superstition, ignorance, or wrong theories impede the harmonizing process between the sense-proper of the phenomenon and the profoundest "meaning," the phenomenal must remain unleavened. The unique prestige of the Chinese, the Hellenic, and the French cultures is due solely to the fact that they alone have so far attained that pervasive correspondence of the overtones and undertones of meaning which is necessary if a single tone is to result and be transferred into rhythm. This unison serves to bridge the claims of empiric qualifications and spiritual value: whatever is stamped with ugliness, evil, or wrong invariably proves the absence of such unison. The absolute prevalence of the scientifically exact expression as against the mythic is due to the same fact, which also furnishes the ultimate reason for the unconditional immortality of a few spiritual creations, be they works of art, religious revelations, or conceptual compositions.

Is it not quite clear by now—although I have been able to give here only a sketch of the connexion in question—why we are entitled to pronounce judgments of value in spite of the fact that we must accept as cosmically justified absolutely all phenomena, creations of the spirit included? True, there is presumption on the part of the intellect in decreeing what should be and what not; for theoretic error in itself never represents an ultimate; though error may mean under certain conditions the most genuine expression of truth. The phenomenon is nothing but "language" from the point of view of significance; and all confessions and scientific theories are in this sense mere languages. It is only

when the fourth floor of language is reached (compare *Creative Understanding*, end of the first chapter) that judgments of value can be passed at all. But from this floor judgments of value can and must be passed. For man is first and foremost a part not of nature, but of the spiritual cosmos. The laws of nature are a business of ours only inasmuch as we cannot operate without them. So it is proved that the question of value and non-value turns out to be, in principle, *untheoretic*. The point is not that "refutation" might remove any one phenomenon—of this it is manifestly incapable, but that spirit, out of its own right, and in accordance with its specific norms, should practically discard certain expressions of meaning.

Not all the innumerable cosmically possible formations *should* live. Whatever stands for error—and in whatever respect—in the spiritual field should vanish. The selection in question, let this be borne in mind, can never be made on the horizontal dimension of the empiric, but solely within the vertical dimension of sense-experience. The question of a change of the world-alphabet as such never arises. Neither do unfortunate dispositions in themselves make sense-experience impossible—all progress is referable to Cain, according to esoteric tradition, the horoscopes of all great minds have been unpropitious—nor do unfortunate adjustments in the field of world-conceptions. However narrow the tensely ethical adjustment of Protestantism may appear when compared with the Catholic, it, nevertheless, allows the highest degree of sense-experience. The question is always and exclusively: where does the *emphasis* lie in a given case? We shall perhaps best understand this truth if we consider the various and divergent

situations into which originally similar dispositions can develop. In their basic dispositions the criminal and the saint are one; the same primary adjustment of the psychic whole is the basis of the disposition of priest and juggler; and the statesman's and the profiteer's dispositions are at least closely related. So too in the domain of spiritual forms the high and the base spring from the same root and live closely together: in Catholicism profoundest understanding and arrant superficiality; in Brahmanism ultimate wisdom and grotesque superstition; the self-same Jewish spirit is at the root of the Old Testament and of the most censurable law-abiding sanctimoniousness. Thus the modern machine world and Johann Sebastian Bach's music are both legitimate children of Protestantism. But *only an adjustment which puts all the stress on depth can incarnate the world of values within the Phenomenal; only with adjustment to the deep can the superficial become the carrier of value: for only then is it adequately adjusted to its own purport.*

And now we come to the main point: the requisite shifting of the emphasis can be done by *ourselves*; for there is genuine freedom in the domain of "meaning"; here what is to be and endure depends on man. We are thus enabled to understand clearly why relativism—in respect to the phenomenal in itself the only rational attitude, because the particular modes of being are throughout cosmically conditioned and in so far necessary—cannot constitute for man the ultimate position. Man's central essence does not lie in the centre of the physical universe, but in the centre of the spiritual cosmos built into the former. From the human point of view too, and not only from the point of view of

God, phenomenal modes of being never mean anything more than so many languages. The Church teaches that all the creatures of the world, the high and the low, the black and the white, are equally near to God; God's interest is confined to the kind of inner attitude the creature's particular modality expresses. Precisely the same holds for man; what finally interests us is also only the question as to the substance of the message conveyed in any language. Therefore, the last word of nature constitutes for us but the beginning of the work to be performed. We should not enquire whether or not an expression is justified on its plane, but to what extent it embodies the meaning intended. And if we now consider the world of mankind and ask what profundity of meaning is its keynote, and to what degree meaning and expression correspond, we are bound to admit that thus far there is more of the ugly than of the beautiful, more of the crooked than of the straight, to be found in the domain ruled and conditioned by man.

Nearly everything in the historical world, when surveyed from the point of view of sense-experience, creates the impression of problems left unsolved. Neither our world-conceptions nor our life-configurations are what they might and should be, thus, there is truth, no doubt, in the idea of progress; but it is a truth different from what the nineteenth century thought it to be. The question is not to refute errors in themselves, but to improve the congruence of meaning and expression.¹ And to that extent the teaching of the Church that heresy should be extirpated was in principle nearer akin to truth than the teachings of that science whose relativism finds its

¹ For particulars concerning this view of things compare the chapter, "The True Problem of Progress," in my *World in the Making*.

boundary only in a few intellectual prejudices. But the concept of heresy needs a new and more clearly defined formula; every expression should be condemned as heresy which fails to express its meaning sincerely. Not the expression which disagrees with the customary is to be condemned, but the expression which is untenable from the point of view of cognition; and in the domain of life, not the phenomenally different expression as such, but every expression which fails to state in its particular language what it ultimately stands for.

Thus, that unconditional tolerance which alone is productive of true insight into the external connexion of things has to be complemented by an equally unconditional radicalism demanding that every phenomenon should be the complete expression of the meaning it stands for. It is true that congruence of meaning and expression will always be definable in each particular case, only in functional relation to the empiric, which serves to explain the persuasive power wielded by the locally and temporally conformable. But the local can become more and more the expression of the universal, while the temporal can stand more and more in the same relation to the eternal.

WHAT can be the ultimate end and goal of the progress which makes for the deepening of meaning and the improved congruence between meaning and expression? An ultimate end within the temporal cannot be thought of; as long as time flows, there will never be anything final; perpetual movement is the most essential feature of this world. But sense-experience cannot have an empiric goal; in regard to sense, and, accordingly, from our own deepest essence, the

whole universe is only a language. If we strive to realize the kingdom of heaven on earth—a consummation in point of fact for ever unattainable—this endeavour is rational only because it represents the only method for us earthbound creatures to realize inward progress. Still, this acknowledgment in nowise affects the value of history. It is precisely from the point of view of spiritual growth that definite tasks in the Temporal arise. Such tasks always arise in each new emergency, which are most helpful for this growth. For as “meaning” can be realized on earth only by means of its expression; and as every possible expression is temporally conditioned, the Eternal really finds its reality-coefficient in the single-tracked process of completed time. This explains the emphasis I am persistently laying on the historically requisite, while I mean the timeless. We are experiencing even now probably the most momentous turning-point in the life of mankind. For this reason the tasks of our days are filled with eternal import to an unheard-of degree. I do not wish to repeat what has been explained at length in *Creative Understanding*, to the effect that the true history of mankind is in reality only just beginning; man has only just now attained to the degree of consciousness which will enable him to take his destinies in hand. I shall here point out only what, for lack of a suitable opportunity, I could not express in other connexions, and what is particularly fitted to shed light on the tremendous significance of the hour. If our present task is to rebuild the world of man on the new basis of meaning, this means at the same time *that in historical life a change of direction has come*. The task imposed on contemporary mankind is arduous indeed: it consists in *converting the differen-*

tiating process of the evolution of mankind which has prevailed so far into a process of integrations. The primordial chaos had to begin its career with differentiation. At the dawn of history innumerable forms had to spring into existence, directed from within by those eternal primordial types which the infantile consciousness mirrors even today in mythical purity; for thus only could man's freedom become conscious of itself. But now consciousness "in general" is irresistibly merging into *understanding* consciousness and, therefore, from now on only such configurations can continue to live which represent expressions that are not only cosmically possible, but also fully adequate expressions of the underlying meaning. And this process will undoubtedly lead to a *simplification* of creation. The music of mankind whose first beginnings were heard, metaphorically speaking, in the spirit of Richard Strauss, will find its crowning effect as an expression of the spirit of Johann Sebastian Bach.

Let this suffice on the subject. I have other aims today. My intention has been to furnish in the present lecture a general framework which would give the proper arrangement for the multiplicity of possible world-conceptions and life-configurations. There should accordingly be kept in mind, in virtue of what has been said, *that the simplification of the music of mankind will never, until the end of time, lead to uniformity*; it will remain polyphonic until doomsday. This is just as true for world-conceptions as for life-configurations; since mankind can manifest itself empirically only as a manifoldness every element of which expresses a one-sided adjustment, it will always be producible only by a polyphonic orchestra. Until the very end of things there

will be as many types of life, religions, philosophies, nations, and languages as the law of correlation of meaning and expression admits of, and as are required in consideration of the unyielding one-sidedness of all particular formations. But there will be one great change: no longer will there exist within *any* of the possible types anything that is false, because it is contrary to sense; every one-sidedness will some day reflect the whole without distortion. Again, until the very end, each instrument which plays a part of the orchestra of mankind will have to render, first and last, a clear tone. Just as there are no "transitions" in the animal world, just as the entire Gothic style is contained in one single clear-cut form-element; just as the whole of Bach's music is contained in one typical rhythm, and as only such clearly outlined formations are effective—just so the coming integration, instead of leading to world-conceptions and life-formations with vaguer outlines, will bring forth formations with preciser contours than ever before. Yet there are things liable to change: The ultimate Sense will be able to manifest itself through the medium of the manifold to an ever-increasing degree of immediacy; all surface features will be able to express the ultimate depths with an ever-increasing clarity; every specific mode of being will become, ever more and more, a symbol of the Whole intelligible as such to each and all; the orchestra of mankind will play its melodies with ever-increasing perfection.

II

The Spiritual Unity of Mankind

T H E R E is such a thing as a cosmos of humanity. Just as in the physical universe no single thing can be completely understood except in relation to the whole, so mankind is in the background of every individual man; it gives him his cosmic place and metaphysical meaning. The whole cannot manifest itself in the phenomenal except as manifoldness. But as the whole constitutes the true reality, every specific phenomenon *must needs* be one-sided; as such it is correlated to all other one-sidednesses. In this respect every clear-cut particular form signifies the same as does abstraction in the intellectual sphere.

Here is my meaning: If you permitted the varied teachings of the lecturers you heard in the course of the last week to penetrate your minds, then the truth of these sentences must already have become evident to you. It must have become all the more evident to you, thanks to those lecturers whose real influence did not lie in what they professed, but in what they personally represented. Rouselle pleaded the claim of the priest-man that he is able to influence this world from the "Beyond" by the intermediary of magic means; he advanced his plea dogmatically, without giving psychological reasons; he postulated the essential unity of his type with that of the prophet with whom, psychologically, he has noth-

ing in common; and he even hinted that the priest is the rightful heir to supreme authority. It is precisely in what he premised and claimed that Rouselle manifested the extraordinary one-sidedness of the priest-type which he personally embodies to a rare degree of outspokenness. What distinguishes the priest as a type, as against the other types of man—I have in mind his unadulterated expression only, not the syntheses into which it may merge, nor especially the accepted concept of priesthood, which is naturally open to all kinds of definition—is, first, the inclination towards objective symbolism, through which only he becomes quite conscious of his personal entity; second, the belief in the possibility of influencing events by means of symbolic performances. He thus shows himself to be, dispositionally, not only anti-analytic and anti-critical, but essentially one with the primitive type of man. For every primitive man possesses the fundamental psychological disposition of the priest. It is, nevertheless, indubitable that the priest exercises a necessary function in the scheme of humanity; this is proved conclusively by the enormous number of those who respond to his magic rites. Only what, in primeval times, constituted a general state of things has in the course of evolution grown to be the exceptional condition. In the West today the priest no longer produces the impression of the typical man, but of the most exceptional who by no means stands for everything, but only for a definitely circumscribed number of things, and whose capacities are likewise strictly limited. But precisely on account of his extreme one-sidedness he is justified and necessary.

Then the aristocrat: Count Lerchenfeld with states-

manlike discretion defined the idea of aristocracy less with a view to its peculiar merits, than to its right to exist among other social conditions. But the lecturer's personality revealed much that his utterances left unsaid: the aristocrat is essentially the born leader of men; whatever may be said of him in other respects, he stands either for a condition of what he is as a type or for its consequence. *Every* aristocrat who is at all true to his type, irrespective of his peculiar qualifications, is adjusted within the psychic relationship of mankind in such a manner as to make the qualities necessary for leadership, qualities which, among others, all men possess—predominant in him to the degree of exclusiveness. In so far his type also is thoroughly one-sided. His sense for tradition, forms, and pageant, his incompetence in the field of middle-class activities, and whatever his other characteristics, all these have the same final significance, that the aristocrat is pre-eminently adjusted to leadership.¹ For this very reason the greatest leaders in all walks of life have from time immemorial belonged to the aristocratic type. None of these—to emphasize but this one point—was predominantly a worker in the ordinary sense; for all great things are decided and given their bent in a region beyond the possibilities of action.

And now to the Mahometan. He undertook to furnish the proof that Islam is, or might, at least, be all-embracing. But as a matter of fact, he rather convinced his audience of the signal one-sidedness of the Mahometan type. It is only for the uncomplicated that

¹ Compare the full description of the type of aristocrat in chapter "Hungary" of *Europe*.

the problems of life wear the color of simplicity in which they were presented by Sadruddin. Only in the pure desert air can they appear so clearly outlined. The Moslem is the uncomplex type *par excellence*. His religion is pre-eminently that of the simple soldier. If you consider what his type, as opposed to others, is not and what it cannot achieve, you will readily perceive that the Mahometan represents a particularly narrow, limited abstraction from the cosmos of humanity.

The same fundamental truth that particulars can be understood only when envisaged from the whole was implicitly proved by those lecturers also whose thought completely mirrored their personalities. How meaningless would the German life-modality, yearning without realizability, appear, if it stood alone in the world! The mutual attraction between the German and the Russian is, first and foremost, due to the fact that the positivist realism of the latter furnishes almost an exact complement to the problematic character of the former. The same relation applies to the Russian's breadth of soul and German intellectuality. And if a representative of the "land of reality"—as Oscar A. H. Schmitz pertinently characterizes the Frenchman—had furnished an additional contrast over and against the German type, it would have become still more evident in what respect precisely the universalist German is one-sided. His essential qualities are denied complete fulfilment. This, on the other hand, is exactly and exclusively what the Frenchman, of all Europeans, is pre-eminently fitted for.

Thus, nations do not really and primarily represent problems of heredity and race, but of *adjustment*; they incorporate one-sided aspects of the single cosmos of

humanity.¹ Moreover, does not the same apply—I am confining myself at present to the empiric and psychologic aspects, without raising the question of spiritual values—to the various creeds within united Christianity? The greatest admirer of Gogarten will not maintain that his Protestantism—the kind advocated by him indeed stands for the ultimate possible expression of Protestant thought as against the non-Protestant—works out exhaustively all potentialities contained in the gospel of Jesus; of all existing tensions between God and man He accords validity only to the relation of culpability, within the scheme of sin and grace. Again, Arseniew laid all emphasis on the minus side of Christianity, that is on the doctrine that none but God can overcome death; that man must, first and foremost, submit to being crucified with God. He gave pre-eminence to the spirit of meekness, to the irrational, and to *αγαπη* in the early Christian sense. He did not set forth as an ideal the world-potent love of the Occidental, but love sublimated into identity with beauty and wisdom, which, as a matter of course, cannot but remain a stranger in this world. And if the Catholic enlarged his frame to the extent that in theory he seemed to exclude no single thing, it was precisely he who proved most impressively, by what he was as a man, how every world-conception, the widest not excluded, creates on the empiric plane a strictly and, as such, one-sided life-formation: the Catholic man as a definite confessional phenomenon, is not the complete man. In him there come to the fore more human traits than with the more one-sided types, yet by no means

¹ My book, *Europe*, is a single illustration of the truth here stated; it also gives the full psychology of the German and the Frenchman.

all. The Catholic Church in its actual state is not only inclusive, but also exclusive; and it debarb many a *Christian* life-formation. The fact is that neither in the field of definite life-formations nor in that of definite world-conceptions can there be conceived a definite phenomenon capable of expressing in itself mankind; I mean that whole of which every individual constitutes an organic part. Mankind can manifest itself completely only in polyphonic manifoldness and by means of a rich instrumentation.

Yet, if on the one hand you have personally experienced the relativity of all separate formations, on the other you have felt that the whole was manifest through every separate phenomenon, which amounts to nothing else than the ancient doctrine that everyone, whoever he be, was originally equally near to God. For every distinct formation represented a *justified* abstraction from the whole; and since this whole is a sense-connexion, and as, furthermore, every symbol is transparent, the profoundest meaning can indeed find expression in any formation, provided it is rooted deeply enough in significance. This explains why the earnest lecturers were all equally impressive, whatever the specific ideas they advocated. We can thus also understand how each of the types they incorporated could have, at one time or other in its singularity, laid claim to exclusive validity and world-conquest. The particular can indeed express the whole. It is a question of spiritual insight, and not of personal experience, whether a man appear tolerant or intolerant. If his spiritual horizon is limited, intolerance brings him nearer to his deepest self than does tolerance. For the man whose profundity is a matter of personal experience coupled with spiritual

blindness there has never been devised a better working hypothesis than the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, the theory of which may be termed the "as if" of religion. In the religious field also—to apply the formula we arrived at in "Tension and Rhythm"—blindness has to be taken as a primary fact; not all-sidedness, but one-sidedness is the shortest way to universality.

NOW does this confirmation of the results of my introductory lecture stand for the ultimate answer to be derived from this week's session? It does as far as concrete life-formations are concerned. Here there is no possible Beyond of one-sidedness; just as every man is bound up, once for all, with his physical body, so he is also incapable of transcending his spiritual and psychic limits in the form of concrete presentment. The most richly gifted man would, nevertheless, produce, on the phenomenal plane, the impression of one-sidedness; for mankind could not be contained even by a personality like his. Things are different in the cognitional sphere. By the comprehension of its meaning one-sidedness is not only overcome and transformed into the symbol for all-sidedness (as shown in the 1922 session), but it merges into a new and more comprehensive *positive* entity. In this respect this year's session carried us a great step forward, the departure having been from the very point which represented the last word of the preceding session. The personal instrumentation, the sequence and rhythm marking its progress, allowed (as was proved by experience) those of you who possessed the requisite musical and spiritual equipment, and freely permitted the influence of the whole to penetrate your minds and souls, to receive an immediate experience of

that higher unity of which all the different lecturers were—and necessarily were—but partial expressions. And it was thus proved that the great whole, the Beyond, as against all individual limitations, is apprehensible as such by the mind.

Still, must not the mind be able to give form to that which it experiences? Historic analogies would seem to suggest an affirmative answer. If the whole in itself can be experienced at all, then it should also be presentable as a world-conception. *There should be possible, then, a positive world-conception from the point of view of the whole conceived as such, a Catholic "world-conception," in the literal sense of the term.* I think you will all admit that I am correct in representing this very claim to be the essential yield of this last week's session. Now might there not actually exist an all-embracing world-conception unifying all one-sidednesses within itself? One of our lecturers did indeed claim to be its representative: the Roman Catholic. He had, accordingly, entitled his lecture, not as was originally intended: "The Catholic Man," but "Catholicism as a Task."

A "Catholic" world-conception in the literal sense should indeed be possible. This is beyond dispute. Now might not the Roman Catholic world-conception in its present-day historical form stand for that positive entity which, enthroned above all conceivable one-sidednesses, conditions them from within? Might it not represent the very world-conception which corresponds to humanity at large? . . .

That Catholicism alone represents in theory the religion of the whole Christian cosmos is beyond doubt; for none other includes in principle all that is Christian in formations. It would be easy for the Church to in-

clude radical phenomena such as Gogarten in its scheme. For Gogarten teaches nothing that was not contained in the body of its tenets; he teaches only a portion of that doctrine, while abandoning all the rest . . . which is sufficient for us to conclude that his Protestantism could never give rebirth to the whole truth of Catholicism within its scheme. Roman Catholic world-conception might likewise include the doctrine of the Greek Orthodox Church, when the converse is out of the question; for the Greek Church does not confess to anything that was not also contained in the Catholic doctrine; but it confesses to a portion only of the Catholic truth. Yet it is mainly upon one point that the legal claim of the Roman Church to be *the* church is grounded: the fact that it alone includes the "World" in its scheme of salvation, while the two other great confessions have forsaken it.

This is proved unequivocally not only by abstract doctrine, but also, and especially, by history, which has reduced to absurdity the exclusive Protestant world in its complete mechanization—which means a defeat of the living by the dead—and the Orthodox world for the destruction of all things spiritual, as undertaken and realized by Bolshevism (which could occur only in orthodox Russia). Today the leaders of all creeds strive for an all-embracing Christianity; they all have the feeling that the hour of the Christian unity is striking, and it is only natural for each to hope that it will emerge from his particular creed. But how is the Greek Church, with its essentially unhistoric—nay, anti-historic—outlook, to produce a new historic form? For the question of a new form would have to come up in spite of all sophistry if the churches which are now separated are

to join in a new union. The process of history is irreversible; what has existed stored in remembrance is a reality; therefore, the morrow must wear an aspect differing from every yesterday particularly because it must awaken a yesterday to new life.

And now to Protestantism: a movement of protest as such must be a narrowing one. He who would exalt protest into a lasting attitude makes an exemplar of a thing devoid of sense, just as the Jews would have done had Ahasuerus become their ideal after the appearance of Christ: for the monumental figure of the Wandering Jew is nothing other than the symbol of Jewish mobility which had lost its meaning after Christ's appearance. Judged by the Christian point of view, the sole object of this mobility was to clear the path for the Messiah. But would not Protestantism forfeit its meaning all the more were it to abandon its attitude of protest? As a purely evangelic and, *therefore*, super-confessional movement—for the Gospels are only the text-book for the later faiths whose dogmas are altogether absent in the Gospel—it would abandon its historic form. But the main point is that the movement which it embodies cannot lead to universal Christianity for the reason that the meaning of protest is movement only: it has a purely dynamic character and, therefore, stands for a reincarnation of the spirit of the Old Testament. Where it would represent a static state, as with a number of Lutheran sects, it only shows its narrowness, and narrowness can by no means give birth to the coming unity. Further: where the main characteristic of a Protestant Church consists in its "going with" progress, it disintegrates, as a matter of course, as a Church; that is, it lives less and less by its own rights. Besides, Protestant-

ism is effective only as a strictly determinate movement; and as such it has attained its object; the things for which Protestantism contended in its time—religious and intellectual liberty, personal responsibility and the right unto a strictly personal relation to God—are now assets belonging to all mankind. Who ignores or fails to acknowledge this proves himself to be no historian. If a movement has attained its object, by that very fact it comes to an end. This alone explains the languishing state of the majority of the Protestant churches in Europe; *Protestantism as a definite creed has run its course because it has been completely victorious as an idea.* The whole of progressive humanity, independently of creeds, has become Protestant. If the freedom of science is the child of the Reformation, then the same applies to technics, social relief, and socialism. The Christian element in Protestantism becomes thus more and more what mediæval philosophy called an accidental quality. The task set for Christians at this hour is very different indeed from that which might be fulfilled by Protestantism; it is even frankly anti-Protestant; what is required now is a rehallowing of the world. It would not, however, avail to re-Catholicize Protestantism on the strength of this belief, because creeds, as living entities, are either exclusive formations—or they are nothing at all. Thus a universalistic evangelic movement might indeed give birth to a new form of religious community, but by no means to a universal church in the old sense. In theory, so far as Christian forms of expression come at all into question, everything speaks for the Catholic Church as being the true representative of the higher unity called upon to co-ordinate with its own structure,

as a spiritual reflection of mankind, all particular world-conceptions and life-formations.

Yet, if we consider the outward manifestation of this Church as it is at present, we must, on the other hand, confess that much, very much indeed, argues against its being called upon to that end. It has as yet failed to rid itself of the attitude of protest it was forced into by the Reformation; to that extent it, therefore, is much more of a "Protestant" Church than any community which has sprung from Luther's or Calvin's reform, since it continues blindly to protest against far too many things which have won complete victories, either as cognitions or as life-experiences; it still cuts itself off far too much from the most pressing contemporary problems; it even stands in many respects for the very opposite of what Catholicism should be, that is for the conventicle and ghetto spirit. Whereas the true founder of the later Catholicism, the first "Catholic" mind of Christianity, St. Paul, in his triumphant obligation to the recognized truth, chiefly sought out the heathens, I know of Catholics of high standing who decline to address "infidels"; whereas St. Paul wrote (I Cor. ix:19, *et seq.*): "For though I be free from all men, yet I have made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law; to them that are without law, as without law . . . that I might gain them that are without law"—a proposition which the School of Wisdom might adopt for its motto, by the way; since it says nothing less than that the meaning is all and that *every* letter can be animated by the deepest meaning—the Catholic Church of our day

glories in its rigidity. In the intellectual field Protestantism is today far more universal than Catholicism, and thus considerably ahead of the latter judged from the Catholic standpoint. And to that extent there is even more Christian love alive within it, though "eros" otherwise is its weakest side. And from our present point of view we can also clearly understand why the Catholic Church should appear to the adjusted Russian, which can understand Spirit in its Love-aspect only to be not only un-Christian, but downright anti-Christian. Obviously every truth is either a potential dogma or it is not a truth, wherefore the dogmatic positivism of the Catholic Church is right in principle. But since the sphere of belief belongs to that of pure freedom (let it be remembered that Jesus could save only the thief on the cross whose soul went out to meet Him), the worldly idea of power, transplanted into the field of religion, as Catholicism has so frequently done, is contrary to the true meaning of religious faith. No less contradictory to the meaning of faith and for the same reasons, is the idea of authority imitated from the worldly sphere: in this connection, Pavel Florensky is indubitably right in teaching: "Living religious experience is the only *legitimate* way to the comprehension of dogmas." For this teaching in no wise abolishes the distance between nature and the supernatural, nor does it deny that man must feel himself to be an object, not a subject in respect to the latter, in which he can participate only through the action of Divine grace: on the contrary, it adequately determines *what attitude* man should adopt with regard to grace. Belief in the strength of authority in the worldly sense, however, actually closes the purely personal fount through which alone

the entrance to the Higher can be obtained; it makes psychologically impossible the mere questioning as to metaphysical truthfulness.

A further contradiction to the essence of genuine religious feeling is the practice of imitation, which, since the days of Thomas à Kempis and Ignatius Loyola constitutes an integral part of Catholic faith. Here again the Greek Church is in the right when it teaches that Christ can never serve as model, but as a symbol only—for, first, we have to deal with metaphysical (not empiric) conditions the reality of which is rooted in the sphere of pure meaning: second, every man can, and also should, live his own life only. Therefore, the idea of an *Imitatio Christi*, not to mention that of an *Imitatio Dei*, amounts to a downright blasphemy. It is to the honor of the Anatolian Church that not one of its saints received the stigmata. If it is true for every aspiring human being that “he must seem until he becomes what he should” (Goethe)—a truth that certainly justifies spiritual exercises—it is also true that “seeming” becomes harmful as soon as it is misunderstood by the higher consciousness. For here also significance creates the facts.

The modern Catholic philosophy maintains through its most distinguished representatives that the Church teaches also all this by implication; it says that what lies at the root of the teachings here objected to—and indeed, of all dogmas of historic development—are symbolic representations expressed in such a shape as will be most helpful to human progress; and it reproaches the Anatolian philosophy because its teachings, being originally and in principle presented in a super-historical setting, have for this very reason exerted too little influence on the world. It is unquestionably right in this

reproach. But there is an answer to the Catholic apology which amounts to a new attack: the value of any symbols can be unambiguously appraised by the effect of the evidence it produces. As soon as a symbol ceases to convey in the matter of eternal truth what it means to convey as an organ of life it is dead. Taken the alertness of modern consciousness, the real task should be—precisely from the pragmatic point of view—to devise equations between meaning and expression more adequate than those which Catholicism still frequently advocates. Indeed, symbols are nothing in and for themselves; they are only organs for apprehending things supersensible.

And this brings us to the second objection against modern Catholicism: its form is too historic. Mereshkowsky, speaking of Goethe, says that the reason why he could approach Christianity only through the sublimest Catholic ceremonies was because he was fundamentally devoid of religious feeling. He needed all possible intermediaries which mind and soul can provide. This then would seem to reveal the core of the problems why Catholicism is so extraordinarily attractive to all exalted cultured souls; this explains also why ingenuous souls are impressed most of all with the Russian spirituality. This latter expresses itself with absolute immediacy; it brands all intermediaries as seduction (*prelesstj*).

And now we know also why Catholicism must undergo a transformation if it is to fulfil its potential mission. Ours is an age of renewal in the spiritual domain as in others, and thus an age in which historic forms that have grown rigid have to be melted down again. Even on earth there are no eternally valid legal titles. In the spiritual domain positive law cannot stand in principle

for the last word. Here, on the contrary, at every moment we must win back what we possess. Obviously, not all historic forms have hardened or become opposed to sense; nevertheless, there is no doubt that today, when there is a yearning throughout the world to regain touch with the inmost psychic depths, the emphasis must *in principle* be shifted from the historic to the elementary which expresses itself in the former.

The modern liturgical movement does not solve this problem, for it moves in regions altogether too sublimated to lead to the elementary renewal our times need. Why is Islam again developing tremendous proselyting powers? Because with it the emphasis is on the undifferentiated, primary religious experience. This consideration ought to carry special weight with the Catholic Church; this Church should also learn from the spiritual exercises of the School of Wisdom how historic forms can become again expressions of the elementary: we bring this about by shifting the emphasis back to Meaning, after having first explained that forms of historic growth carry only just as much significance as the individual is personally able to invest in them, and also after having shown what inner attitude should be maintained during the spiritual exercises. For, however much a super-individual order of things may prevail, its objective realization in the realm of Meaning lies exclusively with the individual as a free agent. And this again brings us to the chief argument against the future of the Catholic Church as it is at present: it emphasizes the *factual* side of what it stands for. Only those who lay emphasis on pathos are psychologically able to realize the Divine through the medium of this Church; those who must surrender themselves in order

to experience; specifically speaking, those who need a determinate metaphysical belief in order to feel free. Now this type is not only a limited one—it *never will again attain to historical leadership*. All historic future will belong to the type I have called the magician. And in the historic connexion of things the believing Christians should evidently accept the historically inevitable as providential dispensations.¹

I cannot (nor would I) in this place enter upon an exhaustive criticism of the Catholic Church as it is today. Still even these few glimpses should have given you a good idea of the particular aspects in which it fails to be what it claims to be, and what it might be on the basis of the idea it embodies. The Catholic Church is in *theory* the one all-embracing Christian Church; for it alone comprises, in principle, every conceivable variety of Christian expression. According to its *theory*, the next historical task devolving on Christianity undoubtedly would fall to its lot; it cannot devolve upon the Greek Orthodox Church, for it completely ignores historical obligations. It cannot devolve on Protestantism, either, for it has completely fulfilled its historical mission; and the same tasks are never set twice in history. The historical problem of today is unquestionably a distinctly anti-Protestant problem: it is to rise superior to all partial antitheses, an achievement that would cause that very attitude of protest, which has a meaning only within existing antitheses, to be automatically released, also to reconsecrate the world profaned by the spirit of

¹ These latter considerations are treated at length in the chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," in my work, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*. There has been published a French edition of this book under the title, *Figures Symboliques*, by the Librairie Stock of Paris.

Protestantism. For nothing else than this, couched in a religious formula, is meant by the task of transforming the entire world-alphabet into an expression of meaning or of imparting a new meaning to a world deprived of meaning.

Still—and now at last I can afford to formulate positive claims—if today the hour of Catholicism is again striking, this is true only if Catholicism has passed through Protestantism. As I pointed out above, the Protestant spirit has achieved a complete victory: its historic form has, by this very fact, become a thing of the past. Therefore, the claim on the part of a number of Catholics that their Church should call again into its fold the churches which belonged to it previous to the Protestant schism cannot be discussed. A new, all-embracing Catholicism can only be established beyond Protestantism, that is, on the basis of a complete assimilation of its achievements. This practically amounts to the claim that Catholicism on its side should become super-confessional and universal in spirit; that it should modify the expression of its tenets wherever it contradicts the postulates of intellectual liberty, personal responsibility, and the strictly personal relationship to God; for these postulates circumscribe the higher modern stage of consciousness. So it is precisely Catholicism which has a very great deal to learn if it wishes to be victorious in the present crisis. Nor am I afraid to make an extreme assertion: unless Catholicism can transform itself in accordance with the demands of the world-hour about to strike (as it often did successfully prior to the Reformation, which forced it into a defensive attitude), *it will, within a few generations, be dead and gone, as an important historic force, and will continue to exist only*

as a sect in which the statically-minded portion of Christianity will foregather. Then, the renewal of Christianity will spring from other roots. No single form is undying. Immortality is conceivable in the form of rebirth only. Juristic law as such is again and again convicted of absurdity with exactly the same ruthlessness in the spiritual domain, just as death again and again disposes of all individual demands. "Catholic" in the true sense of the term the coming Christianity is sure to be. But if the legitimate heir proves incapable of performing what he is called upon to achieve, Providence will turn over his office to the revolutionary. The idea of Catholicism demands universality, first and last. It demands the union, on a higher plane, of the three great aspects of possible Christianity, which aspects have found their expression on the plane of fact in the three great confessions. If historic Catholicism remains narrow and rigid at the very moment when an increase of Catholicity is required, then, on account of the loftiness of its claims, there is reserved for it as a second alternative only—extinction. Among the races which belong to the Catholic faith almost all those who are of historic importance are anti-clerical. It is only in Germany that Catholicism, up to now, has re-Catholicized itself to an appreciable degree. And even in Germany, time and again, minds deeply attached to Catholicism but incapable of doing violence to their intellectual consciences are being forced into secession. . . .

IN PASSING on to a separate consideration of the Catholic problem, I had in mind the *idea* of Catholicism and its reality only as far as it should embody the best possible expression of a potential world-

concept above contrasting views and suitable to mankind at large. Now the trend of our lectures may have created the impression that I had taken for granted the hypothesis that Christendom is called upon to conquer the world. Those who are acquainted with the spirit of the School of Wisdom and with the work it has performed thus far, must needs know that I could not possibly have held this opinion; and more particularly, those who have thoroughly understood the introductory lecture of this session and have allowed their minds to be influenced by the ensuing lectures (it was not a mere coincidence that one of these lectures was entrusted to a Moslem) must at least be vaguely aware of the shape the Catholic problem has been taking in my mind. Up to now I have not expressed it explicitly. It is now incumbent on me to perform this most important task. The Christian cosmos as presented nowadays is by no means the cosmos of humanity. From the standpoint of present-day data, the Catholic Church, provided it passed through the appropriate stages of evolution, would indeed comprise the whole of Christianity, but not by any means of humanity. Its Catholicity is insufficient for this result. However wide its scheme may be, it can never succeed in building the cosmos of the other great religions into its own cosmos; for these others contain elements which it excludes and which it must exclude if it wishes to remain what it is: the Indian religious cosmos, at any rate, is more encompassing than its own. Brahmanism and the Mahayana Buddhism are not only both "Catholic" in the same sense, in principle, as Catholicism in the "*orbis Christianus*": both are more universal than Catholicism since they have, as a matter of course, accepted any "Protestantism" which developed

within their creeds into their fold. And further: the ideas both stand for make it possible for them to accept every religion of a higher order as an expression of truth. To what extent the limitation thus defined of the potentialities of Catholicism is in fact irremovable has been shown in the introductory lecture. Christianity as a specific formation, like the rest, not only corresponds to a particular psychologic, but also to a cosmic situation. It is for this reason that it was born as an event in time; that it experienced, in course of the centuries, epochal transformations; that it appears bound to a particular space, so far as its power of attraction goes; and within these spatial limits it appears under different aspects which are conditioned by its environment. Christianity in its forms of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, is the religion of the West, and of the West only. It is imperative, in this connexion, to realize once for all that religion, being a living relation to the Eternal, can never and nowhere be comprehended through its abstract doctrine, but solely through what doctrine means to the given consciousness. This settles the question in regard to the objective truth of the dogmas in so far as it is raised scientifically and historically. Though Jesus may have been the Redeemer in as absolute a sense as the teachings of Christianity maintain, *religious* meaning attaches to the fact only in the same proportion as man can inwardly assimilate it to himself—which, in its turn, depends on very definite conditions. Men born under different constellations *must* express their relation to the Eternal by other forms than the Christian; in other words: precisely in so far as they are religious they cannot be Christians. There follows from this, then, that I cannot have intended to say when I asserted that Ro-

man Catholicism represents a world-conception beyond conflicting attitudes, that humanity should become a convert to it, nor that it would. As a definite form of Christian faith, it has, even in satisfying all demands of the world-hour, no further claim than that of bringing Christianity back into its fold.

I certainly did not mean that the whole of mankind would in course of time be Christianized. What I meant was something deeper and greater, and this gives to the potential future of Catholicism an even grander aspect than its most confident present-day representatives dare to look for. I said before that the Catholic cosmos is narrower than the Indian. This is so, actually, but virtually the converse obtains. The comprehensiveness of the Indian religious cosmos consists in part of negations or in refraining from ultimate decisions. Now Catholicism aims at creating, through its Church, a *positive* symbol of unified humanity, at the hallowing of the world, and orientation towards God of all units. This theoretical claim of a Church is not only fully justified; it is necessary. And to what extent, in theory at any rate, if not in deeds, the Catholic Church approached the realization of that ideal is proved by the doctrine of non-ecclesiastic grace (which in the Greek scheme includes also the world beneath man) and the redeemableness of all men of good intention. Present-day Catholicism may indeed become the matrix of mankind's world-conception if it is fully in earnest in its pretensions to Catholicity; which means that it must be able to draw everything unto itself, not only the Christian faiths, but also the non-Christian.

This the Catholic Church has always claimed to be able to do under the form of conversion; and undoubtedly

conversion stood in bygone times for just what is most needed today. But today it no longer stands for it. On the plane of consciousness man has now reached, "name and form" can no longer be taken seriously in the sense of earlier times; for they are understood from the very outset as symbols, and "meaning" is *ipso facto* super-confessional. Therefore, Christian Catholicity, if it would mean the same as the all-embracing or mediæval Church, must draw unto itself what is non-Christian *without infringing on the phenomenon as such*; draw it into its scheme, instead of merely acknowledging its validity—here lies the essential difference between it and the Indian equivalent—a difference which at the same time might mean higher worth.

It is only in this, literally speaking, all-embracing form that a Catholic world-conception in the true sense is henceforth possible. Christianity must take a step farther in the career it entered upon when it started on its world mission. The whole significance of Christianity, from the point of view of the present session, lies in the commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself. For this commandment signifies nothing else than the possibility recognized and claimed for man to outgrow from within his external limitations and to centre his self-consciousness in the "I and Thou" connexion. It thus signifies a deeper centring in the cosmos of humanity, a closer approach to its centre, to the point of convergence of all diversities and segregations. Jesus himself probably, and the apostle Paul in his "most Catholic" moments to a certainty, meant by man's neighbour not the Christian only; this limitation which to this day is canonically sustained under the form of confessionally conditioned redemption stands in truth for a

return to heathenism. This relapse probably was inevitable, considering the state of minds out of which all canonical dogmas were born. In our time it has, by implication, vanished. As today we all are objectively capable of grasping the meaning beyond the letter, the Christian principle of charity must be extended to the non-Christian world without stint. Today we should characterize it as the same uncharitableness which Christendom once combated in the pagan world, if it excludes the non-Christian from the Christian cosmos. Today, therefore, a further step must be taken along the lines of love. This is the religious task set by the hour that is striking. Its solution has been spiritually prepared by Protestantism. It is in this achievement and not in the reanimating of the original evangelic idea, that lies its true religious merit. But can Catholicism widen its scheme to that extent? In principle, certainly. To attain this it need not, in an immediate sense, introduce any change in its letter. All it has to do is to transpose its plane of being into another region; that is, *away from the plane of the definite phenomenon into the realm of meaning.*

TO WHAT extent this is possible in principle I need not point out to you in detail; the School of Wisdom from its very beginning has never taught anything else. The process of shifting levels from the letter to the inner meaning in the matter of spiritual attitudes can be clearly set forth by one single proposition: *it consists in "seeing through" the phenomenon.* Every living phenomenon is, first and last, a symbol; for the essence of life is meaning. But every symbol which is the ultimate expression of a state of consciousness is in

itself transparent for another deeper one, and so on into eternity; for all things in the sense-connexion of life are inwardly connected, and their depths have their roots in God.

Therefore, no spiritual form can ever be an ultimate expression; every meaning when it has been penetrated, became automatically a mere letter-expression of a deeper one, and herewith the old phenomenon takes on a new and different meaning. Thus, Catholicism, Protestantism, Greek-Catholic, Islamic, and Buddhistic religiousness can in principle continue, on the plane of this life, what they were and yet signify something entirely new. Thus, Catholicism might, without becoming undogmatic—an impossibility for any faith—become super-dogmatic from the point of view of its present dogmas, and concomitantly capable in principle of centring the whole cosmos of humanity within its own scheme without changing a particle of the meaning which is the life-principle of its dogmas.

It would only impart a new interpretation to them all. Psycho-analysis shows how objectivated psychic states that beleaguer the confined Ego in the semblance of demons can be lifted to subjectivity through comprehension: the siege is then raised; for the seemingly extraneous has now become part of the individual; a wider and deeper Ego is built up. In exactly the same manner, mankind in the course of the tens of thousands of years lying between its present state and the primordial, has unconsciously analyzed away one extraneous pantheon after the other. And the Ego has become enriched in proportion. Well, only a step farther on the same road is needed today. What is needed is to penetrate the *meaning* of existing faiths, as all other forms; for there

is essential progress *only* in one direction—inwardly, meaning-wards.

What is to be done, though, after the meaning has been penetrated? Many a thing will then automatically change, also in appearance; for it *is* another thing by this time, since the meaning always creates the facts. A Protestantism which has been seen through is no longer traditional Protestantism. An orthodoxy which has been seen through is no longer the same. A Catholicism seen through is no longer traditional Catholicism. All one-sidedness is thus overcome from within. Every formation is now installed in its astrologically correct place and, at the same time, understood as a space-and-time-determined sense-expression. This, however, must in the long run bring about also a change of outward appearance. The resulting truthful and genuine Catholicism, though, for which historic Catholicism would have only played the part of the mother's womb would not only be super-confessional but even super-Christian. It would thus become the unified frame for *all* formations which preserved their vitality—vitality in so far as the law of correlation between meaning and expression had remained inviolate in them, which violation entails surer and quicker death in proportion to the increase of the sense-consciousness attained by humanity. It would become the soul of *all* world-conceptions, since it includes even now the most divergent one-sided types within itself. And the "Catholic" quality as such would thus become not only a super-confessional quality, but also a Beyond with regard to the world-religions which had existed till then. It would become the universal expression of the unity of mankind to which all men would thenceforward unconsciously belong. Then, indeed, the

historical Catholic type would also *avowedly* become that which, from the psychologic viewpoint, it had always been, and as which it has also played its part within the consonance-scheme of the present session: a one-sided formation among others, now, however, within the lines of genuine Catholicism. For the Roman Catholic is in fact a special type of man, not superior to the Protestant; he is only psychologically different from and, in many ways, inferior to him. The Catholic man would then be understood as a synonym for the universal, that is, the real mankind-man, and no longer as the follower of a definite faith, just as the man who, being entirely rooted in meaning and seeing through all phenomena, would thus be *world-ascendant*.

The majority of the present-day Catholics will reject these lines of evolution. But Hebraism in exactly the same manner declined to be regarded as the precursor of Christianity. Likewise, the acorn might decline to be nothing but the precursor of the proud oak. There are as yet vast historical developments ahead of us.

It stands to reason that sundry things during the process of transformation automatically started by the seeing through of existing phenomena will become quite different from what they were. In my introductory lecture I showed how absolute congruence of meaning and expression—reaching from the nethermost depths to the outer surfaces—is the condition of lasting vitality of all forms; this amounts to saying that henceforth every scientific error will cause death. Thus, within the sphere of dogmas and other forms of any kind of religion all these elements that cannot hold their own against criticism from the vantage of meaning will inevitably go by the board. This will result, on the one

hand, in the extinction of all lower forms of religion and, on the other, there will come to pass a reciprocal fecundation of the higher, of which all those which express a possible fundamental adjustment in conformity to sense will continue to live—though of course interpreted in a way corresponding to their true cosmic localization. It follows that the universal Christianity of the future will not spring from summing-up, but from an agreement between the present religions (not to mention faiths), as it is taking place unconsciously today in the souls of all Christian believers who seek earnestly to fathom other creeds and to understand them. A great many things indeed will become different in the process. But one thing will never change: the attitude towards the Divine in itself. This, then, is my answer to a question frequently put to me by Catholics. Religious are they only for whom not man, but a higher entity, is the subject of their personal experience, whose religious realizations come to them as acts of grace and not from their personal deserts, who accept subjectively what they are vouchsafed from a higher plane. To this essential of all religiousness seeing through brings no change. This is proved in the grand style by India, and with us by the example of the mystics. But in order that, in Christian parlance, *God* should be able to speak with man, man must from his own resources see through many things that were ultimate expressions for earlier men.

S T I L L, how will the requisite New practically come to pass? By syncretism or by eclecticism? Was this the meaning of the word “agreement”?—By no means. Here we are threatened by such a baneful mis-

understanding that we must devote a special consideration to the question of method.

Reason has always hoped for the resolution of discords into harmony, and for the establishment of a higher unity as a result. The means unto this end, though, were to be considerations of the intellectual and opportunist order. It thus framed Utopias, choosing the best from all that was at hand. Life, however, has refuted every one of these and will always continue to do so. Why? Because Utopia is a dead thing and the way to it, which can be only that of eclecticism, means dying *per se*; for eclecticism would combine heterogeneous ideas into new modes of life, which is an impossibility. Now, with the higher unity required, the question is of life and not of theory. Life is *essentially* a management of opposites and unresolved conflicts, a necessary co-operation of the rational and the irrational, of form and chaos, of necessity and freedom, of the meaningful and the senseless, of dissonance and harmony—factors which are irreducible as such. Therefore, a solution of the problem of the higher unity, today's leading subject, cannot be obtained by rational means. How, then, can it be achieved? The ancient religious idea of *conversion* shows the way to comprehension. Conversion means more than instruction because it consists of a transformation of the whole individual; for the converted, things that his understanding had failed to comprehend suddenly become self-understood. This should be interpreted in the sense that a new living unity cannot come to be *except by a process of birth*.

In nascent man the elements of parental heredity which are irreducible in themselves combine to form a new indissoluble unity. Just as only this sort of union

is possible in the physico-psychic domain, even so it is in the spiritual. For this sole decisive reason it is utterly impossible to furnish and absurd to demand a recipe for the "preparation" of a future world-conception of mankind. Here things are exactly as described by that Russian saint who, being asked how he pictured to himself the future all-embracing Christianity whose coming he believed in, replied with a smile: "It can be known that a child is about to be born; it can be known who are its parents and also, to some extent, when it is going to see the light; but no man can predict which of its forebears it will take after or, for that matter, what it might look like."

It is, in fact, by *birth* only that the spiritual unity of mankind can come to pass. The event will find its spiritual exponent in a unifying symbol and not in a theory, exactly as in the case of every former birth of the psychic and spiritual order. It will, this time as before, wear for the intellect the aspect of a paradox; for it is the intellectual paradox only that does justice to some extent to the quality-beyond-conflicts belonging to life. You were certainly struck at the time by the passion Arseniew displayed in confessing to the dogma of the resurrection of the flesh. Owing to the unprecedented tension which has distinguished at all times, and most particularly during these last years of terror, the Russian's mode of experiencing, owing also to the return of the primitive Christian mood in a people intellectually not modernized but rather on a level with the very best at the beginning of our era, the Russian detects in what to the modern understanding is completely paradoxical the adequate symbol for his realization of truth. But the birth of the spiritual cosmos of humanity will in principle not

be mirrored otherwise in the consciousness of those in whom it will be first born. Here also cognition can be of the super-rational kind only.

The spiritual cosmos of humanity can, thus, come to pass by a birth process only. If this be the case, what will be the good of our efforts? The answer is: they alone can, at this cosmic hour, prepare the requisite birth process. The Logos is the hinge of the universe. It is the principle of change and of transmission. Absolute reality, which is in itself both Logos and Eros, and presumably a great many other things besides, can be grasped by the conscious mind from its Logos-side only. It is because it eludes the grasp from all the others that it has been maintained again and again that man *per se* is incapable of any achievement; that all comes from on high; that all he can do is to yield himself up to experience in a purely passive attitude. Absolute reality is indeed seizable from the Logos-side to such an extent that Nature will serve mind in the exact ratio of the completeness with which she has been understood. This goes so far that complete comprehension frequently disengages love, thus conjuring that which is essentially not subjected to will. Now call further to mind that every single moment of the actual process of events represents a unified, indissoluble cosmic situation to which the free volitions and actions of man belong just as essentially as the laws of God and the movements of the stars. Also consider that life is throughout an enlivening from within outward, and through the medium of subjects, and you have the answer to the question as to the good of our efforts. True, the new cosmos of mankind can only be *born*; but it will be born only if, following up our own initiative, we perform what we not only can

do—but what is alone incumbent upon us. To such only as are *willing* to comprehend the world will it reveal its meaning; they only are capable of seeing through the symbols. So there only, where symbols are seen through with conscious volition, can the “of itself” of the birth process which as such is inaccessible to any kind of determination come to pass. It has never taken place otherwise. Birth has always presupposed fecundation. And this is brought about by spiritual initiative. Every religion has appraised good will as the main point: God vouchsafes grace to him only who goes out to meet Him according to his powers, if not consciously, then unconsciously. This “going out to meet,” though, does not primarily mean love—none ever loved God before his conversion—but the *willing of truth*. Now what obtains for the relation “from man to God” obtains all the more for the human sphere as such: progress has ever come to pass through deeper comprehension. Even Christian love did not conquer the world as love, but as an expression of deeper comprehension.¹ Not always, though, has the cognitional function been so differentiated that it could perform its task independently. It is today. It is so to that extent that *nothing* but pure cognition can at this stage bring about what heretofore thought and feeling combined had achieved. From now on, therefore, understanding alone should be the theme of even where love is meant as the ultimate goal. Only by consciously willed comprehension can the new world-

¹ These ideas which are here but briefly sketched are fully set forth in the chapters, “Wisdom, Ancient and Modern,” “Our Will,” and “The Goal,” of my work, *Creative Understanding*. Those who wish to follow further the trend of what has been set forth in this lecture will there find it developed.

embracing love be freed. And for this very reason it is no longer permitted henceforth to wait passively for the experience expected to be the prelude to the longed-for renewal. The Logos is not only the principle of transmission, but also of initiative. The more it is differentiated, the more responsibility, for all cosmic growth devolves upon man. What henceforth is to become historic fact depends altogether upon his free volitions and deeds. In principle, this has always been so. Even the Old Testament teaches that man is responsible before God; *for* God even, according to the later Talmudic lore. Only because the free act of volition is decisive, can man become guilty before the Eternal. For all bestowal of meaning is indeed an act of free will, and it is altogether by such bestowals that all historical forms have been brought about. Before Jesus and Gautama there did not exist Christian and Buddhistic love; before Protestantism which invented the idea there were no "callings" in the modern sense; where progress was not postulated from the outset, no wealth of inventive achievements has initiated progress. The best example for this is given by China.

It depended on the meaning whether riches were held to be baneful, indifferent, or helpful from the religious point of view. And so forth. Still man's responsibility could remain dubious so long as his understanding consciousness was a dream or a sleep. It is wide awake today. Today, then, man's responsibility has become absolute. It is from now on incontrovertibly true that we are held responsible for every unprofitable word. It is true that representation always has created reality; and, accordingly, man's thoughts have always had cosmic consequences. But since we are *aware* of the fact—consider,

here again, how meaning creates the facts—there is no longer such a thing as private life. We are no more at liberty henceforth to let things take their own course; we may no longer nor in any case whatever wait for the necessary to come of itself.

The necessary “of itself” will henceforth come to pass only then when conscious spirit has brought about the requisite preliminary conditions. This, then, is the task set for sense-apprehension. Today all literally depends upon this. Conscious comprehension henceforth is alone capable of preparing the transformation. Hence the historic mission of the School of Wisdom. It desires and it can only clear the way for “adjustment,” that is, for putting everything in its proper place in the cosmic sense-connexion. But in doing this it performs all that can be done on the part of man. It fecundates. The bringing to birth is no more its business than presuming to perform what man can only receive as a gift from on high. The new life can come only of itself. Nor can its specific character ever be determined beforehand. Therefore, the School of Wisdom also never gives out definite prophecies for the same reason it gives no definite program for action; nor does it set up dogmas. This would be presumptuous on its part. It competes with no possible Church. But the School of Wisdom alone has been able, since there is a Christianity, to adjust three confessions which are in themselves inimical to one another so as to make them understand one another, because it *created by anticipation* the higher unity beyond them. . . .

This then makes clear how in the session I now bring to a close it was not a question of an epimethean, but of a promethean deed. There was no question of setting

forth what exists, but things existing were adjusted in such a way as to make for the birth of the New out of their connexion. Our session symbolically anticipated the achievement of, possibly, a remote future—*in order that this should come to be*; for symbols have always made history. Thus I have built up this session only in the semblance of a symbol for meditation. The sequence of the pictures is significant; in him who gave himself up to them with all his soul the new reality of mankind will have begun; those also who, in reading, awaken within themselves its rhythm will thereby grow apace towards the new universal Catholic type.

C. LIFE AND DEATH

I

Growth and Decay

FROM the dawn of mankind music has been accorded the first place among the arts; whether consciously or unconsciously, it has always been regarded as the expression and translation of the cosmic, beyond the human world, while the other arts were considered to originate within man. And ever since there have been any conceptions of the world at all this privileged position of music has received various metaphysical interpretations. Esoteric doctrines proclaim that the Phenomenal of certain planes of higher reality consists of tones. Song and the playing on harps are said to be the language of the angels. The Pythagoreans spoke of the harmony of the celestial spheres; the planetary system constituted for them not only symbolically, but actually, a problem of harmony and melody. The first philosophical effort to do justice to this specific character of music was Schopenhauer's. Music, according to him, is an art differing essentially from all the others, inasmuch as it is the immediate expression of Will—the world-essence in his system—whereas the other arts present ideas only, objectivations of this Will.

The Essence of the Universe is indeed inscrutable. But this much is certain: music really proclaims deeper things than all the other arts inasmuch as it gives direct expression to the emotional and impulsive depths of life.

This depth really constitutes a "Beyond," as opposed to other life-phenomena. For it is their common womb and is thus situated beyond all differentiations. And as all life-forces above the impulsive are only partial expressions of life which—in the case of thoughts and images—can be externalized as separate entities, while life itself, as a creative evolution, is an indissoluble whole, the primordial consciousness and perception of identity must spring from this very womb. This explains why music stirs man's feelings more deeply than any other art, why it moves even the unmusical; for there does not exist a man devoid of emotions and impulses. Its effect on the primitive is absolute magic, while for the differentiated its significance is great, precisely *because* it expresses only the most general relations and nothing definite (hence the fundamental error underlying all kinds of program-music), which leads him back to the "eternal mothers" he lost contact with; for it causes the differentiated to become, on its own plane, the mouthpiece of the primordial. This effect of music is enhanced by two extraneous conditions: Only with music, as opposed to all other arts, form and content, meaning and expression, are inseparable in the ideal, as well as in the technical sense. Exactly as with life itself, no observation or reflection can resolve the given synthesis. Lastly, music alone of all arts—again like life itself—manifests itself only in the form of immediate subjective experience. For what is life for man unless it be experienced life? Let us not dwell overlong on the intricacies of the problems of the consciousness: there *is* no such thing as life without a subject, without a principle operating from within outward, responding to the external only. With man the emphasis

lies always on the subjective. Just so the existence of music depends on its becoming sound. It is inexistent in the written score.—Music then, whatever else the case may be, is for man the perfect image of life as a concrete experience, and it thus really signifies something different in kind from any other art.

The symbol is, nevertheless, more simple than what it represents. Owing to its purely formal character music conveys various meanings only in its specific dimension; there cannot be the slightest doubt as to what it is that distinguishes it from all that is not music. Therefore, I cannot, in this opening session, express the general problem of life more intelligibly than by the aid of the symbol of music. The intellect can comprehend its specific aspects, expressions, and tendencies easily enough, but the ultimate premise for all conceivable determinations, the indissoluble unity of the flux of Life itself, all cannot be caught by definitions. This unity can become experience only when a self-evident symbol spontaneously sets going the corresponding sense-bestowing function. In music indeed becomes immediately evident what appears to be Life's most elusive aspect—at the same time its unique peculiarity: *the reality of music consists in a flow in and through time, in the unceasing balance of becoming and passing away.*

MUSIC exists in its evanescence only. The fading away of sounds is as essential as their beginning to sound. One tone must die away for another to live. One must decrease for another to increase. When a tone which has died away seems to sound again it is similar, but not the same. A tone which has once faded away is lost for ever. For, as all musical reality

consists in being felt in the concrete, so identity is inconceivable, where the bearer of consciousness has changed. —What else can be said of life? Life, too, is a process throughout, a continuous transformation in time, a being born, a dying away, and a being reborn; or, in the language of Buddha, a process of growth and nourishment or of combustion, or movement on a path that comes into existence by this very act. Here there is no other “being” than the very process which consists in the endless alternations of births and deaths. Every Today lives in so far only as a Yesterday expired before it. This applies to the alternating states of the individual consciousness as much as to the sequence of generations, nations, civilizations, and epochs. If what has been seems to return, this is a matter of mere appearance. For since life is real only as the expression of a subject, so the crucial point is the condition of the passing moment—always newly born, like the crest of the wave, which, though an abiding unity in appearance, at every moment consists of different elements. Accumulating memory changes the basis underlying consciousness. A man’s deeds and omissions mould his being. A new soul enters the world with the birth of every child. A more erroneous statement was never made than that there is nothing new under the sun. The opposite is true: in the realm of living beings there exist only new and newborn phenomena. This is especially obvious in contrast to perpetual repetition, as which the flux of life appears, when objectively viewed. The same chemical reactions, the same types and forms and destinies perpetually recur; the material only remains the same. The essential is what happens only once, the unique. Every love as an experience is intrinsically original; a condition has

never existed before, will never recur. It is precisely this *once-ness* that can be understood through the symbol of music, as far as it can be understood at all. The material of music—the gamut of tones within the framework of the laws ruling their connexions—remains the same everywhere. But every composer makes an entirely new thing out of this material. And not only he: but every virtuoso shapes something new out of the identical musical creation: the interpretation transforms the facts. This does not stop with the player, but continues on to the hearer. In life there is no setting aside personal experience. The subjective is its true and only dimension. Music and life thus really present the same picture. Neither can be taken out of the flux of time. And as early a philosopher as Heraclitus proclaimed: There is no stepping twice into the same river.

Music consists of individual tones, motifs, themes, chords, harmonies, and their combinations, which, again, form higher unities. It has not one, but two dimensions: succession and simultaneity, corresponding to the fundamental categories of melody and harmony. The same applies to life. On all its various planes this too consists of unities of different and hierarchically interdependent orders. In life also these unities are related to two dimensions, one of which means life *at the expense* of others, while the other means life *for* the others. All life proceeds in both dimensions simultaneously. It is impossible to live without bereaving others of something by this very act. The fact that beasts feed upon one another gives us a better general definition for the primordial phenomenon of life than the high-sounding struggle-for-existence concept. Even metabolism, the chemical changes of living matter, would be for feeling

atoms a horror. The dependence of the maturity of each younger generation on the demise of the elder most certainly is a horrible thing. And the struggle for existence is on all the planes a matter of life and death, whether businesses, peoples, gods, faiths, or values be the combatants. In one of his dimensions every single being lives in fact at the expense of others.

But every single being lives with equal necessity *for* the others. The individual life of each cell plays a necessary part in the body as a whole. With the lower animals the border line between individual and organ is indistinct. The correlation of plants and animals—that between bees and clover furnishes the best example—is as primary a phenomenon as the correlation between the organs of the individual body. Parents sacrifice themselves to their offspring by their lives and by their deaths. The hero and his people are also a case in point. And when viewed in this dimension, which all life shares, all life in its giving and taking, its joys and sorrows, its guilt and atonements, obviously is vicarious. The individual is responsible for all the others in exactly the same sense as an unhealthy organ poisons the whole body. Hence the significance of right leaders and the danger of wrong ones. If we retranslate this proposition into terms of music, it reads: the dominant gives to every chord its meaning, a single false note which continues to vibrate will spoil the whole melody. In life then on all its planes, there exists absolute solidarity. The function of a World Redeemer, as seen from this angle, belongs to the same connexion of ideas, and can in principle be conceived of as real as the function of the cell which vicariously performs in the mutilated grub of the sea-urchin a work of restitution which was

not part of its original and personal destiny and gives it now a super-personal significance.

Still, whether life be considered in its dimension of solidarity or of struggle for life, growth and decay must ever belong together. For they really are *one single process*. They only represent different aspects of the same. Wherever there is life destruction is the condition and also the road to reconstruction on new lines. In his original disposition every innovator is a destroyer. In the same sense the destroyer necessarily helps the new into being. Here the question arises: Since in the domain of the inanimate also, where there can be a question of "becoming," there is coincidence of becoming and ceasing to be, be it the case of electrons merging into atoms, or of atoms into molecules, or of any other processes—what constitutes the difference between the "becomings" of the living and of the dead? *The difference is the same as that between music and noise*. Here as there, "becoming" and "ceasing to be" pass through the same acoustic elements. But in the case of music, the process has a *meaning*. Here the primordial rhythm of events appears to be inbuilt into a special sense-connexion. Thus the becoming and ceasing to be of living beings stands out in each particular case, as a particularized whole within the universal process, as a melodic-harmonic whole *versus* the noisy chaos. Herewith we have come to the fundamental concept of life from a new approach: *life represents a sense-connexion*.

But the new approach shows the fundamental truth at a new angle and, accordingly, makes possible determinations which had been unattainable from other approaches. For the first time we are able to perceive quite clearly, in what sense "*significance*" stands for a

"beyond" as against both the rational and irrational: music, too, knits both into a higher unity. Thus, all life, not only the supernatural, is a synthesis of Eros and Logos; the concept of significance gives expression to its ruling law; this concept helps the understanding mind to apprehend a plane of reality located beyond any traditional antinomies. Second, the vantage reached to-day makes possible, as it seems to us, the most graphic determination of the *quality* of sense-connexion characteristic of all life. This quality corresponds to that of harmony and melody. *Harmony*: The connected is necessarily connected; its simultaneous existence continues throughout temporary evolution. The same applies to the cell community, the correlation of organs in the individual body, the correlation between animals and plants, the reciprocal complementing of capacities and professions, and also to the highest forms of spiritual and psychic communions among men. There is, as we know by the results obtained in last year's session, a real cosmos of humanity. This is the true reason for the fact that every great man is, first and foremost, representative, and that there is such a thing as a symbolism of history. *Melody*: that which succeeds another fills in a definitely outlined figure—a unity which, like musical creation, is realized within the temporal. It follows from this that life and *destiny* are interchangeable concepts; for the concept of destiny has no other meaning than what we should call in this connexion the melodic quality of life. There is a fixed destiny for every living being down to the last cell; the evolution of lower animals, like the malaria germ and the tapeworm, through all those diverse and strange forms and states of theirs, for which chance alone creates the external

conditions, outdoes, as wanderings directed by fate, those of Ulysses. When we consider higher planes, the melodic quality of all living existence which applied to the very lowest types becomes still plainer. For the more spirit becomes the true determinant, the more full of meaning, from the human viewpoint, must events appear. Merely organic destiny—the predestination of all typical conditions of existence between birth and death—we seldom experience as fate, for our consciousness views all problems from the basis of that destiny. Yet, if it can be proved by an overwhelming number of cases that man encounters only occurrences attuned to his particular nature, since his unconscious conjures up the accidents that befall him—the more so, the deeper he is rooted in the spiritual, so that with the higher class of men there is altogether no discriminating between their deeds and what befalls them—it is difficult not to conclude that the idea of predestination is wrong to the extent only that personal will and destiny coincide somehow or other in the ultimate depths of the soul. In the case of man, too, a trenchant discrimination between the inner and outside worlds cannot be made; with man, as with the sea-urchin, both worlds are part of his being, even as the world immediately surrounding every organism is its “perception-world.”

And just as every man has a destiny which he must fulfil, since every life is essentially a melody, so also eras, cultures, religions have their Fate. Their evolutions too are irreversible and ever bringing forth the New; they are limited in time, they are melodic wholes, and the perfection of each essentially means fulfilment of meaning. For it is precisely inasmuch as it fulfils a meaning that history is a reality and a process differing

from the biological process. If now we reduce all these assertions to a common denominator, then we shall say: *in the domain of life everywhere the whole precedes the parts, just as the complete sonata exists before its separate movements.* From here on, then, we can perfectly understand that in the domain of life significance creates the facts. Unity is the strictly logical category into which the many-meaning and richer concept of sense-connexion fits. If now the whole is really there before the parts, then indeed every single particular action, as shown by psycho-analysis, must be conceived of as the symptom of a deeper reality; then there must exist a real symbolism of history; then it is a proof of superficiality to look upon any fact as an ultimate datum: for a pre-existing sense-connexion is their *raison d'être* in any case. For this very reason a fact at times—remember the sick man at the sight of whom the young Prince Siddharta was inwardly transformed—can signify what is entirely out of proportion to its specific value: it sets the operation of a pre-existent sense-connexion going. Therefore, such as have the gift of intuitive meaning can indeed know Destiny, in its broad outlines, in advance. Given a determinate disposition, there are conceivable only determinate evolutions, just as, given a musical fundamental conception, however small the number of bars may be in which it is incorporated, only definite further configurations appear to be possible at all.

YOU will now doubtless admit that the comparison with music helps us to understand life as a whole better than exact definition. The latter, following its natural bent, leads away from the primordial synthesis;

it contains in itself no motive for stopping at the real extremity of significant abstractions. And though, as a matter of fact, the point can be determined beyond which given concepts must necessarily fail to enlighten, it is precisely this road to evidence—and evidence is the one vital goal of all demonstration—which is for all, the small number of specialists excepted, the least reliable. It does not create “obviousness.” Logic always only circumscribes the way of the spiritually real. Blind in itself, it must be guided by the intuition of essentials if it is to lead to the recognitions which ingenuous minds have reached without intermediaries. For the deepest life, most difficult for the intellect to fathom, life in its immediate reality, is, on the other hand, “obviousness” itself; its intellectual paradox offers no difficulty to spontaneous understanding which can be called forth by an adequate symbol.

Let us, therefore, with the help of the symbol of music, follow the temporal vicissitudes of life. We realize its sense-connexion in fact, as a perfect analogy to music. In it, as in music, there is the same law of polarity which governs all its dynamics. Ascent and descent, the counterplay of fugues, treble and bass, major and minor, dominant and keynote, overtones and undertones are concepts applicable to the flux of life and do not require reinterpretation. The relation of life's plus and minus sides whose polarity is at the root of the course of life—whether we have in mind ruler and the people, man and woman, original world-feeling and its effect on the plane of surface phenomena, compromise and struggle, progress, differentiation, and integration—is adequately mirrored in music. The same obtains with rhythm, here as there, in particular with

rhythmic repetition. Here the identical form never recurs, but a new factor in the disguise of an external similarity inserts itself into the phenomenal; in each new connexion the same motive has a new sense. Therefore, in the historic domain not the circle but the spiral is the correct symbol of genuine evolution. So there can be shown to exist, in the sequence of that evolution, however rhythmically it may proceed, analogous and homologous, but never identical phenomena and events. If one does not stress the point and only uses the image for explanatory purposes, one may even speak of a "law of historical counterpoint" which gives a deeper meaning to the time-honoured adage drawn from experience that things invariably turn out differently from what we expected. Again and again the vanquished have *de facto* conquered their victors; the triumph of Rome brought about the Hellenization of the then known world, that of Islam in Persia the predominance of the spirit of Persia. The meek everywhere have in the long run inherited the earth, if only for the reason that they alone were not exterminated in the course of the raging conflicts. The complete victory of democracy in a quantitative sense, brought about by the World War, is the real cause that a qualitatively constituted world is already nascent. When a movement has reached its object, its end has come.

This, then, leads us to the basic counterpoint of all life: death. Creative evolution invariably ends in a perfect standstill. But here, too, there is no question of meaninglessness, rather of the specific meaning of a counterpoint relationship. Every melody is finite; its completion is at the same time its end. And a climax

can only be followed by the dying away of sounds or by silence. Thus for many beings life and death coincide in time; Isolde's death in the passion of love impresses everyone as logical. But where the life melody of an individual represents one tone of a more comprehensive melody, there again the overstressing of the individual note evidently demands that it should die away. Thus, extravagant exaltation brings about man's downfall. Yet according to the same law, a voluntary sacrifice leads to victory. Whenever a hero perished, from the standpoint of his enemies the event was belated. Jesus' death on the Cross was the cause of Christianity's triumph.

If we now consider the way of life in its most general aspect, using the symbol of music for our guidance, then the following proposition holds true: the way of life must necessarily pass through dissonances. If the whole gamut is sounded all at once, a horrible dissonance is the result. The ear's interest in the sequence of the tones is externally maintained by the fact that this succession means a continual escape from an insupportable simultaneity. On the other hand, harmony makes for happiness only when it stands for the resolution of—or release from—dissonances; and every resolution, again, must flow into the unresolved as long as the whole has not reached its end; for the very existence of music depends on movement and mobility. In the same sense life has meaning only so far as it is movement which has been experienced, as well as being pragmatically possible. According to the adage, the hardest thing to bear is an uninterrupted series of happy days. In its essence life is a labile and not a stable state of equilibrium; and every disturbance of the equilibrium means suffering.

This is the truth underlying the Buddhist doctrine of suffering. Now where a process of spiritual growth inserts itself into the process of mere biologic growth, this same relation becomes more emphasized. Where the transformation inherent in any process of growth and passing away becomes an ascent; where, accordingly, there is no final adjustment, and where every travelled road is presently abandoned—there the primal phenomenon is the *disturbance* of equilibrium and not the unison of the life processes. For only the disturbance or the destruction of existing states can lead to higher ones. Thus man is more and more beset by sickness and suffering the higher he ascends. He feels gradually more and more imperfect. As creature of mind and spirit he becomes ever more guilty and sinful; and rarely does he attain lasting joy and good fortune. It is not for nothing that the image of Paradise is set back in the dawn of humanity, and that in our time paradisiac well-being is to be found among such only as have returned to the primitive state. If, therefore, life in itself is unthinkable without sickness and suffering, aspiring man proceeds from sickness to sickness, from sin to sin, from guilt to guilt, from crisis to crisis. For destruction alone makes renewal possible, and suffering alone leads to salvation.

The meaning of the particular, however, can be gauged only from the whole. The acts of history are never closed. Only the final result shows the meaning of every event. Thus, the true meaning of the particular phases of individual lives can be recognized only when these have run their course. Here we find the foundation for the belief that a conversion *in extremis* can

redeem a life of sin. What seemed an estrangement from God may in the end prove to be a circuitous way to him.

THE completeness of life can indeed be understood by means of the symbol of music. But now the most important question of all arises: the question of *value*. There are various kinds of music: the superficial and the deep, the exalted and the ludicrous, that which is of all times and that of the hour only. How are we to determine their differences? These invariably depend on the sense-connexion into which the tones in the particular cases are inserted, determined by fundamental conception, motive, and tone. It is absolutely impossible to explain how the acoustic norms can become the means for expressing the spiritual; it is an illustration, among others, of the law of correlation between meaning and expression. If the highest functions of the mind are dependent on the secretions of certain endocrines, if free decisions of the will correspond to phenomena of explosions in the domain of cellular chemistry, all of these inexplicable facts have the same significance. But here again, the facts which always elude intellectual comprehension become understandable with the help of the symbol of music as far as the super-rational can be approached by the understanding. The same tone sounds different according to the various chords or sequences into which it is inserted. And true experience reflects this *difference of sound*, it has nothing to do with the demonstrability of similarity in the keyboard and notes. Just so the significance and value of every fact of life depend on the sense-connexion into which they are woven. The facts of life in themselves

are the same everywhere, like the letters of the alphabet which all must employ, the sage as well as the fool. The same chemical reactions, the same formative and functional laws, keep life going; the same events, the same joys and sufferings, occur to each and all, if we only look at their outward appearance. From a superficial standpoint man is only an animal among other animals. There is no difference between one individual and another, nor is the genius distinguishable from the average mortal. But what appears identical from the external viewpoint *means* another thing in each particular case. Another sense lies hidden in the life of man as compared with that of the beast. There lives a unique soul in every man born. The centre of the sense-connexion from which the utterances of the genius go forth has a location differing from that of the man in the street; though both spell the same, word for word, they *say* entirely different things. Thus, the same can stand for the most divergent according to the varying sense-connexion into which it is woven, just as the same tone may produce the most divergent sounds. The same primordial images of the unconscious which the psycho-analyst correctly interprets as an expression of the lowest impulsive life are to the religious man means for the realization of the Divine. Infliction of death is not the same in the case of murder, of manslaughter, of penal executions, or heroic deeds. Death is not the same in the case of dying from natural causes, by deserved punishment, by martyrdom, by suicide, by sacrifice. Sensual pleasure is not the same in the sense-connexion of love or vice. And so on and so forth. If theology maintains that history, which from the human standpoint is meaningless, *is* at the same time a revelation of the Divine, that God's

judgment *is* grace, it may, in the same sense, be speaking the truth. *Thus everywhere significance is the ultimately real.*

And now we are aware of the enormous error on the part of those who believe that growth and passing away are the last word on the plane of life. They stand only for the material of the sense-connexion which is essential to all life. Life is never an isolated tone, but everywhere melody. Every experience means a single measure within the melody of personal life, and every single life, again, represents a single measure within melodies and symphonies of a higher order of things, and so forth to infinity. *Thus the problem of the meaning of life coincides with the problem of life itself.* The problem of *meaning is thus proved to be the really practical and positive question concerning life.* On all of life's planes a correspondingly adjusted consciousness may experience sense-realization: Those who identify themselves with the generic impulses experience satisfaction in the coming and vanishing of these; for they stand in this case for the ultimate sense. Those whose range of vision is bound up with their momentary emotions experience their existence as full of meaning in the very alternation of joy and suffering. Others, again, who are conscious of their mental selves only may hold their existence justified by achievement and progress. Still, none ever find their true and complete contentment. All the sense-realizations enumerated here are evanescent and end in disappointment, because the feeling of identity outlives their consummation. Who thinks he reads the meaning of a sonata in one particular fleeting measure of it, to him the composition must seem to be a failure. Those only are really immune against dis-

appointments whose consciousness has been centred in the *fundamental motive* of music, as referred to its fundamental tone. For although for him too harmonies and melodies are evanescent, though he knows no more than others what is to come, though he too can survey the connexion no more than the rest—he experiences every surprise as full of *meaning*, whatever its nature may be;—just as every surprise wrought by the genius of Bach or Beethoven appears replete with meaning. This is the true cause of the bliss of those who know God and believe in his providential dispensations.

Today, at the beginning of the session, I shall not proceed any farther. In the course of the ensuing lectures you will become acquainted with the indissoluble interconnexions of growth and dying in the domain of organic evolution, in history, and in emotional life. You will also see how growth and passing away, the primordial ways of life, manifest ever deeper strata of significance. You will see that life belongs to several spheres which are nevertheless interconnected. You will become aware in what sense death leads to rebirth and resurrection. You will understand how the unintelligible, too, is replete with the deepest meaning. And if, with this introductory lecture alive in your memory, you listen to the various voices you are going to hear, *without* reflecting upon the utterances, without paying particular attention to details, but listening as it is seemly in the presence of grand music, the solution of the great mystery will perhaps become a matter of personal experience for you—how it is, that man, whose whole empiric life is temporal, wills only the eternal, means only the eternal, and even understands only the eternal.

II

History as Tragedy

IF ANYTHING has been proved in regard to the processes of history, it undoubtedly is that so far they have invariably ended badly. Shall I give instances? The barbarian hordes destroyed the glorious external aspect of antiquity. Most of its inner values vanished with the triumph of Christianity. In the name of Christianity the cultures of the Spanish Moors and of the Incas and Aztecs were annihilated at a later period. The humanistic era which found its first expression in the Reformation did not lead to freedom, but to a rigidity of forms. The profound humaneness of the eighteenth century merged into the Reign of Terror and, subsequently, when the revolutionary era had reached its term, into the dominance of lifeless Capital. The World War, which was expected to end all wars, produced a crop of dragon's teeth such as no other war ever did. And, in principle, no historical process on earth will ever have a better ending. All processes must end, and every end annihilates the values established during these processes.

And in the vast majority of cases the victory is to the ignoble. The Prince of this world is more potent than the Angel in this life of ours. The nobler of all races destroy one another in war. The Greeks held that the ultimate object of the gods was the ruin of the high-

minded. Modern statistics teach at any rate that the races deteriorate visibly. And if, at times, there seems to be an upward movement, the final destruction of the world puts an end to all historic developments; which end makes all achievements appear meaningless, because they were in vain. Those who are capable of absolute optimism in the face of these irrefutable facts are guilty of the narrowest kind of egoism characteristic of those who are pleased with the world because nothing ails them personally. As a matter of fact it is doubtful whether any historic process that ever took place, even when it covered a short period only, ever ended well. All actual history has been compiled by the victorious nations or written with reference to them. But why should right, in the widest sense of the word, be always theirs? As for "progress" in general, for the sake of which the individual is supposed to sacrifice himself, I still have to learn *who* really regards his life as such a sacrifice. Who does not, when all is said and done, mean his *own* happiness, however much his conscious may repress the truth? What is the advantage for us, the living—the only real beings—if the existence of generations a thousand years from now is a little easier? Are the Inquisition and the Reign of Terror really justified by the fact that nowadays every man Jack can use a telephone?—If the real facts remain obscure for the vast majority, the reason for this is—not to mention the unwillingness to face facts, a cowardice inherent in the race—to be found in the wholesale falsifications practiced by historians and poets, nay, by every individual who reflects on bygone times. According to a law first established by Theodor Lessing, the intellect *must* justify past events; for it is only through such a process

of rationalization that man grown intellectually conscious can adapt himself to existing conditions. This is why success is so eminently practical, why victories are significant events, and why judgments passed by public opinion are so seldom revised. In this sense Lessing is justified in saying that history is "the conferring of meaning on the meaningless." Nor has any man ever shown a greater sense of reality than Buddha. His objections to life are literally true to life. Who fails to realize this proves only that he has not been awakened—or that he is blind.

Still, the problem of history is not finished when we have adequately comprehended these broadly outlined facts. And Lessing's interpretation fails to go to the root of things. Though the hypothesis which invests history with meaning for man be due in many cases to arbitrary acts, this is not a proof that history in itself lacks meaning. The latter alternative is even highly improbable, if only on account of man's obvious lack of inventive genius, and also because he never invents anything not in tune with his own nature. He always externalizes his own inward reality—and this reality must obviously be accepted as real. He always sets forth what is real within himself—and what is real for him must obviously be taken as real in the universal sense also. Now what is history if not living reality shaped by man's mind according to the norm *peculiar to that mind*? The historic process really is the one and only series among all phenomena which are exclusively conditioned by man's will and ability. For this sole reason history must be taken as in itself—full of meaning. And if we examine on this basis our inmost subjective relation to the unbroken series of sufferings which the process of

history indubitably represents, we discover that *in our heart of hearts we do not even wish the process to be otherwise*. As far as our personal experiences are concerned, analytical introspection has proved that man's unconsciousness invariably wills his destiny and, to that extent, co-operates with fate. It can be even proved that when a fateful event has befallen an individual he has always conjured it up personally in one way or another. This is why "*amor fati*" leads always to fulfilment; this is also why those who in times of political revolutions understand the meaning of events and, therefore, accept them, find a rôle for themselves in the new order of things, when the Catos perish. There is, indeed, no man of deep nature who in later years, and with intimate experiences to go upon, has not come to the conclusion that the "purposefulness in the destiny of the individual," which Schopenhauer proclaimed, is indeed a reality, and that, therefore, the belief of providential dispensation, howsoever it be interpreted, is grounded on fact.

But aside from experience—how could the ideas of an historical process which should be the expression of Universal Justice, of a providence overwhelming mankind again and again, of a destroying God—whether in the form of Jehovah the Judge or of the Dancing Shiva—or of an end of history which would as such annihilate its meaning seem so *obvious*, as they actually do, unless these ideas corresponded to man's nature?—That the way of pain and suffering, the very substance of history, is a reasonable process in the objective sense also, cannot be disputed either. It is true that not all that happens is reasonable, as Hegel would have it. But this is owing rather to the inadequacy of reason to seize the full mean-

ing inherent in the real, than because the real fails to come up to the requirements of reason. Destiny operates in a wide-flung, generous way, as does nature, which throws off millions of germs for the sake of the survival of a few hundred thousand beings; and it works in the American style rather than in the European, in that it rarely repairs what is defective, preferring to destroy them. If we look at the workings of destiny with corresponding broadmindedness, then they appear to be reasonable for this very reason, or at least never contrary to sense. An Attila never found work to do except when there was a rotten world to destroy. Castes and peoples never perish without being secretly guilty.¹ And as often as not, what is of eternal value springs from death only. In this connexion the Greeks furnish the most impressive example. First, their culture as a whole had lost the ability to progress at the time of its decay. Second, its zenith—the Socratic-Platonic philosophy—could not have come to pass except as a concomitant of this decay; third, those phenomena of the antique world which were capable of continuing to live did so as integral parts of Christianity. This seems to prove that history is full of meaning in spite of all averred bad endings.—How this is to be understood in principle, and in what sense history can at all be described as full of meaning, was already explained in the introductory lecture. Life is essentially a flux in time; it finds new limits over and over again; it is unthinkable without death. Life is, on all its planes, a simultaneous death and birth.

¹ Compare the chapter, "The Symbolism of History," in my book, *Creative Understanding*.

This, then, means, that every determinate sense-connexion of life *includes* death. The end as an end is thus never contrary to sense.

THIS holds good in general, but the answer on these broad lines does evidently not exhaust the problem of history proper. We feel no aversion for the process of metabolism for the reason that our conscious life is enacted above it. We also instinctively accept the process of growth and death on the biological plane; for here the subject is the Species; and it is through the impulses of the species, which constitute a large and, for the most part, insufficiently appraised portion of soul-life that we acquiesce in the seasonable individual death. Thus, no man who is close to nature—nor, for that matter, hardly any woman—feels the death of parents or beloved to be contrary to sense. But it is different with the historic process; for it is enacted above the physiologico-biological plane. Here growth and passing away, the primordial forms of life, are expressions of a different sense-connexion. Here conscious mind reaches out through these for self-realization. Here a *will unto culture* strives for expression. This leads to the creation of values believed to be eternally valid and which are only conceivable as such. Inexistent on the plane of nature, they represent the ultimately real on that of history. This plane, again, is a sphere of pure freedom. For only the freely achieved is historical.¹ Again, freedom is the means of expression of unique subjects whose uniqueness represents the ultimate

¹ Refer for particulars to the essay on history in my book, *Philosophy as an Art*.

within them. Owing to this the picture of life in its aspect of an irresistible process of growth and passing away assumes on the historic plane a character of its own. If eternal values are destroyed in the temporal process, then in this lies a real objection to life. If the unique being but for whose existence there would be no such thing as history is treated by destiny as a mere element, this seems contrary to sense. When freedom is wrecked by outward forces, we cannot help feeling that this again is contrary to sense. If freedom, and not necessity, rules the process of life and death, then responsibility comes into play, and so does guilt whenever events take a bad turn. In the domain of history no event ever comes by itself: there is always a human being who has voluntarily brought it to pass. It sometimes seems to me as though institutions, authorities, and the like were invented from sheer cowardice, in order to provide man with an apology for not burdening his mind with inevitable responsibilities. He who passes a death sentence in the capacity of a member of a board of judges tries to convince himself that it is not his personal vote which has caused another man's execution. The man who puts his signature to an official decree imagines as often as not that this does not make him personally responsible for the consequences involved. From this angle the whole concept of duty takes on the semblance of a mask for cowardice. As a matter of fact, he who fulfils a duty which is contrary to his own sense of justice is doubly responsible before eternity; for here the objective wrong-doing is coupled with the sin against the Holy Ghost. This, then, creates once and for all for the conscious an indis severable antinomy between the particular and the whole to which it happens to belong. As an

historical being, man feels himself to be a single tone which knows its unique value; he is always aware—though he knows that his dying-away serves the melody—that it is after all *he* that dies, and that there is no sense in his death, from his personal standpoint. And he must feel it to be a profound injustice to himself that his guilt remains his *personal* guilt, however it may help the whole, and that his responsibility remains the same even when it means a sacrifice for himself; in a word, that nothing, whatever can be said in its favor from the standpoint of society, ever lifts the burden from the individual. So it is. The facts are just as hard as they are described in Goethe's verses relating to the Gods:

“You let them be in guiltiness ensnared,
And then you leave them with their pain,
For every guilty soul has its avenger.”

The meaning of history—if it has a meaning—is of a terrible character. But if we now glance backwards, it is just at this point that we fully realize how history, in spite of all assertions to the contrary, can appear to us full of meaning. It is precisely its terribleness which man accepts. The aspect of pain which history presents does not depress us; on the contrary, its effect is exalting. Only for the ignoble is suffering as such an ultimate. Instinctively every man assents to self-sacrifice. This, then, brings us to the threshold of the true meaning of history. Sacrifice signifies the greatest proof of personal *freedom*. We say yea to self-sacrifice first and foremost because we are essentially free. Now, all history belongs to the sphere of freedom which manifests itself through biological growth and death. From this it follows that in history growth and death are fitted into

the sense-connexion we call *Tragedy*. Because this is so, and because we are essentially historic, so that tragedy means our true element, its image, the tragedy-*drama*, lifts us above ourselves. It is not as if the understanding of history, as an essentially tragic process, meant an image derived from the play.

MUCH has been said about the essence of the Tragic (the most recent authors I call to mind are Scheler, Tidemann, Paul Ernst), and there remains more to say. What interests us here are only the following fundamental features. Destinies partake of the tragic quality only in so far as they are inescapable (in this sense Christ would have been crucified at all times *and by all*); in so far as the conflict involved is insolvable in the absolute sense, because values fight values and not non-values; in so far as the guilty is at the same time innocent, as there is no morally satisfying solution, and as the punishment meted out to him is just on the one hand, and yet condemns his judges; in so far as the discrepancy between the necessity of Destiny, on the one hand, and its futility from the standpoint of the unique value at stake is realized; in so far as an individual will creative of new values revolts against a collective will—whether of God, cosmos, destiny, necessity, society—and in so far as this revolt is a conscious manifestation of freedom. When considered within the compass of these definitions, all history is, indeed, tragic and also may be represented as a tragedy whenever the frame for the facts is narrowed or enlarged to suit the particular case. Wherever this does not seem true, what has happened is not history but a mere biological process, even as all national life which is devoted to mere maintenance or

happiness and not, primarily, to the will unto culture, is unhistoric. Accordingly, in ancient eras which, however unacquainted with the meaning of history, "lived" history in a much purer way than any modern period, the populace only was allowed the privilege of recognized ideals of happiness, whereas the life of the great was understood from the outset to be, not only as a matter of fact, but as a matter of voluntarily accepted fact, tragic;—indeed, where freedom rules supreme, nor any longer willingly obeys existing law, tragic conflicts cannot be avoided. And antiquity also saw, with the same incorruptible clearness of sight so conspicuously absent in modern consciousness, that every innovation is due to the perpetration of a crime. It *must* overthrow the established valued order of things; it must destroy—and where could the line be drawn between the merely human and divine laws? According to the earliest myth, the young god ousts the old and rules henceforth under a new law. How heavy the guilt of the victorious god was felt to be is proved by the reinterpretation to which the essential features of the vanquished always were subjected. The qualms of conscience experienced by Zeus transformed Chronos into the Principle of Evil. Dionysos became the Devil through Christianity's consciousness of guilt. Similar conditions explain the disparagement of Christian faith in modern times. Only a new faith which has grown entirely sure of itself allows the ousted gods to continue their existence as saints, as the Catholic Church did after it had become the *Ecclesia triumphans*. Zeus, Prometheus, Lucifer, Jesus—they all were criminals from the standpoint of established order. And so all great earthly innovators have been. So has been every little innovator who, too cowardly to

avow his breach of the law, has sought for reassurance in the "will of the people" or in the "rights of humanity." Breaches of faith, ruthless attacks, violation, annulment of vested rights are normal proceedings wherever a new foundation takes place; nothing new can be founded otherwise, save under exceptional conditions. It is averred as a fact that property held today can be traced back to rapine at the ratio of perhaps seventy per cent. If it were not for the periodic returns of a Bolshevism of some kind, the entire earth would soon be owned by only a small number of individuals—as set forth in Wells's *When the Sleeper Wakes*—which limit had been almost reached in the later Roman period. In the domain of history destruction for the sake of renewal is absolutely inevitable; for here there is no such thing as natural death; impersonal and as such immortal forces rule this realm. This is why history from the very beginning represents cumulative guilt; hence the obvious truth, instinctively accepted by all, of the idea of original sin. Hence also the inconceivableness of a life which is not tragic in one way or another. No great man ever actually intended all the evil he was obliged to do; no one ever brought about even a fraction of the good he had in mind. Worse still: those who intended too much of the good have invariably brought about a maximum of evil; as was exemplified by the noble-minded Kropotkin, the spiritual father of Bolshevism, Luther, the grave-digger of a united Christianity, and, in recent times, Woodrow Wilson. On the other hand, those who intended evil only were never spared the tragic experience that the very force which willed the evil wrought the good. Attila, Genghis Khan, Ivan the Terrible, Lenin are cases in point and a warning. They all, no

doubt, have in the long run done more good than all the apostles of humaneness.

In what sense now do we voluntarily accept the tragic nature of human life, why do we give our full assent to tragedy only? The answer is not far to seek: it is implied in the mere concept of the Tragic: *Because we are essentially free* and because the manifestation of freedom as against the combined overwhelming powers of nature and destiny cannot possibly lead to direct victory; because, on the other hand, this manifestation of freedom is the one thing in which our exclusive human quality originally expresses and becomes conscious of itself. Will unto self-sacrifice is the only way to attain this self-expression; opposition to reality is here the only means. To that extent Miguel de Unamuno is in the right in seeing the prototype of striving man not in Christ, nor in Prometheus, but in—Don Quixote, in the latter's tilting against windmills, in his imperturbable pursuit of his own dreams, of an utterly unworldly ideal. Unamuno's motto is a sentence uttered by Sénancourt, which is perhaps the most courageous word ever spoken by any man of the dying eighteenth century: "*L'homme est périssable, il se peut; mais périssons en résistant. Et si le néant nous est réservé, ne faisons pas que ce soit une justice*"—a saying which Unamuno raises to a yet higher level by giving the last sentence the turn: "*Faisons que ce soit une injustice.*" If man is essentially free, his freedom still is only an infinitesimally small wheel in the clockwork of the world. It has, indeed, the power within itself to readjust in the long run the whole mechanism in accordance with its own significance; but *to begin with*, the body of tradition—the cosmic tradition above all—is stronger than any in-

novator. And striving man, as such, is an innovator in this sense. He is up against a world of routine, millions of years old. Thus the nature of man really is quixotic. Whoever as an innovator counts in earnest on success, believing reason or right to be on his side, cuts a much sorrier figure than the "Knight of the rueful Countenance" ever did. But it is precisely in this courage to the point of ridiculousness that all human dignity resides; it is a particular aspect of the courage unto sacrifice. Whoever, on the strength of imaginary wisdom, adjusts himself in principle to facts, forfeits his manhood; he follows the example of the intestinal worm which maintains itself by adapting itself to every sinuosity of its surroundings and allowing every kind of muck to pass over it. Our human essence, as something super-organic, super-factual, is based exclusively on that very freedom which, by reason of its infinitesimal dimensions as compared with cosmic destiny, appears so ridiculous.

With this freedom only the self-consciousness of the spiritually awakened identifies itself. For this reason, and not on account of superstition, honour means more than life even to the noble savage. From this it follows that man, by reason of his nature, must ever give his assent to tragedy; *for he thereby gives his assent to his own nature*. This is why, as a matter of course, he values sacrifice as greater than success, and the power to endure adversity as superior to happiness. This is why *amor fati*, first and last, conditions human greatness. For the same reasons no great man ever aimed at happiness. An unsatisfactory solution of the life problem from the point of view of attainable happiness is the only logical one, once there exists the antinomy between a super-

individual sense-connexion to which the individual belongs, whose manifestation consists in growth and death, and the individual as an ultimate value. It is true that the fall of every hero, as set forth in the introductory lecture, invariably proved a belated event; it is equally true that death itself leads to victory. But this does not mitigate in the very least the awful tragedy of life, viewed from the standpoint of the individual. For he alone counts on the plane of history; he alone exists in the sense of fact. *The ultimate fact to be recognized here is that from the standpoint of the individual the equation of life is insolvable.* It is insolvable even within the individual's soul. The conflict also between the God within man's self (however this be interpreted), whose commandments everyone feels he should unconditionally obey, and the possibilities of the empiric Ego is insolvable. Thus history, true to its nature, can never lose its tragic quality. Its periods between tragedies do not, viewed from the general scheme of things, amount to more than merry interludes played in a tragedy by groom and chambermaid. Thus the idea of a paradisiac state which comes to an end owing to the eating from the tree of knowledge is not devoid of meaning: *before* man became conscious of his freedom as a task, he was indeed capable of happiness. But the idea of a final state of collective happiness for mankind, as evolved by socialism, is senseless and grotesque. How could it be realized? First, only by force; but man loses, in his own estimate, all his meaning and value along with his freedom. The absurdest of all coercions is the coercion unto the good, the very existence of which depends on its being freely elected. And where numbers are thought

of at all as a standard for valuation, it is no longer life which determines, but the lifeless "thing." Then, collective happiness is conceivable only with the lowest of standards. Owing to this, wherever collective happiness has been consciously aimed at, the lowest ideals have reigned. The tragic cannot be abolished except along with history itself, and suffering cannot cease except with life itself. For growth and passing away are one, and the vanishing of values must needs appear contrary to sense.

HISTORY is inevitably a tragedy. That we give our assent to the historic process for that very reason; that children, those creatures of impulse, are the only human beings to desire that all things should end well; that the lucky man was never set up as a model by anyone; that precisely the young, the essentially striving man reverences the tragic hero only, and for the same reason meets death with a lighter heart than the old man—all this must have become evident to you in principle by now. Not entirely, though, as yet. The mere existence of such a thing as freedom within the superior cosmos does indeed explain the inevitableness of tragedy, but it does not explain why freedom strives to predominate. For if man really in his heart of hearts gives his assent to tragedy and along with it to his own destruction, he must, as a free agent, have his roots implanted in a region beyond and above it. If this were otherwise, life would be deprived of meaning, in spite of everything.—The final answer will be given in my concluding lecture. The present one is fitted into the collective melody of the session as a dissonance clamouring for a

solution. I shall today only furnish one more concrete example which shows with unusual clarity how history as a tragic process can be full of meaning from the point of view of suffering man. We are privileged to experience personally one of the greatest tragedies of all times. The optimism of progress held by a century which indubitably—not only from the external, the technical point of view, but also from the humanitarian—achieved so much that it seemed justified in its hope for an unlimited progress, was convicted of absurdity by the most horrible of all wars. It is still being carried on in the shape of revolutionary convulsions of a kind that must destroy, directly or indirectly, much of the traditional values which survived the war somehow or other. And the result of all these individual processes, in spite of all socialist governments, disarmament projects, the League of Nations, and the like is: *the end of the ideal of humaneness and with it the end of the historic epoch bearing its stamp*; the end of precisely that which had been the banner of all the nations who fought the war. If already this war, as the final note of the era of progress, was a grandiose instance of the law of historic counterpoint, its consequences are all the more so. The spirit of the emerging world—it is bursting into existence the world over on the same lines—stands for almost the exact opposite of the spirit of the past, as shown with a vengeance by its vanguards of the right and left sides, the Fascists and the Bolshevists. It is anti-humanitarian, nationalistic, heroic, stern, bent on quality and not on quantity, a believer in authority, anti-parliamentary, and most of all anti-liberal in the broadest sense.¹ The

¹ Compare for particulars my work, *The World in the Making*.

idealists of the World War, then, have fought in vain; and their disappointment—if only they dare to face the facts—is all the greater because the lowest qualities of the soul have triumphed, all over the world; greed, hatred, blind will unto power. The grandly grotesque symbol for this fact is presented by the Versailles Treaty. In that “Day of Judgment on lounges” held at Versailles, which was the basis of that unheard-of juridical assumption that a fine stroke of business can be got out of the extorted avowal of moral guilt on the part of the vanquished opponent in the game, was such an overwhelmingly comical performance that, for thousands of years to come, men will hold their sides with laughter whenever they give it a thought. Nevertheless, we all have the feeling that the sacrifices of the World War were not made in vain. And the idea of guilt, however much of misunderstanding it involves, has deep foundations. Germany had indulged in self-destruction ever since 1890, committing with a somnambulist unerringness every conceivable blunder in external politics calculated to bring about her ruin; the conclusion is that her Unconscious *willed* her own destruction; she *did not want to avoid* those errors that let loose the World War. There are no persistently recurring blunders which do not express an underlying intention. If we now put ourselves in touch with the consciousness of those who shortly before the war yearned for a better future, meaning a richer and larger kind of life, the question arises: Was any one of them contented? Did we not all wish for the end of the old times because we all felt that things could not improve without passing through a period of unsettled conditions? To that extent we *all* willed the war. And if we now

cast a backward glance on the terrible experiences gone through, we have to acknowledge that but for their occurrence the remaking of the world which is taking place today would not have been possible. For the forces of the Past which operate in every particular soul were far too potent. And as to the low and mean: had it not cropped out everywhere; had the tall talk of the beginning and also the *end* of the war not been refuted by the facts, the mean and low qualities would still be living in a state of repression, and improvement would be out of the question. The caricature every warring nation made of the opponent was in reality the projection of its own unconscious self on the enemy. And thus the malignant peace was exactly in accordance with our own state of consciousness all over the world. *For this very reason, though, there is henceforth a chance for betterment.* Once a thing has been exposed to the mental view it can no longer remain creatively effective in the soul. And, therefore, it is not to be regretted that the old ideals did not materialize—they were on the point of death even when they were proclaimed in 1914.

What now is coming into existence, however unexpectedly—*this completely new departure is what we all really intended*; because it alone corresponds to the living forces really operating within us. If the idea of an humanitarian association of the nations on the basis of the idea of equal rights for all, and of the intrinsic value of numbers is passing away, it is for the benefit of mankind in general, which means something vastly more alive than all that which had been conceived by the eighteenth century. Therefore, we all inwardly give our assent to the sufferings inherent in these great times. We say yea unto them, as we say yea to the throes of child-

birth. And we also say yea to our own bitter sense of guilt, because we recognize it as a tragic guilt. Thus personal experience furnishes the proof for every one of us that history is indeed a tragedy. And it proves at the same time that its processes had a meaning.

III

Death and Life Eternal

IF TODAY I attempt to gather up the many significant threads of what we have learned during this season's course and to show you the unity which lies beneath them, I certainly do not ask to be listened to as a lecturer placed above the others: all I ask is the acknowledgment of my equal right with others. Every mind has its definite place in the spiritual cosmos by reason of its specific mode of being and adjustment; accordingly it has also a definitely limited range of vision and equally limited sphere of gravitation. One man is originally shortsighted, another is originally just as farsighted. If one proves superior in vision at short range, another excels in long-range vision. One man has more discernment for great things or connections, another for small things. One is macrocosmic by nature, another is microcosmic. One is called to influence millions of men, when another will affect only a small number. No man, whatever his particular qualities, has any claim to precedence over any other, for the very reason that all differences are differences in kind and not in degree. A man born of sun-like appearance is no more entitled to pride than is the glowworm. Value and significance can only be gauged by the extent to which meaning and expression, mode of being, intention, idea, and self-expression attain congruence. Therefore, at Darmstadt, *genuine-*

ness is the only standard. Those who are genuine in their particularities—in other words, who are perfectly truthful both to themselves and to the world, who neither pretend nor claim what is not in accordance with their natures, whose objective views are in perfect conformity with the subjective being, so as to represent conjointly a real unity of personal experience, are in the right, whatever the particular conditions may happen to be. For they experience *the real* from the only perspective visible from their particular standpoint; their Subjective—and all experience is subjective—expresses insight, not opinions. What significance their primarily, purely personal right may have for others can, again, be gauged by the effect it produces. There are crooked adjustments which are utterly unsuitable as models for others—they are, in so far, “wrong,” however genuine they be otherwise. Conversely, there are others which help all men in adjusting themselves more in accordance with sense, because they act as tuning forks or because they sound the fundamental tone and dominant at the same time—such adjustments inevitably embody world-impulses. Specific effects cannot be achieved nor, for that matter, impeded of set purpose; they are the immediate effects of the qualified mode of being of the agent, and depend on none but him. Naturally, this specific effect may be misunderstood; but misunderstanding is the first legitimate embodiment of every truth—it is, given the gradations of the intellectual powers of men, the indispensable precursor of true understanding.

All the lecturers of the present session were first and last genuine. Professor Driesch impressed us all so much not because he was objectively in the right, but because

his logic absolutely reflected his living personality. The concept of an "harmonic-equipotential system" voiced by this man carried as much conviction for the audience as any familiar term would have done. Baeck was fully entitled to represent the Old Testament, as was Dahlke in respect to Buddhism. And the outcome of the theoretic clash of the world-conceptions championed in our presence was not contradictory, because what counts first and foremost with us is *symbolic* truth; for which reason the theoretically right and wrong appear *until further notice* equally valid. Absolutely correct statements can be made only from a standpoint from which all statements of which experience proves that they are possible and lastingly tenable can be surveyed and from the vantage of meaning as a single whole, a standpoint which has as yet been attained by none of the historical world-conceptions. Therefore, the School of Wisdom must, to begin with, refrain from recognizing any given theory or doctrine of salvation as definitely "correct." *Genuineness* is the only touchstone for the accordance of a doctrine with reality.

Our lecturers were genuine to a man. Paul Dahlke,¹ though, was conspicuously the most genuine of all; for it was precisely the uncongenial aspect of Buddha's uncompromising doctrine impressed on the audience by this lecturer which threw into strongest relief its unconditional and complete correspondence to the speaker's own personality. Taken *per se*, Dahlke was unquestionably in the right objectively, that is, from the standpoint of every man; and this amounts to a confirmation for

¹ The greatest Buddhist of modern days; he was also an extraordinarily successful physician. He died in the spring of 1928.

us, through our personal experience, of the truth of Buddha's doctrine—so far as this doctrine constitutes an interpretation of demonstrably existing relations—as the expression of a definite cosmic standpoint, while the problem how far can be seen from Buddha's vantage remained unsolved. And did we not all feel, on that last day, that Nicolai Arseniew too, who confessed to the quite irrational doctrine,—to the “foolishness before the world” of the primitive Christian faith with its teaching of the resurrection of the flesh—was to that extent proclaiming objective truth? The physically real is, too, for the greater part irrational; no phenomenon as such can be understood. In principle, therefore, what appears irrational to the mind might be expected to appear obviously true *a fortiori* in the psychic, parapsychic, and metaphysical domains, because our soul-life consists almost chiefly of irrational processes. None other than Buddha, the man who thought most of thought, explicitly declared that there is no other way of transferring knowledge than by making it appear self-evident. He never aspired to more, because there is reasonably nothing to aspire to beyond the transfer to others of one's personal experience of reality. If, therefore, the primitive Christian expression of metaphysical experience, in the course of centuries has again and again appeared as a personal revelation to ingenuous minds and souls, because it corresponded to them personally—I am not speaking of mere believers now—this fact alone offers us proof of the accordance of that expression with reality. Naturally the interpretation of an experience may be mistaken; genuineness of personal experience cannot vouch for logical truth. But here the primary question is of *reality* in itself, irrespective of the manner in which

it is to be understood. Demonstration by experiment and logic can claim conclusive force only on the planes of possible experimentation and valid logic.

For this reason experimental and logical "counter-arguments" against experiences derived from different spheres are also irrelevant; one need only to remember that proofs carry conviction only when no doubt remains as to the reality of the object under discussion. If there is a doubt because of the absence of personal experience or because such experience is impossible (the profoundest significance of experiment is just that it aids all personal experience) there remains only one proof as to its reality: the effect produced. The unreal cannot act. This proposition, however, when applied to spiritual expression, must read as follows: positive result proves under all circumstances *symbolic* truth. Within the deepest stratum of his being every man *knows* all that immediately concerns him, because it is his own inmost reality. If, then, an expression of truth possesses the quality of self-evidence for him, this must invariably be understood as a sign that the consciousness of his *own* reality "flashes up" within him, thanks to that expression. The particular quality which touches off that flash depends on a man's natural organism. Thus, with the myth-forming type of man the myth; with the scientific type exact concepts are the most successful awakeners of understanding; and in this generation for the primitively-minded what is conceptually erroneous (the success of Christian Science is a case in point) is often more successful in arousing comprehension than the conceptually correct. But as objective knowledge continues unceasingly to progress, and so destroys the viability of

such forms of experience as cannot hold their own against the criticism of science, *in the long run* only those expressions exert a positive effect which are not only symbolically, but also scientifically true—expressions, that is, which completely correspond to the intended meaning.

But how, to reverse the question, is one to know whether such an expression is genuine in the sense as we have developed it above? The answer is: again by their effect. Understanding is a primary phenomenon of life; it admits of no further reduction. Genuineness, as having a definite effect, is a *fact* of experience. He who, after adequate training, cannot as easily perceive whether a person he meets is genuine in his expression as his eyes perceive natural objects, does not count, in the sphere of wisdom; for he is blind. A personal equation of some kind is always left over as an ultimate irreducible. If the congruent experiences of fools are believed to adduce stronger proof than the singular experience of genius, such a claim proves one thing only: democratic prejudice.

From all this it follows that the individual should never ask to be taken as genuine; as having achieved in his specific mode of being, a congruence between meaning and expression. It is for experience to show the significance to others of his peculiar personality. All verbal arguments are futile in this field. I shall, then, only *confess*—this is the adequate term—in what is going to follow, how the unity of significance of the present session presents itself to my mind. Whether I am holding an objectively correct view of it or whether I am giving you a distorted picture will be shown by the lasting effect of it.

IF TODAY you will think back to the introductory lecture, you will see to what extent the particular cases which have been brought to your notice since then fill in the framework set up at that time. Life on all its different planes is a temporal process whose coming into existence coincides with its ceasing to be. Life proceeds everywhere from death, and merges into death again. Metabolism is the universal law of life. But it is, nevertheless, nowhere the ultimate datum. As every tone which begins to sound and dies away forms at the same time a part of a pre-existing temporal unity of melody, so all life and death belong to a sense-connexion which is an *a priori* relation with respect to the individual. This holds good even on the lowest plane of physico-organic evolution. There, also, the particular "becoming" appears to be everywhere directed by a pre-existent whole, as exemplified by the spliced grub of the sea-urchin, which, though bereft of half of its cells, grows, nevertheless, to its full size. The same holds for the underworld of the instincts and impulses which psycho-analysis has explored. Here the intentional underlies all factual expressions, or speaking more generally: one life flows through all individual lives and deaths. On the plane of history, then, the ever-identical primordial phenomenon undergoes a dimensional transformation: for as here free will, the creator of values, is the determinant, with the unique individual of a single existence for its subject; and as the sense-connexion of history invariably implies the latter's destruction, history always appears as tragedy. But if now, proceeding from the historical aspect, we consider the more general view of life of the Buddha, we can say: *Every* man's life is tragic to the extent that he is endowed with spiritual

consciousness and consciousness of values. No conflict within the essential part of man admits of a solution. If one life necessarily proceeds at the cost of other lives; if it is impossible to achieve progress without incurring guilt; if every child must, for the fulfilment of its destiny, detach itself from its parents and thereby, whatever its particular attitude, *necessarily* prove ungrateful—such a fate, with all its triviality, means tragic guilt. Therefore, every saint feels himself to be a sinner, first and last. His sublimated conscience makes him suffer more deeply in what is inevitable than would the obtuse soul of a criminal who is planning a deliberate murder. To that extent life really (that is, not only in fact, but essentially) is suffering precisely in the sense of Buddha's teaching. Tragedy, when considered from this angle, is only a specific expression of universal suffering. Every man may *feel* differently. But *to think* otherwise, except for those wilfully blind, is possible for the sincere man only on the assumption that life—a process essentially determined by heteronomous factors—should rest upon the safe foundation of Grace, and that even the worst that can befall man is ordained by some superior power, not only for the good of the individual, but also for the increase of his future happiness. But the unreliability of this assumption is proved by the uneasiness in the presence of any kind of thought of those men who still hold it.

If viewed, without illusions, in its general connexion and interpreted in accordance with its empiric meaning, life *is* essentially suffering and nothing else. And whoever has understood this cannot help agreeing that Buddha's doctrine of salvation—in so far as that awareness of facts is accepted as the ultimate assumption—is

the only one which leads to surcease of suffering: *for it teaches how to destroy the life-urge and, with it, the possibility of suffering itself.* Only the man who withdraws from the round of life, says Buddha, can escape suffering. That a modification of the capacity for suffering can indeed be achieved to a high degree is amply proved by experience. Buddha's doctrine, the highest possible expression of psycho-analysis, is no doubt the most clearly glimpsed and, therefore, truest to life, the most clearly reasoned, the most consistent and courageous world-conception which an empiric and realistic mind from its particular cosmic standpoint ever devised. And as this standpoint, in spite of its difficulty of approach, is otherwise normal and such as any path leading to knowledge must pass by, it is not to be wondered that progressive thought, whenever it stops on its way to consider Buddha's position, is bound to acknowledge ever more and more its fundamental truth. Buddha was the greatest of psycho-analysts and one of the greatest epistemologists. His was an immediate experience of reality; he really understood his experience and was, therefore, freer from illusions than any other mind we know. If you read the works of Paul Dahlke—the best I know of on the subject of Buddha's doctrine—you will see that it is the most convincing illustration of the truth of Lao-tse's words: "Who sees through all with a clear sight may dispense with knowledge." For Buddha was not only no savant, but he believed theory and logical arguments quite unworthy of a perfectly awakened man.¹

Buddha's doctrine would, as a fact, be the last word

¹ Compare Dahlke, *Buddhismus als Religion und Moral*, pp. 177-178. Munich, Oskar Schloss Verlag.

of all wisdom if it did justice to reality as a whole. *But this it does not.* Buddha proceeded everywhere from the immediate experience of facts, which he subsequently determined in terms of thought, or which, more precisely, was resolved by him from the outset into thought. He constrained himself—to revert to music as the best image of life—to consider the growing and dying away of the individual tones only, even where he was aware of the presence of harmonic-melodic connexions. That in using the term “constraint” I am not making an arbitrary statement can be clearly seen from his deliberate refusal to answer any question put to him from another than his own standpoint; and can also be seen from the reiterated determination of his standpoint as a position from which the “either-or” of other ways of questioning appears transformed into a “neither-neither.” The reality recognized by Buddha was restricted to the immediate experience of facts; this reality he personally knew and he trained his followers methodically to the same kind of experience, as the only true and possible one. His prime objective was to bring about the surcease of this experience, because it meant suffering. But there are other cosmic inner standpoints besides Buddha’s. And that others are more natural particularly in regard to immediate personal experience is shown by the historic development of Buddhism itself; its original doctrine continued to live only where its inherent radical heroism, owing to the deficient intellectuality of the people in question got misinterpreted as an easy-going vegetative attitude.

The fundamental tension between meaning and appearance—which finds its empiric expression in the ten-

sion between Atman and Maya, God and the World, Faith and Knowledge—expresses the fundamental polarity of human nature, and can thus be reduced to a conciliatory central standpoint, as held by Buddha, only by doing violence to the facts. That this reconciliation was indeed an effect of violence is proved, to my mind, by what follows: first by the fact that Buddha's standpoint *forbade* the acknowledgment of a number of real conditions; second, by his doctrine to the effect that this standpoint, where it fails to correspond to a man's original disposition, is attainable by means of a rigorous technic of mortifications inducing corresponding organic transformations. Even as life from Buddha's standpoint can appear only as a painful becoming and passing away, just so, from another standpoint, which is not only equally justifiable (inasmuch as it corresponds to a possible personal experience), but affords a more comprehensive survey of all manner of experiences—it is *not* becoming and passing away, but the meaning expressed by both which proves the real ultimate.

Recall the statement made in the introductory lecture, that the question as to the nature of life ultimately coincides with that as to its *meaning*. Meaning cannot possibly be empirically given, and, therefore, an empiric mind like Buddha's is incapable of recognizing its primal reality, because it cannot perceive it. A mind of this description can see in meaning considered *per se* only a subsequent abstraction or an interpretation foisted into the facts; for such minds the quality of meaning cannot stand for more than an attribute of the process of becoming. But as a matter of fact, there is no doubt that meaning is not one of the many attributes of the process of

becoming, but the very foundation of its existence.¹ To the extent, then, that man *is* essentially "meaning," there exists also the possibility of a proximate consciousness of meaning. But the possession of this consciousness presupposes the existence of cognitive organs which Buddha appeared to lack. Now for such as possess these organs the question as to whether the reality which Buddha visioned is the ultimate and only reality does not count. For them suffering *cannot* stand for the ultimate datum, nor can its surcease represent the essential problem of life. This, then, leads us to the true appraisal of the specific deficiencies of Buddhism. The world is not only "feeding and edibility" as Paul Dahlke restates the great Hindoo's doctrine; this interpretation may, in particular cases, correspond to real experience; but when it claims to be the only possible explanation, it is a *dogma of faith*; and indeed, Dahlke, notwithstanding his acumen, belongs to the type of believers. He would not, otherwise, postulate that the possible end of life should constitute its ultimate meaning, nor would he proclaim as an ascertained fact that life is a feeding-process without a feeder. These are unsubstantiated dogmas of faith of exactly the same kind as those the Church confesses to. Buddha's doctrine of Karma, the essential meaning of which can be summed up in the statement that good and evil deeds entail necessary consequences, unquestionably fails to exhaust the meaning of the real personal experience of sin and guilt, the significance of which is certainly not that life *should* come to an end and that all views to the contrary are erroneous

¹ Compare for particulars the chapter, "Jesus der Magier," in my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*.

—a definition which, again, represents a dogmatic postulate and, moreover, that very postulate of a *pre-determinant* meaning which Buddha otherwise denies in principle. For, as a matter of fact, it is impossible to perceive the existing difference of meaning between sufferings due to sin and other sufferings if one holds, as the Buddha did, that all suffering is of one and the same kind. Because of this premise of his Buddha could not admit that there is such a thing as tragedy; he could see no difference between the historical and biological spheres, which differences indeed exist. Whatever reality could be experienced from his inner standpoint this Buddha perceived with incomparable clarity. He actually saw through all that could be seen through from his standpoint; he really saw through the meaning of all that could be seen through from his standpoint. But he was wrong concerning the Ultimate; for he *failed to recognize the fundamental truth of the primacy of the world of Meaning.*

STILL, has Buddhism really been refuted by the foregoing objections? Granted the reality of all the sense-connexions the existence of which we maintain, do they justify the sacrifice of the only real unique individual? Each of us who is sincere with himself asks, when he looks for an answer to the question as to the meaning of life, that his *personal* life should have a meaning from his personal standpoint. The welfare of the race, the advancement of humanity, or the exaltedness of heroism are not identical with this meaning. Thus, Buddha might, after all, carry his point in asserting that life is in the last resort suffering, that, therefore,

it had better not exist, and that nothing except the mortification of the will to live can ensure salvation.

The last two lecturers, Rabbi Baeck and the Russian Nicolai Arseniew, have shown you, in the form of a symbolic image, how personal life with all its sufferings, its transitoriness, and its implied tragedy has for such as possess definite possibilities of experience, an absolute meaning, precisely from the standpoint of the unique personality, a meaning which justifies all sufferings conditioned by Samsara (the vanity of living), *because it implies the triumph over death*. This was brought home to us most impressively by the image of the early Christian which Arseniew conjured back to life across the intervening ages. What Buddha regards as suffering filled the early Christian with joy. For the early Christian the individual soul is saved precisely by death and, what is more, it is saved here and "even now," as Arseniew maintains on the strength of personal experience, and not only in a hoped-for Beyond.—But joy and suffering are polar co-ordinates only up to a certain point: beyond this point joy looms as the absolute positive, even as radical good is an absolute positive as against radical evil, existence as opposed to non-existence, knowledge as against ignorance. Now Arseniew's inner standpoint, or a standpoint closely akin to his, has been held again and again. All religious geniuses, Buddha alone excepted, have adopted it single-mindedly with whatever divergent interpretations; all the great spiritualistic religions owe their existence to its possible experience. And such as could adopt this inner standpoint were *demonstrably* the great impulse-givers and uplifters of mankind. All enhancement and deepening of terrestrial life is in the end due to their influence.

The personal experience of these exceptional men has been carrying *evidence*, again and again to millions and millions of other men, just as a hitherto mute musical string begins to sound when the same is touched in another place. The experience of reality must, then, be taken for granted. Furthermore, this "evidence" proved to be an uplifting force; therefore, a reality of some higher order must have come into play. For let us keep well in mind that not suggestion as such, but only the suggestion of the Real and the True creates new realities which can continue to live. Whatever is due to illusion or conceit soon loses its vitality. *Under these circumstances there evidently exists a real sense-connexion located higher than those in which the individual entity seemed to be sacrificed to the whole; a sense-connexion, that is, which justifies this sacrifice from the personal standpoint of the sacrificed individual.* It is true that it cannot be proved by direct means that there is such a sense-connexion; but proofs in the sense of natural science and logic are altogether out of the question in the super-empiric domain. As far as the experience of the super-empiric was ever proved to be true through the effect produced, it has also been proved to be true in regard to the experience which means triumph over death. But this experience is exclusively of the spiritual order. It is shared by those only whose consciousness has been centred in the spiritual. Accordingly, it is a case of personal experience within the sphere of meaning.

The scientific age, no more than the Buddha, apprehended the reality of a primarily existing world of significance; but whereas Buddha was courageous and radical and consistent, science has shirked every serious decision. It is for that reason only that it succeeded in

accommodating its results to the scheme of an optimistic world-conception. But at the present day epistemology (the achievements of phenomenology belong in my opinion to the same class) has proved that sense-experience holds no privileged position in regard to certainty. Spiritual reality is not less real than material reality; personal experience that is not due to the senses or that is beyond the senses is as capable of adducing proof as sense-experience. Still, knowledge and comprehension are not the same; comprehension alone leads to living insight. It is to the everlasting credit of psycho-analysis that it has blazed the trail in this field of research. Its principal achievement does not consist in its having proved that all vital facts which come under its notice are only symbols, that they are comprehensible only when significance is taken as the leading standpoint, that the intentional underlies all facts—that, accordingly, man's foundation is the spiritual—but in the fact that it *actually made the world of meaning accessible to experimental proof*. Psycho-analysis has created the channels by which the abstract knowledge gained by philosophy can be made concretely understandable. Owing to this achievement, it has become possible in principle to understand how things supersensible can be real; *for if one kind of significance is experienced as a reality, then the same holds true of all kinds*.

It must be admitted, however, that psycho-analysis has not been successful in its interpretations of spiritual reality. I will give a brief survey of the facts in this place; for the psychological chapters of this book will deal with them at length. But I shall have to be all the clearer in what I have to say here because the analytical world-conception, in the opinion of its numerous ad-

herents, stands for the last word of human wisdom; so that the possibility of an adequate comprehension of religious and metaphysical personal experience depends, historically speaking, to a great extent on the realization of the absurdity of the analytical philosophy, as opposed to the positive results of research in the psycho-analytic field. We can achieve this realization best by throwing light on both analysis and Buddhism from the point of view of the introductory lecture. For the analysts, the life of the impulses is the ultimate reality of life. What is true in this conception is that all vegetable and animal parts of man's nature really are governed by impulses; the specifically-human, too, has its earthly roots in the impulses, and every life-phenomenon, the sublimest not excepted, can be interpreted *as a function* of the impulses: once life in a sense-connexion, every sense-image of which reflects all the others and can be interpreted as standing for any other of its kind, every life-expression, even though not of the impulses, has its correspondence in them. But the possibility of an interpretation does not mean that it is correct; with sense-connexions correctness is altogether dependent on the determination of the centre of relations which in *reality* functions as such. This centre in man evidently does not lie in the vegetable nor the animal, nor the strata of the impulses. All life of the impulses, to use the symbol suggested in the introductory lecture, is enacted within the strict confines of a definitely arranged melody; where new elements come in, they invariably consist—even as with physical healing and regenerative processes—only in the re-establishment of a given set of conditions; phylogenetic metamorphoses would have to be classed with them, because they are always conditioned by a surrounding world in

process of transformation, for which reason it seems that change should be interpreted here primarily as a means for maintaining the original equilibrium. But it is of the very nature of man that he not only continually invents new melodies, but that the melody also which is embodied in him is subject to metamorphoses; *because it is of his nature to reach out beyond every condition which he has attained*. As seen from the angle of the vegetable and animal worlds, it is in this that his specific nature consists. This will to progress, an essential trait of mankind, characterizes even the savage. The higher the degree of a man's development, the more the will in question determines his entire life. With the spiritually awakened this is true to the extent that they strive from the very outset to become *conquerors of themselves*—whether as saints, ascetics, heroes, leaders of men, or, at any rate, as workers refusing to indulge in natural sloth.

Here we can reintroduce Buddhism into the course of our reflections. For Buddha as well as for the modern psycho-analyst life was essentially Impulse. In this theoretical conception of the material of life they differ only in this, that the former interpreted the life of the impulses in terms of vegetable, the latter in terms of animal life.¹ But in his person Buddha is the most convincing refutation of the theory that life is only impulse; he was the greatest conqueror of self that ever existed, of an unrivalled inner freedom and power. His determination not to seek to improve life which he had recognized as suffering, but to destroy it from within by thought, nay, his intention to withdraw from the round of life with an affable smile—a thing the gods them-

¹ For particulars compare the Ceylon chapter of my *Travel Diary*.

selves could not do—is in itself proof that Buddha's personal centre lay far beyond the life of the impulses. It lay, as a fact, in the implicitly premised ultimate freedom of man as a thinking being, which he only fails to stress because his specific standpoint forbade him to be aware of its existence. Nevertheless, Buddha explicitly proclaimed that man always produces himself from his own resources, and that he represents, as a conscious spirit, the force of nature grown "self-illuminated"—and a force, according to him, can never have been inexistent nor ever cease to operate, *unless the recognition that it can destroy itself flashes up in consciousness and self-destruction becomes the conscious goal*. This, however, implies the corollary: Life can never cease to be, unless freedom itself elects the end, and the will unto life thus is reversed into will unto final death. As opposed to this, psycho-analysis persists in maintaining that life of the impulses is the ultimate vital reality, and that salvation can come only by freeing those impulses which had somehow or other been repressed.

From this vantage point we can proceed to the positive definition of the real connexion.¹ Those who are at all spiritually conscious recognize as an obvious truth that the sense-connexion of man's life has its centre *above* the sphere of the instincts. It is untrue to maintain that the satisfaction of man's urges suffices in itself to make life worth living. The tensions within these impulses are never, nor anywhere, the Ultimate for man. They are, however, the necessary conditions for all higher

¹ The ultimate exposition of the ideas presented in this chapter is given, on the foundation of all the preceding chapters, in the last but one of this book (the religious problem).

sense-realizations.¹ One can play on taut strings only; one can shoot only with a drawn bow. His vegetable and animal parts are for man only an instrument; he himself is the player or the archer. It is thanks only to these tensions that he is a being who ever strives upward and onward, never finding satisfaction in a merely biological state of equilibrium. Here spiritualists of the occultist persuasion misunderstand the true situation almost as badly as the analytical positivists: they would deliver man from the "impurity" of his physical and psychic body, unaware that this "impurity," at times, proves the indispensable condition of spiritual realization. The pathological conditions of bodily and psychic life cannot be a finality for man, because they represent those dissonances which await solution on higher planes, utterly impossible without them. For this reason man must also not only give his assent to, but really love the Tragic, as he actually does; for in the very insolvability of the tragic condition lies the tension his deepest being demands in order to manifest itself on earth. Correspondingly the law of polarity always expresses itself in the case of man in *insolvable* tensions—insolvable, again, in so far as man is man, that is, a being superior to the animal type—and wills to remain so. The tension between the sexes comes to an end with beasts with the act of copulation; with man it is everlasting; in vain that man and woman forever seek to merge their natures into each other, that they try to understand each other. The insolvable tension between

¹The precise argument in favor of this statement will be found in the chapter of this book devoted to psycho-analysis and also in the chapter of my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*, headed, "*Von der Productivität des Unzulänglichen*," ("The Productiveness of the Inadequate").

ideal and reality represents the primary condition for any upward movement. And, finally, the tension between God and man enacted in man's innermost soul, whatever be its interpretation, a tension utterly unresolvable, because it is infinite, creates the very possibility of spiritual uplift; this tension stands indeed (this truth was first consciously apprehended and eloquently set forth in the Bible) for the origin of all our Occidental striving towards the infinite. There never was progress where there was no tension.

Tension in the lower spheres is thus, as has been proved by experience, the prime condition for all manifestations of a higher life. Deeper sense-connections insert themselves into terrestrial life in exact proportion to the chances of expression created for them by new tensions. It is only through such reflections that we can understand why man, who, as a mind and spirit, represents the crowning work of creation, should be at the same time, biologically, the most imperfect animal, and at any rate the animal that suffers. Biologically speaking, man is no longer progressing. Edgar Dacqué even maintains that man represents in this respect an extremely ancient atavism reaching back to mesozoic forms of life. The fact is, man's evolution proceeds in an altogether different dimension, in another direction than the material world's. Therefore, his nature can never be adequately understood in terms of the earth. Therefore, he must be essentially the animal that suffers, and, the nearer he comes to the realization of the desires which urge him on the more he is in danger. For the tensions which he must unify within himself and subdue to his sway are continually on the increase.

Our time acclaims Dostoyevsky as a prophet chiefly

because the types created by him incarnate, in however uncouth a form, far greater tensions than any historic type ever did, and because the new culture on a higher plane to which we all aspire is possible on the basis of these higher tensions only. So we see that the truly human life only begins with the *conquest* of the kind of life which comprises the whole of life in the eyes of the orthodox psycho-analyst. The promise of salvation held out by analysis corresponds at best to those religions of waning antiquity which held that man's salvation was bound up with his identification with nature as a becoming and vanishing process. They were overcome by Christianity, which denied the world because this religion was above nature and for that very reason really in accord with man's true being.

WE ARE now ready to understand the real nature of the sense-connexion to which man belongs beyond both nature and history. Let us, by way of an introduction, proceed to a simplifying consideration of the relation between antique paganism and Christianity. Christianity's most salient characteristics are two negatives which both Nietzsche and analysis point out as such: The acquiescence in ill health and the emphasis of the consciousness of guilt. Illness was regarded as the true state of the Christian, and his relation of guilt before God was held to be indissoluble on the part of man. Pagan man was indubitably the more perfect of the two; his *kalokagathia*, where realized, meant true perfection. But it is also meant, for this very reason, an end; and, indeed, it had undergone a transformation towards brutalization even before the Christ-impulse began to take effect. Within a world of

growth and decay every perfection is doomed to death. And wherever the stress is at all laid on what has been accomplished and is mature, there is neither a principle nor a motive by which new life might grow out of what is passing away. The essential achievement of Christianity, then, consists in its having built such a principle into history. Christianity, as the first world-conception of our own sphere of culture, did not look upon ultimates, realities, the earthly dissonances, but as symptoms of tensions between two strata of living realities. It thereby reinterpreted illness, sin, and guilt into ways unto salvation *without depriving them of their characteristics*.

This new meaning which Christianity gave to the facts of life was indeed true to reality. Physical ailments *are* on the one hand the external expressions of psychic discords; consciousness of guilt, acts of self-destruction, desire for death *are* always at one and the same time throes of birth; for in a world of becoming and passing away the New can spring into existence only at the cost of that which had already existed. The inner decision of Christianity, then, converted these qualities into recognized facts on which the emphasis was henceforth to be laid; for in the case of a life-process susceptible of several interpretations the ultimately correct interpretation is entirely a matter of man's inner decision.

Thanks to this new meaning given to life, Occidental humanity has, both in principle and consciously, become the player and archer of the metaphor introduced above. And the historic effect observed proved that thereby, something real and not fictitious—as far as this term has meaning here—has been built into the world of events. It is true that the Christian world has until now fallen

considerably short of the realization of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth intended by Jesus—it has rather proved to be a black magician; but it has developed spiritual power in all the fields to which it turned its attention, a power which can only be traced back to a “beyond” of the earlier spheres of life.¹ But I hasten to add that a similar power has radiated from the Buddha-impulse; the meaning he gave to life was also a plausible one, that is, it was virtually in accord with reality. This is why it succeeded in transforming the whole East, directly or indirectly, to a degree surpassing, *prima facie*, the transformative influence of Christianity. Since man in the end is free, he can indeed “divest” himself of the world. Still, as life is basically significance (a fact which alone explains Buddha’s influence; for otherwise cognizance and obviousness could not have creative effect), a doctrine stressing the meaninglessness of life is necessarily incomplete. It was thus not the intrinsic content of Buddha’s doctrine which became a world-impulse, but rather the magnetism of Buddha’s personality. If Christianity has proved far more potent and fruitful of results than Buddhism, the reason is that the premise of the meaning of life is truer to reality than that of its meaninglessness.

Life, then, ultimately belongs to a Beyond of what is empirically demonstrable. Let us now try to determine the meaning of the last sense-connexion under discussion as distinguished from the sense-connexions applying to organic life and history. Wherein lies its difference from the latter? They too are interrelated,

¹ Compare the determination of this “beyond” and of the meaning of the Christ-impulse in a general sense in the chapter, “*Jesus der Magier*,” in my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*.

as melodies in regard to single tones. The difference is that whereas, within the latter connexions, the individual appears to be sacrificed to the whole, in the former *the stress is ultimately placed precisely on the individual and his salvation*. In this respect the metaphysical and religious experiences of all peoples and all ages are absolutely clear. Buddha, who denies that a substantial Self proceeds from one incarnation to another, teaches, nevertheless, that man represents a purely *self*-constituted force, which means that he is not essentially descended from his parents, but from a primordial impulse in the subjective series of phenomena, through the becoming and passing away of egos. And this again amounts to teaching, though with a different interpretation, the very same which constitutes the core of all doctrines of immortality: *viz.*, that also from the merely personal standpoint personality is not the Ultimate. And this sameness alone matters here, where earthly consciousness is quite incapable of representing a form of life which does not obey its own norms. Moreover, in laying all the emphasis on the possibility of the surcease of life, Buddha imparts to it a clearly defined meaning and, with his hierarchy of states of consciousness ending in Nirvana, he even truly posits by implication a melody of reality beyond and above the becoming and passing away of tones; it is, therefore, only natural that the vast majority of Buddhists should have misunderstood his doctrine of salvation for a positive doctrine of immortality. If all eschatologies, the Buddhist included, are focussed into a collective survey from the vantage of their significance (as I have done in my work *Immortality*), and likewise all individual metaphysical experiences we know of, we

cannot help realizing that their meaning is everywhere the same. This meaning is always that there exists, beyond the organic and historic spheres, a real sense-connexion in the dimension of which life and death do *not* proceed at the cost of the individual. The individual is, on the contrary, preserved in some way or another.

But let us turn from Buddha for the moment. The reality of a trans-subjective sense-connexion, as the last resort of Life, can be clearly demonstrated by experience even this side of death. We have already pointed out that man's desire for progress is an essential element of his nature. Every man who is not a beast continually desires to become more than what he is. This desire must be fulfilled, on the basis of the facts which Buddha was first to comprehend in their full significance: he showed that the empiric ego is a *process*, fed and sustained by man's volitions, thoughts, and decisions, so that the mere effort towards the higher suffices to create it; the mere effort to acquire knowledge induces a better knowledge, and the mere will to rise makes for attainment. Only because this is so can man "grow into" higher conditions; for this reason alone does the urge unto power grow with the achievement of power, and eagerness with its satisfaction. But the psychic body is as limited as the physical. Where the will to rise strives beyond the form limits drawn by the original disposition, it must needs burst through these confines. This fact conditions in the domain of the impulsive life procreation within the species, and metamorphosis within the physico-individual series—from the embryonic evolution to the fate of the caterpillar which ends as the butterfly; it conditions in each case the departure from the phe-

nominal existence of the previous living form! ¹ The same facts condition, on the psychic plane, the *metamorphosis* of the Ego which takes place as soon as the growth of the existing being can no longer express its inmost striving.

A few examples will make this perfectly clear. How can repentance actually annul the past? Because, by a psycho-chemical process, the earlier elements which made up the combination are disintegrated, much as the elements of the caterpillar are disintegrated in the chrysalis, and because a new personality springs into life which, being new-born, is actually freed of the guilt of the original personality. Why did Jesus teach that the Ego must die? Why must, according to Him, every man pass through the narrow gate of death, if he is to obtain life eternal? Because that which most men realize as their whole Ego is but a fraction of their total personality; it is actually only the bundle of their urges unto power. In the nature of things love, yielding, and sacrifice are as natural to, that is, as innate in, man as is selfish greed; only the former faculties lie for the most part outside of consciousness, in an undeveloped state, or they come into play only in the deeply rutted tracks

¹ Compare what is said in *Creative Understanding* on the metaphysical justification of death: " 'Meaning' is realized in this world only by its finding expression. This expression originally consists in a first creation and subsequently in a continually renewed enlivening of that which, outwardly, is mere repetition. This enlivening process, though, lasts only as long as 'meaning' has not exhausted its potentialities in the form it inhabits. No sooner has this taken place, and meaning reached its goal, than the latter congeals into dead nature, and thenceforth events proceed according to mechanical laws. . . . Dead nature is thus the inescapable fate of all spirit which has become realized."

of the life of the species, as in mother love and conjugal love. What is necessary is that they be drawn into the self-consciousness of the personality; for it is not before this has taken place that personality has completely realized itself, in the sense of full integration. Such processes of integration, however, can no more be achieved without the abandonment of one's Ego and without the ensuing actual end of it, as an independent unity, than a body can grow without the accompanying loss of independence on the part of the cells which constitute it. This is why the same man, Jesus, taught that only such as lose their lives shall find them.

Now wherever transforming renewal has occurred, it has been termed *rebirth*. And very properly so: for what springs into life then is indeed a new man; not indeed another man than the one born of the flesh; the *same* man is born anew. All new phenomena spring into existence within life by way of birth. Recognition, will, conscious striving, initiative—in a word, everything pertaining to the Logos—plays, on the plane of spiritual and psychic progress, the rôle of the male principle which fecundates, and must fecundate, in order that new life shall come to be, but it cannot give birth. The ability to bring forth to birth belongs to those phenomena only which partake of the nature of Eros, of the Irrational, of the female soul. Because, then, two polar opposites must fuse in order to call into existence what the Logos meant, and because in their fusion the poles die as independent elements, the New stands, in the spiritual and psychic domain as well, in the same relation to that which passes away as does the child in regard to the gametes of its parents. This is not an explanation, but the statement of an ascertained fact; for there can be

no explanations of the whys of life. The word rebirth is, then, an expression relating to fact; it has nothing to do with mythological presuppositions: the individual really experiences, in the case in question, without ceasing to be exactly what the species experiences in its life-process along and through the individuals that pass away.

We have now arrived at the point of vantage from which the comparison between Life and Music reveals its complete significance. We found that the reality of life does not lie in the dimension of the single tones, but in that of the *melody*, that is, of a super-sensible sense-connexion. This explains the phenomena of transformation and rebirth. *Why* does every man take it as a matter of course that he *has a destination or a mission* in life? Buddha did this also; for he could not otherwise have related the ascent and descent of the Samsara to values; if he did not do so explicitly, if he spoke of suffering only and the law of Karma, this was due to his individual standpoint: he certainly was aware of the facts. Why does every spiritually intelligent man regard his life not as a mere process of transformations from one state to another, but as a *fulfilment of meaning*, as a task to which he is equal or unequal? Because every man finds his own personal centre—and not only his ideal position in the species and history—in the *unity of the melody* and not in the particular single tones which he incarnates within the unity. *He thus feels that he is something other and more than what can come to life and pass away.* And finally he feels himself as the *meaning* of his own birth and dying away—as his destiny and at the same time its lord. This then proves the truth of two things which seem to exclude each other,

in so far as in these ultimate relations anything at all may be proved. First, Buddha's Anatta theory. It is indubitably *not* the same man who is born, transformed, and reborn, whether in the limits of one life or in those of many lives; the Ego is a *process*, and no experience forces us to admit that there is a substantial Self independent of the laws of transformation. He who would adduce, by way of refutation, the identity of self-consciousness loses sight of the fact that the sense-connexion in question is not of an objective, but of a trans-subjective nature, that, consequently, becoming and passing away proceed in this case in the series of a possible consciousness of identity in spite of death, in exactly the same sense as they do, in the biological and historical sphere, in the continuous existence of nations and races through the passing away of their members.

The second thing proved to be true is no less a thing than—*Immortality*. There is no doubt as to the virtual (though not *de facto*) immortality of the species and nations, for the reason that these exist exactly on account of the birth and death of their actual representatives. But in exactly the same sense, the life of individual man consists in the becoming and passing away of his states and Egos which conjointly play a melody which is as such sense-realization. Now this sense-realization could be held to be completed in the course of natural life if the deepest meaning of man's life lay in the biological sphere. But it does not lie there; no man understands the meaning of his life thus. It is when his life is essentially a conquest of self that man feels he is leading a really human life. For this reason he prefers premature and unnatural death to a late and natural death in case the former gives his life a fuller meaning. If we now

link up this fact with the other, that the desire to rise, the desire to transcend oneself really makes man—a desire which never attains its fulfilment within the given space of time—then the conclusion is convincing *that not only the melody of the life of the species and the life of history, but also that of individual existence includes death*; and not only that death which means the threshold of rebirth in this life, but also that death which ends it finally. And this means: man knows that he is an essentially timeless being, even as melody as a whole is a timeless entity as against the sounding and dying away of the single tones.

Immortality is thus proved to exist to the extent that sense-perception is realized. If man actually experiences himself as a timeless being which finds its expression only in endless becoming and passing away, then he cannot be destroyed by these. If the Timeless is experienced essentially as a force, then, as Buddha rightly concluded, it can never have been non-existent. And if this Timelessness which is mirrored by self-consciousness is “Meaning”—how can it die? It can only step out of the world of appearance, even as a truth which, for a time, becomes lost to sight. Finally, all Meaning realizes itself from within outward and by means of free subjects: this can only mean that it lives in its own right.

WITH this last step we have reached the summit from which the whole of life, as far as it can be experienced, can be surveyed in all its interconnexions. I will give my final conclusions without further explanations or proofs. Think back to the 1923 session of the School of Wisdom: There is inbuilt in the external cosmos extended in space and time, the dimen-

sion of pure inwardness, a spiritual cosmos of the same infinity. It is related to the external cosmos just as meaning is to expression. Life's meaning and origin reside within it. Therefore, the problem of life is identical with the problem of the meaning of life. Therefore, the plenitude of life is dependent on the depth it is rooted in meaning. Therefore, there is progress only in the inward direction. Therefore, sense-realization is the one practical problem of life. The trends of thought we have followed up this time have led us to much clearer insight into the way of sense-realization. It leads everywhere, and on all planes and dimensions, through becoming and passing away by the alternating of tones, chords, motives, and definite melodies. Man lives at the same time on all these planes and dimensions. He grows and vanishes both as an organic and historic and as an intellectual and spiritual being. Every individual belongs as much to the whole of the external as to the sense-connexion of the spiritual cosmos. Therefore, each individual also embodies in his uniqueness a cosmic situation at every moment. Therefore, there is, practically, no distinguishing between what a man does and what he suffers. For he is always a tone of a melody as well as a tone in a chord; and as a melody he is again determined by a superior whole. Be he never so free, he must still fulfil his destiny. If, on the one side of his freedom, natural necessity determines him, on the other he is subject to a power whose indubitable existence theology interprets as the Supernatural and Divine Grace. Thus, no individual can be understood in his particular mode of being unless he be regarded in his connexion with the whole. Abstractions are indeed possible: man certainly can be appraised in a one-sided sense

from the standpoint of his particular physiology, his impulses, his historical significance, his inner growth—but as a matter of fact all this forms an indissolvable whole; for the cosmos pursues its evolution as a whole. There are spirits of the times, tasks and destinies imposed on particular times. But where lies the emphasis of significance? Where it lies “in itself” no one can say: we must halt at the borderline concept of Divinity. For practical life as it exists, however, the answer is sufficiently clear: *the emphasis of significance lies, in every given case, at every moment, in the spiritual essence of the individual man who asks the question.* Only he who refers the whole sense-connexion of life to *himself* in every particular case understands it correctly. For in the deepest self of every individual resides the only possible centre of co-ordination for him, inasmuch as it is the only one he can experience. For this Self is the very centre of the melodious sense-connexion of the whole life of mankind as it must appear from the particular individual’s point of view. But this sense-connexion is, again, part of a greater whole: therefore, every individual must, precisely in order to live for himself, serve the Whole. It is as impossible to disengage oneself from the spiritual cosmos as from the external world. Man can realize himself only as a member of this cosmos.

Thus, man’s reality reaches beyond his person on all planes. Just as he has, as an organic being, his groundwork of existence in the Species, and, as an historical being, in the historic connexion, just so he has his foundation, as a spiritual being, in the timeless significance of his temporal and personal life. But every one of these real sense-connexions includes death. Under these conditions there can be no question that those aims which

death mocks at do not represent finality. In pursuing these aims, man really intends something essentially different from them. *Then his will is in the last analysis everywhere set only upon progress beyond his given limitations.* Now this applies, as proved, to every man, however insignificant he be. And this recognition displaces all problems of temporal and empiric life. Suffering is not the ultimate of life, as indeed it is never felt to be under normal conditions; on the contrary, Buddha's true statement requires an interpretation opposed to the one he gave; since life is suffering, there is nothing more terrible for man than the inability to suffer. And in the same way we can understand the problem of history's failure: History is not an end in itself; therefore, no end, however bad it be, not even a bad end, can prove that it had no meaning. And the problem of the Tragic is solved in a like manner: in carrying freedom to its utmost expression, tragedy enhances the meaning of life. Man in his essential being stands above becoming and passing away; it only manifests itself through them. Therefore, the Samsara is no essential evil—it is just the becoming and passing away which man requires for his full self-expression. Man does not desire at bottom anything else than this life of suffering, this bitter life, the climax of which is not happiness, but tragedy; he could not stand any other life, *precisely because another would be devoid of meaning.* If this is so, then not only that man who does not think beyond the moment and drives every experience of suffering out of his consciousness and memory can find life beautiful: he too is able to do so, who experiences becoming and dying from such a depth of meaning, that he understands the transient at every moment as an expression of the eternal.

Let us return now to the conclusion of the introductory lecture. We said then that only he who has found his personal centre in the *fundamental tone* of Life's music experiences every surprise as full of meaning; and we held out prospects, as the result of the session, for the solution of the enigma, how it is possible that man, whose whole empiric being is of the temporal, wills and means, and even understands the eternal only. Are we not, now, entitled to say: how could it be otherwise? It is indeed only from the timeless (melody) that the temporal (the becoming and dying away of tones) can be understood, because the foundation of the latter resides in the former. . . . But here I must stop. He who is not satisfied with the recognition that Life is in its deepest aspect meaning and, *therefore, immortal*, demands more of the Logos than it can perform. To understand is not the same as to live. How should it be possible to make clear what the immortal part of Life really means, in what respect that reality which the mind can grasp only as a "meaning" is alive, and in what sense the feeling of identity can continue throughout the changing egos? Most probably there corresponds to every stage of the trans-subjective sense-connexion, a definite range of experience; those who know it are indeed entitled to tell of it. But I have no personal experience of the Beyond. It would, therefore, amount to a presumption on my part, were I to give any positive statements as to its nature. Does individual man, as a monad, remain the same eternally, or does he disintegrate? Precisely the Christian experience of incarnation leads one to think that here is a solution of continuity at a certain point of the trans-subjective series. If the

Holy Ghost descending upon Jesus is maintained to have transformed Him into the Son of God; if God is declared to have spoken again and again by the mouth of man; if God, according to the fundamental idea of the Reformed Faith, is ever the subject of religious experience; or if St. Paul was empowered to say, that not he lived, but God lived within him—so, if we take for granted the reality of these experiences, we approach the meaning that rebirth ultimately passes through a process of flux, so that what really takes place is a change of the subject, in the absolute sense. Certainly the individual free subject belongs in its turn to more comprehensive connexions determining his own processes—Christianity comprises them under the name of Grace. How things really are—I do not know. Only he who can in very sincerity avow that he, like Christ, hath life eternal within him on this earth, or who, like Buddha, can avow that he is completely awakened—only a personally reborn or resurrected man is entitled to offer opinions. Am I to say what I personally believe to be probable? It seems out of the question to me that self-consciousness should die with death. It seems unthinkable to me that the typical way of sense-realization, the way of becoming and passing away, should be abandoned with death, and that there forthwith life eternal should begin; therefore, I hold the doctrine of reincarnation, as the rule for the norm, to be the most probable. But on the other hand, I cannot believe that reincarnation should be the fate of all. Necessity governs life in the inverted ratio of awakened freedom: The more a being has become “self-illumined” as Dahlke, following Buddha, so adequately determines the predominance of

freedom *versus* necessity, the more, correspondingly, sense-realization is directed by the empiric subject, the richer the possibilities should become. Thus, a man of the overpowering superiority of a Buddha might actually cease to exist, if he so wills. He would thus prove himself to be literally the eccentric outstepping the measure of life, the eccentric whom it so pleases to decline, so far as he is concerned, even that which means fulfilment in the Universe.

Within an infinite world there surely exist many possibilities. Nor would the resurrection from the dead in the literal sense have to be excluded from these. Inasmuch as meaning creates the facts, completely fulfilled meaning—the symbol of the Day of Judgment presumably means as much—may also re-establish an earlier state of things. It is not incumbent on the School of Wisdom to confess any faith. Its only task is to show the way to sense-perception and sense-realization. It thus addresses itself only to understanding individuals or to such as want to understand. It deals exclusively with the Logos-aspect of Life. It teaches nothing but deeper Understanding. Does it do too little in doing so?—It does all that man *per se* is able to do in order that rebirth should come to pass. All other events must come to pass by themselves. To conclude, then, a few more words about Buddha. We have seen in what respect Buddhism does *not* lie on the same plane with the great religions. Obviously any man with a corresponding personal outlook may elect to confess Buddhism. But, henceforth, humanity will be able to recognize the nature of the inner boundaries revealed by such a choice. There is a better way of ending suffering than that shown by

Buddha: It is the way of *willing* suffering and death as a means unto higher sense-realization. Whoever has realized that his being is something beyond the range of becoming and passing away, to him Buddha's Ultimate is *no problem* at all. . . . But I must not end this session with a criticism of that mind which saw deeper through the empiric reality of life as a becoming and passing away than any other man born; I will rather conclude by showing that the true hour of Buddha, too, is only just approaching. Every spirit who correctly determined his own cosmic standpoint and who achieved an agreement of meaning and expression, is symbolically right for each and all. As a matter of fact, he is right within the actual limits of its range of vision. For such as have realized this fundamental truth the primitive question as to whether mankind should repudiate or adopt Buddhism no longer arises: what is true to reality in Buddhism will inevitably, and as a matter of course, continue to live and become more and more as understanding progresses, an integral part of the spiritual cosmos. For Buddha was truly great. The Buddha alone in the whole course of history understood the full importance of the fact that thought, or more precisely understanding, is in its nature creative, and that, therefore, understanding is the thing most needful on earth. He used his understanding for the purpose of destroying the world. But it can be used as well for the purpose of raising the world to a higher level. This is what we are undertaking. The School of Wisdom is the antipode of Buddhism. But it reveres, in the person of its creator, the historic genius who first created reality out of understanding thought.

D. NECESSITY AND FREEDOM

I

Freedom and Law

IN ORDER to assign the problem of Freedom to its proper place in the universal scheme of reality, it is necessary to proceed from the fundamental fact that no single domain exists in which statistics of probabilities based upon the laws which govern large numbers will not yield material for predictions. We must start from this as a basic fact; for only from such a vantage point can we gain an unbiased and comprehensive survey of all that is subject to law in the world of experience. Try as often as we will, statistics invariably prove that two and two make four. However inadequately the ways of heredity are as yet understood, statistics have definitely proved that, when referred to the laws which govern large numbers, they invariably obey definite general rules. The same applies to all natural processes. And this holds good not only in the sense that statistics everywhere reveal conformity to laws; it applies principally to the fact that laws qualitatively *differing* from those of statistics cannot, without prejudice, be proved to exist within the whole range of experience. The concept of natural laws, as representing a mysterious and independent reality in the sense of the Platonic Idea, does not resist a mature criticism. Modern physics do not claim anything more for its best established laws

than that they define comprehended relationships which are of universal validity, expressible in the form of mathematical equations, inasmuch as statistics invariably prove their validity. The old mysterious concept of natural law adopted first in the domain of natural science under the impression of the wonderful order of the cosmos was the first to go; because natural science had been first to establish the fact that from the viewpoint of conformity to law there is no difference between cosmos and chaos: The great laws of mechanics rule both. This is why, when at a later period it was established that the reflex movements of organisms and the reactions of the soul also keep to fixed orbits which may be as well described as mechanisms as are the orbits of the heavenly bodies, nobody thought any longer of hypostatizing these laws as independent realities. But on the other hand, it was modern psychology which was first in the field to offer the proof that there does not exist anything on earth which is not conceivable within the scheme of determinate laws. We are, therefore, justified in proceeding without further proofs from the assertion that, whatever occurs, it invariably does so in a determinate manner. There are no such things as lawless processes, whatever the reason for this may be. We are, moreover, entitled to assert that, as laws are nothing in themselves, and yet can be abstracted from all facts, wherever thinking man encounters reality *they represent the intellectual aspect of the Real*. In so far as we reflect upon the world, the existence of laws is as indubitable as that of the world itself. In so far as we do not reflect upon the world, the mere question as to the existence of natural law is devoid of meaning.

This, then, helps us to understand the meaning of a most important fact: however completely the existence of laws may be proved, the *substance* of what occurs is nowise explained by the proof of their existence. Not only is it impossible for the intellect to explain further any "particular modes of being"—neither atomistic nor electrodynamic theories explain the qualities of chemical bodies, nor do acoustics or harmonics explain the qualities of tones—but *the connexion of reality which can be grasped intellectually belongs itself to an essentially non-rational greater whole*. This is briefly shown by the consideration that every definite natural law has its starting-point in the non-rational. It can never be explained *why* precisely one law and no other prevails in a particular case: the rationally understandable aspect of every reality presupposes in the final instance its irrational "actuality." We must, therefore, begin by accepting the differentiation of things and events as they are; only *after* that comes the question of comprehension. This state of things proves more clearly than anything else the superiority of Kant as a thinker. Kant knew by implication—though he did not say so in so many words—that things are as represented by us here. Accordingly, his critique did not start from the question as to how the Real might be deduced from the Understandable: his question was: *granted* there is such a thing as experience, how is it possible? *Granted* there is such a thing as nature, how is it to be conceived? His starting-point lay parallel with the boundary post of the non-rational, which he accepted as such; and he located this point, and justly so from his own premises, within the thinking subject.

THUS, every law that can be proved to exist presupposes a determinate existence and mode of being. What, then, may be the most comprehensive concept in which we can comprise this Irreducible and Inexplainable without bias? It is the concept of the accidental. This is so, however little the intellect may like it. For if this concept is combated on the ground that the law of causation is absolutely and universally valid, causality itself is reduced to absurdity: if *everything* is necessitated, the concept of causality does not transcend the concept of non-rational given experience. And, indeed, if "causative connexion" is regarded from the corresponding point of view, it is only another expression for "that which is given." Accordingly, the question as to causes can be reasonably raised only within the sphere of this given experience. Wherever this has not been understood, there has presented itself the postulate of a First Cause which, as a causeless cause, is self-contradictory as a concept. The same obtains for the conception of a *causa sui*. As opposed to this conception, that of an absolutely transcendent and, within the laws of the intellect, incomprehensible World Creator is the most plausible precisely from the scientific viewpoint, because it is formed on the basis of a minimum of prejudices. One may in this case say: from the human standpoint it is a matter of accident that reality is such as it is: the Accidental, in its turn, presupposes Arbitrariness. Now Arbitrariness in this sense of primary dynamics is known to everyone through his experiences with himself: whether primary urges, libido, character—something which in itself cannot be grasped, which at the same time proves to be procreative, lies everywhere at the bottom of all particular modes of being; this can be proved as

a fact, though never explained. It goes without saying that, personally, I do not adopt this formula. But I state that it is more tenable from the scientific standpoint than any other which endeavours to comprehend something beyond that which is given on the basis of the intellectual postulates. This judgment applies equally to the connexion of events in conformity with law beyond and above the will of the gods, in which the Greeks believed, such as Plato's doctrine of ideas, Laotse's world of validities, and Rickert's realm of "necessity." Unless we resign ourselves to that which is given in the broadest sense as the last resort, we are inevitably brought up against the Accidental and, beyond this, against Arbitrariness, and thus something so utterly irrational that not even a partial aspect of it is comprehensible.

Let us, therefore, accept that which is given as the last resort. But then, as shown by the foregoing considerations, we must take its connexion, subject to law, for granted as a primary phenomenon also! And it would seem, now, as though the circle of possible understanding were closed. It is indeed closed, from the standpoint reached so far. But this does not mean that we have reached the objective borderline of understanding: just that which brought our preceding trains of thought to a close has, in doing so, precisely proved that they can be continued in another direction. *The fact is that the range of all conceivable cognition lies within that circle.* We thus gain a new starting-point for dealing with the problem of freedom. Whatever be the nature of freedom—*freedom as opposed to law certainly does not exist.* Or even if it did exist in itself, we could conceive it only so far as it operates in conformity to

laws. It was Professor Driesch who called attention to the crucial argument in this connexion (though he did not draw from it the conclusions anticipated above; he rather used it to confirm a thesis which we cannot accept): if a single case of absolute freedom could be proved, it would be quite impossible to predict anything whatever in this world. But from what we have understood thus far another equally important deduction can be drawn: *determination by law and necessity are not equivalent ideas*. All events falling within the sphere of experience occur in conformity to laws. But whether those events in the particular cases are more readily conceivable in the category of "freedom" or that of "necessity" is another question. In principle, that which is given, which is in itself an irreducible *Irrational*, can conclude the realities corresponding to both concepts. And if we now, from this vantage, survey the events of this world as they actually are, we find, as it seems to me, that our framing of the question does justice to their richness and manifoldness as does no other framing. On the one hand, we can observe no kind of events which occur without a corresponding law; on the other, not all events take place according to the scheme of necessity. Nor do all laws belong to the same plane.

WE HAVE now reached a point where we are in a correct position to turn our attention to the problem of freedom. But before we do so it will be well to realize more clearly still than we have done up to now in what sense all determination by law is the same. We found that if an event occurs in obedience to law, this means in principle no more than this: if a particular event be given, experience proves that it leads under

given conditions to what follows. That this formula is correct within the sphere of experimental science is self-evident. But are not things different in mathematics or, more generally speaking, in logic? Is not the necessity which rules the thinking process a necessity of a higher and more cogent kind than the so-called natural necessity? It is not; for when viewed from a higher vantage it *means* the same as natural necessity. The reason in the case of thought that no experiment is needed to establish the laws; that we seek for no causes for occurrences in this sphere, and that we do not feel necessity to be a constraint imposed upon us, is that, as thinking beings, we ourselves incarnate the laws of thought. Here within ourselves lies *the same* which in the outer world we abstract from experience. On the other hand, logical necessity is by no means more categorically cogent than is any other necessity in the sphere of life. It is quite possible to think wrongly. Only, in this case, nonsense is the result. And, likewise, an experiment in physical science can just as well succeed as fall short of its object. In all these cases it can be proved, according to the law of necessary and sufficient reason, that the event was necessary. The imperfection of this comparison, which can be found in the fact that error is out of the question in nature, bound by law, is no argument against our statement of the case; because we found that the concept of determination by law in itself does not imply any bias in favour of either the necessity or the freedom of events. There are causal series of more or less determinate quality. Where, as in the case of all that lives, a chain of causation seems not to be completely determined, we must differentiate between positive and negative ends; here the self-destruction of the "wrong" leads

by a round-about way to the very point which inevitable processes reach directly.¹

This trend of thought is most important; for it creates a basis from which the laws of what should be can be surveyed along with those of natural growth, while new light is also thrown on the problem of death. Disregard of the basic laws of ethics leads in the long run to self-destruction. This signifies exactly the same as the self-annulment of erroneous thinking in the act of self-contradiction. Likewise, all phenomena which have become contrary to sense in their actual form are doomed to die. History offers a single illustration of this truth.² The same, however, holds good on the biological plane. Determinate differential equations must pass through moments of discontinuity at determinate points. I do not doubt that some day science will succeed in conceiving the finiteness of the concrete life-series—especially in the domain of hereditary processes—in terms of mathematical necessity.

And this vantage point permits us also to understand more deeply why all ultimately given cannot be further explained. Elementary mathematics proceed from a number of axioms as finalities for which no basis can be established. These axioms do not appear to us as arbitrary, because we approach reality from them. But they are arbitrary from the standpoint of higher mathematics; for other axioms than these are formally constructible, and, on the basis of this elementary calculus,

¹ Compare the proof that the possibility of a Logic of History is based on this very fact, presented in the chapter, "The True Problem of Progress," in my book, *The World in the Making*.

² Compare the chapter, "The Symbolism of History," in my book, *Creative Understanding*.

can lead to spatial and numerical formations entirely different from those known or knowable through immediate experience. It follows that there resides in man's own mode of being, independently of the whole outer world, a last resort, an ultimate premise which can neither be explained nor demonstrated, which we simply have to take as it is. Now this last premise within man is the root of what we call *Freedom*.

WHAT we call freedom must be primarily determined as belonging to the irreducible non-irrational, that which is given of human nature. It is simply contrary to sense to start from an abstract concept of freedom and then to try to find out whether man is really free or not. A concept which comes naturally to all men, and which all understand, is sure to be founded on reality; it must be, moreover, founded on another basis than all other concepts, inasmuch as it differentiates one mode of action from all the others. The first question one should reasonably ask is the following: wherein does that which men have always called freedom *consist*? As we have already made clear that freedom, as opposed to determination by laws, does not exist—if only for the reason that, did it exist, we should still be able to conceive it only within the framework of laws—all that remains to be investigated is the difference between freedom and necessity.

Here again we can evaluate a theoretic possibility from the outset for practical purposes. The difference in question cannot possibly mean that free events occur without a cause; if, indeed, there existed free events of that description, our intellect cannot possibly conceive them; besides, the content of the original concept of freedom

appears obvious. Under these circumstances freedom can evidently mean *self-determination* only. And this it does indeed. I know of none of its differentiated determinations and interpretations which meant anything else. On the other hand, this concept of self-determination cannot be logically proved to be a misconception by any possible demonstration of an existing constraint, because self-determination can be conceived as well in terms of absolute freedom as in terms of determination by man's own self, and also, finally, in terms of an automatism operating from within. For let man be even a biological or a logical or an ethical automaton, let his consciousness be ruled throughout by his unconsciousness, let him even be deprived of liberty to reply with a "yea" or "no" to the promptings of the unconscious—the fact is that he is determined by something with which he, actually and necessarily, identifies himself. We have already seen that we do not feel the constraint of logic to be a constraint, because we ourselves embody it. In exactly the same sense, we are self-determined in all respects under discussion; all that is doubtful is the particular meaning and degree of this determination. If, now, we analyze our deepest and most immediate intentions, we find that we invariably mean, when speaking of freedom, nothing else than this very self-determination. This, again, means nothing else than that we feel assured of living of our own right.

This feeling of assurance corresponds everywhere to reality. The fact is, that not man only, but *every* living being lives in *one* of his dimensions of his own right. With all living beings the causal series passes through that which in man is called the subject. To whatever degree the forms of life be determined by the outer

world, there never can be a question of a *generatio æquivoca*; life is perpetuated from the living to the living only, and every type maintains itself and is metamorphosed according to its inherent law.¹ To that extent the original concept of freedom corresponds to the mode of being of all that lives, as distinguished from all that is dead. Likewise, all that lives is distinguished from all that is dead by its being a complex manifold shaped from within to form a whole, movable and moved as such. There is an essential difference between the necessity governing a chemical process on the one hand and the way an organism reacts on stimuli and motives, on the other. Furthermore, every organism is essentially unique, that is, the uniqueness of the sense-connexion represented by every particular organism can never be disregarded. As soon as the elements composing it are referred to another than its unique centre, the monad in question is no longer there, either actually, through the destruction of its wholeness, or in the consciousness of the others who now misunderstand it. For this reason, the way of life is essentially unpredictable in spite of all typical similarity: no statistics afford the probability of predicting the unique case as such—and with the living the unique alone really matters. Finally, all that lives is distinguished from all that is dead by the fact that it makes an autonomous choice among the influences to which it is subjected. This applies as much to the specific “world of perception” of the lowest organisms as to the freest decision of man. As opposed to this, the reactions of dead bodies, however specified, mean some-

¹ Compare for the independence of life the searching treatise in the chapter, “The Meaning of the Ecumenic State,” of my book, *The World in the Making*.

thing essentially different; here there is no active selection nor any selection proceeding from a "beyond" of natural elements, such as an entelechy, a whole, or, in my own terminology, the particular sense-connexion which every living being represents. Obviously, there are other distinctive marks of the living as compared with the dead; but in this connexion only those that have been mentioned are to be taken into account.

THE living is thus really and essentially self-determined, and this is what the original concept of freedom means, which is thereby proved to be true to reality. But if we proceed to a closer consideration of the results thus far obtained, we find that the concept of freedom thus understood transcends what we actually mean in speaking of freedom. If all living things are free, then there are no gradations of freedom, whereas, with the human problem, the emphasis lies on the "more" and the "less" of possible freedom. Nor does our general concept of self-determination do justice to that expression of it which we invariably imply when we raise the question of freedom; for it obliterates every difference between determination by the ego or some other power operating through the subject, such as the compulsion of heredity, Karma, destiny, will of God. If we say that man is always his own creator, and that will and destiny are the same in the ultimate analysis, this may be indeed true; but such definitions make an answer to the question of freedom in the human sphere impossible. If we call all living things free, this explains Life as little as does the statement that the totality of existing things is causally determined. The idea we have

in mind in forming the concept of freedom evidently means a *specification* of that self-determination which exists with all living beings. This specification can indeed be delimited; all we need to do is to apply a narrower formula to the general characteristics of living beings, as distinguished from the dead.

We call self-determination freedom, first, when "living of one's own right" means that the subject is conscious of being personally responsible for the process of his growth; second, when the entirety of man bears the actual responsibility (this is the meaning of the formula: "character charges, motives discharge"); third, when the actual doings and omissions have a completely personal meaning and cannot be understood except in reference to the unique subject and by starting from it. (This definition is of decisive importance. We actually feel and appraise every event proceeding from ourselves as unfree, wherever it cannot be referred to the unique personal centre. For this very reason only *acknowledged* ties bind in the sphere of freedom, that is, of history; for the same reason none can be compelled from without to convictions or beliefs, nor even to inner decisions. For this reason even traditions can be actually discontinued simply by disclaiming them.) Fourth, when the selection from among the stimuli and motives of the outer world does not take place automatically, but through a conscious decision as against several possibilities. Now the latter delimitation is of the utmost importance. For it not only shows *when* self-determination can be called free; it proves also, when compared with the facts, *that there really is such a thing as freedom*. Ruesch disclaims the reality of freedom on the plea of the inex-

istence of unmotivated events.¹ Indeed, unmotivated events are out of the question, and it may be that the legal concept of responsibility is really tenable without bias in favour of freedom. But Ruesch misplaces the emphasis. He fails to see what follows and what cannot be denied as a fact, however it be interpreted metaphysically: The decision in favour of one motive or another proceeds from its beyond: *for the ultimately decisive motives themselves are projections of inward reality*. Just as in the field of theory mathematical truths mean projection of the relations determining from within the life of both body and mind—the reason why we call them certain *a priori*, which, however, does not mean that we are not liable to make false reckonings—just so the ultimate motives for all practical decisions reside in the creative essence of the mind; not as obligations, though, which man must obey implicitly wherever he acts, but as attributes of this very essence. We are for this very reason entitled to call this essence free, because it is *not bound* to obey any law it posits from within itself. This is the reason why the latter ties are called ties of the “Ought-to-be,” whereas the former are not given that name, for none of us think without willing to think correctly, and the wrong immediately proves to be wrong, while in the practical field bad intentions are frequently met and their opposition to sense is not always revealed to self-interest early enough to give it cogent reasons to prefer the right.

It is thus from the vital basis of the ties of the “Ought-to-be” (they themselves are only projections) or otherwise with them in view that man decides upon the

¹ Compare his most instructive essay, *Die Unfreiheit des Willens*. Darmstadt, 1925.

motive to which he will yield.¹ He thus ultimately follows that motive which *he himself* wills at bottom; and this is precisely what is called being free. *He himself* is, as a subject, the author of the laws that bind him, inasmuch as he accepts them. Here, then, is the root of all ethics, æsthetics, and religions.

But this foundation for the reality of freedom leads us, again, to a new borderline of the important problem of freedom. It never can be proved that the ultimate creative quality of the subject lies on the plane the subject belongs to; it may just as well lie beyond it, in the dimension of the trans-subjective, in a super-ego, in God. Thus, point four requires another delimitation. The conscious decision between a variety of possibilities can only be called free when the *personal* subject was its ultimate author. And this finally proves that the sphere of a significant concept of freedom is *narrowly limited*.

Let us, for the sake of attaining final clarity, revert to the general concept of self-determination applicable to all that lives as opposed to all that is dead. When seen from this vantage point, freedom appears to be a particular stage of self-determination; the possibility of freedom grows proportionately with the centralization, integration, and enhancement of consciousness of the particular life as a whole. The best example of the process is given by the normal evolution of the child to manhood; the most unprejudiced conceptual image of it is furnished by the Buddhist definition, according to which (in Dahlke's words), a causal series becomes "self-illuminated" at a certain stage. But this stage, again, is

¹ I may be allowed to call the reader's attention to the fact that my book, *Das Gefüge de Welt*, written at the age of twenty-four, contains already the germs of the whole of my doctrine of freedom exposed here.

not the ultimate stage conceivable. What has been, from time immemorial, uniformly meant by the state of grace is a state of personal self-determination issuing from a super-personal centre. *Thus, the range of possible self-determination to which the original concept of freedom refers comprises only the narrow borderland between sub-personal and super-personal self-determination.* And now the time has indeed come where we must clearly comprehend *to what extent* freedom can be claimed to exist. If its concept has a meaning only when referred to the *actual*, to the moment of indifference between that which has become and that which has not yet become, its dimension is the moment and not time.¹ Here lies the root of the truth of Bergson's discrimination between *le temps qui s'écoule et le temps écoulé*—a distinction the significance of which by the way the author exaggerates because he presupposes a kind of absolute freedom which does not exist. Every free decision can be proved to be made from a given basis.—But to what extent is a concept of pure actuality, as that of freedom, true to reality when viewed from the world as a whole? *It is true to reality in so far as the world is not ready-made.* It is ever “in the making.” Now where the fulcrum of becoming and metamorphosis lies within a subject, really and actually within and neither below nor above it, these processes are enacted from out of that quality we call freedom.

We have thus adequately located freedom in the connexion of cosmic becoming. What was the first to come into being, freedom, or bondage, is from the standpoint

¹ The first to see these facts was my grandfather, Count Alexander Keyserling; compare his posthumous little essay, *Some Words on Space and Time*. Stuttgart, 1894.

of possible cognition as futile a question as that of the priority of the egg or the hen. Their *connexion* lies at the base of both. Thus the primary reality is that cosmic connexion which comprises both necessity and freedom. This reality seems to us everywhere ordered. Lawless events are as impossible in the sphere of potential freedom *in actu* as in the sphere of necessitated events. This lecture was meant only to place the problem of freedom, in its completeness, in the proper perspective and also to determine in a general way one of the lines on which free events are connected with such as are not free. But there are numerous lines. If the problem of freedom has as yet failed to meet with a satisfactory solution, the reason is that its *multi-dimensionality* was overlooked. The technique of the sessions of the School of Wisdom, though, makes possible a multi-dimensional treatment of the problem in question. You will see, as the session proceeds, what the problem of freedom looks like in the projection upon the plane of abstract theory, the last resort of which is the logical meaning of the concept; how it appears in connexion with destiny; how the fact of an existing community of men creates ties which necessarily limit any kind of freedom; how power, which seems to vouchsafe the greatest liberty, in reality implies the greatest bondage; how, again, strictest discipline liberates man instead of tying him down; how articulate laws limit even the spell-power of the magician; how, finally, freedom loses its meaning when it becomes one with the cosmic dispensation. The concluding lecture will then impart to the multi-dimensional picture the ultimate unity of significance. Of this lecture I shall today anticipate only this much: what we call freedom can be proved to be a particular part of cosmic

becoming. It must, for its perfection, obey laws of as definite a character as those of every other natural process. An immeasurable multiplicity of law-bound causal series occur by way of mutual interference. Nevertheless, no kind of law interferes with man's free creation if he adjusts himself adequately within the connection of the universe.

II

Invention and Form

THE artist who creates is regarded as the freest of men, and his work is appraised as the freest of creations. But wherever this free spirit attains its perfect expression, far from evincing a chaotic or anarchic character, it reveals itself as subject to law. Man sings and speaks first in rhythm. His first and most genuine expression obeys poetic laws. And this obtains up to the highest grades of differentiation. There never was a genuine creation of the mind which, as a composition, was not strictly subject to some law. There never was an expression of genius that was not throughout true to style. And this obedience to laws is really due to freedom and not to subsequent adjustment or constraint; rhythm and rhyme come naturally and freely to the poet. The strictest of forms never cramped genuine inspiration. On the contrary: it is precisely form which enables inspiration to embody its thoughts. Likewise, readers and hearers from their standpoint instantly appraise the quality of form and style as a proof of freedom. For the formless never bears the imprint of freedom, nor does it ever make for liberation, whereas every perfect creation of the mind is in its nature liberating.

A few concrete instances will help us to grasp most

quickly the meaning of these facts. We shall not, however, for the purpose of giving the problem its proper place within the general scheme of things, proceed from creative man *per se*, but from the position he occupies within the community of mankind. There have always been anarchic movements; but they have invariably, in one way or another, of their own selves ended in absurdity. Political anarchy in Russia, where it has manifested itself most conspicuously, merged into the extreme discipline of the soviet system. In Germany it is precisely the young fanatical brawler for liberty—the unbridled riotous youngster, the boyish loafer (*Wandervogel*)—who as a type ends by becoming an eager aspirant for public-service provender, even as the harlot ultimately turns a bigot. All anarchic styles of art prove short-lived; they, too, are typically reversed and converted into their opposites, so that their most zealous champions frequently become in later years devotees of academical sobriety. The same obtains for the solipsist (or none-exist-but-myself faddists) in the broadest sense of the term. If such a one is an active enemy of all order, prison, as a house of constraint, is his fate. The solipsist as a philosopher of life is no less fatally bound for the madhouse when he really feels himself to be an isolated being. The moderate solipsist, on the other hand, the type of whom is represented by the German “particularist,” the man who would hate himself for employing any other terminology than his own and who utterly despises any man who fails to hold his particular beliefs and to resemble himself, feels the senselessness of his adjustment through the fact that his utterances are not transferable to others. At best, these

may have some meaning within restricted circles.¹ Thus opposition to law is evidently contrary to sense and, most of all, to the sense of freedom. For as man is, first and foremost, a social being, his tragic social failure also goes to prove his personal inadequacy. It stands to reason that these concepts of incomprehensibility, intransferability, and tragic failure should be employed with discretion; and the same applies to the concept of universal validity. What today seems utterly incomprehensible may be an obvious truth for everyone tomorrow; what at present appears to threaten the overthrow of all order may be the very germ of a new system. But history has proved our general assertions to be justified, provided that they are adequately understood and applied. Anarchy, whatever it effects in particular, contradicts the meaning of life. The formless may at best prove to be of some value as an embryonic stage. Let us now, from this vantage point, revert to creative man in his attitude toward himself: the more gifted and the deeper he is the more the postulates he applies to himself cover the ground of what humanity in general claims. He cannot reveal his ultimate meaning unless he contrives to find a form which, viewed *ab extra*, bears the imprint of strict conformity to law.

And now we are entitled to assert: How could it possibly be otherwise? It is by "typified form" only that the vital maintains itself. Let us revert to the introductory lecture. *All* reality appears to the understanding as a connexion of laws: that which becomes, or has become, through necessity no less than through free-

¹ Compare, for the decisive significance of the value of transferability, my essay, "*Die begrenzte Zahl bedeutsamer Kulturformen*," in *Philosophy as an Art*.

dom. With Life this general proposition is, again, specified, for every single living being is, first and foremost, a whole and thus a law-connected unity within a manifold; it is truly a microcosm within a macrocosm. Here chaos and cosmos have not the same meaning as in inorganic nature, where the great laws of mechanics apply to what is ordered as well as to what is not ordered: the vital is either a cosmos or it is not vital. What takes place in man's voluntary creations is, on the one hand, an exposition of the laws inborn in his mind, as in the case of mathematics, and on the other, of a continuance of organic creation on a particular plane.¹ Thus, again, a creation of the mind is either a cosmos or it is no spiritual creation, that is, it does not live, a proposition the truth of which is proved from the standpoint of the creator by his feeling unerringly, that when his work falls short of perfection in form, he has failed to embody completely the meaning he had in mind, and from the standpoint of others that the creation which falls short of perfection in form produces no vital effect. Now there are æsthetes who understand life-giving effect to be a function of vitality, a view which naturally leads them to repudiate adherence to laws, inasmuch as the flux of life as such overflows all limitations. But they err; for if any distinctions may be drawn among the expressions of life, then indeed the differentiations established by Melchior, Palágyis, and Ludwig Klages between vitality and spirit, hold good except for the emphasis on which the latter insists; for the vital remains exempt of meaning unless it is acted upon by the *spirit*.

Here, then, the law of correlation of meaning and

¹ Compare for particulars the chapter, "*Harmonices mundi*," in my book, *Das Gefüge der Welt*.

expression takes effect, and from its validity follows the supreme significant value of form and law. Spirit must—no matter whether it operates consciously or unconsciously—shape the vital, even if it is only a question of fulfilment of its biological significance. This, then, would seem to be proof for the supreme life-value of laws. And this, again, means on the plane of creations of the spirit, that the perfect is always at the same time universally valid, since it is exemplary. Therefore, there is no human ideal (nor can there be any) which does not presuppose and include the concept of law thus understood. Beauty means exemplariness, and the same holds for law, truth, and goodness. The very concept of these ideas is impossible without the recognition of the value of laws, whereas in the domain of experience all vital reality goes to prove that enmity against laws contradicts the meaning of Creation, that it leads to death and not to the continuance and uplift of life.

STILL, what has just been said only shows us that formlessness completely contradicts the meaning of life, and that all ideals include the concept of law. We now raise the question why the law of form is most conspicuously valid in regard to creative work. Why does art compared with life appear to be more strictly obedient to laws? We can, on the ground of what has been thus far established, only maintain that the microcosm of the work of art is smaller than that of life, and that, therefore, it can be more readily surveyed. This being so, the total aspect of life might, if surveyed from an adequate vantage point, prove to be as perfectly formed as a fugue of Bach's. Still, a cognition of so comprehensive a nature is an unsatisfactory answer to

the question as to the particular significance of the strictness of art-forms, a question requiring specific treatment within the scheme of life as a whole. The problem thus demands a narrower formulation instead of a wider.

Let us reflect on certain propositions drawn from experience, upon which I cannot, however, enter in detail here: There never was a superior mind which lacked the quality of style; only well-written books survive; no man expresses himself easily before he discovers his own personal style; and, further, the individual expresses his personality with greater ease, the more perfectly embodied the spirit of his language becomes. How are we to understand this which is beyond our former experience? Let us consider music, the most perfect of all arts. Viktor Goldschmidt has established that a musical creation, the more classical it is, embodies with increasing perfection the rhythms governing the inter-planetary relations and also (in potential mathematical reinterpretation) all rhythmical processes in nature susceptible of numerical representations, as *e.g.* the correlations of chemical elements within their periodic system.¹ This means in nature, in which, just as in life, "all possible" events occur as states of transition, that only that *endures* which corresponds to determinate relations. Now what this means in the domain of creative action—our one theme today—will become most readily clear if we consider conjointly the facts revealed by Goldschmidt and three others. The deepest truths, as *e.g.* the truth of Christianity, are the most gener-

¹ Compare Goldschmidt's book, *Harmonie und Komplikation*. Berlin. Julius Springer, 1901. The Philosophic consequences of the results of his research were first drawn in the chapter, "*Harmonices Mundi*," of my book, *Das Gefüge der Welt*.

ally understandable; for they refer to the real depths of the soul of every man, besides being representable in the simplest manner: think of Jesus' habit of expressing His knowledge of God by parables alluding to everyday happenings. The deepest artistic intuition is not only compatible with the strictest forms, but it evidently demands them; think of Bach, whose most magnificent creations have the simplicity and precision of fingering exercises, or of the sonnets of Dante and Petrarch. Finally, the most powerful whose creative powers evince the completest accommodation to existing ties are the freest.

The explanation which applies to all these facts is as follows: He who is free can express himself under all circumstances only by means of what exists and in accordance with its laws, because, empirically considered, however free he may be, he is only an infinitesimally small part of the cosmos which existed before him, which exists over him, and in which he is embedded. Further, since even within the soul of man the primary is not the Ego—for which alone the concept of freedom has a meaning—but the "It" operating according to its own strictly determined laws, it is obvious *that man becomes independent of the cosmic laws to exactly the same extent to which he masters instead of ignoring them.*

Marching men keep time: this obedience to time makes the march easier, because this rhythm is in accord with all the specific laws of the body. If a melody observes perfectly the specific laws of rhythm, harmony, and counterpoint, the human ear will follow it spontaneously. If a train of thought is perfectly logical it will at once become obvious; for it then corresponds to the inherent motion of the thinking process. A lyric master-

piece inevitably calls forth the feelings and emotions whose connexions it represents in the reader who would never have experienced them by himself. The reason is that it utters the unique by means of the specific logic of the emotions. When a master of the word speaks, everyone acknowledges that what he said could not have been worded otherwise or better. This means that such a man is past master of the law of correlation of meaning and expression, a law which is absolutely valid. *All laws of the inner man and of nature must be observed in order that that which is free should be able to express itself untrammelled.* This is the reason why form not only binds, but first and foremost liberates. It furnishes to the creative mind, as it were, the rails along which it can set out for the infinite. Again, those who contemplate creations of the spirit participate in the same cosmic rhythm by feeling their way into that form, and thus attain freedom in the same sense.

As opposed to this, the formless never makes for freedom; and the enemies of form, again and again, find that they are doomed to ineffectiveness and to defeat. The fact is that all reality is essentially subject to laws. He who refuses to acknowledge the laws which govern particular cases, no matter how free he may feel himself inwardly, will be sure to experience hindrances at every step when it comes to expression. What opposes him are either the laws of language, so that he cannot make himself understood, or the laws of communal life, or those of the external world, or he may meet, again and again, with mishaps in the shape of occurrences which reduce his presumption of freedom to absurdity. In no other field, perhaps, is the paradoxical character of reality revealed so extremely. For he who struggles against

existing laws is the very man who inhibits freedom in action. The only exception which might be here adduced is only seemingly an exception. I am thinking of those who renounce, who give up. One may indeed withdraw from reality and he who does so need indeed no longer respect its laws; this is why the Indian social order holds the ascetic delivered from all its ties as a matter of course, and even accords him a position beyond the differences between good and evil. But withdrawal from the world and reality can, again, be achieved only when the laws governing *this process of withdrawal* are strictly observed; no life appears more strictly regulated than the man's who aims at deliverance from earthly ties. But the man who does not acknowledge the laws of this earth and yet would work upon it in the very midst of its activity will never succeed, as we have seen; never, at least, in a favorable sense. What he knows cannot be transferred in his particular way; his cognitions are inapplicable in the particular manner peculiar to himself. What helps him in the pursuance of his own career is of no help to those whose faces are turned towards the world. Nay, what from his point of view appears to be an absolute commandment will, if applied to the worldly, induce a downright deterioration in their condition. This holds good even for those whose inner law demands abstention from action and non-resistance to evil. If such a man lives in the world without having reached the stage when his abstention from action conjures up the working of superior powers, he will invariably bring about objective damage, and will prove to be in the wrong again and again. For the natural foundation underlying this adjustment is softness of character, which, when misapplied, expresses itself as real, and not only

as seeming, cowardice. The anarchist who proceeds to better the world is a completely senseless phenomenon. What is signally grotesque about him is his frequent presumption of being in the right, while the universe is wrong. Here man must needs come to a decision: he must either, in the broadest sense, renounce the world—when the lowest possibility open to him is complete isolation, and the highest complete deliverance from the thralldom of the earth—and here strictest adherence to laws is the *conditio sine qua non* for reaching his goal. Or else he wants to influence this world; in that case he must obey its laws. Now the second alternative is the only one that counts for the creative man. He must master, by following them, all laws of potential activity. He must make himself thoroughly understood as a thinker; he must be a *Realpolitiker* as a statesman; and as a poet he must be a master of verse. The more he enlarges the range of his observance of the laws of reality, the more potent will the influence of his life-work prove to be. What is the reason underlying the incomparably wider influence of Goethe's poetry as compared with that of any other German poet? If we analyze one of the most perfect of his poetic productions, the "Fisherman," we find that he has obeyed at least five sets of laws which here harmonize with one another: the law of thought, the law of the sequence of feelings, or rhythmic language, of the connexion of impulses in the unconscious, and finally, of the cabalistic arrangement of letters. As regards the latter two laws, the proof of which existence is possibly a surprise for many, the whole poem could, psycho-analytically considered, be also intelligently interpreted, while again, the content of letters, embodied in an adequate selection of

words, would mirror to perfection yet another meaning. Now with psycho-analytical interpretation we have to do with the natural groundwork of all spiritual life, whereas with the cabalistic interpretation it is with the roots of all conceivable significances of thought. For the letter, being the precursor of the word, signifies to that extent the germ of meaning which was realized. Goethe thus mastered a whole scale of cosmic laws conjointly; with him fundamental tones, undertones, and overtones vibrate everywhere harmoniously. This then is the reason why his poetry cannot help having a more potent effect than that of any minor German poet. For wide influence is vouchsafed to such only as master the cosmic laws while obeying them, even as the technician makes lightning subservient to his ends.

Hence, then, the ultimately decisive significance of form. Only the magic formula opens the depths of the soul, like the "Open, sesame" of the *Arabian Nights*; for that formula only which takes into account all psychic laws sets the structure of those deeps in motion in the direction intended. Yet, everywhere, the elementary proves to be the most important. With the writer correct punctuation and the correct distribution of paragraphs are almost of greater moment than the selection of words. In the sessions of the School of Wisdom the importance attaching to the right alignment of the central theme, the right selection of the settings for the particular problems, and the strict observance of these settings is far greater than that of the particular contents of the lectures, so much so that I hardly pay attention to the latter item; for I need never fear that the particular thoughts of the lecturers may disrupt the unity of the cyclus if only the setting of the problem has

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been minutely attended to. The world is, in fact, articulate throughout. It is, to that extent, as I sometimes put it, the language of God and the potential language of man. Man can utter his own only if he is conversant with this language and masters it. But it is, as an articulate whole, a poet's language. Hence the dignity and the saving power of poetry: in giving expression to the personal by means of cosmic laws it humanizes the cosmic.

Now what obtains for creative man in regard to the cosmos obtains to a superior degree in regard to his fellow beings. The individual's social significance always depends on his mastering the universally obeyed laws in a manner which permits his mode of being and his personal efficiency to become, by their means, transferable to all and thus to become organs of theirs. The different means of expressing the purely personal, the varieties of thought and emotions, the specific sensations, interests, and basic trends of life are the patrimony of all men. The question here is of data preceding all manner of inventions and arbitrarinesses. In this connexion Driesch has recalled to our notice what Lichtenberg was the first to discover that in truth it is not we who think and feel, etc., but "it" which thinks and feels within us; and that consciousness is not, properly speaking, an "agent," but a "possessor." As to the degree to which men are "possessors," they also are much less far apart from one another than it would seem; for in his unconsciousness every man's knowledge and ability is far ahead of anything that can occur to the conscious of even the richest mind. And, further: those who are most richly gifted often affect others the least because of their inability to express themselves. The significance

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for others of what a man possesses depends entirely on his capacity of expression. *Hence* the significance of special endowments. The painter certainly possesses a greater ability to see what others also see; but this is not why we value him; we do so because he makes us see better for ourselves—not only that which is before us, but also that which is within us. Therefore, the ideal significance of art is not at variance with the interpretation offered here. In the same sense the great mind is essentially the *Awakener*. If such a mind were to utter the entirely new, the unique, this would mean nothing to other men. His social value depends entirely on his ability to utter clearly what all feel in their innermost hearts to be true—for could he otherwise be understood?—and to utter it in so universal a manner, that is, so much in tune with the objective laws in question, that his ideas become organs for the others. From which it follows that none can do *more* than offer suggestions, and that the meanest life-giving suggester means more to the community of men than the keenest adducer of proofs and builder of systems who lacks this endowment. On the other hand, again, he alone is capable of awakening who, by mastering the laws of the universally valid, is in tune with his fellow beings and with the cosmos. This applies in the highest degree to the great leaders of mankind, the embodiments of what I call “world-ascendancy.”¹ Their ability to make their influence felt, directly and greatly, through the ages in the sense of the Chinese *Wu Wei*, is due to their having mastered all earthly laws in the same sense in which the great poet masters the laws of the sonnet.

¹ Compare the chapter, “World-Ascendancy,” of *Creative Understanding*.

This then yields the comprehensive formula: the greater a master, the more universally valid and, *therefore*, the more personal will be his form. Only those who are capable of expressing themselves in a universally valid form can express their own personalities in full freedom. This is what makes the classic. The meaning of the classic's style is not to be grasped by means of the usual concepts of art criticism, for it is no function of cultural conditions. He alone is a classic who masters material and form as though he played with them. Thus in the ideal image of the Chinese sage all profundity appears sublimated into gracefulness. Thus Bach's fugues are also the best of fingering exercises; this greatest of all musicians observed all the rules of art, and yet the influence he radiates has a greater personal quality than that of any other. Thus again the curves of the Parthenon are ideal expressions of technical adequacy along the lines of architectural mathematics and perspective. And so the grotesqueness of those modern bunglers who despise all forms because of their inability to cope with any is revealed with distressing clarity. If there are those who say that strict form is at variance with true life, let them show me one single plant or animal—be it even a deep-sea fish—whose shape is not a classic composition.

WE HAVE, however, until now been speaking of free creative work without determining its concept. Wherein does free creation consist? How is invention possible? In the present connexion freedom can mean but one thing: the possibility of uttering by means of the given something *new*. Speaking absolutely, everything that lives is original to that extent; for all

life proceeds from some datum, and means of expression as a starting point; and on the other hand, every vital phenomenon is unique and owes its existence to the vitalizing effect of a unique "meaning" working from within. But the question here is of something determinate, of the rare flower, as it were, blossoming forth on the non-personal and super-personal stem of general life. For this is what invention of the new really means (as against mere repetition) in which the vital processes taken as a whole appear are incorporated. Now, invention of the new never occurs otherwise than by the imparting from within of a new meaning to the unchanging elements, as, thanks to Goethe's genius, the unchanging alphabet was the means for expressing the Faust poem. Wherever a new meaning is evolved, a new and corresponding form is necessarily produced to fit it. Hence, the uniqueness of every kind of personal style: it is the correlative of the uniqueness of the individual soul. That, again, the most personal creation can be proved to accord with some general type or other, and that there exist super-personal styles of art, means that life has always evolved on the lines of the unchanging frames of primary types. The primary spiritual types, too, have a life of their own; for they manifestly represent an optimum state of equilibrium within the cosmic connexion, an equilibrium which other forms which are equally possible and conceivable do not represent. This explains how there can exist alongside of the specific lives of the styles of art the norms of law, of religious dogmas, or ecclesiastic ceremonials, which hardly undergo any changes throughout immeasurable periods of time. For the same reason a mind conforms the more readily to the demands of its type; the greater its cre-

ative powers; for thereby it is given one more chance of governing through obedience. If the facts are viewed from this angle, it becomes obvious why everyone must *learn*, before he can invent the new; why every young man or woman and every young culture must begin with imitation. From his own point of view even the babe in arms is strictly original. From the point of view of others only that man is original who can lead them beyond what they already know; but this he cannot do until he has become their equal in their knowledge. It is thus precisely the productive type of man who avails himself most eagerly of the imitative mechanism inborn in man, because it brings him most quickly to the condition of his fellow beings.

Thus the new is born through the infusion of a new meaning into what is already known. For all creation proceeds from the sphere of Meaning. This leads us on, or rather back to the general question as to the ultimate meaning of freedom, a question which I can deal with in the last lecture only. Today I shall deal only with the way in which freedom works. And, for that purpose I can do no better than revert to the concept of the magic formula disrupting a psychic structure; it is this which is also frequently called "the liberating word." What we are dealing with here is the prototype for the spirit's working in general. You know the tale of those trumpets the mere sound of which shattered the walls of Jericho. There is a saying to the same effect that every bridge has a definite *tone*, and that he who sounds it ever so softly on a chord thereby destroys its whole structure. How is this possible—no matter whether it be a fact? The explanation would be that this particular tone embodies the one vibration readily in-

ducible into the tension of the structure, which proceeds to communicate to all its components a degree of acceleration, thus disrupting the equilibrium. This means, therefore, a victory over nature by natural means. There is no other possible way by which spirit can work. It is everywhere the strictly determined *form* which is uniquely and solely capable of inbuilding the intended meaning into the phenomenon. Meaning is absolutely dependent on the expression corresponding to it; its very existence is bound up with it. A determinate meaning can never be expressed in another way that is "just as good." We thus see form to be the *absolute essential* from the point of view of the terrestrial significance of Meaning. And this also permits us to gauge the abysmal superficiality of such as despise form as a mere surface-question. The way in which a thing is represented is absolutely essential. What applies to the definite mathematical equation that can never be stated "in another way as well," applies to the very same extent to *every* representation. He who is deficient in the art of representation produces at best the raw material for the genuine creation of the mind, like coal for the generation of light. Therefore, it is as obvious as it is just that humanity should preserve only the memory of the masters of expression. For mastership of expression is not only to be met with in the domain of art, but also in that of life. Every great life was in the same sense also a great work of art. In lives like these, action and refraining from action, utterance and silence can be scanned exactly as in a poem. All public deeds of the great were meant for symbols; from the very outset they were intended as sources for later legends. All their individual decisions were to continue their influence as exam-

ples. And what applies to their lives also obtained for their deaths, where they were free to choose; Socrates and Christ died at the exact time in which they had to die if the example of their lives was to continue to influence in the form of a symbolic image.

FREEDOM in the domain we are dealing with today is thus bound to the condition of observance of law and, therefore, of form. Here there is no contrast between freedom and law. Or is there, after all? . . . There is, indeed: form as a value is everywhere beset by dangers on both sides—it always embodies as such a hairbreadth boundary-line. On one side chaos is imminent. The Greeks would not have confessed to form to that extreme if the chaotic had not meant extreme danger for them. In the same sense, the chaotic soul of the Russian again and again limits itself by calling forth, and submitting to, dictatorships. On the other side, however, the danger of crystallization is imminent. Form crystallized into routine means the death of the Spirit. Copying is fundamentally different from inventing. Imitative classicism is the reverse of classicism. Freedom and law are maintained only in a salutary equilibrium, when freedom elects from within to limit itself by law. But as soon as form works from without inward it spells death. No one masters fate who submits to it as a thing settled once for all. The naïve believer in his horoscope is only a slave. He never rises to the dignity of personal freedom. Those who passively follow the promptings of the “It” within them—except for the relations between patient and physician—and who do not regard those urges as mere material for the shaping of their lives, forfeit all self-deter-

mination; they return to childhood, not in the sense in which the child is blessed of God, but in its impotence. There must be law, because there is no other conceivable way for maintaining the freedom of the individual within the community except through the order established by it. But law which is universally valid can never be just in its application to the individual. Those who regard positive law in itself as representing justice confess thereby their adherence to injustice, so completely that I, personally, consider everyone who looks on his formal right as the ultimate resort as low-minded on account of that very fact, though he may be right in the particular case. Further: Discipline is the best way to freedom. Only where the lower nature is held in subjection can the higher express itself freely. This applies to the soldier as much as to the saint. He who is meant to meet death voluntarily must have subdued his impulses. There are absolutely no higher symbols to be found for genuine freedom than the great warriors, because the unconditioned adjustment of the soul to the sacrifice of life is nearer to deliverance from Self than adjustment to the idea of eternal bliss; besides, the concept of freedom also loses its meaning in the state of grace. But if discipline is taken as an end in itself, it makes of man an automaton and only too likely becomes a mere palliative for moral cowardice. If, on the one hand, there is no freer man than the great army leader, there is, on the other, no more inferior man than the drill-sergeant, whose highest ideal is drill. For the same reason the man who is bound over to duty is the lowest of creatures; for whereas fulfilment of one's duty meant, for Kant, personal responsibility, it embodies for the former the possibility of shirking this responsibility.

This is also the reason why inner unstableness and lack of self-assurance can be diagnosed with certainty, wherever exaggerated stress is laid on determinate concepts of duty and of honour. In the same sense no amount of training will ever make a genius or a saint. The master of spiritual exercises who believes that a higher state of the inner man can be attained by these exercises in themselves is thus nothing better than a metaphysical drill-sergeant. What then is the ultimate relation between freedom and law?—We have to affix a big point of interrogation at this stage of the session. In the matter of freedom it is obviously the question of something unseizable, of a border concept resembling the mathematical point. The meaning and operation of freedom seem to resemble those of the suddenly occurring idea or the decision to take a risk. . . . The concluding lecture will provide the ultimate answer which I am able to give to the question of the meaning of freedom.

III

The Ultimate Meaning of Freedom

A FREEDOM independent of laws does not exist in any dimension. All individual creation—to which alone the concept of freedom can be properly applied—belongs *ab intra* to a dynamic connexion which in one way or another is conceivable only as a concatenation of laws. In its specific domain, creation, the freer it proves itself to be, the more strictly it adheres to its intrinsic laws. Furthermore, its expression in the external world is absolutely dependent on the observance and consideration of the laws of this world, whether of nature or of man. Again, deliverance from the thralldom of the earth comes only through obedience to determinate laws. If we endeavour to understand these facts from the point of view of critical philosophy, and if we start out from the logical meaning of free will, we can only either deny free will or else we may, like Driesch, stop and declare, "I do not know." The introductory lecture showed that freedom and law cannot possibly be opposites, because reality and systematic connexion of laws are convertible terms. That lecture also anticipated that the question as to "freedom or necessity" is independent of the question referring to conformity to law; so that the proof of that conformity in no wise forestalls the former question. Logically, then, there is in an ordered universe room for freedom

in spite of all laws; freedom, I mean, not in the sense of its possible definition, but as to what may ultimately underlie its concept as a reality. The aforesaid lecture finally pointed out that the only significant question to be raised in regard to the problem of freedom is: Wherein does freedom *consist*? and not the other: Does freedom exist in a logically conceivable sense? That there is a specific reality underlying the concept of freedom has been made clear by all subsequent lectures. Driesch's lecture did so in the sense that logic and metaphysics cannot positively deny its existence and that all probability, at any rate, is in favour of what he calls "admittance-freedom"; the subsequent lectures proved the fact in the form of concrete illustrations. Self-determination is indubitably a possible fact, whatever its interpretation may be. On the other hand, all the speakers confirmed the result of the opening lecture to the effect that for what we can intelligently consider as freedom there is a limited sphere of reality. Richard Wilhelm's lecture was, in this respect, particularly instructive in that he stated that for subjective personal experience, at any rate, there not only exists a this-side, but also a beyond of freedom. Nevertheless, we have not yet discovered the positive concept of freedom. The final lecture is intended to give it after the groundwork of all the preceding ones.

TO THIS end we shall have to start from the final sentences from the lecture on Invention and Form. Freedom and law are not in principle opposites. The surprising thing is, however, that again and again they do practically appear as opposites. There certainly is such a thing as destiny, and in principle it does not

suspend either the possibility of personal experience of freedom or its operation. But as soon as man submits to destiny, this suspension takes effect. He who believes in the "It," as Freud and Groddeck call the super-personal essence of man, as he would in a God, really becomes entirely dependent on the compulsion of his unconsciousness. Whereas astrology teaches *astra inclinant, non necessitant*, the blind believer in his horoscope is, as a matter of fact, the slave of the stars. This applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to any belief in occult laws. If the classic artist—that is, the strictest observer of laws—is, indeed, the freest of artists, there are none so bound as the imitative classicists. Discipline means, on the one side, the highway to freedom; but if discipline is conceived as an end in itself, it degrades man to an automaton. Positive law guarantees justice in community life—that is, the freedom to decide in every particular case in favour of the better. But as soon as it is conceived and accepted as an ultimate issue it is converted into injustice in the sense of the adage, *summum jus, summa injuria*. For there is no pre-established equation between that which is right in general and that which is right in the particular case. This is why all founders of religions have hated the just. This is also the reason why, as Richard Wilhelm phrases it, the heavenly door of ethics leads inevitably to the hell of despair. Since the good can be realized only by means of free volitions, if it is not to lose its meaning, the result is, here again, that the belief in law annihilates freedom. Hence the extreme lack of freedom of the fanatically law-abiding type of Jew. Hence also the fact that nothing could furnish a more striking illustration for the antagonism between law and freedom

than the problem of the Church. The idea of a church is a valid idea: for it represents the ideal objective order within which alone the individual can express his freedom in complete conformity to meaning; and its visible form is, conceived as it should be as a sense-image, fundamentally adequate to that inner cosmos of significance which is fitted into the external cosmos extended in space.¹ Nevertheless, Karl Barth is right in saying in his book, *Der Roemerbrief*: "Precisely there, where the Church attains its object in service rendered as between man and man it fails of fulfilling the object of God; and the Judgment is near at hand. . . . The Church is certainly the very place where the enmity of man against God is revealed. . . . The pious and godly man whom the Church would produce, the man who knows and practises and prays, appears to be somehow the ultimate and insuperable obstacle this side of the barricade. Whatever man undertakes in order to fend off God is revealed cumulatively, ponderously, concentratedly, armed to the teeth, in this type of man. Hence the cleansing of the temple." But the selfsame author writes also: "Those who know are aware that belief, preaching, and praying are *imperative*; they are aware of the inevitableness of the fact and they know that man's God-sickness is expressed, again and again, precisely in such practices, in ever-renewed forms. They are aware of the inevitability of ecclesiastic religiousness." The fact is that the equation is insolvable. The particular beliefs of men like St. Paul or Luther ultimately go back to the impossibility of establishing any rule man can safely rely on. On the other hand, there is no conceivable domain in which acknowledged rules

¹ Compare the lecture, "World Conceptions and Life Configurations."

could be superseded; which is the reason why every kind of anarchism and subjectivism is, sooner or later, convicted of absurdity. The most critical item is the problem of Divine Grace. For this refers to the question of man's ability to make decisions, which question must be clearly distinguished from the other question as to the possibility of rising superior to certain states of consciousness, for the reason, if for no other, that the fact of superiority can be determined as functionally dependent on any one of the concepts of grace, freedom, and necessity. As I cannot, in this place, give a detailed exposition of the existing doctrines of grace, I may refer you to the booklet by Felix Weltsch, *Freiheit und Gnade* (*Freedom and Grace*, Munich, Kurt Wolff Verlag), which presents the completest and also the most searching treatment of the question I know of. I also refer, once for all, in this respect, to the fact that I personally hold much the same general views as Weltsch, and that I have learned certain things from him. Now what follows from the existing doctrines of grace for the connexion we are now considering is this: in the relationship between freedom and grace we are dealing with an *absolute circle*. He who puts his trust in Providence only will have to go without his penny, is the way popular parlance paraphrases the glorious choral, "*Wer nur den lieben Gott laesst Walten.*" He who believes that all things depend on Divine Grace—and this is the creed of many Lutherans and practically to a still greater extent of vast numbers of Catholics—forfeits all initiative and thus descends below the purely human state. On the other hand, all those who believe in freedom exclusively share the typical fate of Lucifer: they lose personal contact with these super-personal powers whose

existence cannot be disputed, and their end is a meaningless tragedy, if only in the sense of a severance of their consciousness from the living roots of things, which characterizes the modern state of mechanization. If, again, the state of grace is to be obtained, yielding of what theology calls the "lesser will" is imperative. But this will as such never leads to the "greater will." Grace can never mean a reward; it is always a gift pure and simple. The only states conducive to grace are consciousness of guilt, the feeling of inferiority, and despair; but no sooner does a man feel himself to be in the state of grace on the strength of these feelings than all his strivings come to naught. Likewise, virtue and dutifulness are imperative as a means for obtaining grace; but they avail only when practised in consciousness of their essential futility. Thus the practitioner of spiritual exercises and the yogi who believe that they can obtain a higher state by mere training become sub-human machines. The belief in grace is itself founded on grace, on the one hand, while on the other the Talmud speaks truly when it teaches, "Everything is in the hands of God except the fear of God."

If we now revert from the problem of grace, understood as the problem of the freedom of the children of God, to freedom in the worldly sense, we find, again, in the highest expression of this latter freedom, the same circle. The central lecture of this session bore the title "Power as an Obligation" ("*Macht als Bindung*");¹ and, indeed, the more a man's power increases, the greater, not the less, grow his obligations. A prince must defer to more men and things than any other man.

¹ It was delivered by the venerable representative of Hungary at the League of Nations, Count Albert Apponyi.

Power, if it would bear real fruit, requires absolute consciousness of responsibility. The man in power who lacks this is an unmitigated criminal. Every power which fails to feel itself a part of a preordained and complete whole necessarily works for destruction not only in regard to others, but also in regard to itself; so that a power which conceives itself as despotic makes its freedom an absurdity. But does any man conscious of the meaning of his freedom desire to consider his power as an isolated force? All experience—except that of criminals—proves the reverse. Every man feels himself, precisely because of his freedom, to be indissolubly bound to his fellow beings. If he wills to be himself the ultimate determinant, this always amounts to his willingness to assume responsibility, not only for himself, but also for others; and thereby he wills the highest degree of obligation. We thus see *that the problems of freedom, grace, and necessity are indissolubly connected* with one another. This is proved beyond refutation by the self-contradiction or self-annihilation to which any exclusive emphasis laid on any one of these necessarily leads.

OUR actual task is to find the ultimate meaning of this connexion, as viewed from the problem of freedom. Its solution can be most readily arrived at if we start out from the fact that hardly any man really wills to be free. Every child *wishes* to obey; the wayward child is the artificial product of the ineptitude of his educators. Only the most superior man can afford to lead a life outside the frame of a profession demanding definite rules of conduct. Almost every man stands in need of a "position" investing him with a social

status, hence the grotesque increase of self-consciousness of men when they receive titles and degrees; what they wish is to act in the name of what they are not themselves—that is, they desire to act unfreely. Or else man wishes to speak in the name of his superiors; then the most timid personality frequently and, alas! gladly would play the hero. Or, again, the poet would present what he really is and think in forms which others have invented, while hardly any autobiography was ever true to fact. Or else, again, he would at any cost have law on his side. This, too, clearly demonstrates man's will to dependency—given the dubious value of all kinds of positive law, the superior man is inwardly indifferent to the question as to whether or not he is objectively in the right. Or, again, men are ruled like slaves by customs or by public opinion. The same phenomenon can be observed in the field of religion. As Harnack has pointed out, no Western founder of religions has ever dared to speak in his own name; they have all referred to an established authority. Possibly there has been only one founder of a religion who was entirely in earnest in his self-determination and personal responsibility—Buddha. But again, in his case, it is characteristic that he conceived life as suffering only, and that he knew of only one way of deliverance from life—personal extinction.

The will unto freedom with the implication of personal responsibility is thus proved to be in a parlous condition. This applies in the extremest sense in the domain of politics. Liberty of the press, of speech, etc., may indeed be the aim; but no one wants really to be free. Emancipated classes such as the modern proletariat immediately bind themselves by far more rigid

programs than were ever devised by the traditional guardians of authority, and take them seriously to a degree which alone suffices to reveal their inner dependence. Inner freedom has one infallible exponent—that is, a sense of humour. The man who is incapable of laughing at what he advocates is an inferior sort of person in any case. Thus Protestantism's original urge to freedom was all too soon smothered by pedantic dogmatic subtleties which the inwardly stabilized Catholic Church had overcome long before. Nor is the outlook for will unto freedom any fairer in the field of creative activities. Not one among thousands of men is really bent on freedom; it is precisely the much-abused mechanical labour requiring only a minimum of initiative which is the beau ideal of the majority. Or does the typical man of scientific research desire freedom? What he strives after are hard and fast truths, and he seeks them, psychologically speaking, chiefly in order that he may defer to them as to binding authorities. Only a small minority of men ever conceived their search for truth in Lessing's sense. To that extent all theologies, jurisprudences, occultistic and other theories signify insurances which cowardice desires, and even thought generally means escape from freedom; thinking simply seeks reinsurance in proof. Cowardice thus understood is indeed a basic fact in history. This is also the main reason why, as shown by experience, mere personal courage is sufficient for success, why the great man of courage is never seriously compromised by his mistakes as long as he believes in himself. The most signal instance of will unto unfreeness is furnished by the belief in Grace. This belief emphasizes, according to Weltsch's felicitous formula, metaphysical security as opposed to metaphysical

courage, which the will unto freedom essentially is; for the concept of freedom has a meaning only when there is still something left which is undecided and requires a decision. The believer in grace holds that all values *are* realized. All that remains to be done is, then, to accept those values and to allow them to make good their influence. But he who desires grace in this sense wills, at the same time, deliverance from searching final peace, and, accordingly, not freedom. He has, psychologically speaking, deliberately adopted the attitude of the child.

It is simply a falsehood, then, to maintain that freedom is a universally accepted ideal, though almost all philosophies take this for granted. Nor can this fact, if we recall the reflections contained in the introductory lecture—the result of which was that freedom, considered historically, is no basic substance, but that it is possible at a stage only when the life-process begins to be centred in the conscious subject—surprise us. In the field of organic processes there can be no question of freedom; in his childhood no man is autonomous. Even the consciousness of the Ego awakens years after man is born. The more primitive a people is, the more deeply rooted are its customs. Will unto freedom is proved to develop in proportion to the growth of consciousness, and the authority of super-personal laws, again, is variable with the degrees of consciousness. The history of law is a most conspicuous evidence of this. The concepts of law of primitive peoples are the most rigid of all. For a long time the law utterly disregarded man's inner attitude and motive and considered only the bare facts. It is only in modern days that in the law the first question has gained preponderance; but this, again, means the lowering of the prestige of the law in gen-

eral. Now the range of possible freedom is hemmed in by boundaries which are not only below but also above it. There is no doubt of the existence, above the domain of immediate personal decisions, of super-personal decisions to which the concept of Cosmic Dispensation does justice with a minimum of prejudice. This sphere lies within the trans-subjective dimension and should be clearly distinguished from all external determinations—that is, from all necessity. Where freedom is proved to mean nothing but the “becoming self-illuminated” of the universal Way of Life, as Buddha put it; where this illumination prevails but for a short distance, and where the wisdom of nature, fate, and providence is not less but much greater than all that human insight could gain from its own resources, there the reality of this higher sphere cannot reasonably be doubted. And inasmuch as this sphere posits obligations from the standpoint of freedom, the one-sided tension of freedom demands, on the one hand, “religion” in the literal sense—that is, subjection to the cosmic powers, in order to work intelligently, while, on the other, it is impossible to maintain, as a principle, that the predominance of freedom necessarily embodies the higher state as opposed to the state of inner subjection. There have been eras of equal richness and value passed under predominant dominion. It is, therefore, impossible to arrive at a decision as to which of the two attitudes is preferable—that of the (essentially disciplined) Catholic world or that of the Protestant. The Catholic world, which works all its ancestral wisdom into a background for every individual life, is certainly the wiser, added to which all freedom must inevitably start out from some point not subject to doubt, which is the reason why the alternative,

"authority or non-authority," is never practically posited. The only alternatives that are practically posited refer to *what* should be regarded as a binding authority, whether some super-personal reality, a dogma, another person, or personal judgment. In so far authority and freedom are correlatives, which explains how the believer in authority feels freest under its sway, and how the man in a state of grace—within which the concept of freedom loses its meaning—may be regarded as the freest. It must also be admitted that inasmuch as man, considered in the cosmic connexion, is certainly more bound than free, the emphasis of Catholicism on subjection is sound; nay, even that, in so far as a religious dogma is absolutely true, its unconditioned acknowledgment cannot fail to liberate; then only those Protestants or independent metaphysicians whose personal experience had the same roots as the doctrine of the Church could compare with the Catholic in inner freedom. Now absolute and complete knowledge can be attained by no isolated individual. Millions of souls have achieved conjointly under all circumstances a richer experience than was ever gained by the isolated individual; and if qualitative differentiations are resorted to in this connection, and if the more deeply rooted mind is accepted as authority, belief in authority can have only a liberating effect. It is because more wisdom is expressed in subjection than in a life based on personal initiative that an old man, as distinguished from youth, typically professes, in one way or another, adherence to the former. *But this does not militate against the fact that freedom expresses itself only in shifting the emphasis to the free side of life, and that, granted the premise that enfranchisement is the meaning of human life, the*

less wise adjustment is to that extent preferable to the wiser. There is, from the point of view of freedom, no greater difference than that presented by the alternative whether a man acts in his own name or in that of another. Here the "how" ultimately gauges the value of the "what."

WE ARE now able to tackle without further détours the solution of the problem of freedom. We can start out from the result gained from Professor Driesch's lecture, not, indeed, because this solved it, but in so far as the lecturer avowed his incompetence to solve the question. The necessity for this avowal lay in his approach. If the departure is from the verbal concept of freedom, the question as to the real import of what is meant by freedom is absolutely unanswerable; all that can be honestly maintained from that premise is that so far as our intelligence can grasp the matter, determination prevails. But the indefinite result arrived at by Driesch was due also to another cause: he started out from *consciousness*, and consciousness no doubt only means a "having." Viewed from this angle, will certainly includes no element of activity. When things are viewed from this perspective, there is certainly "nothing" between will and events; man is not even an agent in thinking—his thoughts come to him of their own accord. But how could consciousness be more than a mirror? It only *reflects* the real; it assuredly does not coincide with it. In so far I cannot even allow the existence of what Driesch calls "admittance-freedom." Lastly, Driesch started from the antiquated prejudice that freedom necessarily means free will. Free will cannot by any means be in question, because that which is

meant by freedom, self-determination in the broadest sense, refuses to be coupled with the concept of will. We know by now that will is not creative, but rather an inhibitory mechanism closely bound up as such with the physical organism and, in the psychic sphere, with what modern psychology calls compelling mechanisms. The only creative function in man is imagination. Now since freedom is essentially creative, how could there possibly be freedom precisely of the will? Driesch has indeed made an important contribution to critical preliminary work by his showing how the problem of freedom *cannot* be solved.

There is now no longer any difficulty in proceeding from negations to assertions. The first cause of the negative result obtained by Driesch need no longer be particularly considered. It was anticipated in the introductory lecture. The third cause has been made sufficiently clear by the foregoing reflections. So much the greater is the attention due to the second cause; and with this we are going to deal now. Consciousness "carries," has; it is not active. But what we mean by freedom is precisely creative action, action which, furthermore, is proved to be independent of the particular stratum within the subject from which it springs into being, provided that it originates at all with the subject. Only because this is so do we call the most unconscious of men, the creative artists, free; they incarnate their innermost personality in their works; only because this is so can it be said that motive discharges, while character charges: The concept of freedom is related immediately to Being. Lastly, for this reason only can a man in the state of grace be considered as free; it is true that, in the ultimate analysis, he is determined by the super-

personal—for not he lives, but God within him; but then his personal will has become one with God's will. We thus find that the problem of freedom posits itself in principle independently of the alternative "consciously or unconsciously," because we experience inner reality only in the mirror of consciousness; but the question itself does not lie on the plane of consciousness; for that Being which is all that really matters does not coincide with it.

The fact is that the problem of freedom is apparent only when life everywhere self-determined finds its creative centre is a potentially self-conscious subject, which presently evinces—or can evince—by way of personal assumption within determinate limits, the same initiative which on lower stages proceeds from impersonal centres. It is well, in this place, to adopt the distinction suggested by Melchior Palágyis between vitality and mind: whereas vitality is a perpetual flux, mind maintains its character solely by way of discontinuous acts. Only where consciousness is centred in the mind can there be a question of freedom; for as all personal decisions proceed from the mind, they occur in discontinuous acts, a fact known also to Bergson, who wrote: "*Conscience n'est pas synonyme d'existence, mais seulement d'action réelle ou d'efficacité immédiate.*" Life is everywhere initiatory. Specific formations, specific creations of organs, reactions, and regenerations, such as belong even to the lowest organisms, mean in principle, viewed from the external world, self-determination in the very sense of man's free decisions. But this proceeds from mind—whose independent existence cannot be proved to exist below the human stage. Thus the problem of freedom is again raised only as relating to

mind. This, then, reveals to what extent the question as to whether there exists free will or free agency or only "admittance-freedom" is inadequately put on the habitual plane. What matters is that the subject which is everywhere the determinant becomes, on a definite plane and within definite limits, the *agent of the universal creative power of Life*. Once this is the case, there is no longer a question of kind, but of degree, how many parts of the psycho-physical organism appear accessible to conscious self-determination. The majority of men can be safely regarded as being unable to say more than "nay" or at best "yea" to what goes on within them; this certainly holds good for all young souls. But psycho-analysis teaches that entire regions of hitherto inaccessible happenings can be lifted to the region of the consciously determinant subject. The same is proved by the practices of the fakirs. Furthermore, the possibility of religious and metaphysical sounding of man's depths goes to prove that man can be determined by himself to the extent of making his ideal self-dominate his whole life, a result which makes him superior to most things that keep others in check. But, again, it is not in the degree of his deliverance from the thralldom of the world that lies the crux of the problem of freedom. It lies entirely and exclusively in the fact that the living and creative power is centred in the subject which is, or can become, self-conscious.

FROM this point of vantage the meaning of the problem of freedom can be readily apprehended to its whole extent. It is clear that the question with freedom is not of a primary substance, but of a particular and limited aspect of life. All constraint by the

external cosmos and, also, all self-determination on this or the other side of the stage, where the *élan vital* centres itself in the subject awakened to mind-consciousness, lie outside the range of the true problem of freedom. Nor does the reality of freedom imply a prejudgment against the reality of a trans-subjectively operative cosmic dispensation. Furthermore, in dealing with the reality of freedom we have a pure problem of actuality; it refers solely to the point of indifference between that which has become and that which has not as yet become. This problem of actuality is raised objectively at every moment of a creative act; but it becomes precisely the point on which freedom hinges, where creation originates in the personal and mind-conscious subject. Here the objective decision takes on the character of a personally-subjective decision. To that extent the problem of freedom is also a borderline problem; it refers, as it were, to the mathematical point at which super-personal guidance and sub-personal compulsion meet. And because it is in so far a borderline problem, is it a problem at all, even as the ethical problems presuppose actual conflicts? For this very reason the East, which takes its departure from the cosmos as a whole, altogether ignores the problem of freedom in our acceptance. It is, finally, a practical and not a theoretical problem, and it is for that very reason not only insolvable, when projected on the plane of abstract theory, but it cannot even be understood.

What, then, is the distinguishing trait of free decisions as against such as come by themselves? The one distinguishing characteristic of free decisions is that they occur through the *personal* subject. The introductory lecture had already given us to understand that the

generally organic self-determination assumes the character of a *free* action then—and then only—when the sense-connexion of events has its determinant centre in the conscious *unique person*. From this vantage we now can find the transition from the generally organic self-determination to spiritual initiative. The inheritance of qualities is generally brought about by the continuance, through the individual series of unchanging, independent hereditary elements which are called *genes*. The uniqueness of each individual is thus a function of the particular meaning which manifests itself through him; to use the traditional formula of the School of Wisdom, what makes the Unique is what he *says* by means of the Gene-alphabet; for it is obviously not one with it. Every particular soul differs from every other; its origin lies in another dimension than that of parental inheritance. It is of spiritual origin.

When viewed from this vantage point, the meaning of possible mental decisions becomes obvious; for its possibility coincides with the other of imparting a new meaning to the facts unchanging in themselves—the world-alphabet. And if, proceeding from this, we now consider the concept of freedom in general, as it presents itself to the inborn feeling and yearning of every man, we see at a glance that the question was adequately put; this concept never refers to the facts in themselves, but to the meaning they win for the individual. If significance creates the facts at all, it does here, and not *vice versa*. What a fact “is” in the life of the individual depends, first and last, upon what it means for *him*, and for him only. One man may be happy in the most straitened circumstances; another may pine away in spite of the most brilliant external situation. And the great

man's essential mark of distinction is that he imparts to *a priori* unfavorable conditions, by his attitude towards them, a meaning sufficing to turn his misfortunes into blessings. *For the imparting of meaning is not essentially interpretation, but transformation of facts.* He who understands the world inwardly in a new manner makes it at the same time externally different. Here a mere shade distinguishes the sage from the creative statesman. While the former attains to such a degree of inner exaltedness that nothing external disturbs his equanimity, the latter imparts by the same qualities a new direction to events, the overwhelming majority of which he must, like every other man, accept. And as the destiny to come is, on the historic plane, in every particular case to a great extent due to the free decisions of individual men, it follows that man is also the creator of Destiny, a quality which also enables him to rise superior to his fate. Self-determination thus becomes freedom wherever the centre of the sense-connexion lies in the personal subject.

LET us now return to the practical problem. We stated at the beginning that hardly a man wills to be free. The reason should be obvious by now. Events need not necessarily be referred to the personal centre of meaning, and responsibility need not be assumed by personal sense-bestowal. Events run their course, anyway, and it is simpler to drift with the tide. Nor is it only simpler; it means, above all, much less exertion. For nothing requires greater tension than the rallying of all one's forces and then radiating them in a particular direction. This is not a metaphysical assertion, but a fact experience has taught us. Besides, nothing re-

quires more personal courage; for he who wills freedom will also risk. Freedom as a pure problem of actuality is utterly dependent on the uncertainty of events. It is true that the belief in grace in its theoretical aspect involves the same amount of risk. But the consciousness of that risk is practically abolished by the fact that the believer in grace also *believes* from the outset in a wise and sure guidance, and thus compensates in his consciousness for the risk he actually incurs by taking his security for granted.

That freedom is essentially will unto risk can be proved briefly by an historic example. Freedom consists, as we have seen, in the imparting of a new meaning to facts; it must, accordingly, where it turns to actuality within the world, become manifest through its operation of changes. Now it can be proved that all transformations which have occurred in the Occident can be traced back to John Calvin's doctrine. It is, theoretically, the most contradictory doctrine imaginable, but it was in its original intention a pure doctrine of grace. Yet, as a matter of fact, it demanded the utmost personal initiative; for it maintained, furthermore, that predestination depends, for proof, on success. It therewith made of will unto risk the crux of all life, religious life included. And the historic effect of this doctrine was that the peoples directly or indirectly inspired by its teachings made good their freedom in the ways of the world far beyond all others and all other times. All modern domination of the world by the mind is traceable to Calvin's impulse, whereas Catholic humanity, the principle of which is belief in authority, appears essentially not world-domineering and non-progressive. That, on the other hand, the definition of freedom as will unto

risk does not imply a prejudice in favor of modern progress is proved by the fact that the conditions obtaining for action apply also to "abstention" for the sake of escaping from the world. First, a still greater effort, a more energetic breasting the tide of life, are required for forbearance. Second, success is here entirely dependent on the assent to insecurity. A part of this question has already been dealt with in the first part of this lecture. What remains to be said can be gleaned from the Indian motto, "Work unceasingly, but sacrifice at every moment the fruits of thy endeavours" (the *Tivan-mukta*); from the Indian doctrine that the liberated have passed beyond all ties—that of a determinate doctrine included; and from the Indian practice which consists in regarding the goal as essentially uncertain and in demanding immense patience (which, however, does not consist in a mere expectation of grace), not to mention the opinion held by Indians that release presupposes *complete* "abstention" in regard to all terrestrial things—which is assuredly harder than any possible action.

But now it should also become clear why the problem of freedom represents the very pivot of human life. Theoretically, freedom is only an infinitesimal little wheel in the clockwork of the cosmos, and also a tiny organ within the essentially super-individual organism of life. *But where creative life-force has on one of its planes its starting-point in the conscious subject, there this tiny organ is obviously of decisive importance.* And it is indeed on this plane that the whole higher life of humanity is enacted. On this plane, and on no other, history and all human progress play their parts. Therefore, the higher life of humanity is indeed pure personal responsibility. Nor do the compulsion of nature

and cosmic dispensations make any difference herein. The compulsion of nature obtains absolutely on its own plane; its law can never be counteracted by any free decisions whatsoever. Cosmic dispensation, on the other hand, does not annul freedom, because the sphere of possible freedom is subject to the faculty of freedom alone in spite of the overwhelming power of the cosmic. Thus the antagonism between grace and freedom, which we pointed out in the beginning, is resolved in part. It is true that what Divine Grace ordains occurs independently of freedom. But Divine Grace needs, on the other hand, to be accepted. To the thief on the Cross who repulsed him, even the Redeemer of the World could not open the doors of Paradise. Without the lesser will, the greater will cannot come to be. Even the most extreme doctrines of grace admit that man must at least throw himself open to the influence of God, and that the institution of what we call freedom is willed by God, which is expressed by the Talmud in the following terms, "The World was created for the Choice of the Choosers." Were it otherwise, this world of ours would be in a state of grace from time immemorial, since the goodness of God is held to be infinite. It should be also clear by now why man is not only responsible to himself, but also to God, nay even—according to the profound Talmudic doctrine—*for* God: the concept of responsibility holds good for the realm of freedom only. Man's higher life is indeed nothing but responsibility, and, therefore, nothing but freedom. It depends upon man alone what sense he bestows upon events. It is incumbent on none but him to refer the external back to his personal centre.

By deciding in one way or another, a man *becomes*

another man himself. Let us return to the analogy of the organic sphere, where the personally unique element was seen to spring from the mosaic of unchanging hereditary elements because of the determinate utterance of the unique soul by means of the Gene-alphabet. In exactly the same way, all facts are transformed according to the meaning imparted to them and according to the decision reached. For freedom, by selecting a particular one from among several practical possibilities, and thus constituting a new natural state, changes the *base* for the freedom of the next possible decision. It may do so in the upward direction, and it then transforms the natural circular motion into a spiral track. But it may do so just as well in a downward direction, and this is the way of fall, of sin; of sin, inasmuch as it is in principle always optional for man to decide in favour of ascent; and this direction only corresponds to his spiritual nature. For that very reason all that matters is again the ascendant movement in itself, never the elevation of the stage attained; for freedom can, within its range, strive in no other way than from a *given* base. Therefore, no fallen man is ever lost entirely to God as long as he has not definitely decided in favour of descent.

But what is the significance of the fact that free decision changes the base? This means that it transforms nature. Every decision creates in the psyche and the physical new fixations which can, again, be disrupted to a certain degree by every new decision, be it only to make in its turn for the creation of a new fixation. Thus the same ties that on the one hand impede ascent may become means of growth. This proves the logical basis, as it were, for asceticism and discipline. They avail nothing to such as conceive them as ends in themselves;

for they only serve to settle them still farther in the ways of routine. But he who uses the mechanisms of habit and automatic performance for the purpose of inducing new fixations upon higher and ever higher planes, to him they are helpful indeed.

Here, then, we can measure exactly how little absolute is freedom. Freedom is impotent if deprived of the possibility of connexion with necessity, and it then also utterly loses its meaning. I can make myself best understood, perhaps, in choosing a paradoxical formula: man is not the father of his deeds, but their offspring. All history proves this interpretation to be true of men. How often have not born cowards become heroes after an unexpected victory! The inner adjustment undergoes a change through success or failure and, as every soul practically harbours all human qualities, all depends upon the adjustment and the degree of its fixation. Hence the difference of character created by a great or a shameful history, a long or a short one. The same holds good, practically, with the great leaders, however much their deeds may have been prefigured in their dispositions. Napoleon became a new man dating from the *coup d'état* of St.-Cloud, which he had not personally intended, but which his brother Lucien eventually imposed upon him. Thus every man grows with his power and position. And he grows chiefly by his achievements. Why does the circuitous way through the work performed appear to be inevitable in the case of the majority of men for the attainment of inner greatness? Because for the majority only the outward expression of the inner reality transforms the latter into personal experience and thereby raises the basis of consciousness to the higher state. This is also the reason why appre-

ciation helps, while its refusal inhibits, and why, for the unproductive, *amor fati* is the highest ideal attainable.

It should also be clear by now why every single action, every thought, matters. Every inner decision creates a new state of facts, as a basis for the workings of freedom. He who decides in favour of the higher and the better in every single instance must of necessity grow in his inner stature; the same necessity applies to the fall of those who do not resist their downward tendencies. Graphology in our day is most instructive in this respect: it can be proved for every man how certain qualities of his increase or otherwise decrease in accordance with what he assents to and emphasizes within himself. And this is *actual fact*; his qualities can get completely lost; for the psychic functions are not hard and fast facts; meaning creates out of its own self the facts. Thus what really matters, from the standpoint of value, are not a man's inborn dispositions, but the account to which he turns them. Every man carries within him, as an impersonal capital in itself, the most dissimilar dispositions. There never was a saint in whom there did not dwell all potentialities for evil. It is the mission of freedom to turn this collective capital to good account, which is splendidly expressed by Jewish wisdom in the words: "Thou shalt serve God with the good impulse *and also with the evil impulse.*"

We can now draw the metaphysical conclusion: *Man is ultimately that for which he decides.* Nature, the outer nature and inner, affords him any material there is. "He himself" is only the sense-bestowing centre of the whole relationship. Every man is objectively at once ultimate depth and ultimate surface. In every man there live hundreds of the most varying potentialities.

He who, then, has decided in favour of depth, *is* deep; and who has decided in favour of his surface, *is* shallow, metaphysically, however great his potentialities may have been. For the positive reality born of his decisions is the one and only thing that matters in the individual man. This, then, also leads to a full realization of the tremendous words of Christ, that the rich cannot enter Heaven; not many, indeed, of those who in one way or another have been blessed by nature or destiny feel the urge to lay the emphasis on their ultimate depths, a fact readily conceivable because only what is insignificant and superficial ends well and because the man who wills what is great must give his whole-hearted assent to tragedy. On the other hand, again, *all*, positively all importance depends on the decision in favour of a man's best qualities; dispositions mean nothing in themselves. I am personally convinced that the immortal part of man is only this intangible quality which expresses itself in such and such a decision. From which it follows that the Christian idea of a possible salvation by conversion *in articulo mortis* is well founded in fact, and that, if reincarnation is a truth, the gifted man who decided in favour of superficiality may well look forward to his rebirth in the shape of a mouse or a sparrow. If the last presupposition is true to fact, special light is also thrown on the reason why men destined to greatness are rarely born under happy constellations. . . . Man *is* that which he decided; empirically in the form of the precipitate of his choice in fixed nature, and metaphysically as the ultimately decisive thing itself. It will by now have become quite clear why all higher religions, without exception, lay the main stress on good will; it is indeed freedom on which all mind-conscious life

hinges in spite of the overwhelming power of cosmic dispensation and the compulsion of nature. We now also understand why not only the failure to realize the decisive importance of freedom, but also the exaggerated emphasis on freedom, are accompanied by such bitter consequences. He who wholly gives himself up to grace is precisely remiss in that which is solely incumbent on him as man; he who believes himself to be wholly free, like Lucifer, cuts himself off from the cosmic association. This helps us also to understand the particular attitude of Buddha. His was not Luciferian nature, but the individual *per se* was for him the Ultimate. This breaking loose from the whole, though, of necessity led him, precisely because of the profoundness of his mind and soul, to the conviction that Life was suffering only, that its one positive quality was its potential surcease, and that its sole object was its extinction.

WHAT, however, does the possibility of making a decision amount to? It cannot be further explained, because it signifies the given basis for all thought, because it is altogether the preordained basis of Life. It is meaningless to call in causality here; for the law of causation obtains, first, only from the point of view of the cognizing subject, and, second, we need not enquire after a cause where the occurrence in question passes through the determinant subject. As for freedom, it cannot, *a fortiori*, furnish the ground for freedom. But we certainly can tell with greater precision, by now, what freedom *amounts* to. The most wonderful fact of our cognitional sphere is perhaps this, that freedom can destroy itself—that is, by unbelief in itself. He who does not believe in his freedom actually falls

a prey to impotence and bondage. It follows from this that the possibility of freedom is essentially dependent on belief; which fact should, on the ground of what has been stated above, be understood to the effect that a "beyond" of freedom actually exists in so far as self-determination, in the case of its centralization in the conscious subject, must also decide, whether or not it will express itself in terms of freedom; for it might abdicate in favour of necessity or grace. This is the ultimate meaning of the facts described in the beginning, and also of the other facts dealt with in my work, *Philosophy as an Art* in the chapter "*Erscheinungswelt und Geistesmacht*." Now belief, as I was the first to prove in *Immortality*, is, when viewed from consciousness, the ultimate. It signifies in the sphere of creative life the subjective reflection of objective Being. It is ultimately by believing in it that reality is "posited" as real. I may be allowed to quote what I wrote at the age of twenty-seven: "My own existence becomes for me a matter of belief at the very moment in which it becomes a materialized representation for my consciousness. Whenever I am not immediately existent, but only come to myself by the circuitous way of reflection, all I can do is to believe in my existence. The Ego then becomes the ultimate hypothesis—that is, it becomes a something which can be no further reduced—which means an object of belief. Hence the paradox that it does not suffice to be some one, but that a man must, in addition, believe in himself in order to triumph; hence also the guaranty of success, nay the anticipation of destiny, which are founded on self-consciousness; hence the miracle that belief seems to achieve the impossible, to be able to oppose natural laws; hence, finally, the pos-

sibility of influencing man inwardly from without—the principle underlying Prussian military drill: the idea is that one acts as *if* the requisite qualities were lying ready within man and developed from within. In the end their existence is really believed in; what man believes of himself that he becomes. . . . Thus mind-conscious life is enacted between two focal points one of which corresponds to the *being* of the subject, while the other answers to the *belief* in the object, and which must interact congruently, wherever mind-conscious life is to become a productive power” (3rd ed., p. 94).

To that extent Anselm of Canterbury’s celebrated proposition, *Credo ut intelligam*, is true. In so far also Weltsch is in the right when he reduces all reality to a primary decision in favour of confidence. But belief not only “posits” reality as such; it “creates” it. And this means, applied to our present problem: If unbelief in freedom suspends it, belief, then, *creates* freedom, as experience proves that freedom grows proportionately as it becomes conscious and assents to it. *Therefore, the expression of freedom presupposes belief in freedom*, which explains, psychologically, how a concept may have originally come to man and enlightened him, the reality of which the mind, from its specific premises, cannot prove. But what also follows from this is that the reality of freedom is founded upon something which would seem to be merely subjective. And it is subjective indeed. But this is at the same time precisely a proof of the supreme reality of this very merely subjective. It is impossible to go “beyond” belief, because belief incarnates the creative power of Life itself within a definite appearance; within a definite appearance for, viewed absolutely, it is not belief which is the ultimate,

but the universal creative power which, when proceeding from a materialized representation, identifies itself with it in the form of belief, and thus makes it participant of Being. Belief is a specific expression of that which I am accustomed to determine as "emphasis." The capacity for this, though, is a primary phenomenon, because it is identical with the primary phenomenon of freedom, in the most general acceptance, *viz.*, as the capacity of selecting between a number of possibilities and of giving one's assent to the selected one; the specific existence of freedom thus understood cannot be denied, because there are operating external motives, since the specific operation of motives presupposes in its turn the specificity of free life.

Those, however, who bring in here the compelling influence of suggestion in order to deny the existence of freedom should remember that free positing avails itself here of the mechanism of suggestion, and that thus man himself creates the causes which set the mechanisms of his soul going, so that the intended goal operates as cause, as it were. Now, indeed, it is no longer a problem for us that freedom is neither deducible nor provable on the plane of logical theory: *Freedom is essentially magic.* Magic is nothing else than the creation of the objective, in the broadest sense, from out of the subjective. When, in the domain of life, meaning creates the facts and not *vice versa*; when the entelechy (as Driesch calls the specific force of life) builds, maintains, and disposes the organs from within, in some obscure, invisible way, this is in principle the same as that which the medium in materialization séances performs on a particular plane, and the same as the meaning which man gives on the plane of the given phenomenal reality. Let us here

remember the practical basic doctrine of the School of Wisdom according to which the idea creates reality. Nothing else, with respect to the content of a belief, is meant by the creative power of the latter. Our basic doctrine only provides the more comprehensive formula comprising both conscious and unconscious creation. Therefore, it holds the key to the whole problem of freedom.

Let us now briefly return to the question of so-called free will. Since Coué's researches it is an ascertained fact that it is not will which creates, but imagination, and in this manner that an ideal firmly kept before the mind realizes itself *spontaneously*. This may be regarded as the positive as against Driesch's negative, according to which there is "nothing" between will and deed, idea and reality. This is obvious in view of the "magic" character of the vital spontaneous becoming as well as of free creation; for magic operation means forming the objective from out the subjective. This, then, helps us to understand finally how the problem of freedom does not exhaust itself in the problem of free will: the inhibitory mechanism which is will is only an insignificant organ which serves freedom among other functions. Freedom itself and the primary possibility of magic mean the very same thing.

Magic may nowadays be considered as critically comprehended, thanks to the work, "*Theorie einer natürlichen Magie*" (*Theory of Natural Magic*), by Ernst Marcus (Munich, Ernst Reinhardt). This strict Kantian has established that the magically creative agency coincides with Kant's *a priori* organized Noumenon; this Noumenon exists in very fact. It forms the body out of itself. Its organizing is, therefore, literally "organic

thinking," that which also underlies the primary materialization of our bodily manifestation; for all its performances correspond exactly to what the understanding performs on the plane of ideas. This organizing agency, which in its particular performance creates, maintains, and regenerates organs after the prototype of a platonic idea, can be understood only in the form of "ideas" which create realities, although our seemingly intelligible concept of an essentially incomprehensible reality is correct only in the sense of a distant analogy. I cannot in this place go into further details: let me recommend the work already cited, which also furnishes an explanation of how "reason" creates laws from out of its own being. I here simply state that the proposition, "ideas create realities," obtains for the whole of human life. We need not, then, trouble ourselves any longer with asking what the "origin" of ideas may be. *Meaning*—the vital content of every idea—indeed *creates the facts*. The primary source lies ultimately in meaning itself, however numerous the intermediaries between the primary meaning, the ultimate personal centre of the sense-connexion, and that which actually touches off a decision may be in the particular case. For the external motives are, again, always only representatives and symbols of deeper strata of purely inner volitions (the concept of which I naturally use unprecisely here in the manner of Schopenhauer). Therefore, every man lives his strictly personal life, whatever may happen to him, and has his strictly personal destiny. That which I call "meaning," and the phenomenal appearance of which cannot be understood by epistemology (which is bound to consider living realities on the excentrically located plane of theory) except as "ideas," the source from which all

reality springs, is of a purely spiritual nature. This, then, rules out the question as to the origin of ideas, in so far as it was meant to serve as a refutation of freedom, *because it was wrongly put*. It is indeed possible—and it is most probably true—that the ultimate basis of all creation is located within the trans-subjective dimension beyond the personal subject. But from the point of view of freedom this does not alter matters. Freedom ultimately is the capacity of personally determined magic, and thus the ultimate known blossom on the stem of Life, which is ever a process of magic creation.

We can now give its last setting to the problem of freedom and law. It is a fact that all the known laws of occultism work, *provided that the practitioner is possessed of occult capacities*. Considered from the standpoint of freedom, things are just the same with laws of every kind. In the ordered Whole of the world—and it is indeed ordered everywhere—there is no room for events without laws; nor does freedom ever express itself otherwise than in conformity to laws, whether the magician casts his spells or the poet sings, the ruler rules, the judge dispenses justice, or man seeking God disengages himself from the bondage of the earth. But law in no wise implies a prejudgment in favour of inner necessity. Where man's life has attained mind-consciousness it is *freedom* which operates in conformity to laws. Its actual existence is the first condition: A man must be capable of poetic production before the rules of poetics are tested. A man must have decided in favour of the right before he can pronounce a righteous judgment. A man must be powerful before the elements of power can be revealed. A man must be a seeker after God before the laws of this path can mani-

fest themselves. A man must *be* a magician if the observance of occult laws is to lead to success. Freedom, that is, magic power, is the primary thing. It follows from this, then, that it is not the magician, in the broadest sense of the term, who is obliged to justify himself in the eyes of the scientist, but that the reverse obtains. It was because Prometheus had created it beforehand that Epimetheus had material at hand for reflection and proof and refutation. The profoundest thought uttered by Driesch was, "I *believe* that there is freedom." It is with this utterance that he truly *posited* freedom. There is no beyond of this positing. And this, furthermore, explains the condemnation of doubt we meet with in the sayings of all religious founders and sages; doubt dissolves and paralyzes the highest motivating powers of man. Doubt destroys freedom.

I MIGHT bring the lecture to a close here. But some of you may still have remained in a state of uncertainty as to how exiguous the domain of potential freedom is compared with the universal connexion of the cosmos, and how it belongs in that connexion. I will, therefore, to bring the matter to a conclusion, fit the results of this lecture into the connexion of those with which last year's session was concluded. Life resembles a melody. It consists everywhere in the coming into existence and passing away of its elements. It is a unity in time, held together by meaning. This applies to species, peoples, and generations. But it is also valid in the sense of a trans-subjective connexion. The melody of a man's life is not played out in the terrestrial existence. It only includes the latter in the semblance of a brief movement or time. Its ultimate meaning, its

fundamental tone, escapes human understanding. But it can be practically proved that there is such a thing; if a life is to be true to Meaning, it must be referred to this fundamental tone. How, then, can the results obtained today be fitted into this picture?—The answer is: the melody of organic life is played below what we feel to be our real life wholly spontaneously and without our interference. Viewed in the upward direction, our consciousness-determined existence only signifies a time within a greater melody. This more comprehensive melody is cosmically preordained. It certainly sounds to perfection on its own plane, and it is also everywhere victorious in the long run on the plane open to our perception, however numerous the discords may be through which it passes. But on the plane of his consciously self-determined life man is himself the player. Here no one can unburden him of his rôle as a player for himself. But man not only plays the melody the limits of which he can comprise, he plays also a greater melody. In this greater melody is rooted the meaning of every isolated measure. This is the reason why man plays correctly, from his own point of view, only when he voluntarily plays the melody of God and, since he does not know this melody, takes the ultimate risk upon himself. Man becomes free only in so far as he unites his own will with that of the God unknown to him. Thus freedom is indissolubly connected with necessity, in the downward, and, with grace, in the upward, sense. Who denies or refuses grace does not will his own fundamental tone. But if a man thus voluntarily plays a greater melody which includes his own life as a tiny time, then something higher plays at the same time through him. Then he is, as free man, a child of grace.

E. MAN AND THE EARTH

I

Man and the Earth

THE existence of any kind of essential problems—problems, that is, which not only proceed from and belong exclusively to the province of the intellect, but which concern man in his innermost nature—presupposes the existence of vital conflicts. Logical problems made their first appearance with the Greeks, because they were the first to become aware of the conflict existing between thought and being. The ethical problem, as a problem, originated with the Jews; it arose, consciously, first out of the insolvable conflict between the unconditional commandments of the God of their faith and their own manifest incapacity to fulfil them. Just so, the religious problem, as a problem, may be called a German discovery, because the German's original bias is toward thinking and not toward being, a quality which makes him incapable of feeling safe as an unsophisticated child of God. Now the special problems of the School of Wisdom are exclusively of the *essential* kind; it rules out of court all problems of a purely intellectual order by reason of their inessentialness. For this reason the fact that the general theme chosen for the present session is "Man and the Earth" sets up the assertion that this theme enshrines a vital conflict. In other words: *the connexion of Man with the Earth is not self-evident.*

Not self-evident, is it? Indeed, he who regards only the external, who thinks only of others without taking sides, is naturally content with things as he finds them. There is no life without death, without food produced by the earth. The existence of the non-earthly, of the earth-free, is not provable *ab extra*. Ideals may be regarded as nothing better than imaginations; the loftiest of thoughts may be nothing but a means of subsistence. The meaning of the deepest love can be reduced to the act of propagation of the species. The whole of the last-century science, generally speaking, pronounced judgments such as these, and on the plane of projected knowledge its doctrines cannot be refuted.

But the World War and its consequences have disproved the validity of this conception as it affects real life. The war, which we may look upon as the continuation of politics with different means, was to consolidate, once for all, the era of progress. Bolshevism, as the system of the most unmitigated rationalism ever carried into practical effect, took upon itself, after all ideological prejudices had been dethroned, to transform the world into an Eden which should vouchsafe perfect satisfaction to the greatest number of men. But the outcome was the unfettering of demoniac forces of a power reminiscent of primeval myths. The sway of these powers beggars all materialistic interpretation. Their meaning is quite incomprehensible from our earthly point of view. Here, we were in the presence of an unmistakable spiritual—if unconscious—will unto destruction of all that is earthly. Here was proof positive that with ideas of vital import the question is not of epiphenomena—that is, of phenomena added to the familiar earthly problems—but of primary forces opposed to the

terrestrial. History dating from 1914 is not to be understood in terms of materialism and rationalism.

Let us now proceed to a review of the inner man. What is the meaning of death here? There are few who have anything to say against the death of others. When a beloved person dies the average man holds that all that can be done is to mourn for him or her. But in that, too, there is no intrinsic evil; for, while being sorry for others, he is conscious of his own welfare. A man's own death, however, makes all the difference. It is only in the days of his youth that man takes it lightly; only youth meets death with a light heart. But why? Because in the period of upbuilding, soaring forces man does not believe in death. The earthly instincts of growth are so preponderant then as to render man incapable of realizing his possible end, exactly as, with the naturally brave, the combative instinct keeps the idea of danger from becoming a vital experience. These things undergo a change when the midday of life is past. Not, though, as if man now identified himself with his proclivities to decline, but in the sense that the outlook on death becomes for him more and more paradoxical and inexplicable. Impulses, instincts, and so forth are the progeny of this earth; they demonstrably decline and eventually die during the lifetime of the individual. But real self-consciousness—this is more clearly revealed with every year of man's life—mirrors the timeless and, with it, an essence the surcease of which is unthinkable. The life of the spirit does not follow the rhythm of the vegetable and external life; it even grows with age, so much so that there never was a great mind who, if his body was at all successful in withstanding decline, did not feel his earthly career to be an unbroken progress.

Man grown spiritually conscious no longer feels his life to be a sequence of changing conditions, but a fulfilment of meaning; think of the results obtained in the 1924 session of the School of Wisdom, the general theme of which was "Becoming and Passing Away." In this connexion physiologic explanations are of no avail unless Buddha's premise is espoused that the very same man lives through a multiplicity of lives. But this possibility as such would suffice to annul man's essential relationship with the earth. In fact, this relationship is, from the point of view of the inwardly-directed consciousness, not self-understood, but a paradox. Women sometimes regard the earth as their ultimate home; but I do not believe there ever was a man in whom the words, "Earth thou art and to earth thou shalt return," if really understood, did not cause a shudder. There is something awful and, therefore, sacred in the idea of interment. Surely man, the male, invented cremation urged by the idea that the bondage of earth might be overcome by this means, and that the soul would soar heavenward with the flames. The psychological facts outlined here must be accepted as a fact as ultimate and not to be explained away as is ocular evidence. We must even ascribe to it greater weight than to such evidence; for man's essence is indubitably a Beyond to his bodily existence. Thus death is and ever will be a monstrous paradox.

But things are the same with birth. The advent of the mind-conscious, ideally-minded, heavenward-aspiring man by the well-known ways of physical procreation is utterly inconceivable. Hence the connexion of sexual relations with the idea of sin—or (which means the same) the forced sanctification of these relations—is to be found all over the earth. And the same obtains for material life in general. Man no doubt lives on the

substance of the earth. But whence the ineradicable idea that man should *earn* his living? The mere wording of the idea presupposes the notion that man, after all, does not really belong to the terrestrial sphere. Again, the idea of property. *Why* does man want to own the earth? He does not belong to the earth, and yet he wants to own it. This essential paradox of what is universally accepted as self-understood is most clearly revealed by the opposite ideologies. Wherever there was spiritual consciousness in the sense of a divorce from nature, death was regarded as the reward of sin. It was held, accordingly, that it should be possible to overcome it. So also was the sexless state regarded as the higher, and poverty as the state most becoming the spiritual. Men who have been exclusively spirit-conscious were, for this reason, always averse to history and culture. The best symbol for this antinomic relation is afforded by the Russian people. It appears, on the one hand, as the most primitively earth-bound of all peoples; it feels itself as being owned by earth, and no man should own it in his turn; yet, on the other hand, this people, wherever it becomes at all conscious of spiritual reality, wills directly the terrestrial catastrophe, the end. Russian Maximalism—of which Bolshevism is but a specified expression—signifies nothing else than the negation of evolution. That historical evolution should be able to lead to the ideal state is a belief shared by no Russian. There should be for him a new heaven and a new earth. Thus it can indeed happen that God becomes Satan, and that the Third Rome turns into the Third International; but in no case do men of such a mentality believe in a terrestrial felicity *à la* Bentham. They likewise disown the concept of well-earned rights: man has no rights in their eyes,

for, ultimately, what is evolved on earth is none of his business.

So much for the primary facts of life. But, are things at all different in the case of its spiritual determinations? Let us name a single purely human ideal recognized by each and all which does not transcend the terrestrial sphere! This can be a matter for doubt only to such as do not see that the Unique in and within man signifies the ultimate terminus, the reason why reference to collective utility is completely at fault. Truth is unattainable; truthfulness unprofitable; the ethical problem is insolvable. For the meaning of all ethics is that man should *become* good, not that he should attain happiness. Nay, more: in the estimate of all higher religions death is regarded as an *adiaphoron*, as unessential, as compared with the commandments to be observed. Material aims never and nowhere are the ultimate determinant. Even the business man, who does not look for anything higher than his profit when working, feels his life to be devoid of meaning. Finally, concerning man's fatherland, or home country, which seems to bind him with the strongest ties to the earth—it is not the fact that counts, but the idea of it. He will fight for his country not as for a possession, but in the spirit of self-sacrifice.

These brief reflections should suffice. You should have seen by now that from the spiritual point of view man's connexion with the earth is no self-evident thing, but a tremendous paradox. This primary paradox is the matrix of all earthly problems without a single exception. On the other hand, the mere existence of these problems proves the existence of a paradoxical basis. And this paradox, again, takes on an altogether monstrous appearance when we reflect—from the vantage point of

what we have understood thus far—that *we are, as a fact, most closely connected with the earth, nevertheless.* Things alive are altogether more earth-bound than the dead. An inorganic body hurled into the world space would subsist; as opposed to this, live beings are entirely dependent on their surrounding world, and the more so, the more specified they are. Their existence is essentially correlative to that of their surrounding worlds. In the case of the starfish, its external milieu, the sea, stands in the same relation to man as his inner milieu, his blood. Yet again, man, inasmuch as he needs air, is physically as truly open to the entire world as the starfish. And by his blood and heredity man is earth-bound everywhere as a psychic being. All spiritual aspirations have their purely terrestrial impulsional correspondents. Also, the spiritual requires everywhere physical organs for its manifestation. Nay, more, it is precisely spiritualization of the body which is required for spiritualization on purely spiritual lines. Hence the further paradox that diet has spiritual significance. Thus, viewed from the point of view of obviousness, it is as essentially true that man is connected with the earth as that he is not connected with it. This is how the problem stands, thus and not otherwise. While the naturalist is free to argue that man is most probably no more than a terrestrial being, the other question as to how man can possibly be of this earth is equally justified. This vast tension forms the framework for the present session. Bear this tension in mind when you consider the primary problem, “Man and the Earth,” along the lines of the particular precise formulations of the problems which the ensuing lectures will embody, and the expression, “bear in mind,” is, let this be well understood, not meant in the sense of a

theory, but in that of an adjustment instinct with life and making for personal vital experience. Your attitude to what you will hear should not resemble the attitude to views on which you are expected to form and maintain opinions; you should rather avail yourselves of the symphony of the session as a whole by way of a symbol for meditation. *Every* problem to be dealt with here refers to a vital, an emphatically vital problem for each of you. *Every* man shares, as an infinitesimal component part, the unity-life of the changing planet. To *every* man his body is his fate. *Every* man's psyche is earth-bound in part. *Every* man is a cultural factor dependent on the destiny of the earth at the same time. *Every* man experiences, somehow, his specifically human predicament as a falling off from the natural order of things. *Every* man is, on the one hand, mind ruling the earth, and, on the other, a soul divorceable from the earth. And finally, *every* man is for himself the measure and centre of the world at large. Each of you should, therefore, refer what he hears to himself alone. You will, then, have comprehended at the end of the session, in case you understood deeply, in the sense of a personal vital experience, to what extent man is earth-bound and to what extent he is not.¹

¹ The *Leuchter*, 1927 (Darmstadt, Otto Reichl Verlag), which contains the whole of the lectures of this session of the School of Wisdom, provides particularly instructive reading. Some of the lecturers have worked out into books, meanwhile, their ideas on their particular subjects. This applies to Professor Hans Much of Hamburg, who lectured at Darmstadt on "Man's Body As His Destiny" and is now writing a philosophy of medicine; and to the late Max Scheler, whose lecture, "Man's Particular Position in the Universe," can now be obtained from Reichl in pamphlet form. Of the particularly interesting lecture by Dr. C. G. Jung on the earth-boundness of the soul I have quoted the part most interesting to Americans in *Europe*, p. 356.

II

The Changing Planet as a Unit

MAN apprehends and experiences only what belongs to his personal world of perception. This holds not only in the general biological sense Uexküll had in mind when he coined the expression a "Perception-world," showing that every type of organization, the human species included, is definitely incorporated into the cosmic Whole, making possible, on the one hand, experience, while, on the other, raising insurmountable barriers to possible experience. Nor is this concept confined only to the abstract Kantian theory that all phenomena for the perception of which the mind has no specific organs must remain transcendent to cognition: its validity is concrete in the sense that every valid cognition presupposes a determinate disposition for its attainment, as well as for its transmittance to others. The concept of a "thinker" entitled, merely because of his thinking powers, to deliver utterances on all kinds of truths is illogical. Thought as such is—in Kierkegaard's words—"existential" only in the field of logic; and even there it can appraise realities through itself only to the extent that Spinoza's proposition is valid: "*Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum*"—a proposition the truth of which is confined to a very narrow field. It is a mistake to understand man's "world-openness," as Scheler calls it, as permitting the sufficiently

endowed thinker to decide upon the questions of existence and non-existence or on the possibility of this or that mode of being. The fact is that any apprehension of realities presupposes a concrete relatedness of personal experience to the reality in question—a relatedness which is invariably dependent on a determinate concrete disposition. Just so, the deliverance of any definite knowledge invariably presupposes specific gifts of expression. For this reason only the opinions of a man who is capable of innate religious experiences can claim attention, and even then only when the man in question is capable of communicating his experiences also to such as do not share his natural disposition. Again, opinions on the nature of the Unconscious delivered by such as have no innate apprehension of the phenomenon are devoid of interest. "Things," in the sense of the German *Sache*, are always irrelevant; it is only the *correspondence* between a man and a "thing" which can justify advocacy of a determinate standpoint; for unless it is a question of a *natural* standpoint in the particular case, it is a question of usurpation; for there is the natural law that man is proficient only in what he can involuntarily perform.

Under these circumstances the question may well be raised why it was precisely myself who was called upon to deal with the theme, "The Changing Planet as a Unit"; for the fact that I happen to have studied geology in my time certainly does not qualify me for the task.—The truth is that I am entitled to speak on the subject because I happen to be capable of experiencing that Unity to which the theme in question refers. This assertion does not mean that I can offer an opinion of value or a presumption on my part. I am, as it were, simply a green frog. Other frogs may surpass this species in point

of size, ability to leap, and depth of voice; the green frog alone, however, is endowed with the faculty of indicating to man the weather to be expected. For me the unity of the landscape, as a psycho-physical entity, is a primary personal experience. This is why I was able to write my *Travel Diary* and why I have such a facility for apprehending the genius (though not necessarily the wording) of a language, when I happen to sojourn within its territory. This is also why, at times, I am even successful in determining *a priori* the particular species of animals of a definite type which corresponds to particular surroundings. I simply possess the organ requisite for the immediate awareness of realities which differently endowed persons can conceive only by way of ratiocination; that is all. And this reality, on the other hand, is unmistakably the primary reality in terrestrial existence; this is the reason why the opening lecture, after the introductory address, should deal with it. But as this reality stands for "what is given" in the true sense of the term, it can obviously only be experienced on the spot. In its quality of a higher synthesis it comprises all manner of particular conditions such as climate, nature of the soil, formations, colour scheme, speech, and thought. During my sojourn in the desert there occurred in my mind a spontaneous birth, as it were of that desert-god which is known as the God of the Jews and Arabs. In China I apprehended spontaneously the world within the scheme of the Chinese thought-categories. I apprehended the spirit of India at once, after having attended the temple ceremonies—but not before. Every landscape (in the aforesaid broadest and all-comprising sense) actually brings forth a particular sort of man who experiences the world in a definite personal

manner. We now know through Reche's researches (compare his book *Moana*) that the general world-experience of the Polynesian proceeds from a previous experience of time and not of space; from colour and not from tangible objectivity. In the tropics the problems of the north do not exist; hence Buddhism and Hindoo polytheism. Breadth of soul commonly goes with breadth of scenery; accordingly, the Russian belongs to a wide-flung type, whereas the European's type is narrow, and the Swiss, confined in valleys, is *borné*, even, as a national type. Narrowness can also prove to be the principal cause of differentiation; the culture of Greece and, later, of Europe, could not have sprung from broader conditions. The components of this primary landscape-unity are so numerous, and the distribution of the accents are so various in the particular cases, that beyond the suggestions offered above hardly more than general assertions can be safely made. It stands to reason that the excessive preponderance of one factor or of several factors can seemingly disrupt the landscape-unity for a time; in the long run, however, the spirit of the landscape proves always and everywhere triumphant.¹ Just as the great ocean currents mirror the average directions followed by the main air currents that have held their sway for thousands of years, just so the same landscapes, provided they remain the same (the Sahara Desert, for instance, is not the same; at the time it was covered by woods), are in the long run always inhabited by the same types. Thus, the plant called man has grown from time immemorial with stronger growth in Italy than anywhere else in

¹ I have dwelt at length on the problem in question here in the introductory chapter, "The American Scene," in my forthcoming book, *America Set Free*. New York, Harper & Brothers.

Europe. Thus, Egypt is inhabited to the present day by the traditional Egyptian cow in spite of the fact averred by Frobenius that it can be proved to have died out entirely no less than three times. Facts of this kind are dealt with by the special sciences of geopolitics, geopsychology, and so forth. The results of their findings are as vast as they are uncomplicated, and they are always unambiguous. Just as animals brought from foreign parts keep to the traditional local routes, although they never saw them before, and just as migratory birds, though they are mostly led by the younger of their kind, keep to the time-honoured main streets of passage, even so the same strategic points and lines prove their right to existence from the times when warlike nations first came into being. For man also lives correlatively to his surroundings. Wherever he is not adapted to the surrounding world at the outset, there he is sure to adapt himself in time. He cannot be the same kind of man as an inhabitant of the steppes, the woods, the deserts, and the seas. He must needs think and will differently, according to the case. Of the connexion which obtains between organic periodicity with the influences of the earth—as, for example, between woman's life and the phases of the moon, between fruitfulness and the frequency of earthquakes—I need not dwell here, for everyone is acquainted with these phenomena.

And this unity is everywhere manifested in the correlation of *all* components. This is true also of the different animals. Symbiosis is the original phenomenon. For it is this symbiosis which is the real characteristic of the relations between bacteria and the higher animals they inhabit; it is exceptional only because their presence becomes noxious. Medusæ and common crabs co-operate.

Clover is dependent for its fertilization on bees. Animals are dependent on plants for their continuance. This correlation is so complete that an equally complete world-image, as we are wont to make with man as a starting-point, could be derived from *every* living being as a starting-point. It would in the end be only more or less pessimistic according to the respective situations of these beings. We determine the meaning of insect life with respect to man; assuredly, the necrophorous beetles and maggots are as entitled to appraise our rhythm of existence according to our significance for them—which means that the human corpse would represent the state of perfection. One should read Maeterlinck's description of the putrefactive process of corpses; the precision with which each phase of the process of decomposition seems to be preordained for the benefit of a determinate class of worms or beetles, and the self-evident rhythm with which they take their turns, provide a truly appalling experience. And this standpoint permits us also to understand completely the reason why the many excentric world-images produced by philosophers are, nevertheless, entitled to existence—that they are so is proved by the number of persons for whom they are obvious. In the majority of cases they are indubitably deranged in the literal sense. But the reason is that the men who invented them deranged themselves from the world centre. They are thus in the right in advocating what is the dislocated.

THE same absolute relation of the planetary existence which obtains in space prevails also in time. I shall again proceed from my personal experience; for that is my only right to speak on the subject. I had felt

the coming of the World War long before its outbreak, independently of events in the external world to which I gave little heed; it was in the psychic air, that was all; the unconsciousness of all nations pressed on to that crisis. During the war I was incapable of mental work; for it seemed meaningless to me. But no sooner had the New Age come than I became aware of my task, and it was what I had never given a thought to before. But that which came thus into *my* mind spontaneously came at the same time into the minds of all men with the gift of looking ahead—in various senses and ways. The fact is that all contemporaries are inwardly interconnected, whether they are aware of it or not. Indeed, every man understands only those others who give utterance to what he unconsciously knew beforehand. It is only because the leading mind is ahead of the others by a few leagues that posterity is a matter of greater moment for him than the present time. New Problems of the same import occur simultaneously to everyone. Thus, the Fascists, Kemalists, and Bolshevists are all of the same mettle. The World War was truly aware of the Spirits of the Ages. In this war the superannuated “fell in battle” in the literal sense of the phrase. But, again, the victory was gained by a totally new spirit of which the combatants were entirely unconscious before it manifested itself; most of all the victorious nations resembled the hen that hatched the ducklings. Thus, the basic law underlying all historic life is the *Kairós*—now or never. Only once was an historic phenomenon like Christ possible; only once the Reformation. In our day psychoanalysis is having its world-day, and it never will again. In the same sense every great and profound man knows whether his day has come or not, and adapts his efforts

to the fact. Only the superficial fails to understand, in view of the existence of eternal values, the world law of the Kairós.

But since, as we have seen above, the spatial unity, the Topós, represents as essential a thing as the Kairós, history in every sense deals with the single time. Every event can be simultaneously determined by both spatial and temporal co-ordinates of a single time. And the law of the Topós becomes, in its turn, understandable from the vantage point of the Kairós which is self-evident from the very outset. In determinate *places* only determinate events can come to pass at a determinate period. Only in Palestine could the Christian era have its origin; only in Germany and Russia could the new era set in. The Chinese and Indians compute their world history on the basis of millions of years, when the peoples of the Mediterranean think only in thousands. Both are probably right. Mankind is certainly able to look back upon longer stretches of time from the confines of the ancient Gondwana Continent than around Europe. Accordingly, the oldest traditions must profess other teachings. For man participates in the vicissitudes of the planet in its changing totality, and cannot, as an historic being, detach himself from them.

The now and the here is thus the law of all earthly events, and not only of life. Life lives on the one hand in its own right. But the rhythm of its existence again depends everywhere on planetary and cosmic rhythms. I began the lecture with what we moderns are able to experience as collective situations; for from out of these only can concrete experience arise. But my point of departure was the psychic. Why? Because all primary personal experiences are psychic. Any imaginary idea as such is

a thing better demonstrated than any material fact, be it never so well ascertained. The next reason was that the indissoluble connexion of all planetary existence has the best chances of becoming consciously realized when viewed from the psychic domain. It would seem that every man can think and act as he would. In reality, however, every man who does not work to his own ruin wills what is in accordance with his place and time, simply because he wants to *live* and because there is no terrestrial life except in functional dependence on the now and the here. A classic example of this is furnished by the German belief in the dollar at the inflation period. As other people regulate their lives according to the rising and setting of the sun, so the Germans at that time instinctively adapted their very lives to the fluctuations of the dollar. The fact is that primitive impulses in the ultimate analysis also govern man, because it is they alone which root him to the earth. The law of the now and here explains why the immigrant is never adapted, and, therefore, invariably refuted by history, however "absolutely" he may be in the right; whereas the man who remained in his country involuntarily adapts himself to the times that be in spite of all his spiritual persuasions to the contrary. I may cite in this connexion the case of a Russian noblewoman who wrote to emigrants that she would have to make an occasional excursion abroad some day; for she might otherwise quite forget that other conditions than those of Soviet Russia are possible. Another fact to be explained by the law of *Topós* and *Kairós* is that only the representative mind has chance of success on the historic plane. The unity of the *Zeitgeist* is of so absolutely determinant a nature that archæology invariably concludes that identity of forms

proves contemporaneousness, either literally or in the sense of Spengler.

THIS leads us to *geology* and to the consideration of the faunas and floras of prehistoric times. The meaning of the sequence of geologic epochs is indeed the same as that of the sequence of historic *Zeitgeister*. Exactly as with the latter, the geological periods are characterized by the specific qualities of the determinant types. The geological formations, too, regarded *ab extra*, are synthetized unities of space and time, and unities of style in themselves. Here also it is the dependence of life on general conditions which causes the domination of what accords with the time. What does not accord with it still continues to live, for a time; but it is of no account; just as there live in our days men of the Middle Ages, of the Reformation times, of the Wilhelm the Second era, who do not, however, count any longer. What fails to accord with the times gradually dies away, because its coming into existence grows rarer and rarer. The causes for this extinction are always hundredfold, because for every specific state the question invariably is of a specific expression of an all-planetary situation. On the one hand, inner causes are the determinants; at some time or other the span of life accorded to an entire species appears exhausted, as everyone knows by the example of families. As for external causes, the simplest of their class can be safely regarded as the true determinants. The prehistoric giants most probably became extinct for the reason that the cost of their sustenance was too high in the long run; just as monogamy gradually succeeds in superseding polygamy all over the world merely because the majority of men cannot afford the upkeep of several

wives, however much they would like to have them. Thus, the earth's history can be divided into a number of primary ages. They are the age of the determinant chondropterygians, amphibia, reptiles, marsupials, and, finally, mammals. All types probably lived together at all times—no decision can here be arrived at, owing to the accidental nature of the preservation of remains; but what accorded with the times was ever the *determinant* type. And what accorded with the times was always that which corresponded to the changing planetary state as a whole. The magnitude of the differences in question here can be shown by a personal experience by anyone who puts himself completely in the place of a plant or, otherwise, of a seal, that creature which, though so near to man, lives in water as we live in air. In the atmosphere of the carboniferous period, charged with vapours and carbonic-acid gas, only plants and amphibia could eke out anything but a miserable existence. All fauna and flora require, in order to thrive, a determinate general milieu. Physically they depend on it everywhere.

For this reason the transformations of the first magnitude on earth are certainly due to planetary and cosmic influences and not to such as inhere in life's specific laws. The nature of those times, when the prehistoric giants came into being and throve, can today still be sensed in North America. In the United States there still grow trees of fantastic size (the *Sequoia gigantea*); there the quantitative dominates even spiritual life; nor does the purely spiritual come easily into man's mind. But America no longer corresponds to these times from the standpoint of the Kairós, but only from that of the Topós. There are no new growths of sequoias in the celebrated Sequoia Grove, and in other places their seed

grows trees only as Wellingtonias reduced to normal stature. The vitality with which the atmosphere is charged effects only superficial energy and not genuine force. The American is erotically weak. The key to the comprehension of the *way* in which the telluric-cosmic transformations operate changes in the sphere of life is furnished by the modern science of hormones; it is the first approach—to be sure, no more than an approach—leading to the antechamber of comprehension. But this much seems to be ascertained: it is a question of inner secretions whether giants or dwarfs are born. And from the substances secreted by the glands in question to chemical influences in general there is an unbroken passage; otherwise artificial hormone preparations could have no effect. To the extent that life *is* susceptible of interpretation in terms of chemistry the influences wielded by the surrounding world are paramount in every case, and a very large portion of what inheres in the phenomena of life *can* be explained in terms of chemistry: the ox, besides other distinguishing traits, is an animal differing chemically from the sheep. The changed chemistry of the milieu brings transformations in the larvæ of lower animals. With some of these, salts can even supersede the male principle agent. Male daphnides are transformed into females of their kind, and *vice versa*, according to their nourishment.

Now the more active a telluric influence was, the more potent it necessarily had to be. To this very day volcanic regions are impregnated with a particular virtue. I have no doubt that in hoary antiquity the total body of the earth radiated entirely different forces from the present and much more powerful than these. I can, for once, agree with Edgar Dacqué, who thinks that the most

ancient myths reveal man's immediate experience of a demoniac element in nature which in our day is scarcely felt. At any rate this much is true: he who in our day *really* experiences the atmospheres of the virgin forest, of the desert, or of the ocean can appraise for himself what cosmic influences may have signified in bygone times. If it is a fact that medicines act and medicinal springs vitalize, then the great cataclysms may well have given rise to very miracles. Nowadays *one* cosmic influence is still at work whose forming potency can be experienced by any man. It is the influence of large towns. They change the newcomer within the shortest time. The child's development differs there entirely from what it would have been if brought up in the country. And it is obvious that the large town, regarded as an external influence, belongs to the series of cosmic influences in spite of its creation by man. Now every changed or disrupted equilibrium sooner or later produces a new state of equilibrium, in which the laws of *Topós* and *Kairós* govern a new unified total state. Until this state is reached the governing power is the law of catastrophe. We can thereby understand the significance of war as a planetary event. Where self-regulation in the guise of epidemics, famines, natural decline of birth rates, etc., fails to take effect, free will must step in. The fact that certain peoples grow too potent or too numerous must be considered in exactly the same sense as the years when the locusts swarm.

FROM this assumption alone can we arrive at an adequate comprehension in planetary terms of the present age. Many bewail the dying away of earlier forms of life on account of the overgrowth of mankind.

But how could there be a chance of survival for these forms within the changed equilibrium? Just as, in pre-historic times, amphibia and reptiles *had to* be paramount, by turns, just so today man dominates of necessity. The fact is that we happen to have invented gunpowder; this is a cosmic event from which definite consequences inevitably follow. For man, when regarded from the terrestrial standpoint, is ruled by the most primitive urges exactly as the saurians and chondropterygians. Viewed from the earth, mind cannot be placed over against nature. Here, mind never manifests itself except in the form of intellect, which, again, is a *means* unto life, like the fin and the cuirass scale. We thus are bound, as earthly beings, to perform with a sense of guilt precisely the same that nature performs innocently. Wars, then, take the place of epidemics, and systematic agriculture supersedes natural growth. The logical inference is that in future, unless man's *nature* changes—for which no signs are apparent—there will be more wars and not fewer than in the past. Personally, I find proof for this chance in the fact that pacifism is on the increase; pacifism is a contrast ideology. Its ideological purport could become an attractive force only as a set-off to the feeling of a tremendous contradictory reality. And in so far, all kinds of movements for peace should indeed be countenanced. This shows that all that is blamed by so many as an estrangement from nature represents a characteristic of the period which *nature* actually traverses. *It is now the age of man and not the age of mammals.* Anthropomorphism, viewed from the terrestrial sphere, is today the adequate world conception, exactly as, in earlier days, sauriomorphism would have been. The fact that what we now call history began, as

a sequence of conscious events, with the Greeks may be explained by their being the first to confess consciously to anthropomorphism. They were the first to become conscious of the new geological epoch—a new epoch which in Asia is becoming a matter of consciousness in our days only. *It is indeed the age of man on earth.*

Today extra-human nature as opposed to man is, in principle, no longer able to compete with him. Man's special proficiency is indubitably paramount precisely from the geological viewpoint. His proficiency, at any rate, produces effects with a million times greater speed. And if some day the sun's warmth, or, at least, the difference of temperatures between the surface of the sea and its depths, can be adequately harnessed, so that we should become independent of coal—and there is no doubt that we shall—the age of man will be able to stamp a more indelible mark on the surface of the globe than any other geological period ever did. Let us, then, not talk of decadence; it is the new geological epoch which, like all the former, builds itself on the foundation of its predecessor. Its dawn was in the West, in a restricted region of the smallest continent. Every class which is to dominate in the future begins as a minority and starts from a confined area. The fact that now Westernization encroaches upon the entire globe means in principle nothing else than that millions of years ago the whole planet assumed the character of the Jurassic period.

IS IT likely that there should be a post-human epoch? There are no premises at hand for a judgment in this matter. The most improbable surprises are within possibility. We may discard the theory that the earth's

crust is supposed to have shrunk. That the earth ages at all is most questionable. Dacqué believes two things: first, that man was in olden times a "seer" of nature and endowed with magic powers; most assuredly modern man can neither invent mythologies nor produce, from wild stock, domesticated animals and corn. Second, that new capacities are even now unfolding; this is, according to him, the meaning of the reawakening of occultism in all its forms. I refrain from all manner of prophecy, for I do not know. But I do know another thing: when a new time comes, then the unity of the changing planet will be revealed in such a way that new creatures will come into existence. Man must undergo an anatomic change as well if he is to become proficient in things qualitatively different from those he is capable of today. Without physical organs nothing on earth is capable of self-manifestation. The psyche as such is completely ineffective here. Let Spirit be never so super-terrestrial, if it is to manifest itself on earth, the brain, the solar plexus, and glands of various descriptions must co-operate. The ancient Hindoos, who certainly knew more of the evolution to higher states of the soul than any other people, denied that this could be attained otherwise than by a transformation of the physical. As a fact, the belief that the body can be discardable at any future time is a logical error.

But a transformation of types is as possible today as it ever was. It is neither more nor less possible or probable. And if things take that turn they will also come to pass in the same manner as ever before: new "ruling races" will make their appearance as conquerors. And their coming into existence will defy any attempt at explanation. Bernard Shaw's way of phrasing it in

Back to Methuselah—"the thing happens"—is certainly the truest and most significant. It is most likely that a large amount of what happens by means of natural processes today will be brought about by artificial means at a later period; if birds could think they would certainly wonder that we invent airplanes instead of simply growing wings; they are also likely to look down upon us for that. But this artificialization of many processes will nowise change the total aspect of things. The earth's powers will always be the means by which all things that are possible are brought about. We moderns, said to be "estranged from nature," unquestionably do not carry on our work with less, but with a much greater number of natural powers—electricity, magnetism, radiative energy—than any creatures before our time. I dare to assert: As Zeus slew the Titans, so there may indeed be coming a geological epoch in which Spirit will be the determinant.

Let it come: the total aspect of things, from the earthly point of view, will not undergo a change on account of its advent. Never will man, so long as he is man as a phenomenon, escape his relation with the earth. For ever and ever will the changing planet remain an indivisible unity. Man is the predominant feature today, because this corresponds to the destiny of the *planet*. Mankind will, some day, disappear along with the earth. We have this morning been dealing with the spiritual side of the idea of a fatherland. How is it to be explained that man reaches his acme invariably only in innermost unity with his mother, Earth? The reason is primarily that the changing planet is a unity. Earth herself favours the permanent resident on the soil—the peasant and the nobleman. In the last analysis

she will acknowledge only him who lives *for* the land and not only on its substance. She condemns to death the uprooted. Proletariat and intellectuals die away again and again. Only he who acknowledges the past has a future on our earth. Nomads never created anything terrestrially enduring; only he who acknowledges the Earth is acknowledged by her. The Mongols in China, the Germans in Europe, merged into the permanent residents when they did not die away. For those German types also who always acted as conquerors were nomads; this, not lack of national feeling, is the reason for their fateful merging into foreign peoples, where they do not shut themselves artificially off from influences, as colonial parasitic growths. Nomads may, like sand-dunes, roll over the land; in the end, the spirit of the land, embodied in the permanent residents on its soil, always triumphs.

This, then, leads us, as a conclusion, to two considerations of actual import. We are living in the beginning of a new and, this time, an earth-comprising age of nomadism; it is the chauffeur age, as I called it in *The World in the Making*. Yet it is not the chauffeur—we see it now—who will be the lord of the future. What takes place nowadays all over the planet is similar to what occurred in Europe during the migration of the peoples. It is a time of transitions. Its meaning is that of an age introductory to the universal era of mankind. A new vital relationship to Mother Earth must come into existence before new human acmes can be reached. The second consideration I would put before you is this: our considerations, in spite of their brevity, seem to me to have *proved the senselessness of abstract idealism*. There is no doubt that he who would

transcend the Earth must turn his back on her. But whoever would do his day's work on her and with her for the sake of the good, must reverently acknowledge her and her laws. He must learn how to play on the whole keyboard of reality, would he perform essential deeds of essential and lasting value. Meaning and expression, sense-realization and "*Realpolitik*," must then be in a relationship of mutual correspondence. This, then, explains in planetary terms the established life-enmity of the ideologist. It is a matter of justice and not of injustice that he who has no sense of the Kairós invariably fails. He never fails innocently, but guiltily.

III

Spirit the Lord of the Earth

THE admirable lecture of Max Scheler¹ on the particular place which man holds in nature's scheme wound up with a canticle on the *powerlessness* of spirit. Indeed, if the problem is approached in Scheler's way, his views prove right. What we originally mean by the term power is indubitably of a purely terrestrial nature. To that extent, then, it may be said: the more earthly, the lower in the spiritual scale a creature is, the greater is its power. Surely, bacilli are better adapted to the conditions of the earth than man. The termites have held their own against such changes of climate as have destroyed all other organisms. The brutal man has always been more successful in things terrestrial than the spiritual man. Thus, in our own days, almost all power runs into money power. The idea of God's omnipotence, when appraised in terms of earthly power—a concept which we involuntarily everywhere employ—is certainly false. If, in spite of God's absolute good will, the world can remain wicked, His powerlessness is manifest. If Christ was unable to save the thief on the cross whose soul did not turn to him of

¹ This lecture by the great German thinker, who has unfortunately since died, has been published by Otto Reichl, Darmstadt, as a separate booklet entitled *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*. It should by all means be translated into English.

its own accord, the inevitable conclusion is Christ's impotence. This was already pointed out by me in my *Travel Diary*, in the "Adyar" chapter. The realm of the spiritual is essentially the realm of freedom. The purer the spirit as such, the less it knows of constraint; and the possibility of a resort to constraint in some sense or other underlies ultimately every earthly power. But it seems to me that full justice has not been done to the problem as a whole by putting it as Scheler did. As a matter of fact, the state of things is this, that *if* Nature is open at all to the influence of the spirit—which is indeed dependent on her—certain effects of a quality which makes one think at times of Almightyness come about. For transformations then occur which can hardly be accounted for by "natural" causes. This is, to my mind, sufficient proof that the possible power of the spirit is not completely explained by the fact that impulses and passions submit to its sway and thus become the powerful organs of a thing powerless in itself. Nor is the problem of suggestion adequately accounted for by Scheler's contention that one soul acts by necessary compulsion upon another, as one chemical acts upon another. It is a question, here, of a difference in kind. I may, then, be allowed to complete Scheler's expositions. He spoke in the capacity of an epistemologist (in the broadest sense of the term). Now the epistemologist, even when he believes himself to be proceeding on the lines of what Scheler's teacher, Husserl, called "essence-intuition" (*Wesensschau*), can approach spirit *ab extra* only. He considers it on the plane of projected representations, which inevitably leads to the result of one-sided determinations that are indeed necessary and adequate determinants of the one-sided aspect, but of this only. Thus,

Scheler is right from his one-sided point of view, but from this only, when defining the essence of spirit as independent objectiveness (*selbständige Gegenständlichkeit*). But spirit in itself is more—and Scheler would be the first to admit this if he appraised the problem not as a theorist, but from his own vital personality, and if he were to proceed not by reasoning from this concrete source of his being, but by simply giving to the latter direct expression: spirit is a real *force* which cannot be understood within the natural scheme and which lacks natural power only to the extent that it does not belong to the “natural sphere.” Spirit itself, if considered functionally, is a specific *force of radiation*, expressing itself in various ways according to the specific mediums through which it passes. With the philosopher the force of radiation in question is that of his *own* understanding. Just as Driesch in a previous lecture convinced the entire audience, in his capacity as a logician, not because all his hearers had followed his expositions down to the last argument, but because he was *genuine* as a logician (meaning that his spirit found its adequate expression in logical thought); in the same way Scheler did not secure the immense approval of his audiences because they had followed his expositions with close reasoning—I, for one, am too inferior a reasoner, compared with Scheler, to be able to do so in so short a time—but because his personal spirit poured out directly in the forms adequate to it, and because we others were thus enabled to participate, for a time, in a reality of existence which would not have been accessible to any person of the audience *per se* in the same degree of clarity and intensity. This being so, what mattered was not by any means that all points should be minutely “explained”; what

matters in philosophy, too, is not the proof, but the spiritual *reality* which may, if required, be "proved" into the bargain for the special benefit of the scientifically adjusted type of men. Thoughts which lack a corresponding background of spiritual reality, directly radiating out as such—though they be never so correct—must remain without effect. So spirit, when appraised functionally, is a specific radiative force. With the great philosopher it is his capacity for transferring in a direct way his own personal knowledge to others; with the healer the reality in question resembles closely a radiative force in the literal sense, because in his case the effect produced bears the greatest resemblance to that of physical rays. In a face transfigured by spirit, the spirit is manifested as "expression," acting as a power which radiated afar in the medium of pure bodiliness manifests itself as beauty. In its affective aspect it is that love which was meant by Christ. In all these cases the question is indubitably of genuine forces; and Scheler's opinion that spirit is without power is correct to the extent only that these forces are not terrestrial and that their immediate effect operates on spirits only.

But this the theoretic philosopher, from his particular standpoint, naturally cannot see. Therefore, no reproach attaches to Scheler. From his angle he was indubitably in the right. Accordingly, it was not incumbent on him to set forth in detail that suggestion is not only (nor essentially) that which he maintained it to be—that is, a compelling force akin to chemical action. Its deepest essence rests on the fact that a spiritual "thing" kept before the mind in the form of an idea, operates spontaneously its own realization. Thus, a real comprehension of the real possibility of influences wrought upon the

earth by spirit cannot be reached by proceeding from Scheler's definitions, but only on the assumption of the law of correspondence of meaning and expression. The more a being is spirit-transfigured—which is to say that the spiritual is, in its sphere, susceptible to the influence of spirit—the more its specific laws become, throughout the different planes, means of embodiment and realization precisely for the spiritual. Thus, inertia, the earth's basic law, becomes the most important means for the realization of freedom, just as gravitation makes possible the bird's flight. In truth, and in strict accordance with the nature of things, we should not, with man—unless we would transcend the world of experience—discriminate too sharply between body, soul, and spirit. Man in himself, as Scheler rightly pointed out, is essentially spirit; but he is, on the other hand, if regarded from the natural point of view (in exact accordance with the early Christian doctrines), the *indissoluble unity* of body, soul, and spirit. Physical power is only allotted to him *quâ physica*, psychic power only *quâ psyche*; we all know of persons with powers of suggestion who act with compulsive force. But pure spirit also becomes a power, once it incarnates itself in a manner which calls into play the natural law of correspondence, and the urge to that incarnation invariably issues from man's *spirit*.

Spirit must, no doubt, make the impulses submissive to its sway: but precisely this is the meaning of all that belongs to the Yoga domain in the broadest sense. Every higher religion teaches that man must, on the one hand, pray, but that God, on the other, has a much greater longing still for the soul striving to come to Him than has the soul for God. This certainly goes to prove

God's powerlessness from the earthly standpoint, but it also proves that, *if* man's spirit will open, an influx of higher powers takes place into it. Furthermore, the operation of every power depends upon strictly determined conditions. This necessity, then, that the Word should become flesh, underlies the supreme significance of the gift of speech. Speech is the one pure and primary expression of spirit. It is primarily not sound, but sense-expression. Therefore, the myth that the Word is at the bottom of all creation is profoundly true. In the man who really masters the laws of speech, spirit becomes in very fact an immediate earthly power. Hence the ancient belief that the mere naming of a thing or person meant sorcery. But that the word has magic potency is clearly proved by all history. Men in whom the Word became flesh in whatever sense—whether we use Christian terms or Chinese terms—who find the adequate denominations, are beings through whose instrumentality spirit actually rules the terrestrial sphere, while the profoundest truth remains powerless, exactly as Scheler would have it, where it fails to achieve adequate expression. In this sense Christ's significance as Saviour by no means is based on His Sonship in relation to God (I am here assuming the Christian hypothesis without taking a personal stand on the subject), for as a man He perished on the Cross; and in his lifetime He could influence only those few who immediately believed in Him; and these persons were probably not the best. His significance as a Saviour is based on the fact that He found and animated from the inmost sources of His soul such words as could embody His purely spiritual impulse in the earth. He delivered no "proofs" to the world. Nor did any of those spirits

who have radiated original power ever lay the slightest stress on proofs. If one of these did take the trouble to collect proofs, such were only intended *ad usum professorum*. A word pregnant with soul-life means more than the bulkiest scientific treatise. Christ's words have moved the world not because of the later theologies, but in spite of them. The fact is that a supernatural Spirit became terrestrial reality with His words. Thus, what He knew personally could also be understood by earthly intellects and souls. It is because of this and nothing else that Christianity has proved triumphant.

IT WAS, thus, most important for the present session of the School of Wisdom that the essential powerlessness (in the terrestrial sense) of spirit should be maintained. On the other hand, however, the emphasis does not lie on spirit in and for itself (it is only for epistemologists); nor is its impotence the ultimate terrestrial aspect to be stressed. Scheler's expositions, therefore, need to be completed. I shall, to this end, begin with transposing his theme, "Man's specific situation," into the world. It is not imperative that the way of posing problems should be precisely scientific. It may even be maintained that all such minds as have played a decisive rôle in the actual history of the spirit and the soul were—at any rate, where ultimate issues were concerned—not of the scientific type. Science forms and appraises its objects on the basis of intellect only. In so far as it is only through the intellect that we gain an objective cognition of what is not objective in itself, there can be no doubt that the greatest possible scientific clarity should be aimed at in the sphere of vital problems; for universally valid laws can be established only

from the scientific point of view. Thus, on our actual plane of evolution, we have reached a stage when beliefs, the objects or the forms of which, as far as they come at all within the range of the understanding, cannot stand against criticism, are not only logically untenable, but physiologically incapable of survival. Nevertheless, the rôle of the scientist is, in spite of its utility and necessity, necessarily a humble sort of rôle; nor do those hierarchic orders set up by men like Comte and Hegel, respectively, correspond to a transient reality. The scientist is to the creative or otherwise vital man what statistics are to historic reality. Indeed, only an age as lacking in spirit as that which is now fortunately ending could think that the last word of science could be the last word of wisdom, or even of spirit-irradiated Life. In truth, the mythic expression is to this day, notwithstanding all psychic differentiations, more adequate to vital truth than is scientific expression. For if it is true that the latter can comprehend the intellectual side of reality according to fact, the mythic alone is able to provide a comprehensive view in the form of an image of both the rational and the non-rational; and on the synthesis of these all life rests everywhere; and *because* life is such a synthesis of logical opposites, the mythic expression also means more in and for life. If it cannot be intellectually understood, it reaches, instead, down to the innermost strata of the Unconscious, and unites itself with its formative powers.

For this reason, before proceeding to my particular theme I shall deal briefly with Scheler's *sub specie* of that myth which from time immemorial has been accepted in our Western Hemisphere as the one best adapted to man's situation on the earth—the myth of

man's Fall. What is its meaning? It means nothing else than that man, by reason of his specific constitution, fell out with the natural harmonic connexion of things. The myth in its biblical form is in every respect profounder and, besides, more exact than anything known in scientific philosophy—more exact, that is, because it takes into account *all* components of the reality in question. What is the significance of the expulsion from Paradise for the knowledge of good and evil consequent upon the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge? It means the splitting of the constructive and destructive principles which form a unity in nature into two poles, between which man forthwith must, by free will, strike the balance himself. Man accordingly, becomes really guilty wherever he lays the emphasis on the pole of destruction; this holds true even for physical ailments.

But what, on the one hand, conditions the falling out with the natural order of things makes, on the other, for the ascent to higher states. In so far the quality of being human, as such, does not mean sinfulness; it means only an enlargement of the range of possibilities. Nor is this world a fallen world in the strict sense of the term: Its "Fall" signifies the condition *sine quâ non* for the manifestation of inner freedom. Therefore, every man who goes his way truthfully and manfully to the end nor casts furtive glances at a divine order of things for the sake of his security, surpasses in worth not only all God-fearing men, but also all gods and angels. Where sin is regarded as an absolute, its concept stands for a misinterpretation of the possibility of inner growth, a misconception of which the Jews and, after them, the Christians have indeed been guilty. This

was due to their particularly bad consciences, the nearer and remoter causes for which I cannot enter upon here. In truth, that which is called sin by the Christian means a Fall only when sinfulness is a function of *sloth*. When it is a function of *freedom* it means the very highway to inner growth. This is the main reason why Jesus vouchsafed precedence to the sinners before the just—those fanatics of moral regulation. The concepts of good and evil correspond ultimately to those of yea and nay, and these, again, to the ideas of life and death. Every life is bordered by some kind of death. Therefore, "evil" in itself is completely insuperable, nor ought it to be superable; what is required is only that an absolutely satisfactory meaning should be given in every case to the virtually indissoluble synthesis of good *and* evil.¹

Now what severs man from nature, in both his ascent and descent, is precisely that which is called his freedom. Freedom, again, means initiative. What, then, is the meaning of initiative? There is no ultimate explanation of its nature, for it is an ultimate reality. But it can, nevertheless, be more accurately determined from the very angle from which we are envisaging the problems in this session. *Initiative is spirit itself*. Initiative means pure actuality, and this, again, constitutes the very essence of spirit; for spirit *exists* within experience only to the extent that it acts. This consideration in its turn proves once more that the essential element of the spiritual is freedom; if it appears limited in power, the reason for this lies in the fact that it can act directly on freedom only. If now we wish to determine more accurately the reality here meant, we must

¹ I have developed this theory in the chapter, "The Ethical Problem," of this book.

from the very outset dispose of all modern conceptual co-ordinates, because all of them hold good only for the plane of projected representations. We must resort to co-ordinates of more ancient invention, and here we shall give, as Westerners, our preference to the Greeks, since with the Greek the cleavage between thought and being was much less pronounced and complete than with us. We may thus maintain—for particulars I refer here to the chapter, "Wisdom, Ancient and Modern," of *Creative Understanding*—that one of the co-ordinates determining the concept of spirit is the Logos principle. Logos "in itself" signifies meaning. From the standpoint of the recipient it means understanding, and in its outpouring or radiating quality—change. Facts can indeed be essentially transformed only by meaning, since all empiric elements serve only as an alphabet for it which—provided that meaning conforms to specific laws—cannot prevent its taking effect. The principle flanking the Logos as the second co-ordinate is that of the Ethos. Ethos in the dynamic sense means initiative and formative activity; in its static acceptance it means bearing in the sense of the French *tenue*. Formative activity and initiative, again, are the basic properties of freedom. Remember the results of our last session: Freedom is called self-determination—and all life is essentially self-determined—when the creative principle of life has its centre in the autonomous subject. This, then, leads to a further determination, namely that Logos and Ethos—*always regarded from the point of view of the earth; for this is the one point of view maintained in all problems of the present session*—signify determinate qualifications of life.

This, then, proves at once that a discrimination much

in vogue in our days is not true to fact; I mean the distinction between life and spirit. This distinction, no doubt, obtains for a determinate and restricted plane. When life reaches such a state of differentiation that vitality on the one hand and intellect on the other exist disconnectedly, it becomes indeed necessary to distinguish between the two; one may even decide in favor of either, according to one's private propensities. But this distinction is ultimately false. There is no life which is not, ultimately, Meaning, and thus expression of Spirit. There is nothing spiritual which, so long as it proves effective, would not own everything that belongs to life. From which it follows that, although it is inadmissible to make of Spirit the ultimate basis of life on earth—this is as inadmissible as it is to attribute to all life the quality of freedom—still, in order to understand the essence of Spirit, one must needs dive into the Beyond to what, nowadays, is generally thought of as spirit.

WE MUST dive into the Beyond to "spirit" was what we said. The truth, however, is that we must dive into the Beyond to *consciousness*, and thus the Beyond to the essentially human. This, again, takes us beyond the definitions employed thus far; we shall have to proceed to the concept of *Creativeness*, which, again, subdivides into the two principles of fecundation and conception. I here revert once more to Scheler. Even here I do not object to his theory of the powerlessness of the Spirit. The act of procreation, though giving rise to the most wonderful developments, still implies no display of power. In my opinion the idea of potency arises, in fact, from a misconception similar to that as to God's omnipotence. But what is more

essential than all the corresponding theories is *that there actually are such things as creativeness and receptiveness*. These concepts have, thus far, been explicitly employed in China only; which can be easily understood, for the Chinese alone, in principle, started out from the connexion between man and the earth. Ultimately, though, the Chinese concept corresponds fully to what constitutes our Western concept of *nature*: Nature has become lifeless for the latter-day intellectualized man only. For the unsophisticated mind of earlier times it was instinct with life and it was sensed, and accordingly interpreted now as divine, and now as demoniacal. At any rate, *this* concept alone corresponds to reality—that reality which our mediæval wisdom defined as *natura naturans* over against *natura naturata*. In this respect nineteenth-century thought was superficial to a degree. How could it possibly regard evolution as an ultimate? Evolution is obviously only a clockwork sequence of phenomena, and not a formative power. Johannes Reinke, the biologist, once pointed out, by way of a comparison to show the true facts, that it is not the first chapter of a tale that creates the succeeding, but the narrator. Now far be it from my thoughts to maintain that all reality is alive. On the phenomenal plane and, according to human determinations, matter as such is indubitably lifeless. But as a matter of fact we originally mean by nature the *connexion* of Life and the lifeless. And as death can mean only an end and never a beginning and an origin, we are unable to conceive a synthesis of the living and the dead otherwise than in terms of the living. No living thing can ever be deduced from the dead, just as sense is never to be deduced from non-sense. To that extent, then, the terrestrial

becoming actually represents an unbroken creative process, a weaving of the living garb of Divinity, as Goethe calls it. Call to mind the sequence of faunas and floras to which I referred in the second lecture: There is Meaning at the bottom of all that lives. And there is also initiative at the bottom of it; for the organic processes of formation and heredity are autonomous over against the external influences. And is not every living form profoundly full of meaning, as full of meaning as the sublimest work of art ever was? Does not deepest meaning underlie every process of healing or of evolution to higher states? From the point of view of the earth we must needs uphold that here, too, spirit is at work. Certainly not that spirit in that particular sense we have in mind when speaking of pure spirit. On earth spirit appears incarnated everywhere through the medium of the forces of nature. It expresses itself directly through the body. But what should be borne in mind is that in spite of these material ties, the essence of spirit at any rate expresses itself in a purer way in the creations of nature than in any conceivable conceptual scheme of the learned. This kind of spirit is the actually creative principle within us as terrestrial living beings, also and with us, too, it operates pre-eminently within the unconsciousness or through it. What is held before the mind in meditation becomes real *spontaneously*; the longed for and the prayed for are realized "somehow" spontaneously; sacrifice "somehow" disengages deeper forces than any set purpose could bring into play. If anything, then, this kind of creativeness is spiritual; for it is ever a Beyond to that *natura naturata* which alone corresponds to the modern concept of nature. I have often declared the real essence of life to be *magic*.

You will now understand better what I meant. You will also understand by now why all myths speak, first and foremost, of sorcery and not of "natural" doings in our sense. Indeed, from the standpoint of original and primary life it is sorcery that appears as the actually natural. The real miracle does not consist in the fact that we can practise magic, but that we cannot do so, or can do so but poorly. I must, in this connexion, side with Edgar Dacqu  again: I, too, am convinced that man began his career as a magician. It is by a mere accident, as it were, that we do not even now feel ourselves first of all as magicians; a minimum of consciousness, nay, of dream-consciousness only, would suffice to bestow on the normal natural processes of the sort in which we take an active part the appearance of downright witchcraft. Imagine what would be felt by man if consciousness participated in the least degree in the evolution of man out of the ovum and sperm! Or in the processes of healing, of regeneration, of mutation! Here the question is indubitably of magic events as incomprehensible exactly as the Creation of the World. Yet there cannot be drawn from these considerations the conclusion that we have "fallen" because we are no longer proficient in magic, nor that spirit in the human sense of the term is inessential. No theory relating to the Fall of man in an absolute sense has proved to be anything but fear of that responsibility which man's specific situation on earth imposes on him. What follows is simply that the originally natural is spiritual in its nature. Not spiritual in our sense, though, which represents a specifically human quality from the terrestrial standpoint. Here things are just the same as with freedom. All life, as a process of nature determined from within, is preg-

nant with freedom. Still, this does not mean that all life is free.

All these points must be sharply and clearly understood. *Not until then can* we gain an objective conception of the opposition prevailing between nature and spirit. But then the first thing we experience is again, that the concepts usually employed are false instead of adequate. For, once the cleavage in question reaches to the plane where spirit means pure initiative and nature *natura naturata*, whatever is formed once and for all in the sense of the French word *figé*, whatever has become inertia and routine appears as Nature; it is to her domain that all rigid dogmas, all hard and fast concepts of the moral and juridical order, all habits, all mechanisms, the logic of the learned included, belong. At this particular point, in exactly this sense, then, Ludwig Klages is indeed in the right in determining "spirit" as a quality external, nay, downright inimical, to life, however superficial the ideas concerning Spirit of this typical German romanticist of the Schlachten-See type¹ may otherwise be. For wherever mechanism is prevalent, there is no longer any creation, no "becoming-by-itself," no security in the fold of natural growth. But Ludwig Klages declares himself against spirit altogether. He can do so for the reason only that he overlooks the fact that life is in itself a metaphysical principle, that all Creation is magic in the sense that representation, though powerless in itself, is creative of reality; and because he forgets that *natura naturans*, as a chthonic phenomenon, is as utterly incomprehensible as the purest spirit. In the

¹ I refer here to a story illustrating the particular lack of sense of proportion which is characteristic of a certain German type, reported in *Europe*, p. 130.

ultimate and deepest sense all life is Spirit, because all life is Meaning.

We are, nevertheless, fully entitled to discriminate between nature and spirit. Here I have the advantage of being able to refer again to Max Scheler's lucid expositions, instead of taking the trouble upon myself. In man spirit becomes conscious and operative not only within its natural bonds and relationships, thanks to which prevalence is preserved for matter and the earth-conditioned psyche, but also in its "own essence." In one of his works Scheler has determined the essential characteristic of man's specific situation with still greater precision than in his present lecture; I, therefore, take the liberty of quoting the passage in question: "The cleavage between man and nature does not consist in the cleavage between man and animal, but between animal beings and spiritual beings, between organisms and persons." Indeed, in man the spiritual no longer manifests itself in the guise of a natural embodiment, but as an independent quality, which is, thus, personal. (We would have, it is true, with this belief in view, to complete an hypothesis of Max Scheler's lecture—conditioned by his one-sided standpoint and, therefore, not absolutely correct—in the following manner: the true essence of spirit does not reside in the "essential" (*das Sachliche*)—vital spirit, on the contrary, is completely personal—but it only takes on the appearance of a positive reality as distinguished from vital reality for the epistemologist. I have, again and again, in my writings, stressed and proved that the proper dimension of the spirit is *uniqueness*. Hence, then the pathologic quality which has, since man's Fall, become a characteristic of

man as man to an ever-increasing degree. Man feels himself belonging to two worlds; and as all power is nature's, and as, again, all cognized—if not all recognized—value has its roots in the spiritual, the result is a great spiritual and moral insecurity and unsteadiness, as well as illness on the physical plane. No man is as unerringly guided by instinct as is the animal. Again, it is only the rare exceptional man who embodies in full consciousness the law and order proper to pure Spirit. For in order to achieve this he must be everywhere transfigured by spirit, not only in his earth-conditioned psyche, but also as a bodily being. Man is thus essentially immoral, a quality animals completely lack. He misunderstands in principle the true relation between nature and spirit. When man stresses nature, his emphasis takes an exaggerated turn; his impulses lead an undisciplined life by themselves; he turns materialist, which again applies to no animal whatever. When man is spiritual, he typically exaggerates the worth of pure thought; he then will accord to the more abstract the greater share of reality. Nevertheless, every man knows in his heart of hearts—this trait distinguishing him from all other animals—that his root lies in pure spirit. And it is for this reason alone that every man not spoilt by over-education is religious in some sense. He *knows* his origin to be of a metaphysical order. For this reason man knows himself from time immemorial, since he developed beyond his myth-forming stage, to be first and foremost conditioned by spiritual, and not by natural ties. He feels that his true foundations do not lie in nature, but in what he calls God.

And for that reason for him the unity of creation,

which is still experienced as such by aboriginal man, is split in twain. Nature in his eyes appears inimical to spirit. Now a gulf seems to yawn between the demoniacal and the divine. And this gulf appears the broader and deeper the more nature is regarded as dead. Now the ethical commandments which every man feels to be working in his heart of hearts stand rigidly opposed to all natural desires. Now there is a contrast established between æsthetic ideals and given reality. Now the alternative is either subjection to the impulses or yearning for salvation. And since man must feel that his true origin is in the spiritual, while at the same time he experiences great difficulties in seeing that it only depends on his freedom to reconcile spirit and nature by way of a thorough appropriation of nature by spirit, he feels himself, by dint of this experience—for in man the psychic is everywhere the ultimate determinant—in *reality* severed from nature. In his present stage man needs psycho-analysis even to render him conscious of his impulse-foundation. Today man strives to escape the one-sided stress on the Ethos characteristic of the age of prevalent intellectuality by emphasizing with the same one-sidedness the chthonic pathos, by which I mean passive submission to what nature chooses to do with him. One of the disciples of Ludwig Klages, in an access of despair caused by his intellectual nihilism, thus went to the length of declaring that the minds of lunatics are the only authentic and genuine ones; and Ludwig Klages is right in this: if man achieves no conscious contact with his own vital spirit, if he abides in the sphere of the intellect to the detriment of life, then he is actually cut off from life. Then all Logos deteriorates to a

fleshless intellectuality. Then indeed all Ethos leads unto evil.

THIS trend of thought can be brought to a close in the final lecture only. Our present task is another. It consists in showing how spirit in itself belongs to terrestrial life. It has, by graduated differentiation, evolved from primary sorcery. Its external expression is sovereign, world-independent, world-ascendant, creative initiative. When man thoroughly embodies and represents spirit, then he continues in pure freedom what nature accomplishes in the form of necessity. In all situations and upon all planes life maintains itself first by means of adaptation and, later, by mastering its milieus, its environments. For in that it is capable of transformations, it is in principle always superior to outward conditions, however imperilled it may be. Here there is no gulf to be perceived between natural growth and spiritual creation. Spirit, too, must first adapt itself—that is, it must understand. It must first acknowledge the laws of nature, the rules of magic. Where it fails to do so, it succumbs. Hence the impotence, in the worldly sense, of all spiritual giants to this day; they all ignored what is required first and foremost for the improvement of *this* world. Nor was it, thus, anything but a misunderstanding on the part of Jesus when he rated weakness higher than strength. But once spirit has attained understanding, it at once lords it over things. For then the impotent in itself becomes possessed of the earthly means of power. Spirit-endowed as he is, man must first understand in order to live. For his natural adaptation is inferior to that of any other creature; his only creative powers lie in the

psychic and spiritual domain. He no longer heals by his own potency; he stands in need of medicine. He grows no wings; he must build airships. But his spiritual resources are not restricted to this function of utility which only represents the lowest stratum of his being. The differentiation of the spirit into an absolutely independent quality presented the essentially world-ascendant quality with an earthly organ. I say: an *earthly* organ. Without a brain, without a solar plexus and without endocrines, man is powerless. Nor is he possessed of any power without earthly means of expression. The word represents the latter at its highest; but the word, too, is bound by the earthly laws which govern language, grammar, and syntax.

Nevertheless, within this indubitably earthly sphere a nature-ascendant and, in so far, non-earthly element, works its will. It no longer does so in natural embodiments, as in the glorious times of magic, fairy-tales, and myths, but—to make up for the loss—it does so within a sphere in which its own laws and no others prevail. What now obtains is: thus *should* things be, no matter what they are. The ethic and æsthetic laws appear grounded in themselves. Logic and mathematics need no empiric proofs. Religion scorns all earthly concerns. Here, then, the eternal conflict between nature and spirit sets in ever again and again. The impulses are ignorant of ideal laws, and we humans continue to be, for the greater part, creatures of nature. But it *is* possible to overcome nature, to transfigure it by spirit. It *is* possible to bring forth ideal art. It *is* possible to will truth for its own sake. It *is* possible to strive for goodness independently of rewards. Here, then, nature must bend. It is certainly true that spirit is impotent

from the earthly standpoint, even as all ideas are impotent in themselves. But when an idea is kept before the mind's eye long enough it transforms itself in some mysterious way or other into reality. Thus Spirit, when consistently contemplated in the long run becomes the possessor and ruler of body and soul. Then its own force of radiation gains terrestrial effect. Then the earth becomes the mere material of spirit. All this clarifies the paradoxes contained in the teachings of Christ, Lao-tse, and all profound men to the effect that the soft is ultimately more potent than the hard, or that the poor are superior to the rich. In the long run Christ's spirit vanquished the Roman Empire. In the long run the spiritually-minded, though by natural necessity they are as such weaker than any bullies, prove the true lords. It is thus not only the intellect, not only spirit embodied in impulses and passions, which rules the earth; the pure, the super-earthly spirit becomes a prevailing power on this earth. Hence Christ's teaching that the Kingdom of God can be established on earth. Hence the—however slow—increase of love and goodness and truthfulness on earth. It is true that these are always and continually endangered. They maintain themselves, indeed, only where they are supported by terrestrial institutions which of necessity destroy their meaning again and again. But even if an increase of spirituality on earth were not manifest as yet, *it is certainly possible*; it is possible because man is himself ultimately Spirit. The more he rises superior to nature, the more he becomes personally and consciously rooted in the realm of meaning, the more, on all planes, that same thing becomes manifest for which speech provides the primary symbol; let a thought be born, and the requisite phrases,

words, and letters, which are each and all of a purely earthly origin, co-ordinate and fall into line of themselves. From this, then, there follow two things: First, that we judge wrongly if we attach a minus quality to the ruling of the earth. There is no doubt that the irruption and full effect of the spiritual destroys many things; for in its lower forms of expression it is inimical to life. But even apart from the fact that today, geologically speaking, this is the human era—wherefore all regrets for the so-called nearer-to-nature states imply a misunderstanding precisely of the human—the true mission of man is to make the lower spirit a servitor to the higher. This is also the true meaning of the claim to pre-eminence of all religions, ethics, and philosophies. And this pre-eminence is indeed realizable, thanks to the essential freedom of the spirit. Second, there follows, as it seems to me, from today's reflections, as a truth finally proved, what could be stated as a thesis only in the introductory lecture: that man is, in *one* respect, as truly not of this world, as he is, in *another*, indissolubly united to it. Hence his emergence from the realm of nature. Hence his ineradicable, his irresistible striving for the super-worldly. The true root from which man springs is metaphysical.

IV

Man's Place in the Universe

IF THIS week has brought to you a really vital experience, then you will realize that the unified content and effect of the lectures was, in Frobenius' terminology, not "application," but "expression." By virtue of an arrangement which put every speaker in a definite place, making him deliver his ideas from a definite spiritual background, and in anticipation of further developments by later lecturers, which would link up every detail with a pre-existent Whole setting forth as necessary the differences and contrasts between the points of view of the various speakers, each one of them really stood for more than himself alone. But it is this very Whole and its awakening in the souls of the audience as a vital premise for independent thought and renewal of life, that is the real object of the sessions of the School of Wisdom. Still, the unity you have experienced was brought about precisely by the fact that every lecturer spoke exclusively and always in his *own* name. If there is any connexion between living human beings, it is owing to the *unsought* unity of independent qualities. And if individuals are really unpretentious—that is, if they pretend to nothing except to what they really are and stand for—their respective broadness or narrowness, their intuitions or their logical reasoning, as the case may be—in a word, if they pretend only to

what they can perform originally and, therefore, involuntarily, then every Ego actually *posits* every You; it never excludes it. Now the speakers of this session were, to a man, unpretentious in this one acceptable sense of the term. We have not heard a word of presumption. Indeed, no Master speaking in his own name ever indulged in pretentious utterances. That "boundless impudence" (*Das grenzenlose sich Erdreusten*) which Goethe stigmatized in the case of Wagner, as opposed to Faust, is the one unfailing mark of the "disciple" who, when extolling the Master over all the others, really means himself. Now the sequence of the independent and unique qualities represented by the lectures of our session actually formed a unity. I know from analogous previous experiences that not every unit of the audience can have been aware of this fact. Not every man possesses the mental quality necessary for recognizing the experiences of today as standing out against the background of those of yesterday, or for understanding opposites from the outset as counterpoint relations. But, by way of an after-effect, all those who gave their whole minds to what they heard will experience the same themselves.

In order to clear the path for this (from the standpoint of the School of Wisdom) all-important result I shall, before saying the concluding word, endeavour to draw the rough outlines of the unity in question. The introductory lecture showed that the connexion of man and the earth is not self-evident; man is as obviously earth-bound as he is not. This tension provided the frame for the whole session, and it gave a specific significance to every detail. We then saw how the growth of our planet—from the formation of rocks to the process

of history—represents a closed unity. Everywhere and at all times there prevails the law of the Now and the Here, of the *Topós* and the *Kairós*. Man, who seemingly escaped the planetary connexion by virtue of his predominant position, is, from this viewpoint, only as it were the leading fossil of a particular geological epoch. We are, furthermore, through our bodies, indissolubly linked up with the fate of nature. And there is also such a thing as psychic fate; the collective unconsciousness conditions *ab intra* the character of every individual formation. The Jew has other dreams than the Nordic; no man ever had religious experiences which did not confirm those pre-existent ideas and images within whose sphere of influence he had been born. This earth-bound state of man finds its grandest expression in the connexion which exists between cultures and civilizations and the vicissitudes of the earth. But Frobenius' lecture—the *fermata* of which represented, as it were, the spiritual watershed of the lectures—pointed also to a Beyond to that earth-bound state. I shall here take the liberty of completing the thought of Frobenius: the decisive factor *inside* of what is actually possible at every time, and which belongs to the plane of the collective unconsciousness determined by Dr. Jung, is, nevertheless, always free initiative. The doings of great minds, gauged from, or with a view to, Meaning, were never prompted by necessity, but by inspiration having its source in free spirit. What they performed belonged in itself to the plane of timeless value; in so far, then, that history of the timeless, as which the greatest part of the cultural history so far written may be adequately described, is indeed possible to measure. Expression,

however, depends everywhere on the respective conditions of space and time.

After having heard Frobenius' lecture we had become ready to understand the peculiar status of man in its true relationship. We saw in what sense man, and man alone on earth, is animated by spirit which is essentially unearthly. There loomed at the same time before our mind's eye the symbolic image of man's Fall. Man as a spiritual being can no longer be understood on the natural basis alone. Nor is man any longer fitted into nature as perfectly as other beings are. Biologically speaking, he produces the impression of having been outdistanced by the others. Compared with the ape, says Scheler, man is a mere dilettante. He is essentially out of harmony and ailing. And we are thus entitled to the further statement: the more man rises above the natural sphere, the more he appears pathologic. By virtue of the unity of the changing planet a new organic type would have to be produced on earth, for genius to appear harmonically fitted into nature. This truth is even recognized by all those (for the most part rather naïve) religious doctrines which expect salvation to arise from a transfiguration of the body by the spirit. The tensions induced by higher spirituality are too great for the present physiological status, barring rare exceptions. When extraordinary perceptions grow conscious, they in one way or another destroy the pre-existent equilibrium. But apart from what the philistine deploras as abnormal, the proximate effect of the gradual development, by way of differentiation, of particular expressions for the purely spiritual is in itself a disturbance of earthly harmony. The requirements of æsthetics, ethics, and logic are opposed to nature's inertia. Intel-

lect becomes the enemy of life. The more consciousness awakes, the more the presence of *insolvable* problems becomes the basic characteristic of human life. Man's equation thus grows solvable to an ever-decreasing degree. It is true that man as the Lord of the Earth, measured from the earthly point of view, re-establishes the disturbed harmony of nature on a new plane. But on the other hand, this very earth-ruling spirit is driven by an inward urge in the sense of a counter-polar phenomenon to flee this world.

When spiritually considered, lordship over the earth is obviously not an ultimate object. It is rather a position implying liberation from earth-ties, which is the ultimate goal; were it otherwise, the great religions would not wield such power. And also at all times there have been ecstatic experiences. Dr. Prinzhorn has told us how such experiences can be induced by purely physical means, by poisonous substances; he justly asserted, furthermore, that *any kind* of ecstasy, as a deliverance from the Ego, brings man nearer to the origin of his being. He later laid the emphasis, much too one-sidedly, on the terrestrial aspect of a possible liberation from the world. Whatever he admitted in theory, one could not help feeling that personally the only thing he acknowledged as possible and true was "the earthly mothers," namely, those primary images of the unconsciousness which are the ultimate *termini* of the earth-bound soul. His opinion then was quite unmistakable that there can be no salvation except in the return to the bosom of nature. For this assertion of his he invoked Goethe's name. But it is precisely this example which made quite clear to us the one-sidedness of Dr. Prinzhorn's point of view. Goethe was the very man

who knew that there is not only a withdrawal from the earthly towards the "mother-zone," but also to the zone of the fatherly pure spirit; think of the last verses of Faust. The distinguishing feature of the unique greatness of Goethe's mind is precisely that he did not yield himself one-sidedly to the spiritual, like Hegel, or to the earth-bound psychic, like the romantic *Naturphilosophen* of Germany; but that, as the true complete man that he was, he maintained within himself the equilibrium between *both* principles. For others—let us think of the great mystics—the way to salvation lay as one-sidedly and exclusively in the withdrawal from the world as it lies in the falling back into the state of nature for Ludwig Klages. And we have no right to dispute the veracity and objectiveness of their personal experiences of men like Jakob Boehme, Ruysbroek, Tauler, not to mention Jesus. History *has*, after all, furnished experimental proof through the whole of its course that the persons who believed in spirit only wielded by far the greatest and most wholesome influence on mankind, and even today the healers *endowed* with grace, as it were, belong to their kind. Personally, I know at least two for whom the spiritual world is as much a reality as the physical world is to us ordinary mortals; they know how to produce healing effects on the physical plane from the spiritual plane.

But there is another side to this: judged from the *earthly* point of view, even the greatest among them are eccentrics. The example they give to men is not acceptable as a norm for terrestrial life; for they were all by far too incompetent in other respects for them to advance such a claim. For weakness will always be weakness, ignorance is ignorance to the end of time, narrow-

ness of soul—this very kind of narrowness is typical of the majority of those who feel themselves to be superior beings; they are almost invariably of a sectarian nature—is narrowness and always will be, no matter what its compensations. It must, then, be put down to presumption, when such eccentric characters would impose on the strength of their knowledge of the spiritual, their particular law on the earth.

The true position of spirit-conscious man (this was the further result of the session) does not, therefore, mean withdrawal into special regions or into ecstasies, but is that of a *gauge and centre* of the world. Man can, indeed, hold this position. And it is in *this* that lie his greatness and dignity. The entire cosmos can be centred in the unique man and be ruled from there. Primarily, in terms of consciousness, since consciousness is nothing other than the appropriation of the world, in both the narrowest and the broadest sense, without detriment to personal form.¹ Second, man is the gauge and centre of the world by virtue of his being personally the zero-point of what philosophers call his "indifference," which strikes the balance between the plus and minus, the yea and the nay, good and evil, ethos and pathos, as poles. He is not the patient of life, but its agent. He is so by reason of freedom, which is for him the ultimate personal end. But above all, man is the gauge and centre of the world in so far as the ultimate end is not a social or collective quality, but the *unique* element in the uniqueness of each man. This is indeed the alpha and omega of all insight into the nature of man. That value has everywhere its exponent in

¹ This felicitous formula was employed first by Otto Flake in his book *Der Erkennende*. Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

uniqueness was known even to the pantheistic religions; thus every Hindoo child is given a particular name which God alone is supposed to know and by means of which it stands in a relation of uniqueness to Him. But ultimately and principally man is the gauge and centre of the world in that his uniqueness is the medium of that highest pathos located beyond all possible kinds of ethos, namely the pathos by means of which man is related to the cosmic. The cosmic forces work through the medium of his *free will*. This is the only way in which the world can become the expression of super-terrestrial spiritual meaning. But in this way it can really become this expression. It thus becomes to me a mere language for the spirit.¹

Here, then, is the starting-point for a survey of man's position in the cosmos. Here and nowhere else. Astrology does not furnish it, as some believe. The truth of the fundamental ideas of astrology may safely be said to be proved in our day chiefly in virtue of the research on statistic lines carried on by Ch. E. Krafft.² If man is earth-conditioned, it stands to reason that he is also cosmically conditioned. From the point of view of the unique, however, the horoscope also belongs to the world-alphabet only; it depends on the *unique* what the constellations ultimately signify. But no longer can the starting-point for a view of man's position in the cosmos be found in occultism. Surely the human soul leads a life of its own, and much of this life is no longer com-

¹ Compare for further particulars the chapter, "The Religious Problem," of the present volume.

² The publication of these statistics drawn from an immense material is in preparation. I would refer in the meantime to my fundamental consideration concerning astrology contained in the present volume.

prehensible on the hypothesis of bodily limits. But all occult revelations suggest the assumption that they have their source in the collective unconsciousness—that is, in a world the ideal place of which is situate this side, and not beyond, the unique. This interpretation is clearly supported by the fact that thus far no seer ever experienced revelations which did not confirm his inborn religious belief. I have of late (I refer the reader to the last lecture of this volume and also to the literary review of the number 14 of *Weg zur Vollendung*) been principally concerned with clairvoyants. The more fanatically convinced they were of holding the ultimate truth, the more probable it appeared to me that their concrete personal experiences were of symbols, of sense-images only. For in the purely psychic sphere there is no Beyond to the subjective; therefore, no man can be aware of realities not clothed, as it were, after the fashion of his nature; here more than anywhere else the biological principle according to which man's world is his perception-world is valid; for here the basic phenomenon is what in hypnotic séances is termed being *en rapport*. I would thus interpret the claim that Christ alone can show the way to salvation in this manner, that the born and believing Christian belongs indeed to an exclusive Christian sphere, but that the same can be said of the genuine Buddhist, Hindoo, etc. For the rest it should be borne in mind that none of mankind's great ever were occultists or set great store by occult faculties if they happened to possess them. It is *this* life which matters principally during our pilgrimage on the earth. All humanity's problems require their solution—and are solvable—in the here and the now. It is nothing short of presumption, then, when seers maintain that the order of

the earth should rise spontaneously to the elevation of the order they personally stand for. As terrestrial beings, men who are capable of a wider range of experience should, on the contrary, endeavour to interpret their knowledge in terms of the terrestrial. *Noblesse oblige*. He who judges this world as too bad and unworthy of his closer attention is nothing less than one more of those heroes of Resentment whom Nietzsche stigmatized once for all. We must thus take our starting-point in man as the gauge and centre of the earth if we would realize his true position in the Universe.

TO REACH this goal we must begin with realizing once more the enormous extent to which we are earth-bound creatures. It is utterly impossible to understand creation as such; for all organs of thinking and understanding have sprung into existence after its consummation and presuppose its laws. For us terrestrial beings a solution of problems irrespective of the Ego as the primary premise is quite unthinkable. No epistemology ever written applies to spirit without a body, a good reason why school-philosophers who are so proud of their abstractions may look out for extra surprises in the hereafter. All problems, without exception, which we are able to posit are stated from the *terrestrial* point of view and bound up with *earthly* possibilities and impossibilities. We are unable to understand life. We cannot understand death. These two incomprehensibles mark the boundaries of the sphere within which any intelligent statements of problems can take place. This being so, there are most probably no possible answers to our questions relating to the hereafter—death obviously ceases to be after death. Furthermore, we can only ex-

perience things and events for the perception of which we possess specific organs. We thus owe all revelations, the reality of which can in any sense be held proved by the effect they produced, to specifically organized individuals whose organizations cannot, therefore, be submitted to an after-trial. The learned who, on the strength of such and such logical arguments, would attempt to define the nature of the Beyond, as, *e.g.*, the existence of a realm of necessity, or posits the inexistence of God on the plea that His existence would cancel man's freedom, simply cut ridiculous figures. Even the claim of modern phenomenologists to be able to teach real essence-intuition (*Wesenschau*) should not be taken quite seriously: with the postulates of the adherents of this school of thought to start from, all that, at best, can be attained is an advance to the ultimate *ratio cognoscendi*, but never to the *ratio essendi*. This is only to be reached by a shifting of man's mode of being, by an interiorization of the Self, whereupon new realities are experienced.

The fact is that there is no end beyond the charism of a specifically terrestrial organization which enables man to receive specific direct experiences, and there is no other proof for the existence of these experiences beyond the effect they produce. The only general law valid for all planes is that of the congruence of meaning and expression as exposed in *Creative Understanding*. If divine meaning is to be revealed, then its manifestations must also be a divine quality; hence the Christian idea of the *God-incarnate* which is so profoundly true. Besides, the incapacity of all merely intellectual philosophies for bringing about the good is a fact proved by history. The effect produced by the greatest thinker of the Germans, Hegel, was downright disastrous; it is to his phi-

losophy that, first the Prussian "etatism," then Social Democracy, and finally Bolshevism, owe their existence. For still another reason the terrestrial charism is the *conditio sine quâ non*; where it is wanting, there is no possibility of terrestrial effectiveness. Thus, there have indubitably been profound minds who, as mediums, knew of the super-mundane. But to the extent that they were mediums and not masters they remained impotent. This is the very reason why the world of our day is lying in wickedness (if we adopt, for the time being, the Christian assumptions). This state of things is surely not the fault of our poor world which knows not what it is doing, but of such as those who, though they knew better, did not feel it sufficiently incumbent on them to make themselves understood to the world at large.

Every kind of knowledge presupposes a particular state of being. And in this sense our present state can be defined as to its very essence by the fact that we *cannot* know and *cannot* understand determinate things. I personally even believe that we *should* not know them. All great religions held the standpoint that only the "initiated" should know. The others should "believe." But this means that they *should* not know. And indeed, if we *knew* for a certainty that we are immortal, that man doffs his body in death with the same ease as a lady's gown is slipped off, could we understand the meaning of death, would not death lose its whole significance? In my opinion the depths of sense partake of the mysterious as such. . . . We thus ultimately remain earth-bound as understanding beings also.

But if we now alter the setting of the problem it does indeed become possible to realize man's true position in the world from the cosmic point of view. This is pos-

sible on the basis of the proposition that man is the gauge and centre of the world. This central standpoint can be reached by man in that he embodies within himself, in his purely subjective inwardness, but nevertheless in reality, the inner side of the cosmos, and that, therefore, he is capable of viewing the cosmos *ab intra*. Here and to that extent he is actually in touch with the cosmos as an essence and not as an appearance. Here Scheler's discrimination between essence and reality obtains. But it does not, for that, obtain in the sense that essence is powerless to produce effects according to the theory of the ineffectiveness of the spirit; for spirit "in itself" represents only an abstraction arbitrarily made by terrestrial man. On the contrary, it is precisely the essence which can become effective and prove its reality by the effect produced on the basis of the law of correspondence between meaning and expression. It is an experimental fact, proved by all history, that the deeper lie the strata of his own being to which a man descends, the more profoundly he understands himself, the wider grows the range of reality in the sense of time and space with which he comes into immediate touch. There is indubitably such a thing as spiritual effectiveness at a distance, however incomprehensible it may be. And as for effects in time, the most unbelieving cannot deny that the simple words of Christ work to this very day miracles of healing power. When man becomes his own gauge and centre in the sense that he comes into *personal* contact with his own spiritual centre, then his words, however simple in their external aspect, prove magic formulæ. Then the externally weakest man can overcome the externally most powerful. Thus Jesus Christ vanquished in the space of a few centuries the all-powerful Roman

Empire. But the one who reaches this state is always at the same time selfless. He no longer desires anything for himself. Self-sacrifice is his natural attitude; for he has experienced that his earthly human meaning is not his *own* deepest meaning.¹ Thus, a survey of man's place in the world from the cosmic point of view is possible on the basis of the (historically proven) possibility of actually outgrowing the empirical-human. This, however, is based on the further fact—and this fact leads us to the ultimate justification for the use of the term “cosmic point of view”—that this process of outgrowing leads beyond *Life* itself.

BEYOND Life. This has, to my knowledge, been understood thus far by one man only—Georg Simmel, during the last weeks of his pilgrimage on earth, when he was in the grip of death, which he consciously awaited and lived through more than any other man I know of, and with whom I kept in constant touch throughout the last weeks of his life. I speak of him only; for here it is a question of *reality-experience*, of cognition in Buddha's sense, not of a merely epistemological distinction made in our days by many thinkers in one way or another. It is not only the distinction drawn by Klages, nor that drawn by Scheler, which fails to come up to what Simmel meant at that time. He meant that which can be known only by a man whose consciousness has already passed beyond the boundaries of earthly existence. Indeed, the profoundest experience of human depths takes men beyond the sphere of life. There is no understanding of life otherwise than

¹ Compare for particulars the chapter, “Death and Life Eternal.”

in its earth-bound quality; whatever can be stated beyond this is based on hollow formulations of the intellect which always falls short of the essential. But not only the rare, perfectly interiorized spirit knows the truth, but even language as such—the most original and immediate sense-expression in existence. It says: Man *has*, man *loses* his life. And even the earliest and most unsophisticated of men, provided they were genuine, lived the truth: Life is *not* the ultimate of man's patrimony. All spiritual values are indeed, for the man who has grown conscious of his deepest reality, a quality of greater reality and essence than life. The question here is by no means of "things" in themselves called values and, for the most part, lamentably misunderstood and subjected to the basest of interests; however appropriate the epistemological discrimination between the personal and the specific essence of the spiritual may be, however much the latter is impersonal in its nature (this has recently been pointed out with particular acuteness by Ortega y Gasset), the question here is of the *ratio essendi*, the root of all being, and not of any *ratio cognoscendi*, which alone can be eventually apprehended from the scientific point of view. But no one really means those "things." We only stammer about them because we do not know how to express ourselves more adequately. But on the other hand, we *must* at least stammer about them because we *are* in our persons the very same thing that we do not understand. The profoundest meaning of all belief in values is this that man asserts his personality most in sacrificing his life. That this is neither a matter of theory nor one of superstition is proved directly by the effect produced, either

in the inward growth of the man in question or in the historic effects.

This, then, is the place for stressing once more the fact that there is no other proof of reality and of essence than that adduced by the effect produced. Logical proof is altogether inadequate, for it confirms no more than the observance of the rules of thought, which proves reality in a restricted field of facts. On the other hand, every really important or profound man *has* produced effects. Otherwise we should not know of him. If the effect was produced only after his death, the determinant causes were particular circumstances, within him or external to him, which could be ascertained in each case. Therefore, the fanatical denial of the demonstrative force of the effectiveness of great men one so frequently meets with never signifies anything other than resentment and impotence. Nor does the hatred of the power and influence of the silent in the land (I have ridiculed their type in *Europe*) which seeks refuge behind the saying that effects have nothing to do with truth, mean more than insidiousness; it is precisely the despisers of the contemporary world who invest the largest amount of hope in posterity. But this should suffice. We actually live, whether we understand it or not—and the fact is we cannot possibly understand it—from out of a position beyond Life. It is this very fact which makes possible a looking at things from the cosmic aspect. "Immortality" in the absolute sense is an idea without content. At any rate, most of what makes man, most of what, precisely, makes that soul the continuance of which man hopes for, is without any doubt terrestrial and thus perishable.

That we actually have our essential basis in something

beyond what alone can be reasonably conceived as perishable—I mean in a Beyond to life—is finally proved, to my mind, by the following reflection. Life is essentially of the temporal. As against this, every value which gives to life a meaning, every spiritual creation belongs, as a content, to the domain of the timeless. Man's deepest self is timeless. Essentially, man does not grow older with years; he grows younger, provided the spirit predominates within him. What Jesus said of Himself, "Before Abraham was *I am*," can be experienced personally as an obvious matter by every spirit-conscious man. Essentially Life is not a mere process, but a fulfilling of meaning. This alone explains the permanence of self-consciousness throughout the changing states of man. We thus are ultimately, as beings and essences, independent not only of the brain, which indeed can alone "apprehend," but also independent of Life. What the ideas of the "should" and the "values" refer to is no longer comprised in the life-sphere. It is a super-biological and, thus, a super-mundane quality. *We are, thus, as essential beings indubitably superior to the fluctuations of the terrestrial.*

OF THE Beyond I am unable to profess aught. I have no personal experience of it. I thus dare not utter statements on God's existence or inexistence, or on His specific quality, as do nowadays so many men who pretend to know better. But what is required from the point of view of the School of Wisdom *can* be said, and with this I will bring this lecture to a close. The fact is that the averred perceptions of the School can, on the basis of the perceptions gained during this session, be determined anew because they have been ap-

proached from another angle and thus they can be more accurately defined, since every additional co-ordinate renders the centre more clearly discernible. There is not only an external, but also an inner cosmos; this cosmos I call the Realm of Meaning. Meaning thus understood is the ultimate terminus of what we call essence. It is not true that other worlds constitute that ultimate terminus; this is the reason why Jesus as well as Buddha set so little store by occult experiences. What a spirit is worth, in what regions it is rooted, are revealed on earth no less and no worse than they may be revealed in the Seventh Heaven. There is a Realm of Meaning. The relation of this realm to the becoming and passing away of the life phenomena—as minutely shown by the 1924 session—is the same as the relation of the tones to the sense-unity of the melody. This means, the essentially temporal is the terrestrially adequate expression for an essentially timeless quality. But we can, today, condense these facts into a more general formula. *The ultimate essence of reality is related to the terrestrial in exactly the same way as meaning is to expression.* The ultimate and most alive of the qualities of life is the meaning of life. This, however, viewed from the aspect of the Earth, resides already in a Beyond of life. According to the law of correspondence between meaning and expression, no possible sense-realization exists which is independent of the specific laws of the world-alphabet. Hence, again, the essential powerlessness of the Spirit. God stands in immediate need of a man's good will if He is to reveal Himself. He stands in a more urgent need of it than the weakest earthly creature; for in the realm of pure spirit there is no possible constraint; here the freedom of each is the abso-

lutely ultimate terminus. Now to this world-alphabet with its specific laws there belong the changing planets as a unity; man's body as a fate, as Professor Much demonstrated it; the attachment of soul to the earth, as shown by Dr. Jung; and the dependence of the growth of cultures on the vicissitudes of the earth, as illustrated by Frobenius. But the spirit is superior to the alphabet, nevertheless. He is superior to it as every thought is superior to its expression in speech.

We are thus enabled to solve the antinomy of the introductory lecture which revealed the facts that we are, on the one hand, terrestrial, while we are non-terrestrial on the other; and that a general denominator cannot apparently be found. If all postulates of the spirit point to a region beyond the terrestrial; if the ethical problem is absolutely insolvable; if the religious problem is ultimately incomprehensible; if ideals and reality are forever disparate—the ultimate meaning of all these facts is this: *these very insolubilities create the tensions Spirit requires for its manifestation on earth.* It is owing to them that what is powerless in itself becomes a power, even as the melody which cannot sound independently becomes a heart-stirring power, thanks to the taut string touched by the bow. Tragedy *must* be the basis of life. The ethical conflict *should* remain insolvable, and the same obtains for all possible tensions: precisely he who, as an ascetic, turns his back upon the world must obey the terrestrial laws all the more strictly if he would spiritualize himself. We thus understand the fundamental error of the doctrine according to which this world is “fallen” in an absolute sense: precisely its “fallen-ness” gives to the spirit a possibility of realization which he lacks in Heaven. But on

the same ground we understand, on the other hand, why the School of Wisdom had to show everywhere that the one sin against the Holy Spirit is sloth. Inertia is indeed the basic law of the earth! It is the first thing to be overcome if man is to rise superior to the terrestrial. This holds good for every kind of sloth. It also holds good for good conscience, which Albert Schweitzer has justly called the one ascertained invention of the devil. It also holds good for blind obedience to an alleged divine order: all human progress was due to men who fully exercised their personal liberty and to that extent recognized no kind of extraneous order on the strength of mere belief, not even God's order. We are now also able to see in what sense precisely the hardships of terrestrial life are a blessing: Unless man is already entirely ruled by the spirit, it is only in hard times that he lays all the stress on his freedom. Nearly everyone yearns in his heart of hearts for possible inertia. The ideal of happiness, nay, even of eternal bliss in the hereafter, is in turn nothing else than a desire expressive of man's ultimate will, as it were, that inertia should conquer freedom.

This solves yet another conflict we met with at the beginning. We found that the earth grants privileges only for such as are rooted in the earth. But viewed from the cosmic angle, man is only a guest on earth. It thus remains true that earthly nomadism is contrary to sense: *spiritual* nomadism, however, is the only state compatible with meaning. Accordingly, the profound man always obeys the laws of the terrestrial order; he never fails to fill the place which happens to be assigned to him. But inwardly he feels, he knows, nevertheless, that he is a Wanderer. From his terrestrial home he

ultimately strives away towards homelessness. This is taken into account by the Hindoos in that same sense that every man must become, to begin with, married and a father. But after he can prove his grandfathership he is not to remain sedentary and to live on his income—he has to leave the world as a Sanyassi. The Russian is observant of the same truth in recognizing no earthly goal as a goal. And, finally, the German does the same in so far as his primary symbol (as drawn last by Leopold Ziegler) is the Eternal Wanderer, the ever-restless man who never overcomes tragedy, who has a home neither in this world nor in another. The antinomy that the Earth recognizes only that man who confesses to his loyalty to her, and that man can ultimately be only a Wanderer, is the necessary function of the fact that only a fraction of our essential life—and are we still allowed to call it life?—is enacted on earth.

Part Second

PROBLEMS OF THE SOUL

The Limits of Insight into Character

BEFORE the problem of insight into the human character can be approached, it must be stated that such insight indubitably exists in spite of the impossibility of explaining its nature, and that this fact corresponds to a natural necessity. Insight into character cannot be deduced from other sources, because "the understanding of other men's souls"—that crux of the epistemologists—is a "primary phenomenon" of as elementary a nature as the phenomena of sight, hearing, and smelling. In principle there is the same immediacy of contact between souls as between bodies. Where the organs to establish such contact are wanting, it practically fails to take place either here or there. But its existence as such is a fact to be accepted with Life; it does not, therefore, constitute a problem at all, except for an extramundane standpoint which man may imagine, but never realize in fact. The matter stands exactly as with solipsism, which is so hard to refute precisely because, as the natural result of a question wrongly put, it is absurd.

The insight into human character stands and falls with the primary fact of understanding. How far, then, does this capacity reach? It is as impossible to ascertain its limits as it is in the case of sight. Just as, with sight, whatever belongs to the plane of the visible must also be visible in principle, no matter whether it is actually the case, just so whatever belongs to the plane of the understandable must be understandable. As a fact, these

limits are altogether dependent on the existence of adequate organs. God is believed to be omniscient and all-understanding. Men gifted with divination are capable of stating true facts regarding the soul, which, from the standpoint of normal men, can be explained only on the assumption of supernatural powers. There is no doubt that thought-reading and foreseeing the future are facts, whatever their ultimate causes may be. But as the "organs" of the soul upon which the higher and lower degrees of the ability to know and to understand are dependent cannot be ascertained as such, and as in this field a "plus" cannot be arrived at by artificial means, as with sight by the use of a microscope—artifices without which man could not have attained adequate comprehension of natural phenomena (for his particular domain is limited by his faculty of invention and not by what he happens to encounter)—it would seem out of the question at first to make general statements on the limits of insight into character.

BUT appearances are deceptive. We must put the question differently according to the particular circumstances. What strikes one first is that the accuracy of judgments based on a general knowledge of man should increase with the number of persons in question. Statistics show that the number of crimes and suicides committed within definite social spheres remains constant to a considerable degree, or, otherwise, that their number increases and decreases with equal constancy under ascertainable conditions. Criminalists proceed on the supposition of accurately determined general probabilities, the logical network of which allows only the exceptional criminal to make his escape. Things are still simpler in

the case of psychiatry. The psychology of masses, finally, is intrinsically simple: to influence a people, an army, or public opinion is a pursuit in which such as possess a modicum of political sense in addition to their acquaintance with the general laws in question, succeed with almost mathematical precision. The reason is that with large-scale, and also with typical, reactions, the question is of the *resultants* of all the individual soul-lives; for the thoughts and wishes and wills of all men pursue, in the ultimate analysis, the same eternally constant aims of all human life, aims whose specific appearance is always reducible to a small number of primary types. Now the same regularity which results from the laws applying to large numbers also obtains for the *elements* of the individual case. All men have the same primary impulses, and the distribution of their relative importance, again, accords with only a small number of prototypes. For this reason the psycho-analyst, in his particular sphere, can pronounce no less infallible judgments than the statesman in politics. We may, then, set up this statement: Insight into human character approaches the nature of an exact science in proportion to the increase in the number of persons to be considered simultaneously or in the same general respect, and with the elementary quality of the particular case. So far as the latter is concerned, not only the analyst, but also the seducer is a case in point: very few women can resist a man who by instinct is familiar with the laws of erotic wooing, if he really means business.

IF WE now enter upon a closer consideration of those fields of possible insight into human character in which infallible knowledge and skill can be attained, we

are brought up against the fact that here *understanding* in the strict sense of the term plays only an inconsiderable part. The politician generally has none whatever for the individuals he works so successfully upon. A classic example of this fact is furnished by British statesmanship: in however masterly a manner statesmen may deal with the intricate prejudices of the various types of Hindoos, probably no single statesman ever took the pains to feel his way into their souls by an effort at comprehension of their essential natures. Which, again—the analogy being close at hand—puts us in mind of the fact that the most consummate connoisseurs and managers of women are precisely the men who pay to the unique nature of the particular woman, not the greatest, but the minimum of attention. If, at this point, we consider further that the psycho-analyst reduces all particularities and exclusively individual qualities of his patients to the elementary-typical—this means that he deprives the unique of its uniqueness and does *not* understand his patient personally, for personality stands and falls with it. We already begin to have an idea of how the problem of insight into character is limited, provided it is correctly put. We hardly exaggerate in saying that there are practically no limits at all in the direction of the cumulative (the masses) and the elementary (the primary impulses and the collective-psychological groundwork of the individuals). *On the other hand, however, "understanding" is hardly required in this field.* Here the knowledge required is the same kind as that of natural phenomena, which we can master thoroughly without having (or even being able to conceive) the slightest idea of their true natures. Understanding, in the adequate sense of the term, on the other hand, refers to

essence, and thus to the subjective; that is, to what the objective facts signify personally to the concrete unique individual man. Not to the subjective in the ordinary sense—opinion *versus* knowledge—but in the sense of what objective facts *really* signify to the individual beyond his potential illusions and arbitrary interpretations.

THIS brief consideration disposes of two things: first the typical contempt of man by such as appraise the individual from the standard derived from the collective behaviour of mankind; they utterly ignore man's true essence. He who considers the essential only, as does the saint, is known—as distinguished from the worldly connoisseur of men—to hold every man worthy of honour, the lowliest not excepted. The aforesaid consideration settles, in the second place, the analyst's claim to understanding. What he calls understanding is only an exact determination of man's impersonal side—that is, the material by means of which the unique—man's only true essence—expresses itself. This, then, leads us to the problem of essential knowledge of man. There can be no question of such knowledge except when stress is laid on the unique in its uniqueness—that is, on the adequate comprehension of that which lies "beyond" what the politician, on the one hand, and the analyst, on the other, consider in man. And this means, furthermore, the adequate apprehension of that pre-eminently and intrinsically personal quality which the elements revealable by analysis, on the one hand, and, on the other, the practical resultants and results of every particular life, make significant from the point of view of *that particular life*. This subjective significance is what really and ultimately matters, because the truly vital is ulti-

mately enshrined in the "meaning" of the empiric, and because in the vital sphere significance not merely *creates*, but actually *is* the fact. For this reason only a great man's deeds are not predictable on the basis of a general knowledge of men, nor understandable on analytical assumptions; while it must be admitted that the sense-bestowing quality of the personally-unique, as opposed to the generally-human and the elementary, plays so insignificant a part with the majority of men, that practical judges of men and analysts actually seem to possess also a personal understanding of the men they deal with. But, as a matter of fact, they do not, since for the politician the practical outcome of the doings of the persons in question, and for the analyst, the basis of their impulses is the centre to which all is referred. Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the intellectual is, as a type, a poor practical judge of men, and that he dislikes the lack of personal respect implied in analysis. What the practical judges of men and the analysts perceive is only the means of expression of the Essential. He who gives his attention exclusively to "meaning" must needs, while maintaining this relation, fail to perceive that which takes place or can take place on the plane of "the alphabet."

IN WHAT sense the essential part of man resides in the unique only, and in what sense this unique can be apprehended by the mind only as the meaning of empiric data, requires no detailed explanation after what has been said in previous chapters. Nor is there any need for particular explanations, since it is quite certain that every man in his essence is the unique expression of an entity which occurs only once, and since the most

casual thinking reveals that man's uniqueness, considering the typical and ever-recurrent character of all external facts, *can* depend only on the particular sense-connexion into which the data of external experience fit in the particular case; or on the specific meaning, as the creator of reality and the judge of direction, which manifests itself through the medium of those empiric data. This applies, let us repeat, to the primary impulses as well as to Jung's primary images, the super-personal of which consists only in their generic nature and not in their metaphysical nature. When a new idea flashes through the mind, when an unexpected deed is done, and when a man *is* different from others, the only interpretation of the fact leading to true understanding is this: a particular spiritual agent is coercing the ever-identical primary material of the elementary and generally-human into new formations. Now what interests us here exclusively is the problem of the limits of insight into the human character. The next step, then, to be taken on the basis of the facts we have so far ascertained is the tackling of the question as to what extent the Essence of man which escapes both the politician and the analyst is capable of being understood. That this essence can become a matter of personal experience has been proved. There are men for whom the soul of another, however reticent, is revealed to its depths like an open volume. Max Scheler's assertion that it depends on the object, whether or not it is willing to be understood, is inaccurate. Surely everyone is, in the last resort, the only arbiter of his doings and of the destiny he fulfils; but whether he is *seen through* depends entirely on the capacity of the observer. How, then, is it possible to see through others? It is possible, in principle, in

exactly the same sense as any other cognition is. Just as there is an immediate contact between all bodies and psychic formations belonging to the plane of experience, just so there is a direct contact between the human essences. Generally speaking, insight into essences is a primary phenomenon exactly like understanding in general; it occurs, like all phenomena, wherever the requisite conditions are at hand, which means here when the requisite organs and functions are available. But we are here confronted with a divergence from other possible modes of understanding which gives to the problem in question a particular character. Every man of normal eyesight can see, and practical knowledge of men is attainable by almost anyone who, with sufficient powers of observation, normal intelligence, and an adequate capacity for acquiring rich experience, is able to consider simultaneously meaning and expression. Just so, every man can learn—at least in principle—how to practise psychoanalysis; for on the planes considered here we are dealing with the typical, not the unique and, therefore, of facts with which everyone is acquainted or can become acquainted. The unique essence, however, is essentially unique. It can, therefore, be understood only from its particular region, which means: from out of the unique in its uniqueness. And this leads to the following conclusion from which there is no escape: *not* every man is in principle capable of understanding the essence of others. We can understand only the man who more or less resembles us. We are here brought up against the same fact formulated in the well-known words in Goethe's "Faust," that every spirit resembles only the spirit that he comprehends. This, then, brings us for the first time to the *absolute* boundary of the possible knowledge of

men. And it must also be clear by now that this boundary, as a matter of fact, *must* be absolute; just as in the sphere wherein all men resemble one another there is no denying a theoretic boundary of possible judgment for any man, so, on the plane of what in its essence is once-occurring and unique, only the unique individual who resembles a particular man *can* be an adequate judge of the latter's essence. This statement may be formulated more precisely thus: Man's essence corresponds to the centre of the sense-connexion which combines the ever-identical elements into a unique particular. Figuratively speaking, this centre can be located on different planes and on different levels.

WE HAVE thus arrived at the core of the problem. In the case of every particular level the same facts have different meanings; they may have a superficial, a profound, a sublime, and an obscene significance. The facts themselves never reveal the level. He who discovers it makes it the basis of the facts themselves; for all sense experience is due to the sense which is voluntarily given from within outward. How, then, could a man give to facts a meaning he himself does not know? He need not, it is true, incarnate it in life—but his mind, at any rate, must be able to realize it; and no man's capacity for realization extends farther than the possibilities of his psychic nature. For self-representation in actual life is only one among many representations, and not always the most felicitous; that which a man invents forms, necessarily, a part of him. Shakespeare was, in his psychological make-up, all that which he gave out as a poet, even though he may have been, as a living reality, far beneath his creations. For the most signifi-

cant result of the psychology of the Unconsciousness is precisely the fact that we are far from living out our entire being consciously and practically, and that a full image of this being is approximately attainable only when a survey of all our psychic manifestations is possible. Thus, abstract consideration has led to the confirmation of what has always been a fact of experience; the advance, however, is that what is real now appears as an obvious necessity. Only the great man can really understand the great man; only the little one, one who is little. It is true that the second part of the last proposition should be modified to the extent that all lower levels, in principle, can be surveyed from the higher; a great man is, after all, nothing other than the concentration of a greater number of lesser men into a unity of a higher order, which is the reason why it seems, again and again, as though great men could also thoroughly understand the little. Theoretically, in intellectual or poetic reproduction, this certainly is a fact. Nevertheless, it is an incontrovertible truth that man really and thoroughly understands only what reaches up—or down—to his own level, because vital understanding is an act of concrete life hardly influenced by theoretic knowledge. Man succeeds only in what he does involuntarily, even as he lives involuntarily. Now everyone involuntarily interprets his experience of the external from the point of view of his personal level; for which reason great men involuntarily hold too high an opinion of the little, while these think too poorly of the great. That this is really so can be proved without further argument by the mere fact that all extraordinary men are typically disappointed with mankind—disappointment is only possible as a manifestation of misunderstanding; and that all mediocre

men as typically fall short of an adequate comprehension of the great. For when the mediocre—once envy has been banished and spiritual self-preservation makes its claim to acknowledgment in place of it—make demigods and gods of the great, for whom no praise is felt to be exaggerated, they thereby only prove their inability to understand. There never were such creatures as Goethe or Cæsar or others appear in the distorting mirror of the average intellect which reverences them; nor can there ever be; such creatures are mere phantasms and not men of flesh and bone.

This, then, has brought us to the discovery of the essential *principle* of the understanding of men. However necessary it may be for everyone to learn practical comprehension of men as does the statesman, and however well everybody can, in principle, learn to become a psycho-analyst—the following axiom remains as unshakable truth: *Everybody is capable of understanding vitally the being of only another whose centre lies within the confines of his personal ability to comprehend.* For this reason any man who claims to understand others should first put the question—and answer it adequately—as to the level to which the being under consideration belongs.

NOW here the objection may be raised: how is a man to answer this question adequately when the other man's level happens to be too far above or beneath his own, and if the observer can understand only that which resembles himself?

The objection is justified. Yet the determination of levels in the requisite sense is possible, nevertheless, *because a being in its sphere produces as immediate an effect*

on others, and works as specific influences in them as do bodies in the physical world. We have thus introduced an item into our considerations which had been disregarded thus far. There is not only a question of conscious understanding, but also of a commutation of the unconsciousness. The great man elevates by direct operation; the small one lowers. The former raises the level; the latter makes things trivial. In the mutual polarization which takes effect between men, tensions come into existence which operate a change in their original structures; they loosen the components, and thus create the possibility of extension which did not exist for the isolated man. For this reason only does mankind revere the great; for this reason is the art of teaching possible; for this reason only the influence of books and lectures depends on the writer's or speaker's loyalty to his *own* level; and for this reason only faith and idealism are able to elevate us.

There is, then, a way to rise above the limits of one's own level: the *experimental* way, the way of testing the effect which one's own being has or naturally must have on another. To my knowledge there has never yet been carried out an experiment of this kind for the sake of scientific information. But if it is true that a being necessarily influences another, the possibility in question is so obvious that we can discard all further proof. And this possibility applies to the determination of one's own level as it does to that of others. There is no other way of getting to know oneself than by experience. To a man's own consciousness his own inner nature is as much an outside world as that of physical nature. As, furthermore, this inner nature does not represent a static being existing once for all, but a dynamic being realizing

itself by operation and influence, it must work itself out in actions in order to be experienced. Mere introspection never gives a true picture. But the unconscious region of psychic nature, which comprises more than three-fourths of it—not only its instinctive and generic underworld, but also its loftiest and most spiritual qualities, the foundation of all creative production—is altogether inaccessible directly to consciousness. Now psycho-analysis has established that the emotional unconscious of man expresses itself unambiguously in his mien and gestures, his involuntary thought and actions, and that it can, therefore, be determined by the effects produced: either normal effects, as observed in others, or effects produced by way of experiments—that is, by that particular process called psycho-analysis. The range of possible experience can thus be enlarged. It is true that the deepest essence of man cannot be determined by experiments in themselves; but it can, by conducting the experimenting in a manner corresponding to the facts under observation. Personal levels interact immediately. From personal and historic effects, from vitality, from dynamics and style, in a word, from all that helps the historian's subsequent comprehension, there can also be determined in the man who is actually alive that centre of the sense-connexion which gives its particular significance to every one of his specific utterances, and of his only. The *conditio sine quâ non* is merely recognition of the prime importance of the question of the level attained by the individual under observation and of the absolute conclusiveness of the effects produced by him. Nor is the conclusive force of both level and effects compromised by possible misconceptions, since the possible causes in each case (deficient powers of expression, immaturity

on the part of the agent, dislike of the new, impatience with interference, ill will, antipathy) can be easily diagnosed. The "corresponding" experimentation in question thus consists, when applied to oneself, in one's accepting the effects (in the broadest sense) produced by him as an absolute proof, and in his drawing such consequences from them as lead to an adequate determination of the level in question. When the experiment is applied to others, however, it consists in maintaining an adjustment representing an absolute *surrendering of oneself* to them. Unless one surrenders completely to another being, the latter is unable to exert any influence. For to gain the desired effect in principle is the same as in the effect of a chemical reaction on the reagent, namely, of a transforming effect. It is only by measuring the transformation of one's own being that another's can be appraised. And the corresponding transformation in its turn succeeds only where the adjustment of the consciousness creates no impediment against it. This is the reason why great men during their lifetime were almost invariably better understood by humble souls than by the wise, and why all great men have specially revered the humble whom they wanted to understand. There is no other way of apprehending a man's being than through the giving up of oneself. From which we deduce the following general truth: Understanding in the truest sense presupposes the capacity of naïve passivity.

This proposition implies that only he who demands nothing of the other man—in other words, the theoretically adjusted—is able to understand in this highest acceptance of the term. At the same time it makes it clear why the man who looks at things in the grand style

is typically a bad judge of man, and why, *vice versa*, the man of practical knowledge utterly fails to understand others; he never escapes from his personal centre; the others never mean more to him than his own elements—that is, his means of expression. The same proposition finally defines more clearly the truth of the belief that one can understand only that which one loves. In so far as the lover unconditionally approves of the beloved and surrenders himself unreservedly to his influence, he undoubtedly is in a privileged position to understand. But on the other hand, the lover is not disinterested. Hence the fact that love not only opens the eyes, but makes us blind as well.

WHAT we now have to decide is how far it is *technically* possible to appraise another's personality and to determine the general direction of our present reflections. We can appraise the personality of others only because it represents a sense-connexion. Such a sense-connexion consists of sense-images every one of which mirrors the other and can be read as a sign of the other, which fact makes it possible to *see through* each individual phenomenon. This is in principle the same relation that makes psycho-analysis possible: the difference is, in the case of intuition of being, that it refers all particularities to the personally-unique subjective centre of the individual, while analysis employs the emotional roots of the latter as its centre of relations. This difference explains, first of all, why everyone, by dint of scientific training, can learn analysis and practical knowledge of man, whereas no man can learn to understand what does not resemble him. The latter kind of understanding requires an original ability

which must be inborn. It is only by sense-*bestowal* that meaning becomes real in the phenomenal world. One cannot possibly give what one does not possess. One may, indeed, given a sufficient degree of intelligence, construe meaning in *abstracto* at will; one may prove experimentally the existence of differences of levels: but a *vital* understanding of what is above him is not given to any man; and even the most imaginative and experienced can at best attain to only an approximate understanding of what is beneath him; this latter may lead to an adequate appreciation and treatment of what seems foreign and strange, but never to that concrete kind of understanding which every man desires for himself.

This leads us then a second time to the postulate formulated in the end of the sixth paragraph, *viz.*, that the determination of the level is the necessary premise for any true judgment of men—the difference is only that we revert now to the subject in order to determine the limits within which this primary condition can be fulfilled. It can be fulfilled in the positive sense, only by him who is originally capable of understanding and only in relation to what is like him to some degree. *Negatively, however, it can be fulfilled by any person experimenting in the manner stated above.* This, then, shows that there is a possibility of widening the range of general and objective knowledge of man and men. Once the principle of the first importance of the level to which a man belongs is recognized, cumulative experience is sure to bring about in the long run an extension of the limits of possible knowledge of man on the objective plane also.

The consequences to be derived from this are quite unpredictable. There will certainly never come a time

when every man will understand every other. But every man will be able to attain to an understanding of the *limits of his personal horizon in the knowledge of man*. It will be possible to "know" what cannot be "understood," as in the case of extra-human happenings. At present things are in a most parlous state in this field. Here psychic mediums furnish an even more instructive example than those presented by the statesman and the analyst, such mediums being permeable, as it were, to the empiric-psychic qualities of others; they also believe themselves able to apprehend the essence of others. But it is precisely this which they signally fail to achieve; they only sense the empiric material of others *in terms of their own essences*. Since essence is spiritual and operates solely from what is not empiric, from meaning, it cannot possibly be apprehended by mediumistic means; it can only be mirrored by spirit as such. Now the medium is in his nature altogether unspiritual. He is for this reason particularly prone to misunderstand other men's natures when he experiences them most completely within himself. This holds good even for the few mediums of individually spiritual nature: they, too, really understand only what resembles them. The scale of values set up by them never exists for others such as are similarly organized; this serves to explain the absolute incompetence of almost all occultists in their judgments of the true leaders of humanity; they appraise them as though they, too, were mediums and not masters. Once, however, the determination of levels is recognized as the first presupposition for essential man-knowledge, there is indeed a possibility of a Science of Human Nature such as has never existed before. All results of practical insight into character and of

analysis will continue to be valid on their own plane; to those versed in human knowledge and to the analysts everything which they can achieve will be credited to them. *But the limits which every practitioner of human knowledge must apply to himself will be thoroughly recognized.* Delimitation is the first presupposition for any extension of the sphere of knowledge. Just as Kant, by his delimitation of the sphere of the intellect, took the most important step forward ever taken in the field of philosophical research, just so every extension of the horizon is due to delimitation. No man is proficient in all fields. But if a man knows what he is really able to do, these limitations act forthwith as rails which guide the train that without them would slip off into the Infinite. So every one-sidedness which strictly determines its specific character and adjusts itself correctly and accepts its limitations straightforwardly is truly the symbol of universality and totality.¹ But no individual can be more; all individuals are one-sided and limited. Now at all times there have existed all kinds of talents which complement one another. Once the recognition of individual limitations has become a universally acknowledged postulate which no vanity would dare to question or to deny fulfilment, then the existence of multiple talents must needs bring it about that at all times and on every occasion the right man will do the right thing. What follows from this touching the problem in hand is this: Knowledge of man will be practised henceforth hierarchically as it were; and owing to this very fact it will, for the first time, become possible in an abso-

¹ We arrived at the same conclusion from another side in the chapter, "Universal Tensions and World-Ascendancy."

lute and objective sense. The analyst will continue to analyze, and those who go in for practical knowledge of man will, as before, gauge the general results of man's behaviour. But only those who are capable of sense-intuition will be thought competent to reveal what can be known of man's essence. These various types of perceivers will complement one another. From their joint endeavours, however, will come in its time a complete knowledge of man, from his husk to his core.

IN CONCLUSION it will not be amiss to assign the knowledge of man to its true place in man's potential wisdom. Here, then, the following definition holds: knowledge of man is an art to the extent that "science" in this field can result only from a correctly "instrumented" art. From the standpoint of the philosophy of significance, the usual limitation of the validity of the concept of art (as shown by me in the essay, "Philosophy as an Art," in the book bearing the same title) does not hold good. Whatever a man is proficient in of himself and which he cannot learn from the talent of others, is always art. This holds good for experimentation in the field of the natural sciences, and still more in that of the art of healing. But art in the fullest sense of the term is the knowledge and understanding of man. There are no rules whatever to teach this knowledge. It is true that there are rules which can be subsequently deduced from experience, but they hold good only with him who possesses a personal knowledge of their application, just as no musician ever became a composer from a mere knowledge of the rules of harmony and counterpoint. If a man has personal knowledge of how to apply rules, then they are worth

while. This is shown most clearly in graphology, because its path to the knowledge of man is, comparatively speaking, the most objective. It is, however, no less clearly revealed in phrenology, chiromancy, cabalism and astrology.¹ The question to be decided is always whether a definite language of signs accords with the faculties of a determinate man. I know men who can draw from horoscopes conclusions of exactly the same reliability as from handwritings. I know others, again, whom the observance of cabalistic tradition has enabled to attain what seem to be miraculous insights. The *raison d'être* of all these strange phenomena is that men of a certain type put into practice an inborn proficiency by means of a definite system of co-ordinates which is a fundamentally possible system, but proves helpful to him only whose special endowments accord with it, and who knows how to apply it adequately; that is, who knows how to refer, by *free selection* by its means and the given connexion pregnant with diverse meanings to the only system of relations really applicable in the particular case. Thus the Chinese *Book of Transformations* yields, in my experience, true prophecies in every single case in which it is consulted according to the rules by such as are versed in the art—but only in that case. I place deliberately the means of obtaining human knowledge recognized as possible on the same level with such as are rejected by most men as absurd, because

¹ I refer my readers here to the most instructive and profound book on astrology ever written (it reveals the absolute correspondence of the results of psycho-analysis and astrology), which should be translated into English as soon as possible. It is *Die innerseelische Erfahrungswelt am Bilde der Astrologie*, and written by my disciple, Baroness Ungern-Sternberg. Detmold, Meyersche Hofbuchhandlung, 1928.

they have the same *significance*. In this field even the analyst arrives at correct interpretations only when he is able to select freely from among a vast number of possible interpretations. The last word, then, on human knowledge is this: Its limits are as immovable as those which prevent science from becoming art.

The Natural Reach of Personality

MAN, empirically considered, is primarily one of nature's phenomena. On the one hand, he is inserted into the total connexion of things and conditioned by it, while, on the other, he is a determinant himself. He thus inevitably produces the results corresponding to his nature, both as an agent and as a reagent. In so far he differs in no wise from other phenomena of nature. The concepts of affinity, range of effect, field of power, degree of tension, thus prove objectively valid throughout the whole of nature.—In the second place, man is an organism among others. This means that he is, *quâ* phenomenon, specified in such a way that his mode of being is not expended by what he has in common with other natural factors, but that these factors are, in their turn, the means of expression of a specific quality situate on another plane which Driesch calls *entelechy*. The latter is rooted in the metaphysical, that is, in that realm which belongs to the concept of meaning. Viewed from this standpoint, every man essentially represents a uniqueness: he is himself only and not a creature among others.

I have repeatedly dealt with man in this ultimate and essential sense. The majority of practical problems, however, present themselves on the first two planes. Even as a metaphysical being man can manifest himself only in accordance with the general laws of nature. I

shall now deal with the particular aspect of the relation in question as indicated by the title of this chapter.

AS A natural phenomenon among others, every man brings about necessarily specific effects, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is proved by experience which shows that it is always man's genuine reality that produces a lasting effect in spite of all his designs and pretences. Every man is in very truth only what he is involuntarily; every man can perform only that in which he is involuntarily proficient; the effect which every man makes involuntarily corresponds to his actual specific nature. Only in so far as this is so does the proposition hold that the world's history is the world's judgment. On this basis alone rests the conclusive force of success, within its proper sphere, and the reasonableness of the belief in the just verdict of posterity. Posterity is by no means more clear-sighted than our contemporaneous world; but inasmuch as short-lived qualities such as ill will, personal enmity, inflated values of the market are ultimately equalized and permanent values are manifested to which human ideas, with a view to self-preservation, adapt themselves, posterity is indeed better fitted than our contemporaries to deduct reality from effects. For the deeper-reaching effect always touches first the unconscious and not the conscious, which instinctively recoils from what is unsuited or distasteful to it; what I mean here is not the unconsciousness as opposed to consciousness in the sense of a mystic quality, but the unconsciousness in the sober sense of the sum total of psychic reality, only a small part of which becomes conscious. The postponement of the manifestation of the real effect and of its cognition is furthermore condi-

tioned by the fact that man is not born as a mature being, but grows from out of a germ in correlation to his environments, wherefore, not only his fate, but also his particular mode of being, is dependent on his surroundings. Nevertheless, the entelechy—that is, the natural factor which man as an organism actually represents—lives absolutely in its own right. Its being was originally present in the germ, wherefore man's final destiny and form depend exclusively on the specific character of the entelechy. For this very reason an organism, according to Uexküll, does not primarily experience the entire surrounding world, but only its perception-world. To that extent man truly conjures up his destiny; for he selects autonomously from the vast number of possible accidents those which can become significant for himself, because they square with his specific nature. Accordingly, the fact that growth (or victory, in the case of social competition) is required does not alter the fundamental facts. He who is unknown to the public, who is unrecognized, whose influence is frustrated by his own inhibitions, or by an excess of routine and tradition within his particular sphere, naturally cannot win through to success; but he must succeed where his inmost law demands it, once those inhibitions fall away. This is an immediate proof of the truth of the proposition that man ultimately lives in his own right. And the same is true of the experience that man as others see him shrinks or grows in proportion to the adequacy of the frame his life is set in, and that his destiny brings him to the place which corresponds to his nature, whenever life is well organized.

What has been said, however briefly I had to express my views, should make clear to what extent man can

and also must actually be considered as a natural phenomenon; from his particular mode of being there arise of necessity specific effects. This, then, means for every man the existence of a *natural sphere of activities* corresponding, in its extent, as well as in its specificness, to his particular individuality. And this brings us to the definite object of the present considerations.

IT IS not accidental, whether the effect produced by man is far-reaching or only near at hand, whether law of his personality demands intimacy or distance, whether he embodies a world-impulse or merely furthers homely interests, whether he represents a timeless or otherwise a temporally limited power. Nor is the qualitative character of the effect produced by him merely accidental. What is brought into play here is a natural necessity of the same kind that rules the differences in the spheres of influence of atoms and stars, or the different reactions of acids and salts. These differences, it is true, establish no prejudice in favor of absolute values. He who is able to influence only a limited number of men may be nearer to the ultimate than he who sways the destinies of a world. But this consideration, in its turn, establishes no prejudice in favor or disfavor of possible significance within the terrestrial sphere of life; and this is the point which is generally misunderstood; men do not see that in this case *laws of nature* are operating. Most people take offence at the fact that some men and nations grow irresistibly to the status of world powers, while others, no less valuable, never come to the front. We are dealing here with natural necessities.

The meaning of these necessities is not difficult to comprehend, once the question is correctly put. Here is

an example which may serve as a type of them all. What is it that makes it possible to exert a wide influence? First, the ability to transfer spiritual impulses over spatio-temporal distances. This ability, again, rests on four things: the general validity of the formulæ chosen, their general comprehensibility, the setting of the goals in question in the direction of generally recognized desiderata, and the explosiveness of the spiritual projectiles sent into space and time. Let us consider the first three points conjointly. He only can reasonably count upon far-reaching influence who does not exhaust his powers in the nearer sphere—in whatever sense of the word—whether the superficial, the private-personal, and national, or the time-limited spheres. This single brief consideration shows why the German *can* act only—music alone excepted¹—directly on the world in exceptional cases which are, however, no longer true to kind; the German, who in his nature is bent on intimacy and near effects and who, therefore, expresses the generally valid in such specific forms that non-Germans hardly ever understand at all what he means, who is, besides, a poor hand at outlining his thoughts and incapable of passing over details, *must* be caught in the meshes of the proximate, wherefore his best efforts usually acquire significance for mankind at large only after they have been reborn in forms better adapted to the laws of far-reaching effects. On the other hand, the same general determination makes it clear why the Briton as a politician, and the Frenchman as a creator of intellec-

¹ Compare for this particular case, and also for a definite aspect of the problem outlined here, my essay, "*Die begrentze Zahl bedeutsamer Kulturformen*," in *Philosophie als Kunst*.

tual formulæ, *must* produce instant far-reaching results. The Briton in what he does, the Frenchman in what he says, both fulfil to perfection the laws relating to potential transmission to all other men.

Conditions which are in principle the same decide, *mutatis mutandis*, the extent of the sphere of action according to the spirit of the times. Here their extension increases the more influentially a spirit expresses itself in a threefold sense—depth, clarity, and exactness. For the deeper a problem is apprehended, the more independent of empiric determinations does the validity of its formulation appear; the clearer the formula applied to a problem, the more general its comprehensibility; and the more exact its expression, the more immediately a problem reveals its ultimate and, thus timelessly, valid meaning. Now the most interesting condition of far-reaching effects is to be found in the fourth of the aforesaid moments, in the explosiveness of the spiritual projectiles sent into space and time; for it proves that far-reaching effects in the spiritual field follow laws analogous to those of artillery. That only such spirits produce far-reaching effects whose personality embodies strong tensions needs no explanation: only he whose being is swayed by motion can transfer or start motion; only tense natures feel the urge to personal progress. But the same applies to seemingly abstract formulæ. They contain tensions of a strength exactly proportionate to the lack of equalization of the opposites they embrace, on the one hand, and, on the other, to their being disposed in such a manner as to liberate energy as soon as inflammable matter is introduced. Hence the explosive power of the paradox. The paradox corresponds in the spiritual field exactly to high explosives in the physical domain; as it em-

braces concentrated opposites without solving them, it brings about a spontaneous solution in him whose understanding it kindles; such solutions, however, explode wherever the concentrated opposites are sufficiently strong. Hence the ever-renewed effect, independent of space and time, of men like Lao-tse, Heraclitus, Jesus Christ, some Hindoo sages, and, in modern times, Nietzsche. Such spirits remain inaccessible to superficial thinking, for their words do not contain "knowledge" which can be gained by information. Only through eventual "understanding" proceeding in that case from out of an ultimate depth do they reveal their truth; for here they *engender* knowledge—that is, that knowledge which is eminently adapted to the particular individual. Hence also the possibility of ever-renewed interpretations; hence, objectively speaking, their inexhaustibility. Only paradoxes, as spiritual projectiles, have in so far an immeasurable spatio-temporal range. From the point of view of possible far-reaching effects the next best means is the pregnant formula—that is, the formula which expresses all that it means, but nothing besides; it roughly outlines what is to be apprehended, and thus obliges the receiver of the message to restrict his attention to the resultant and to disregard the components. Hence the compelling force of Napoleon's orders of the day by dint of which his troops were *obliged* to march; hence also the fact that only masters of significant words have continued to live on in their own formulæ. Abiding is static and not dynamic; the process of developing a trend of thought detains, fatigues, not to mention the fact that there is no developing except in dependence on spatio-temporal limitations. This, then, serves to explain, *vice versa*, how copiousness and

long-windedness do not disqualify a spirit only, when he is bent exclusively on influencing what is near; if he would produce far-reaching effects, he should by all means avoid copiousness. This consideration helps to explain again why the German attains, with so much difficulty, importance from a European point of view, not to mention a world point of view: copiousness is an essential trait of the German character; he is tense and concise only in exceptional cases, and he is the arch-enemy of paradoxes. He is, moreover, essentially unexplosive, and as he is also a particularist, he is, whatever his aims, with the exception of music, denied from the outset a naturally wide range of effect.

AFTER these concrete reflections I will let the matter rest, for what interests us here are merely the outlines which convey the idea of the principle. This principle should, indeed, have been made sufficiently clear by these few examples; therefore, to amplify it, according to what has been said above, would only militate against comprehension. Let us now proceed. Every man as a natural phenomenon has a natural sphere of activity; he has such in virtue of his specific quality as much as every star has its sphere, and he has it independently of his purely spiritual value—that is, so far as the latter is defined as functionally dependent on the Absolute and not on possible terrestrial significance. What, then, is the practical conclusion to be drawn from this? The only conclusion, to my mind, is that he alone can attain his utmost effect *who determines accurately his natural reach—that is, who apprehends his limitations correctly and accepts them as facts of nature.* For as, under no

circumstances, can he reach, in the long run, beyond what in him lies, neither imagination nor design is of any avail.

This proposition, the truth of which cannot be contested, does not, however, mean that our investigation is closed; on the contrary—what, for the majority, is the natural starting-point for all reflection on the subject of human fate now all at once takes on the nature of a problem—the problem, I mean, inherent in the fact that the natural reach of a personality is, as a rule, *not* apprehended either by the individual himself or by the others.

If we consider these facts from the standpoint of the knowledge that man as an empiric reality is a natural factor or agent analogous to other natural factors the result is absurd. He who would take an atom for the sun, or *vice versa*, would be ridiculed; the same would apply to the atom that wished to wield the force of attraction and illuminating power of the sun, and resented it when others judged its forces correctly; the same would, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the sun and also to bodies differing from another in kind, in their mutual relations. But among men misconceptions are recognized as justified, if not demanded; while adequate conceptions are either extolled as particularly meritorious, or otherwise condemned. Thus, inter-human relations, as opposed to all other natural relations, are typically relations between unrealities; here it is the exception that the natural sphere of activities is recognized, and the production of natural effects is impeded, since misconceptions produce facts in the psychic domain. It is only in the domain of pure proficiency, and where an urgent personal interest demands this, that decision in the sphere of activities to be accorded or to be created is

attained through insight. But scarcely anyone judges what exists according to insight. It is only as an exception that the right man has ever been found in the right place. Hardly ever has a spirit been recognized at the right time as what he really is. Thus, the natural reach of a personality is almost always revealed only through the medium of belated lamentings over misconceptions, thanks to which fact to be misjudged is ironically regarded as the distinctive mark of great and genuine souls.

How is such nonsense possible?—It is possible because man is distinguished from all natural phenomena by his inherent liability to error. The discrepancy between ideas and reality is with him a basic phenomenon.

Yet, for this very reason he is superior to all other creatures. It is only because ideas are not, as with animals, bound up with given data that man is capable of invention. He can, therefore, alter data, progress, soar upward, and discover new truths. If, on the one hand, his ideas mirror the non-real, they can for that very reason commute the non-real into reality. Therefore, it is an originally positive element which gives birth to this nonsense. *It must, accordingly, be possible to commute nonsense into sense of a higher order.* And this is possible indeed. In virtue of the insight we have gained by what has preceded, provided it has been accepted, man—who from the beginning does not know or possess the natural field of activity in which every other natural creature is at home—can win it as a normal achievement, thanks to which human life can represent, on a higher plane, the same harmony as that of the animals. But this object of all social utopias cannot be attained otherwise than through the victory of the knowledge we have

gained; they cannot be attained by any kind of social reforms, and certainly not by revolutions.

THE limits of possible self-recognition have been dealt with in the previous chapter. My present task is restricted to pursuing the trend of thought predetermined at the beginning of this, to its logical conclusion. We have seen that every man has to recognize his natural reach and accept without reserve the implied limitations; for they are held valid under all circumstances. The same has to be observed by every man in his relations to others. If the goal defined in these propositions were generally attained, mankind would clearly represent a complete cosmos; for in that case every man would work in the very place suited to his nature; everyone, as a matter of course, would be acknowledged for what he really was, and to everyone would be guaranteed the possibility of his highest achievement and acknowledgment corresponding to the value of it. What, then, is the reason that the foundation of that cosmos, even with our present insight, is, as shown by experience, obstructed by absolutely insuperable psychologic obstacles? Why does almost every man think himself more than, or different from, what he is? Why are other men's merits envied instead of being put to use? Why, in Goethe's words, is the man of distinction expected to think himself an ass? Why is modesty so highly prized? Why do we not consider injurious to the common weal those average men who, by their objections to the flaws in the character of a man of distinction, obstruct his potentially wide influence, and, why do we not—judging them on their own merits—charge them with greater presumption than the most

arrogant genius ever was guilty of?—What lies at the root of this is, again, a defect of discernment. Only when this defect is removed can the knowledge attained so far be made to bear fruit.

The defect of discernment in question has a threefold root. It arises first from the appraisal of the natural fact of a given natural reach as a function of a man's value; second, from overlooking the fact that all differences between men are of kind and not of degree; third, from the non-recognition of the fact that the others constitute an integral part of every man's self.

Let us consider the first: When Jesus teaches that the first may prove the last before God, this is true to the extent that a man's natural reach establishes in itself no prejudice in favour of the value expressed by its means; from the absolute point of view, terrestrial gradations of importance are irrelevant. To put the matter in neutral terms: every individual as a partial aspect of the human cosmos is from the beginning as near to the centre of that cosmos as any other man; therefore, no man need feel himself inferior to others of demonstrated superiority. But he is no more justified in denying other men's merits in the sphere of relativities, on the plea of his particular discernment or his awareness of absolute values. Here, again, Christ's words are to the point: "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's and to God the things which are God's." This means that in the empiric connection the emphasis should be placed entirely on the empiric possibilities of significance.

Now the second: Strictly speaking, there are absolutely no differences of degree between men, but only of kind, which is the reason that the question of "more" or "less" is wrong. There is no doubt that differences of ability

can be expressed in terms of quantity. But the significance of ability comes always from being. Now in this respect every man represents an absolute uniqueness; this is why it is as absurd to envy a man for being different as it would be for cows to envy horses. This is made particularly clear when we consider the third of the alleged defects of discernment. Every individual—as has been expounded in “World Conceptions and Life Configurations”—represents, as it were, an abstraction from the human cosmos which, as an indivisible unity, stands beneath all individuals as their basic groundwork. Therefore, the “other men” not only necessarily belong to the very self, but there exist a reciprocal relation and supplementing between the individuals, exactly as between the organs of the individual body. Therefore, not only is the proposition correct: Just because I am such a man, another man must be different from me, but there corresponds to every plus a correlative minus in one respect or another; so that if envy were not altogether senseless every individual would have to envy *every other* individual, and not that man only who happens to be superior to him in one way or another. To revert to the specific case of far-reaching effect: When things require close inspection, the nearsighted are superior to the farsighted; a man intimate with his neighbour is naturally more vitally related to him than is the man who moves worlds. Thus, an individual who is inferior in one respect need only stress that quality within himself in which he excels the one he envies, and envy will disappear as senseless. In truth, every man lives for all others under all circumstances; it depends on the right adjustment within the whole whether he lives for them to a good or to an evil end. So the sentiment according to

which other men are regarded as tools is far more true to meaning, and thus more moral, than any uninterested view which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred is nothing better than indifferently passive; for every man *is*, as a matter of fact, as an integral part of the human cosmos, and from the point of view of every other man, an organ intended to function for the benefit of all others. This, incidentally, serves to explain why rulers and other leaders of men who, by their very professions, regard others as tools take most signally into account the veritable essence of those whose services they require.

It should by now have become clear that the alpha and omega of all proper positing of the problems of the human society consists in starting—for oneself and for others—from the fact of the existence of a natural reach and from the proper conception of the latter. Once a man accepts himself *as a matter of course* as he is, all wrong statements of problems disappear and all ugly realities which arise from them disappear also. Nor is it hard to accept oneself in this manner. As a matter of fact, every single man gives his whole-hearted assent to himself as he is. And this accepted self inevitably embraces all the limitations that go with it. Therefore, no man *really* wishes to be different from what he actually is. If this were clear to him, and if, furthermore, he saw that he can satisfy his highest ambition under all circumstances only through the acknowledgment of his natural reach, every man would as a matter of course accept himself in his particular mode of being. This he did do in the ages when a stratification of society according to type and Being prevailed. In those times there was a minimum of envy. What we advocate here is

nothing less than a rebirth of the ancient idea of caste on a higher plane of discernment.

LET me, finally, give a few practical hints and advice. The principal obstacle in the way of a sensible attitude to one's fellow beings is the thirst for power and envy. Both are, wherever they exist, psychological powers of such force that idealistic and moralistic considerations are of little avail. The urge unto power grows necessarily with power as the plant grows with sunshine and rain. Where its hypertrophy is not impeded by conditions of an equal physiological reality, what follows is an organic destiny which no one who aspires has ever escaped. (Herein lies one of the chief justifications for man's remaining in the station into which he was born: the born ruler alone appears physiologically safe against an hypertrophy of the urge unto power.) The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to envy. All life maintains itself in one way or another at the expense of other lives; to combat this fact on moral grounds is senseless; for the struggle for life is a primary phenomenon. Now envy, *quâ* psychologic fact, arises necessarily wherever the feeling of inferiority and considerations of equity play conjointly the part of decisive motives. Under these circumstances there is obviously only one way of opposing the undesirable; it consists in recognizing the facts from which it arises and in taking the necessary steps that the same forces which, left to themselves, lead to the undesirable, should bring about the desirable. From which the following principles are derived. First: we must recognize it as only right that self-consciousness should mirror man's being; what should be discountenanced is only the incongru-

ence of man's idea of himself, his phenomenal representation, and his being.¹ In so far a pronounced self-consciousness should be demanded as naturally of the man of distinction as modesty is demanded of the inferior type. In point of fact, every great man knew to a certainty how great he was. And the fact that no great man of the Christian era who did not happen to be at the same time Machiavellianly cunning escaped the reproach of presumption, is in my eye a decisive proof that every great man must of necessity feel great; if he did not he would be either not great or otherwise false. On the other hand, the same reproaches were heard of only exceptionally in antiquity which knew of no Christian prejudices in favor of meekness; this seems to prove, in my opinion, that the *demand* that the great should pretend to be little leads to presumptuous behaviour. For every gifted youth is presumptuous compared with the successful man; he usurps the acknowledgment which is withheld from him, and he feels justified in doing so, inasmuch as what he is destined to achieve is already within him, and ultimately decides what he is to be. Under these circumstances the best means of preventing presumption is to accept a man not only for what he actually is, but also, as a matter of course, for his consciousness of his worth. Kings and those in high places are never arrogant; they are, on the contrary, naturally inclined to extreme latitude in their appreciation of others and to as extreme a degree of courtesy. Here, then, the prejudices in favour of modesty and meekness are at fault. They are conditioned by resent-

¹ Compare the development of the same idea in the introductory part of the chapter, "Man's Place in the Universe."

ment pure and simple. The best antidote for arrogance would thus seem to lie not in the triumph of the idea of modesty, which, according to the old adage, is to be looked for forever only among the ne'er-do-wells, but by accepting the man who with sound modesty comes to think no more of himself than of others, as that which he really is, namely, a man of resentment—a demand which can be quite easily met in our day, when the fundamentals of psycho-analysis are, or at least could be, known to all. But on the other hand, again, there is a way to salvation in the correctly understood idea of democracy, as the modern expression of what was originally Christian thought. As the struggle for existence is posited with Life, which imposes upon every man the duty of winning in competition that which he is, so no noble-minded man inwardly acknowledges that any other man is his absolute superior. He must needs have the feeling that *original* equality is accorded to him, and this feeling is only possible when the corresponding outward forms countenance its growth. This, then, is in the first place brought about by democratic institutions. And however we may find fault with their disadvantages, there is no doubt that wherever a people is truly democratic¹ (which holds true of only a few modern democracies, but all the more of the old Nordic Freemen and the enfranchised members of the feudal republics of nobility) arrogance and envy recede to a considerable degree; for they have less to feed upon.

But external democracy does not suffice; it must be eked out by consummate civility in social relations if it

¹ Compare the developments of this trend of thought in the chapters "Socialism," "Privatism" and "Democracy" of *America Set Free*.

is to lead to the extinction of the ugly propensities. Kings are by instinct perfectly courteous, for they feel that this is the only way to make their privileged position endurable to others. But the same should apply to *all* men. The reason why the English are of all Westerners the least presumptuous and envious in their mutual relations is in great part due to the fact that perfect courteousness adopted as a general rule of conduct is the rule of the game, and that no man feels that he can "say frankly what he thinks"—the German habit—to any other man, though he be his worst enemy; there is never an excuse for personal discourtesy on the plea of objective differences. Equal courtesy actually creates the *one* intelligent equality between people of otherwise different social positions who, nevertheless, want to feel as good as any others, *quâ* men. Again, where courtesy is made imperative, established differences are also recognized outwardly; this is again illustrated by England, and, still more so, by Spain; Spanish etiquette is possible in Spain because every Spaniard feels himself a grand seigneur, because he knows he is acknowledged as such, and thus does not forfeit his dignity by observing particular forms in his relations to people in higher places.

Still, even democratic institutions plus courtesy fail to bring about the extinction of the base propensities. The struggle for existence must itself be prevented from becoming the forcing-house of what is base. The only way in which this can be achieved is to consider the struggle for existence in principle as a matter of sport. This is the chief reason for the absence of envy among the English, which is in its turn the reason why England never lacks born leaders. When the struggle for existence, which, as such, cannot be abolished, and, therefore,

requires defeat, is conceived as sport, the consequence is that defeat does not lower a man, but is to be valued as positively as victory, provided a good fight has been put up. Here, indeed, is the deepest sense-bestowal which the natural can receive at the hands of the spiritual on this plane. Victory and defeat actually signify equivalent poles of life's reality; nor is it even possible to know beforehand in any particular case which is better in the long run—defeat or victory; for defeat has a greater chance of liberating forces of renewal. This does not, of course, imply a justification of masochism and defeatism, for *consciously* man should always strive after victory—that courage should be a matter of course is the *sine quâ non* for the problem as it has been posited—the conclusion to be drawn is conversely that it is absurd to be ashamed of having been defeated provided the defeated did not compromise his dignity. Now the sportsman-like attitude requires that every player should inwardly agree with him who vanquishes him. In doing so he identifies himself with him, and thereby centres his self-consciousness in the higher unity beyond the field of competition, which is, as a matter of fact, life's ultimate resort. In so far the sportsman-like man is indeed the deepest of men, metaphysically speaking. Therefore, the salvaging of our envy-ridden era really lies with the idea of sport. The sportsman alone realizes on the plane of experience the truth that every man is, as a person, the organ of a higher order of things. This explains the fact that, however regardless of the well-being of others are the English, their victories are never lastingly resented. This is also the significance of the unanimous reverence accorded by posterity to the ancient Greeks of the great period, in spite of their great de-

ficiencies. For the world-conception of the Greeks was, too, agonistic—that is, that of the sportsman.

So much for a groundwork for the recognition of the natural reach of personality. This recognition alone does not, however, suffice; there must be developed along with it a purely inward quality, lest the possible good might be perverted into the base. What I mean is the consciousness of absolute uniqueness. Every individual is indeed absolutely unique. In so far no man need make comparisons between himself and any other man. Now if the consciousness lays the stress on uniqueness, *arrogance and envy cannot possibly develop since they will then appear devoid of sense*. Here, then, lies the most important educational task which can indeed be undertaken. What is required is simply that all should be educated in the manner in which only the nobility have been brought up till now. No genuine aristocrat ever envies another man's merits.¹ The reason is that he feels his being to be a value in itself. And he is absolutely in the right in doing so. There is, indeed, no possible end beyond the unique being. The only intelligent idea consists in being, personally and for oneself, conscious from the outset and in every respect of the absolute value of the human soul, as the Christian dogma formulates the same truth. Now this very consciousness is distinctive of the aristocrat. This is what makes for his absolute superiority. This is what constitutes his nobility. To that extent, then, all men should become aristocrats. There is no call whatever for inculcating modesty in the young; they should, on the contrary,

¹ See the full development of this trend of thought in the chapter on "Hungary," of *Europe*.

be taught so proud a self-consciousness that every one of them could afford to acknowledge the other's merits without envy.

AS HAS been shown, we have dealt with the education of the human nature, accepted as such, independently of all moral prejudices. Education directed in this sense has indeed at all times been the only one which worked for good. Thus the appreciation of man as a fact of nature proves valid also on the plane which seems to be reserved entirely for the world-superior necessity. Let us, then, in conclusion, say a few words on how the individual should think of himself, independently of what others think of him. He should first recognize once for all that every disappointment is his fault only, for he could have avoided it by using the judgment which every man should demand of himself. He should, furthermore, demand everything of himself and nothing of others. Under no circumstances should he demand their understanding of him, for precisely this which is in highest demand occurs, or can occur, as shown in the previous chapter, only in extremely rare cases. I personally hold every man who amounts to anything and is not misunderstood as downright despicable.

Furthermore, every individual should accept once and for all his direct effect upon others as a decisive proof of reality. It is true that the individual is not to be "charged" necessarily with his being misjudged and misunderstood and with the antagonisms he experiences. Yet, given certain conditions, these obstacles signify necessary reactions to his nature, the change of which can arise only from a deeper understanding of the

situation. The individual must, therefore, study with the objectivity and sobriety a chemist applies to his preparations the effects he produces for both good and evil, and he must strive to obtain a more intimate acquaintance with himself, his possibilities, and his limitations on the data of that experience. A man's essence is constant in a sense similar to the anticipation of any potential insertion of numbers by the algebraic formula; the smallest experience helps to bring about a correct conclusion in greatest things. All realization of value under all circumstances takes effect by means of this empiric medium; therefore, the man who, priding himself on the nobility of his intentions and his ideal aims, neglects the means of sense-realization, is a mere blunderer. As the way to hell, according to the adage, is paved with good intentions, so it is with ideals. Nay, more: he who wills the ideal must make a *special* point of observing and thinking soberly. He who fails to maintain in regard to the deepest and highest at least the same sobriety as he would in regard to any natural object, is really lacking reverence. *He*, of a truth, is irreverent and not the one who smiles at the "inward compulsion" of such as remain inferior to the world and to their egos. For this necessity is never to be revered; it is always only a proof that a man has failed to clear for himself by integration and deepening the path to the depth of *self*-consciousness, from out of which all deeds are done in function of freedom and where the word "must" loses its meaning. To the man who has attained inward freedom all his endowments naturally signify mere instruments with which and upon which he plays. The man who maintains an attitude of strict objectivity and sobriety to that within him at which those who are not

free shudder reverentially violates no mystery of his soul. He has passed beyond every vain insistence on his particular mode of being, for he is at every instant a *quasi modo genitus* and can give the lie to the criticism of the day by every tomorrow. And the freedom of this free-man and nothing else should be the one goal of every man striving for recognition; for only his natural reach is potentially unlimited. Accordingly, he alone can reasonably expect unrestricted recognition.

Psycho-analysis and Self-perfection

NOT a few of my personal friends have voiced their misgivings at my going in practically for psycho-analysis; their contention is that spiritual and psychic helpers of every era and, recently, the researches of the second Nancy School, have proved that self-perfection can take place without psycho-analysis, and also that it is doubtful whether its premises accord with facts. I was thus—if only for the sake of forming a judgment on the latter problem—obliged to acquaint myself personally with psycho-analysis. For only where the object of possible experience is personally known to the critic can his theoretic objections claim serious attention. Even before the time of my personal acquaintance with psycho-analysis, I was struck by the fact that the majority of its opponents were ignorant of what they were talking about. This suspicion has since become for me a certainty. I know now why these misgivings of mine *had* to prove founded in fact. First, that which in man is most of all unconscious is that which he is *unwilling* to know; therefore, the censor stationed at the frontier inhibits with consummate cunning all direct knowledge; second, the unconscious differs so much from the soul's normal consciousness, and the laws of the unconscious are from the outset so far removed from obviousness, that none can form an adequate idea of what occurs in this field unless he becomes acquainted with it through personal experience. Since, then, I did this as

thoroughly as possible, I must acknowledge that the psycho-analysts experience no difficulty in refuting literally all those who object to their science out of mere prejudice. It is an acknowledged fact that the unconscious embraces by far the greatest portion of the human being, of his spirit and soul as well as his body. Of the inner happenings of his soul man hardly knows anything—and he wields hardly any power over their processes—beyond what his consciousness reflects and governs in the bodily sphere. The deepest and wisest and most decisive issues and factors of man's soul belong to those regions of it which remain originally and normally unconscious. Undoubtedly, every psychology, philosophy, moral and metaphysical theory must be set down as erroneous which in any respect gainsays the ascertained results of the psychology of the psychic depths (a judgment which certainly does not apply to all results alleged to be ascertained!). I must likewise acknowledge that the modern soul is a typical representative of an "analytic case." Evolution during the last few centuries has brought about the result that the unconscious and the conscious do not complete each other harmoniously, and that not that is unconscious which should be, and *vice versa*, under normal conditions, but that the reverse obtains in many cases. To that extent, then, psychoanalysis is in our day typically called upon to clear the path for the possible higher evolution of humanity. This naturally applies to such cases only where higher evolution comes at all into play: men who, from physiologic reasons, cannot get beyond the *amor fati* should not allow their psychic structures to be loosened for them, except in case of direct need. But here as everywhere I have in mind only such as are capable of prog-

ress. Thus the School of Wisdom cannot afford to pass over psycho-analysis in view of the very fact that self-perfection is its own sole object. Higher structures can indeed be reared only on a sound base. And a man for whom his unconscious means an unknown enemy whose primary forces antagonize instead of helping him, is without a reliable foundation from which he could proceed.

Under these conditions there is no question whether to accept or decline in principle psycho-analysis as a means of healing, if self-perfection is the goal; the question is rather as to the limits of its desirable effects. This is the problem I intend to deal with in this chapter. But I shall be very brief and refrain from explanations as to the nature of psycho-analysis; since nowadays every educated person can be expected to be acquainted with the facts.

THE relation of analysis to self-perfection is primarily so easy to establish that any man must hit upon the right definition as the first available one: the relation in question is, generally speaking, the same as that between analysis and synthesis. But what is the practical meaning of synthesis in this case? Here the difficulty of comprehension begins. Synthesis does not mean anything else than what used to be called magic and sorcery. In the chapter, "The Way of Creative Understanding," I have shown that the concept of sorcery squares with that of suggestion; furthermore, that *all* creation that lives goes back to suggestion, so that its "magic quality" accords with the incomprehensibility of creative life in general as a primary phenomenon. Ulterior reductions are thus ruled out of court here. Nevertheless, the recognition of the sphere

of possible explanation helps us in solving our present problem: if the relation of psycho-analysis and self-perfection is to be determined, this means practically and technically that we must define the limits between the practicability of an analytic establishment of facts and creative suggestion. In theory, however, this is what it means: Life itself is creative significance; this is clearly manifested by the fact that the impulses have a definite direction. If suggestion by words has a life-giving effect, this only proves creativeness to the highest degree; for words are only messengers of spiritual meaning. But the same is proved also by the mere fact that the "obviousness" which follows operation of the psycho-analyst who originally aims throughout at interpretation without the help of suggestion, is the *one thing which matters in the practice of healing*. However correct an interpretation may be objectively, it fails to be effective until it becomes obvious.

These brief statements give the outlines of the significance of psycho-analysis, which indeed is hardly the meaning its first champions gave it. Their interpretation refers the entire unconscious life back to the instinctive. It can indeed do so, seeing that the instinctive represents the primary material and means of realization for all life, the most spiritual included. Still, even with the very instincts, the primary thing is their meaning. Their nature is distinguished from that of higher life only in that they represent a fixed meaning, even as plants and animals are distinguished from man, in this connexion, only by their established condition. The organically established, the animal-like and the plant-like in man—as his instincts can most appropriately be defined—does not, therefore, signify the true facts as

opposed to an alleged and imaginary superstructure, but only a specific side of meaning within the generally human sense-connexion.

Now the centre of his connexion lies essentially *not* in the instincts. As these facts have been extensively dealt with in the chapter, "Death and Life Eternal," the mere statement is all that is needed here. Man's true centre lies in the deepest Spiritual. Therefore, reducing the contents of consciousness to their primary material never leads, in itself, to the apprehension of man's personal centre, however incontestable the success of the operation may prove to be, and however necessary it may be in many cases where pathologic tensions and fixations have to be removed; successful healing operations which suggest a different interpretation never, if rightly understood, mean more than that the solution of spasmodic tensions, the release of cramped emotions, the reducing of complexes disengage the centre, so that it can express itself in accordance with true meaning. Second, for the same reason a fundamental misconception is implied when the primary material of the higher soul-life is regarded as something other and more real than that life: empirically speaking, the question is of something identical as to kind and reality, of one particular sense-connexion within the universal sense-connexion. But what is also revealed by these considerations is the reason why psycho-analysis appears necessary at times. The instinctive is at the root of all earthly life, just as the loftiest of spirits owes his earthly origin to the sexual urge of his progenitors. Therefore, the loosening of the given psychic structure is a necessary preliminary stage for the synthesis on a higher plane (even as all religions make catharsis precede enlightenment) wherever nothing ex-

cept such a loosening can put consciousness in reach of those primary forces of the deep which minister everywhere to the upbuilding of life. For these primary forces can be ousted from consciousness to the extent that man seems unable to live from his root.

Still, that these forces are also related to meaning is shown by the one fact that they appear to consciousness in the form of *symbols*. For psycho-analysis deals for the most part with the interpretation of sense-images, whether dreams or accidental ideas are called into play. But this also throws light on the reason why misconceptions of the relation of the instinctive to the higher Soul-Life—misunderstood by the majority of psycho-analysts—so frequently have pernicious effects. Since Life is meaning, the operation of understanding is always creative. And this, again, means for the case under consideration that whoever conceives the phenomenal appearance of symbols—as the primary forces express themselves in consciousness—as the ultimate termini of their being, literally abandons himself to “animality,” since the nature of the instinctive in itself is purely animal. The same, again, makes clear how these same symbols can become a source of salvation for him who appropriately regards them as mere means of life-expression in that, being no ultimate ends, they are not independent and come under the sway of the human Logos (though not, from the beginning, of the conscious Logos). This is what Jung aimed at in teaching, somewhat vaguely, that there inheres in the very primary stuff a progressive tendency. The truth of the matter is this (proving at the same time that the contention between Jung and the orthodox psycho-analysts is due to a misconception) that the ultimate terminus in man is the sense-bestowing, ab-

solutely unique individual whose plane of existence is metaphysical and, accordingly, does not belong to the domain of analytic research; but that, on the other hand, the unique individual can express himself solely by means of the material furnished by the earth.

Man's soul, in the sense of the psycho-analyst, is just as earth-bound and earth-conditioned as his body; posterity will credit the psycho-analysts chiefly with having formed an exact conception of this absolutely earthly part of the soul. They have, in this respect, achieved just what the "materialists" of the nineteenth century achieved in respect to matter. This earth-born material—manifested in images in the case of the soul—originates, furthermore, in the individual, on the one hand, and in the general, on the other; it is to the latter—to the non-metaphysical, in other words—that belong the primary symbols attributed by Jung to the Collective Unconscious, the historic expression of which we call myths. Now all these earthly and natural phenomena possess no progressive tendency in themselves; nature as such knows nothing of progress. But the natural can at any moment become the material for the progress of the unique, provided the latter performs the sense-bestowal requisite for the process. For there is no other embodiment of the metaphysical than the physical and the psychic. This has been well known to priestly tradition throughout the ages: it employs all over the earth, as means for spiritual progress, the same primary symbols which for the orthodox psycho-analyst are ultimate natural ends and, for the followers of Jung, revelation of an alleged higher collective world. Priestly tradition does not, then, give to the primary forces their place in the general consciousness for the sake of reducing man

to primitiveness, but in order to make them subservient to higher evolution. These few observations should serve to link up psycho-analytic research with the objects pursued by the School of Wisdom. Psycho-analysis deals with the material of which every psychic structure consists and with which, thus, every higher structure has to be built; for there is no other material at hand. But as such it belongs to the mere world-alphabet; what affects man is not what this alphabet is, but what is expressed by its means. The fact that psycho-analysis so often seems necessary for modern Westerners is due to their misconception of the true nature of their souls, so *that they cannot say what they really will and mean*. But this "saying," which from the human point of view, is the only essential, is in itself absolutely independent of the specific character of the letters of the alphabet. Whatever the impulses and mythic images may have stood for originally, they can—such as they are, and without undergoing transformations—become a means of expression for sense-connexions which before never inserted themselves into the human life.

HOW, then, is this possible? The way of true progress (compare *Creative Understanding*) can be made exceptionally clear from the vantage reached here—though in all likelihood for him only who, having been analyzed personally, associates forthwith concrete ideas with the words and concepts employed. The primary character of all purely psychic formations is their mutability, which goes so far that in their particular domain, the logical laws of identity and contradiction do not hold. Everyone is acquainted with this phenomenon through his dreams. The same is expressed by myths and

fairy tales. But the same is as true of all spiritual forms which have ever become historic forces and thus belong indubitably to acknowledged "reality." Let us here give one example. Dionysos, the collective symbol for the instinctive erotic forces, was regarded by the Greeks as the Beautiful, and so their Dionysian reality was beautiful. But when the Christian world-conception replaced the pagan, the *same* Dionysos became the Devil, that is, a being as ugly as Dionysos had been beautiful; again and again, he was actually experienced by men as such. The absolute authority of the mediæval church maintained him in a state of comparative impotence which he never escaped from in the Catholic world. But, thanks to Luther, who broke down this authority, he attained for a time tremendous power in the Germanic North. With the *Aufklärung* (the enlightenment period) his image had been repressed, while the concrete reality underlying it manifested itself ever more terribly in deeds: think of the French Revolution and the horrors of the World War; the tyranny of the urges unto gain and power, too, comes in for a share of that reality. Now there has been, within the latter decades, in the soul of the Vanguard of Spiritual Europe, a reawakening of the Devil, but along with it a retransformation of him into Dionysos. This process is irresistible, since this vanguard has begun to conceive doubts as to the immutably evil quality, while fully acknowledging its reality.

He who analyzes his personal history actually lives through the history of the demon outlined above. To the one who, looking back, takes in his past as a whole it becomes clear that, in the course of evolution of his own soul, the most various forms have taken their turns, forms which, nevertheless, had all the same roots, how-

ever much their characters warred with one another. And if he then endeavours to ascertain the cause of this process of transformation, he finds that it resided in the *meaning* inherent in the primary material of his soul from phase to phase. Dionysos really became the Devil when men began to conceive his essential character differently. . . . Well, if this is so, if unconscious and involuntary sense-bestowals perform such miracles, *then the same must also be achievable by means of the conscious*. The opinion often to be met with, that conscious creations can produce only the artificial and spurious, is altogether wrong: what in its nature can come to pass "by itself" only occurs thus and not otherwise under all circumstances. But consciousness is able to induce the requisite involuntary process and to accelerate its progress, according to the law discovered by Coué to the effect that the unconscious in its unknown ways always carries into effect exactly what the conscious holds up as a goal.

The conscious no doubt is unable to accelerate this process entirely at its will: the idea which fails to arouse interest, which does not "take," which releases no emotions, remains ineffective. But I never maintained that there is such a thing as absolute freedom. Again, that freedom which is actually given is sufficient to make possible what we are here stating. Thus, creations of the new by conscious sense-bestowal have always occurred. Who has not heard of children who became vicious because their natural instincts were stigmatized as evil; or of sinners and criminals to whom the simple words of a spiritual man restored the purity of their souls? What manifests itself as evil is primarily *force*; it is the *meaning* invested in that force which gives it its constructive or destructive character. From this vantage, then, we

can understand the possibility of self-perfection in general and, in this connexion, also the possibility of that particular progress which the School of Wisdom strives to bring about. The School teaches *self*-perfection, that is, the centring of consciousness in a deeper stratum of being than that of the empiric ego, which thereby becomes a mere means of expression. It is precisely to this stratum that psycho-analysis in its endeavour to reconstruct the history of the soul and to establish all causal connexions exactly and minutely, can at times best clear the path. From the point of view of meaning, psycho-analysis signifies the same as the Buddhistic technique of inner liberation. For when man recognizes every one of the definite forms of his being as historic growths and open to change to the extent that the same primary force may manifest itself both as god and as demon, he must realize that his self is not identical with these forms. His self can be identical only with the spiritual primary source which bodied forth these forms out of its own, though in the guise of instinct material. In this manner his Self, as opposed to the Ego, becomes tangibly revealed to him. This Self is indeed not a result of arbitrary constructions and imaginings, but *the metaphysical reality of man*.

We are thus in the presence of something other and deeper than what Jung's School calls Self and into which it succeeds in integrating the originally given personality under propitious circumstances. Thanks to Jung's method, there is indeed frequently evolved something higher than what originally existed—namely, a higher Ego, in the sense of greater individualization and increased wealth of empiric material. But this kind of individuality is not identical with the metaphysical Self.

Jung is not aware of this. This is why his later metaphysical theories are all beside the mark. It is not true that God is a mere "psychological function," or that what he calls "Spirit" and "Earth" are identical with what the Chinese call Yang and Yin. Nor is it true that spirit and earth are principles on the same plane and of equal value, and that, accordingly, a happy balance between them should be the human ideal; it can only be the ideal of human mediocrity. Actually, the earth is related to the spirit exactly as meaning is to expression. I repeat: Jung's "integrated individuality" is in the best of cases the best possible *expression* of the metaphysical self. It is for this and no other reason that a person integrated according to Jung's meaning reveals sometimes, even when he is personally unimportant, greater metaphysical depth than a less integrated individual. He is more transparent, as it were; the others can see more easily through him that which stands at the back of every man. And even if the individual in question is mediocre, the profound may be revealed through him. This is most likely the reason for the effect of profundity produced by so many Oriental sages who do not appear otherwise to have been men of great gifts. But man himself, as a metaphysical being, is never deep because of what manifests itself through him, no more than a telephone becomes important because a great man speaks through it; the *personal sense-bestowing* element in man alone is metaphysically real; accordingly, a man is profound in exact proportion to his personal profound understanding and profound effect.

Now from the viewpoint of the School of Wisdom what alone matters is man's conscious root in the metaphysical Self; the quality of the latter is the decisive

factor. But this Self, too—and not only that of Jung—can at least be disengaged or disentangled by psycho-analysis; psycho-analysis removes the psychologic obstacles in the way of the Self's expression. If this takes place anywhere, then, by way of the ordinary transformations, the necessary growth of a new Ego expressive of the Self begins, and this phenomenon forthwith both confirms and adequately interprets two very ancient mysteries—that of sacrifice and of rebirth. One certainly should sacrifice one's Ego. But this never means sacrifice of one's Self—hence the feeling of bliss which accompanies the process: what is actually experienced is a rebirth by means of the Spirit. This, then, clears the path for those ethics of the future which I shall not be able to treat more minutely until the end. Here I can say this much only: if no man can help the facts of the soul he finds within himself; if, on the other hand, no man need acknowledge his actual particular mode of being, as his destiny, because meaning creates the facts and can thus eventually work a change in them—then it is clear that all ethics founded on static concepts of virtue are manifestly false, and that the only ethics in accordance with meaning are a dynamic ethics of fruitfulness and freedom.

THE general relation between psycho-analysis and self-perfection should have become clear after these cursory reflections. The particular aspects of the relation in question cannot be treated exhaustively in this place. But I would deal with two of them briefly, because at the time of my personal psycho-analysis they struck me as signally important. The first applies to the limits of a fruitful and profitable psycho-analysis in a

general sense, provided that not the re-establishment of a normal state, but an enhancement of personality is aimed at, and that this increase is not meant to occur in the sense of the Buddhistic Nirvana or the Beyond of some purely contemplative Christian monks. Psychoanalysis should never go so far as to mean disembowelment—and as a matter of fact it goes so far very much too easily. Every determinate sense-realization is tied up with definite presuppositions in the domain of the spirit, and of the soul—no longer called into question as such—just as the life of the body is tied up with the integrity of definite organs, or the reality of a poem with concepts and images recognized as ultimate termini expressing its mood or atmosphere. Now the presuppositions in question can indeed be regarded, from the medical viewpoint, as unsolved complexes. In almost all cases the tensions within a man are due to such; and without such tensions there is no productiveness. I am obviously not advocating the maintenance of morbid singularities; but he who understands only this—namely, that an experience of Godhead is brought about in man nearly always through the empiric means of what is called the “father-complex”—will not doubt that solutions of complexes can lead to real impoverishment. The boundaries between complexes and organs are too undefined; thus, most of the undefined animal instincts—particularly those fears which make for life preservation—obviously correspond to our complexes. It should also be borne in mind that the nether world is in its proper place precisely and exclusively as a nether world, wherefore it is basically injurious, and only exceptionally—as in cases when, so to speak, surgical operations are needed—is it advisable to bring certain events back be-

fore the conscious, where the ascent a man has accomplished up to that time meant that the processes became increasingly automatic. It must never be forgotten that all creation proceeds from a dark maternal womb and that it becomes technically impossible as soon as the latter appears inverted *ad extra*.

No; repression in itself is by no means morbid; it is in principle one of the expressions of the fact that man cannot be conscious of his entire being at one and the same time; where originally conscious parts of his being vanish from consciousness consequent upon a new adjustment, they are, technically speaking, repressed. Thus all culture developed thus far really and literally owes its existence to repression, the last of modern cultures, the English, even to an extreme degree. It is only at the stage of consciousness reached in recent times by the vanguard of humanity that it becomes at all possible, and also imperative, to base the totality of life on a complete understanding. Repression becomes morbid only when there arise lasting conflicts inimical to life between the conscious and the unconscious. Finally it should be remembered how difficult it is to maintain that inner dissatisfaction which is the presupposition of all progress and ascent under too auspicious external circumstances—to which belongs, in the first place, perfect psychological health. It is quite exceptional when those of high birth and great means, however gifted, are found in the class of the striving. An absolutely happy woman only too easily reverts to the animal. If, then, a man is to become more than he originally was, instead of becoming merely healthy and happy, attention must be paid to the kind of tensions which are to be solved in him: such tensions exclusively should be solved as di-

rectly impede his evolution to the higher stages. He who fails to use the utmost discretion here is very likely to destroy the only available means of realization of spiritual values in the particular case; analysis can dissolve a poem into its component letters, so that the mystery of its poetic intent would vanish.

In this connexion, then, the following rule can be held proved by experience: where self-perfection is in question psycho-analysis is innocuous in exact proportion to the amount of imagination a man possesses, and fruitful in exact proportion to the degree to which imagination commutes the solved tensions into higher tensions, instead of equalizing them. Here, too, as with all culture, the aim can never be destruction, but only construction in the sense of elevation. And every new level of reality arises from an originally free spiritual construction. Imagination is the creative source of all psychic reality. The more potent it is, the larger the amount of loose material it can sway, the more able it is to rebegin at the beginning, as the case may be; a creative spirit of Godlike quality might, therefore, allow himself to be analyzed into his last atoms without any danger. It is, however, different with any man the depth of whose conscious soul is not anchored beyond all names and forms; here a single analytic step too far may compromise the very possibility of progress. For progress inevitably proceeds from some one given empiric basis to another; wherever such basis is abandoned (provided it were possible) the concept of progress would be deprived of meaning.

Hence, then, the further demand which from our standpoint must be put to psycho-analysis: the demand that it should never remove tensions altogether. Em-

pirically realized, life *is* a state of tension which remains such also even where the one who lives it releases his tensions consciously. Thus his ascent can consist exclusively in the solution of inhibiting tensions and in the transformation of tensions of lower degrees into others suitable as means of expression for deeper and more comprehensive sense-connexions. For even complexes are expressions of such tensions; only, their meaning from the point of view of the psychic whole is for the most part contrary to sense. But even they need not be so. It is a question whether men like Beethoven, Hebbel, Nietzsche—not to mention individuals like Rousseau and Strindberg—could have realized precisely the meaning of *their* lives if their complexes had been removed by psycho-analysis. There is no doubt that perfect soundness of the soul is alone able to create a work of perfect unison. But not every man is born a Homer, a Buddha, a Goethe; none can outstep his personal Dharma; and personally I am convinced that the achievements of the first group were absolutely dependent on their being “non-liberated” or “non-regenerated.” As apparently liberated, they would only have become barren; and barrenness in the empiric corresponds to death in the metaphysical. Therefore, psycho-analysis again is profitable only in exact proportion to the transformation by its means of solved tensions into higher ones instead of their definite compensation. Here, then, the magic significance of the “right words” is revealed with an almost uncanny clearness. It depends, paradoxically speaking, directly on the capacity of the analyzer to find magic formulæ, whether psycho-analysis leads to the transformation of the psychic body in the sense of progress or retrogression. In view of the mediumistic adjust-

ment necessarily adopted by the subject to be analyzed in the presence of the analyzer, a sentence, a word, a step beyond what is appropriate can pervert the possible perfection of the subject's being into retrogressive developments, if only by driving the ego which feels imperilled into such an attitude of self-defence that forthwith from the outset it frustrates progress. Therefore, strictly speaking, only the born and predestined magician—that is, the man who instinctively finds the right word at the right moment, should be allowed to employ the instrument of psycho-analysis for other than merely medical purposes. Therefore I explicitly warn every man against allowing himself to be psycho-analyzed for the purpose of self-perfection unless a truly competent guide is at hand.

The second point I deem of importance in the present connexion, and which is also so intimately linked with the former that its consideration means an immediate continuation of the preceding one, refers to the independence of the world of values of the world of empiric facts. This, again, takes me back to the ethical problem. In principle, this independence is a matter of course. Since all facts as such, the psychic included, only concern the world-*alphabet*, there is obviously no necessary connexion between the particular mode of that alphabet and that which is said by its means. Still, there is the need of a few special explanations, because the psychic facts in their turn already represent sense-expressions, therefore it is not obvious at first sight to what extent the value of a life may be independent of empiric deficiencies. The dilemma is solved by the consideration that, owing to the essential mutability of all psychic formations, it is always possible to transform a given "mean-

ing" on the basis of a deeper one: in this manner the end which had been the ultimate now becomes a plastic means of expression. In that the Devil is metamorphosed back into Dionysos, the erstwhile "Evil One" literally becomes the Good. So a man's empiric mode of being is really in the last resort indifferent (hence the primary postulate of generosity towards oneself which we inculcate on our disciples); what matters is only what a man shapes out of the material of his personality, however imperfect. Now this fundamental wisdom is drawn out by psycho-analysis into a point, the experience of which, when I made it, surprised me: in my personal case—and I dare say it is typical of all men in the process of psychic growth as opposed to those who are perfected—all spiritual and psychic achievements were proved direct functions of my empiric shortcomings.¹ If, from this vantage point, Freud's reductions are called to mind, we reach, on the one hand, a confirmation of his results most surprising from the point of view of value, while these results receive, on the other hand, an equally surprising new meaning. It is certainly true that the greatest part of what is valuable is related to the originally morbid; but this holds good only in the sense that the growth of new physical life passes through states of ill-health. There is only one way from one harmony to a higher—namely, by dissonance. For this reason I will reinterpret here some of Freud's and Adler's propositions which have been most objected to, without further

¹ Compare for an elucidation of this proposition my autobiographic sketch printed by way of preface in *Menschen als Sinnbilder*. French edition: *Figures Symboliques*, Paris, Librairie Stock. This preface is not identical with the autobiography contained in *The World in The Making*.

explanations, in such a manner as to make them appear thoroughly correct and valid. It is true that all intellectual men suffer from the disease called "narcism" (self-adoration)—but narcism, again, means the absolutely necessary means of realization for every world of values; he who does not begin with taking himself more seriously than anything else will never make much of a personality out of himself. It is true that all geniuses show infantile traits of character—but infantilism, again, guarantees the continued existence of child-like creativeness, a fact which calls to mind the words of Christ, "Except ye become as little children." It is not to be denied that the desire for appreciation by others can be proved to be the *primum mobile* for all manner of progress; but the important point is that no one progresses without it. A never-recurring motive in artistic *representations*, which in every case means self-representation, is exhibitionism. And so forth.

These facts throw new and brighter light on the fundamental truths of the chapter, "Tension and Rhythm," on the one hand, while enabling us, on the other, to apprehend them in a more concrete manner than it was possible before. In that chapter we said that all progress was, psychologically speaking, due to super-compensation of some one side of the life of the spirit or of the soul, because the concept of progress cannot be formed otherwise than in a single-tracked and thus one-sided manner; from that super-compensation alone the requisite mobility was seen to arise. As, furthermore, every individual is necessarily one-sided in his disposition and adjustment and cannot attain universal perfection, and as, on the other hand, he is an integral part of an all-comprising connection in which the Self, as op-

posed to the Ego, has its promised centre, we pointed out that what mattered was to adjust oneself in such a manner as to make one-sidedness the symbol of all-sidedness, and that man, accordingly, should become superior to himself: *this*, we said, is the one way to overcome one-sidedness. Do not these truths, through the proved correlation between empiric shortcomings and possible higher sense-realization, take on an obviousness they lacked before? In the matter of self-perfection the point is never to achieve serenity or peace merely by removing the fault; what is demanded is, on the contrary, a higher and more comprehensive state of tension. A given super-compensation may never be cancelled; its transition into a harmony of a higher order must be induced by means of a corresponding education of those parts of the soul which remained undeveloped. Therefore, it may well be maintained that the task set to the healer in the case of the modern neurotic—and what modern man is not neurotic?—does not consist in reducing him to “normality,” but in helping him to achieve a higher kind of norm. The disharmonious state of tension of our days which typically expresses itself in neurosis—since neurosis represents the normal expression of a relation of contrast obtaining between the conscious and the unconscious, and also its provisional healing—signifies from the standpoint of sense-realization the necessary preliminary stage for the higher and more harmonic state of tension aimed at. But it means no more than the preliminary stage. If anyone should interpret the above confirmation of Freud’s conceptions in the sense that what is inferior from the medical standpoint *is* at the same time spiritually valuable, he would misunderstand me altogether. The fact is (I would rather repeat what

I have already said than permit an ambiguity) that the primary instincts are the building stones and elements of *all* earthly life, the highest included; for this reason it is always possible to prove in every particular case that the tensions manifesting themselves as sense-realizations and creations of value in the realm of waking consciousness are in the depths of the soul inferior-grade tensions; so religious tensions undoubtedly correspond to sexual tension, and the urge unto self-perfection to elementary desires for power of the Ego, and so forth. But the essential thing in this connexion is not this correspondence in general, *but the fact that it permits these instinctive forces to be carried over to higher connexions.* The same interpretation should be applied to the typical coexistence of pathologic qualities in the instinctive and higher development in the spiritual sphere. The pathologic, as opposed to the normal, is the expression of a state of lability; for this very reason it is also a concomitant of all inner transformations; therefore, it *must* also denote the empiric base of a possible progress of the soul. But the goal is always a new and higher normality. The shortcomings and deficiencies of the particular case have of course to be got rid of. They are automatically disposed of by their gradually increasing sublimation into their highest spiritual correspondents.

FROM here there is no longer any difficulty in apprehending the cardinal point of self-perfection, inasmuch as it can be linked up with psycho-analysis. The dispute as to which of the two theories, that of Freud or that of Adler, should be preferred has remained unsettled. It arises from a wrong putting of the question. First, neither of these theories does full

justice to all cases, because both lay all emphasis on one side of the psychic structure, which need not, in point of fact, be held paramount. Furthermore, both implicitly proceed from determinate concrete presuppositions which fail to be generally applicable. Jung thinks that Freud's presuppositions often apply to Jews and much more rarely to the Nordic type. He holds the characteristics of the unconscious to be dependent on the history of the races, on their age and destinies; according to him, the Nordic's unconscious is on the whole barbaric and primitive and, correspondingly, unerotic, whereas the Jew with his far-receding historic past is, within that same stratum, a differentiated Alexandrian. Undoubtedly Freud's psychology applies principally to the over-excited class. Likewise, Adler is chiefly right for such as are conscious of the unique side of their being to an exaggerated degree and in an erroneous aspect, a state most readily induced by the suggestions of the modern *Zeitgeist*; where social consciousness is paramount, as in all social aggregates closely held together by customs, as in the "United States,"¹ there cases of the Adler type can occur only exceptionally; here they perhaps occur only in the case of tyrants. A study of primitive peoples from this angle would assuredly lead to interesting revelations. But secondly and chiefly, it implies an error in principle to hold only *one* interpretation as justified in the psychologic field. For here the question is always of sense-connexions; and these can, as a matter of principle, be centred *ad libitum*. In principle every whole may here be related to any centre of relation and

¹ I have developed this trend of thought at length in the chapter, "Socialism," of *America Set Free*.

projected on whatever planes as far as such are available; correspondingly, the validity of each of the two theories can be proved beyond doubt through their application to cases in point. But this is all. What may reasonably be questioned in all theories which fail to do justice to all facts together is by no means their absolute accuracy, but only their expediency in regard to particular applications. And this leads us to the decisive objection to the psycho-analysts: they think they can apprehend exhaustively the complexity of the whole of soul-life, while starting from a single basic factor. This enterprise, in view of the proved multi-dimensionality of Life, *a priori* appears futile. Olga von Ungern-Sternberg has made probable (see her book previously quoted) that, generally speaking, the scheme of five assumed basic factors leads to the most perfect understanding of the psychic structure, which five factors, according to the author, correspond exactly, in their qualification, to the five astrological planets (and, what is particularly striking, also to the characters of the Greek gods, their namesakes). According to this view, the quality represented by the libido which Freud and his school deem sufficient for all cases is only the principle symbolized by Mars, a reference which throws full light on the one-sidedness and incompleteness of the libido theory. If the interpretation of the author proves valid, this would be tantamount to an almost complete confirmation of my theory as to the connexion between astrological presuppositions and analytic results contained in the chapter, "World-Conceptions and Life-Configurations."

But however the case may stand, none of the psycho-analytic fundamental theories does justice to more than one side of a multilateral connection. Accordingly, their

usefulness must vary with the objects under treatment. Every one of them does more justice to definite concrete cases than any of the others. Likewise, their usefulness proves variable according to the adjustment to theory or practice, and, within their ranges, to the particular object of research. In the domain of pure knowledge of facts in the sense of natural science, Freud's psychologic theory can be said to obtain the most satisfactory results. That of Adler stands foremost when self-perfection is aimed at, and the question is here not of a relative, but of an absolute superiority, because a definite movement can be induced only unilaterally. It is *exclusively* from the feeling of inferiority and the need of appreciation that the psychic whole can be practically set in motion. There is absolutely only that one primary urge of the Ego hungry for power, the sense of which would set the goal for self-perfection.

But I certainly do not mean, in making this statement, to advocate Alfred Adler's world-conception. The point is by no means to restore every man to the status of the normal social type. In the first place, the community does not stand superior to the unique individual, but *vice versa*. Second, Adler conceives the community only as an aggregate without interstices like that of tinned sardines or Ghetto Jews. And it is only the principle of distance and not that of intimacy which creates such accelerations and alterations as can alone induce progress. In this respect Adler's theory and practice can unquestionably be understood as an expression of Jewish resentment: all distance is *meant to be* abolished in order that there should be no differences whatever between men. Thus Adler was the first rightly to apprehend the nature of an important lever of the human nature; yet he not only

fails to teach its proper application, but he teaches a downright false application in all those pathologic cases which are not typically Adlerian. As I wrote above, the adequate *starting-point* is the feeling of inferiority and the striving after appreciation; but it is only in exceptional pathologic cases that they should be removed by psycho-analysis. From here, then, it should become ultimately clear that it is contrary to sense to condemn as faults ambition and striving after power, even in the milder meaning of the Christian doctrine: they are the natural groundwork for all manner of progress. The same point of view provides a vantage point for apprehending the true meaning of Nietzsche's Life-doctrine. But first of all, this shows why Christianity surpasses all other world-religions as an accelerating power in the evolutionary process; none other begins so sure of its goal from the psychologic cardinal point in the matter of possible self-perfection. But it is as true that this very trend of thought leads beyond the limits of Christianity as it has been realized thus far. Its fault was its fear of sin, which became transmuted into the repression of sin. Now psycho-analysis has taught us not only to apprehend, but also to understand, the error of that fear, and it has thereby shown the way back to that ingenuousness which is the only profitable attitude. Since we know what infernal abysses every soul hides; how the life of the instincts consists to a considerable degree of a yearning for Babylonian excesses, lust for murder and rapine, brutal desires and cowardly envy—abysses which are as necessary to life as the intestinal processes are for the maintenance of the brain—there becomes possible on the higher "stage of subjectivity" (in Jung's terminology) that very thing which had, at the "objective stage,"

made for the believer in Gods and Demons a so richly developed and deeply rooted existence—namely, a positive attitude towards its being as a *whole*.

This, then, is the very place for stressing the particular merits of Jung and for determining at the same time the limits of his theory. Jung, too, is an explorer of nature pure and simple. His views, no more than those of other psycho-analysts, lead to the metaphysical. But his ultimate termini are deeper than those of the heads of the other analytical schools, inasmuch as he alone succeeded in apprehending the general which supports all that is natural and individual not only on the animal, but also on the specifically human plane—by his myth doctrine and his soul-palæontology—and inasmuch as he alone establishes in man's individuality a terminus within the scheme of nature beyond and above the Ego. For this reason he alone leads up to the immediate vicinity of the metaphysical. And on that account his observations on the subject of the religious instinct are always instructive; though they never refer to the religious instinct in itself, they always apply to its collectively—and individually—psychologic means of embodiment.

But he who is himself endowed with metaphysical consciousness goes beyond Jung by Jung's own help. He reaches, by means of psycho-analysis, not only a positive attitude towards his whole being on the "subjective stage," but also the point of view of the metaphysical self, from what I call significance. However inadequately the psycho-analysts may have apprehended the true meaning of their own achievements—it is to them that we are indebted for the knowledge that the evil, far from being superior to man, represents his true nether world, which the self grown conscious of its true nature

alone can turn to good. This self actually governs all that, in its turn, governs the Ego-imprisoned man: even the Demon-alphabet can be coerced by man, by free sense-bestowal, into a means of expressing the Divine. When mankind as a whole will have reached the level of superiority outlined here, then all transcendent problems of the "Ego" will not indeed be solved, but dismissed.¹ Meanwhile, however, the little difference in the matter of adjustment as against the ruling Western World-conception brought about by the idea of self-perfection making use of the results obtained by psycho-analysis, will suffice, if all goes well, to introduce forthwith an era of unerring ascent, however long and frequent the intervening periods of compensatory retrogression may be.

And this ascent, once reached, leads again beyond still another boundary of the traditional Western World-conception—the egocentricity in the determination of human welfare. The Christian has until now striven after perfection as an Ego, in order to go to Heaven in the flesh, as it were. Today we know that a perfection of the Ego is absolutely out of the question; perfection is to be attained exclusively beyond the Ego, in the Self. And on the basis of that insight two deep (but all the more obscure) Christian doctrines become understandable; the doctrines that the Ego must be sacrificed, and that to give is more blessed than to take. Indeed, if the Ego and the Self are not identical, then the Ego is by no means the ultimate term. But these doctrines are now given a precision transforming them in part. Since the

¹ Compare the development of this trend of thought in the chapter, "Universal Tension and World-Ascendancy."

Ego can never attain perfection, and since the true essence of man does not lie in his phenomenal appearance, but in meaning, *the true task consists in realizing perfection by means of the imperfect Ego whose metaphysical problematic nature is forthwith dismissed*; which means nothing else than what I wrote in the chapter, "Tension and Rhythm," that one-sidedness has to be deepened into the symbol of all-sidedness. *One* realized type absolutely excludes others in the same human individual; and every one of these types is defined by limits meaning deficiencies from the point of view of perfection. Thus all merits have their reverse; thus it is impossible for man, as the Church has always correctly taught, to escape sin on earth. Therefore, it is wrong to represent sinlessness as a goal at all. Now he who does not strive after the perfection of the Ego, but only of the Self, no longer strives after his empiric personal salvation, since he aims at, if not to overcome all his failings, at least to palliate them; he rather takes all the guilt courageously on himself, and by doing so does what Jesus did for the Karma of mankind, or what the soldier does who offers his life for a great cause—he has passed beyond all egocentricity. He disposes of his faults in shifting the emphasis from facts back to meaning.

But from meaning, he can attain precisely that in which he formerly failed and had to fail: the *transmutation of the facts*. Christ's word, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you," means in the last resort nothing else than that meaning and meaning alone creates the facts. Thus the new adjustment we advocate does not lead to a sanctioning of imperfection—it precisely makes for its removal. As Christ, again, taught, "Whosoever shall

lose his life shall find it," only he who is not anxiously careful of the welfare of his Ego finally reshapes it into a vessel for the Divine. Now he who had thus overcome his imperfection would indeed be absolutely superior to the traditional Western type. He would be free of all those ties which robbed that type of his inner freedom. He would rule both the upper and the nether world. He would be in very truth the world-*ascendant* man.

The Body, the Soul, and the Art of Healing

FROM December, 1922, until the fall of 1924, without a break I was occupied with psycho-analysis, both in theory and in practice. My experiences after my first treatise on the subject (written in spring of 1923) thoroughly confirmed the opinions therein set forth. So I have thus nothing "new" to say. But I am now able to grasp better several points, to throw a clearer light on particulars, and to express more comprehensibly certain truths of vital importance. To this the following chapter is devoted.

TO BEGIN with, I will present a few considerations regarding the practical medical question. There is no doubt as to the efficacy of psycho-analysis in the healing of a great number of patients, some purely somatic ailments, it would seem, included. But this does not mean in itself that any of the previous theories have been proved correct, but only that experience shows how a definite class of modern men can be helped by a definite mode of treatment. For there never was a fashionable cure which did not prove serviceable in exactly the same sense as psycho-analysis does today; and this means that methods which were subsequently "refuted" were justified in their own age. On what principles can the success of a cure depend under these conditions? If we consider that what proved theoretically false, or otherwise only partly adequate, often was as

efficacious as cures acceptable to the scientific point of view—nay, that this statement may even be put more strongly to the effect that *no* treatment has ever been entirely correct scientifically—one is led to the assumption that, generally speaking, there are four points which are decisive in effective cures: the stimulating effect of the treatment; its adequacy to the particular nature of the patient; its adequacy in regard to the physician, and finally the sympathetic relation between the doctor and the patient.

Under all circumstances, a patient is cured spontaneously, if he is cured at all; no physician can do more than support the will to recovery. Now as this support can consist in only two things—namely, in the elimination or suppression of noxious influences and in the stimulation of the deeper life forces (two points which I reduce to the general denominator of stimulation; since elimination works efficaciously only because reconstructive forces are thereby released)—this proposition proves the validity of Groddeck's paradoxical assertion that there are absolutely no wrong treatments. The so-called body and the so-called soul are both ultimately means of expression of something deeper—namely, of the specific "*meaning*" embodied by a given vital monad.¹

¹ In order to maintain the uniform trend of this chapter and to furnish a perhaps desirable completion of the text, I will add as a footnote the main ideas contained in a lecture delivered in 1925 at Kissingen on the same subject.

Three causal series interfere in all human life, and three co-ordinates are required in every case for the definition of a definite state of life: that of the cosmic influences (of the environment in the broadest sense), of heredity, and of autonomous spirit. All life means, on the one hand, a relation to the outside world; continual reaction and adaptation are in that respect the signature of its essence. But on the other hand there

In all probability the body is only a phenomenon of materialization among other phenomena in accordance

is also a continual vitalizing of the non-vital, the dead from within. Every type, form, entelechy, culture as such lives in its own right. As against the outer world, heredity means a perfectly independent factor. Another independent factor in function, wherever it happens to occur, is the creative spirit; and the increase of its significance within the total connexion outdistances the proportion of its own growth, because its creations, once projected, also become "cosmic influences"; for it is precisely such influences that are in question in what is understood by psychic atmosphere, spiritual environment, and *Zeitgeist*. The psychic organism reacts upon ideas no less and not otherwise that protozoön on chemical substances.

What, then, is the interrelation between the bodily and the spiritual spheres? However easy the distinction between either may be in definite cases, a discrimination in point of principle is altogether impossible; to that extent all formulations of the problem resorted to thus far are false. All reality to be experienced as a fact is "appearance"; this applies to concepts and ideas exactly as it applies to physical bodies. A non-phenomenal and yet undoubtedly somehow "existent" something is met with alone in the region of "meaning." Remember the fundamental example upheld by the School of Wisdom—namely, the relation of the significance of an idea to the letters expressing it in the phenomenal. Now within the phenomenal a reliable delimitation between the bodily and the spiritual is impossible. Phenomenal life is everywhere full of meaning; a physical organ can be understood from out of its significance only, exactly as a philosophical proposition. A delimitation in principle between body and spirit would be possible only, if we were allowed to identify the latter with the intellect and consciousness. But this cannot be done. The body, which lacks understanding, is for the most part wiser than the intellect; and the greatest and most important portion of the mental processes is unconscious. Hence the necessity to put the problem differently. Instead of discriminating between the bodily and the spiritual, one should discriminate, as a matter of principle, only between meaning and expression. The more meaning as such becomes *conscious* and the more it is *intended*, the more spiritual a being is in the ordinary sense. But, again, the traditional discrimination between the spirit and the body is false. To the extent that the bodily has meaning, it is everywhere spiritual; to the extent that they appear in the phenomenal, all spiritual things are of the material order. And further: to the extent that the expression which has become fixed dominates, it is

with Geley's¹ theory, and there cannot, for that matter, be any doubt that a substance immaterial in itself brings

¹ Compare *De l'inconscient au conscient*, Paris, F. Alcan. American edition, New York, Harper & Brothers.

the law of matter, inertia, which rules; to the extent that initiative, the fundamental attribute of creative meaning, dominates, it is free spirit that rules. From which it follows that there is no difference in principle between the natural order of things and spiritual routine. He who operates according to fixed rules is exactly as unspiritual as a chemical substance. He only is a spiritual being whose stress is on freedom. But, even here, there is no difference between body and spirit in the ordinary sense. With animals the body is endowed with unfettered imagination to a degree to be found in man only in the most productive genius. Think of the cuttlefish's ability to change its hues, of the regenerative force of the starfish and of the salamander. The same amount of imagination is normally given to man as spirit. But spirit, too, can only express itself *by means* of natural routine. Spirit, too, is bound everywhere by the laws of matter. Thus, however autonomous man may feel as a spiritual being, none is independent of the two other co-ordinates defining human nature: the cosmic influences and the heredity of the blood. From this vantage point the deepest meaning of the art of healing can be determined without ambiguity. The art of healing does not deal with abstract ailments, but with living man whose life it desires to maintain, to heal and to enhance. Therefore, it must co-operate everywhere and in absolutely every case with the three co-ordinates of all human life. Its surest means are the cosmic influences, because these are, on the one hand, the strongest—all life exists *primarily* in regard to the physical outside world—while they are, on the other, the most practicable. Climatic influences, water cures, medications can be applied *ad libitum*. Therefore, somatic medicine will remain paramount to the end of time. It will do so for the reason also that obviously in the end much more of the "psychic" is physically conditioned than present-day fashion would allow. I know of psychic symptoms which were treated for a long time without success by psychoanalysts and that disappeared when a treatment for *uric acid* was resorted to. I likewise think that Hans Much's "physio-analysis" would seem to approach the fundamental formula of the "It" in many cases more efficiently than the most deeply searching psycho-analysis. Assuredly the hormone treatment will work miracles undreamt of in our day. On the other hand, somatic medicine is effective only when the other

forth and regulates the material phenomena. It is, therefore, objectively and in principle irrelevant by the use of

factor is adequately taken into account, I mean the generic and individual life formula. The third factor, again, becomes more important in proportion to the prevalence of the psychic as a determinant. This obtains with primitive peoples and children, on the one hand, and with the most cultured peoples and spiritual personalities, on the other. This explains why the modern West commits itself more and more to psychic methods of healing. The true physician is thus the healer who diagnoses the relation of the three causal series or co-ordinates belonging to the specific case, and fashions his treatment accordingly. With some patients physical medicaments are pre-eminently effective, greater or smaller doses being applied, as the case may be; with others psychic means are chiefly effective. What decides is always the particular point of intersection of the three co-ordinates—that is, the particular individual centre of the living sense-connexion. Therefore, the same symptoms, nay even the same progresses of illnesses in two different cases, never *mean* the same. Nor can every physician heal every patient. Why? Because the doctor represents as such, independently of the mode of treatment, the third factor determining all life: the initiative of the spirit. Not every initiative is helpful to all. It is on this basis that we can now proceed to the fundamental concept of medical art in general: it consists in the capacity for changing by means of spiritual initiative the equilibrium between the three factors according to the requirements of the specific case, and in inducing thereby the transition of a morbid state into a normal. It is irrelevant in which way the physician brings about this effect, whether by physical means or by kind words or by tacitly awaiting a catalytic effect. From this it results further that physicians are not to be dispensed with: changes of the aforesaid kind can only be induced by “others,” exactly as a child is brought to life only by the polar co-operation of two persons.

The ultimate object of these considerations, however, is not medicinal, but refers to principles. I therefore return—to bring them to a close—to establishing the falseness of the habitual discrimination between the body and the spirit. Our considerations yield a twofold result beyond the domain of a possible art of healing: first, the falseness of every conception to the effect that the spiritual should be trained apart from the bodily; that is, the erroneousness of every idealism and every world-conception stressing mere inwardness. Second, the erroneousness of every materialistic world-conception. The materialist misunderstands precisely the *bodily*. Therefore, every physician who is not at the same

what means, physical or psychic, medicaments, diet, moralizing, psycho-analysis, or suggestion, a physician ministers healing; what matters is only that they stimulate, in the appropriate direction, the sense-principle. In this field, however, every man reacts in a basically different manner. If cures are almost as much subject to fashion as dress (in contradistinction to the statement in the foregoing paragraph), which seems to prove the similarity of all who live in the same age, however different men may appear at different periods, the underlying reason in both cases is the uniform evolution of the unconscious, and thus of the groundwork of all individual differentiations which occur correlatively to the psychical influences of the time—an evolution which, in its turn, produces uniform representations as to the object and means of healing, to be considered everywhere as the actual forms of expression of something real. Another reason is the fact that only *that* influence stimulates to which the organism has not as yet adapted itself. To that extent change working as a surprise to the organism is perhaps the most important point with every cure; it is, therefore, right that new medicaments are being constantly invented, for sooner or later the organism becomes immune against every medicament too frequently taken. For the very same reason psycho-analysis in the orthodox sense even now has no healing effect upon many persons who are no longer surprised by what it reveals; it can thus, with certainty, be predicted that it will go out of fashion as a panacea—even as was the case

time capable of ministering to souls is truly dangerous. The ultimate conclusion is that the final determination of the value of a physician lies in his value as a *man*. Being determines the value of ability. The specialist who believes in his specific proficiency as representing the ultimate essential is in so far the worst of all blunderers.

with former cures—as soon as the *Zeitgeist* will have assimilated its general idea. This consideration explains, by the way, why even erroneous interpretations of psycho-analysts often effect cures: the fact is that they stimulate, nevertheless. There certainly is, in principle, a mode of healing which is not subject to fashion. It is the mode which apprehends with mathematical correctness the particular formula of the individual and which then, with the most scientifically adequate means, changes the tune, as it were, of the ultimate connexion. This is what Hans Much of our days strives after, following the footsteps of the great physicians of antiquity. But this highest mode of the art of healing is in its application even more of an art than the inferior grades.

The second and third points I had best deal with conjointly. The bodily and the spiritual not only belong in every man to a unified whole—they are interrelated in each single case in a particular manner, and the vital connexion, again, is differently centred within every part of both. The result is, again, that in principle to every man peculiar or specific things must be helpful. The obtuse reacts but poorly to psychic influences; with the hypersensitive, poisons disagree. With every man the cure must be concentrated on that point from which the psycho-physical connexion is most advantageously set in motion. In exactly the same sense every physician proves most helpful when using the method which provides the best chance of transmission for his own creative life-force. (That it is this transmission which matters, whenever there is a question of extraordinary physicians, not to mention miracle-mongers, I need not, I think, go out of my way to prove; everyone knows that there are stimulating and depressing personalities.)

Therefore, every great physician has committed himself entirely to his particular method as the panacea, and justly so. But how in almost every particular case, so far, could this lead to the error of a physician's proclaiming his own method as the absolutely correct or even the only possible one? The reason is that with every extraordinary man and unusual method it is the patient who chooses the physician, and not *vice versa*. In virtue of the divinatory faculty of the unconscious, the result in the long run in every case is that only such persons apply to a particular physician—and this leads us at the same time to the fourth of the chief points—who stand in a relation of particular sympathy to him. It is thus by no means to be wondered at that every one of the pioneers in the field of psycho-analysis has met with confirmation of his particular theory: what we should wonder at would rather be the lack of confirmation. In point of fact, *no* success in the matter of cures confirms the correctness of a theory unless it refers to conditions so generally organic that the personal equation can be relegated to insignificance. Were things otherwise, Mrs. Baker-Eddy's *Science and Health* would mean the acme of intellectual insight. Medicinal success under definite theoretic pre-suppositions never proves anything more, at least in the first instance, than that in the given equation between the patient and the physician a definite theory proved practicable as a working hypothesis. Healing is thus, whatever theory and insight may attain to, in every case not a science but an *art*.

THIS being so, is there no such thing as "the correct" in the field of medicine? There is. Not only in the organic field in general is there definite knowl-

edge and generally valid methods which spring from it because it is a case, here, of fixed mechanisms, but the same are met with in the psychic field. *But what matters is to see that with man mechanisms are never the ultimate termini*; therefore, correctness in the sense that statistics demonstrate never decides the practical issue. One should not, therefore, be surprised at the fact that psycho-analysis—to furnish a special example—thrives most particularly on German-Protestant or, otherwise, on Jewish soil, while, especially in France, other theories and practices obtain better results. The unsophisticated realistic Latin mind is assuredly less liable to the repression of emotions than the Germanic and Jewish minds; accordingly, in France not only other cures, but also other diagnoses, prove more effective (one should make a study in this connexion of the work of classic clarity—in three volumes—by Pierre Janet: *Les médications psychologiques*, Paris, F. Alcan). From this vantage we can now obtain a deeper insight into the meaning of medical knowledge and practices. A student whose initiatory knowledge was confined to psycho-analytic literature, and who then should proceed to study Janet, would discover that psycho-analysis produced a much smaller crop of new facts than it claims; what is new is only their interpretation. Furthermore, he can, if his personal experiences are sufficiently many-sided, hardly evade the conclusion that the interpretations also of the psycho-analysts, not only in very many cases, but often also in principle, do less justice to the ultimate meaning of the facts than many a pre-analytical interpretation. I am personally convinced that probably all statements—those of Freud most particularly so—are correct as definitions of psychic facts. Unfortunately, however,

there are no hard and fast facts in the psychic field in the same sense as in the physical domain. Here the symbol reigns supreme; every one of them mirrors the other; here one thing continually changes into the other; therefore, no definition of facts ever proves a given interpretation to be correct. What a fact *is* can here be derived only from its meaning in the total sense-connexion; for here Meaning creates the facts altogether. Thus all depends on the centring of this connexion. Now the psycho-analysts much too frequently misplace the emphasis in this field. It seems to me even as though the emphasis of the non-analysts were more correct in general and also in principle; therefore, it is to be expected that modern psycho-analysis, far from revolutionizing from its own premises psycho-therapeutics, will rather, sooner or later, be assigned its place in the old scheme of experience as a definite technique adapted to specific cases only. Not always does the sexual, however clearly its presence in the unconscious be proved, signify what the Freudians maintain it to mean; the same applies to the urge unto power; every man has complexes, but some men only grow morbid on their account. Within the very circle of the psycho-analysts Freud, Adler and Jung place different interpretations on the identical facts. In so far as generalizations are at all permissible, it seems to me that, however frequently the psycho-analysts may be in the right, the primary phenomenon with the neurotic patient is, according to the interpretation given by non-analysts, his state of depression and by no means repression, etc.; for a man who is well balanced from the outset will not be upset by any experience whatever. The true problem of the complexes is not their existence, but the fact that definite complexes were not assimilated;

the problem with traumas is the non-liquidation of experiences; and so forth. If analysis, as Freud justly avers, really lives on what he calls "resistance," this is, on the one hand, in part due to the fact—presented for the moment in the formula of Groddeck—that every successful cure signifies a victory in the contest between the will unto life and the will unto death, wherefore, every resistance (whether offered in the form of resistance in the analytic sense or of a relapse, unwillingness to improve, deterioration, or whatever other form) has generally to be interpreted as a predominance of the urge unto death, and signally as an index of the place in which the help given to the will unto life should be first applied; and, on the other, to the well-known fact that it requires an effort to raise the inner tension to a higher level; and to avow the disagreeable requires, no doubt, the most deeply rooted effort.

Likewise, the definition of the lack of psychic equilibrium by means of the co-ordinates sadism-masochism often leads astray: what certain physicians are in the habit of interpreting thus is in the majority of cases rather the spasmodic striving on the part of the somehow psychically weak to lift himself by means of excitement to a state of equilibrium, making an otherwise insolvable task appear solvable; or, again, a means for stimulating the deeper creative forces. The question is thus of a thing which is *normal* under given conditions.

Now the epistemological nucleus of all errors of psycho-analysis is as follows: It is altogether *impossible* to establish a correct theory of psychic life in terms of mechanics. Psychic energy is not of the same kind as the physical; the law of the conservation of forces obtains for them in a small proportion; diagrams such as Freud

draws after the anatomical pattern in his book on the Ego and the It necessarily lead astray; Freud's as well as Jung's "libido" can be only taken seriously *quâ* realities as symbols suggestive of a thing unknown, or at best divined. And if precisely Freud's theory, the most mechanistic of them all, leads most frequently to successful cures, the reason is probably that most of our contemporaries are children of the mechanistically thinking age; therefore, every mechanistic interpretation is the most likely to be the most obvious for them and most serviceable in confirming knowledge. Furthermore, Freud is, of them all, the best observer of facts; he is *also* right under all circumstances. Now as the vital sense-connexion is all-sided and mirrored on all sides, *every* precise definition leads farther than an unprecise definition. In re-experiencing a concrete event one becomes most readily conscious of a general adjustment—this is the reason why a causal reduction of a trauma effects a cure more frequently than any treatment which is intellectually less well defined. I am a great admirer of Jung personally, and I think him a true pioneer in the new field of what I call soul-paleontology; it is an enormous merit of his to have shown that there is such a thing as a collective memory. But I doubt whether an individual treatment referring, time and again, to mythology is very often efficient; and wherever Jung the metaphysician takes the field, this is altogether to the detriment of the psychologist. He has no more first-hand experience of the metaphysically real than has Freud; his theories as to the relationship between the spirit and the earth, his paraphrase of the Chinese doctrine of Yang and Yin, in particular, seem to me anything rather than adequate. In the field of analysis the

law of correlation of meaning and expression operates for the most part in favour of Freud, since he is by far the acutest thinker of all the psycho-analysts. Finally, it can hardly be left out of account that precisely the repulsiveness of Freud's interpretations makes them so suggestive. It is the old story of the "bitter medicine." The result of all research into psychic life will not be rightly understood before public opinion starts from the assumption that the psychic organism is a sense-connexion; therefore, every theory which fails to take this primarily into account and to erect its structure on the laws of the transference of it into the psychic and physical medium is in principle false. It is precisely this side of Freud's work which can be termed pioneer work in the highest sense: Freud was the first among the physicians to recognize with perfect clarity the symbolic character of all life phenomena, making it the cornerstone of his conception.

THIS brings me to the question as to the value of psycho-analysis for striving humanity. If the problem of every patient is strictly personal in the sense that the living centre of the sense-connexion represented by every individual lies above all mechanisms of every case—what matters exclusively is their significance in the special case—the same holds good pre-eminently in the spiritual and psychic personality. The analytic facts—however indubitably ascertained and medically well defined they may be—do not in themselves contain any data which make it possible to pronounce judgment on the spiritual value and its life value. Now this knowledge leads forthwith to the main objection which can be raised against the majority of present-day psycho-

analysts, an objection the cogency of which appears proved to me by the mere fact that *all* psycho-analysts without exception who have replied to my prior arguments on the subject showed by their reaction that it is precisely herein that *their* main complex resides: it squares with my warning against over-analyzing for fear that what is of value might be destroyed in the process. I will only hint at the singular resemblance of many of the arguments adduced, or otherwise deducible, from the text (to the effect that what might be analyzed away was not really valuable; that a "correctly managed" psycho-analysis could never be detrimental; and also the necessary synthesis, that no one would apply to a psycho-analyst who was not ripe for the process; or that women who had experienced detrimental effects through psycho-analytic insight, or men whose liberation by psycho-analysis had injured them, were no great loss!). Answering those of fanatical believers I would say: a man of pre-eminently scientific interests is, as a physician, very much of a vivisector, the latter, again, being the psychic brother to the inquisitor; I would also touch lightly on the fact that the only explanation for the proceedings of certain psycho-analysts of whom I have heard appears to be that psycho-analysis is for them an end in itself and not the patient; that it is thus a matter of sport with them, and that the insistence of others on the existence of determinate complexes "in spite of all" can hardly be interpreted otherwise than by their readiness, from preconceived opinions, to inflict any kind of torture for the sake of wringing from the patients confessions, however false they may be. The true facts—I repeat here in slightly different words what has been said above—are these: analysis is a dangerous instrument

for two definite reasons: first, because every personality represents a strictly determined sense-connexion intimately bound up with the particular mode of being of its elements; second, because the seeing through a symbol destroys the same. It certainly follows from this, on the one hand, that the strong and the superior kind of man can stand most things, and that very often deficiencies which manifest themselves symptomatically can be most advantageously removed by psycho-analysis. On the other hand, however, it follows that the weak cannot stand certain knowledge and perspectives—and most patients who are likely to think of psycho-analysis as a remedy are weak in one way or another. If every personality is that which it represents in its function of strictly limited conditions, then a girl who had been prematurely initiated into the abysses of the life of the instincts, to the extent that a personal experience was the result of that knowledge, is no longer the same person she was. Whether she becomes better than before depends exclusively on whether she is capable of creating a new psychic connexion—such as the normal experience of love spontaneously induces—which can assimilate what the former connexion was incapable of assimilating. In principle, the psycho-analysts can create traumas exactly in the same manner as the well-known fright-shock in childhood; it is not true that only early experiences produce lasting derangements. The question is here, as everywhere, what a man can *endure* in the way of knowledge. He who expects a man to stand what is intolerable to him in his actual state must at the same time be able to change that state—that is, to create a new personality. But this (I here anticipate later developments) is not the psycho-analyst's business, but that of

the spiritual guide who, as such, must believe in a spiritual reality lying above all that can be analyzed. If the psycho-analysts who fail to see this have not long ago been convicted of absurdity by experience, this is due to the fact that psycho-analysts in the majority of cases have to deal with real ailments only, the cure of which is mostly possible on the basis of the patient's personality as it is. But what I mean here is something more essential than ailments—namely, the beauty of the soul depending on right proportions. And a very great number of persons who may possibly have been cured in the medical sense have become loathsome in their souls; for they have lost their entire inner balance in the process. It is for this reason that one hears, again and again, reports by such physicians as feel the responsibility of the guide of souls of how psycho-analysis, in undoing a man's psychic structure, degraded his psychic standard. Unfortunate persons of this sort can only be reintegrated and raised to a higher level by a wise guide. It is not true that this takes place spontaneously under all conditions. Let us repeat: only where the whole of the personality in question can immediately integrate the new contents into itself, psycho-analysis is at the same time synthesis.

Here too, then, we approach the solution of the problem as to why every creative man is afraid of over-analysis. I said that a symbol which is seen through loses therewith its vitality. Goethe's "Fisherman" is capable of an analytic interpretation as few other poems, and this interpretation is assuredly one among many other correct ones. But would Goethe have written his glorious poem if he had known of such an interpretation, or even thought of it as the only possible one?

Most certainly not. And undoubtedly the work of art matters more than the correct interpretation of the basis of the instincts underlying it. The creative vital core of man is a most delicate, susceptible, and easily injured thing. It is—as only Beatrice Hinkle among all the psycho-analysts I know has grasped—literally a second man in man, resembling in its requirements the foetus in the mother's womb. Any premature exposure to light during the period of growth can result in death. If what is uttered is in any case detached from man and loses its formative powers within him, the basic condition of psycho-analysis, that all should be spoken out at once, must, from the standpoint of the creative, be felt as a preliminary to capital execution. What does it matter to the creator within man, that is, to that essence for whose sake alone the artist's empiric Ego lives, whether this is suffering from nervous derangements, notably when these have a stimulating effect on the former? This belief is, again, completed by another: with rare exceptions, it is only the psychologic type whose disposition forces him to write in order to know himself, who perfects himself as a great writer; and for that matter all art creation thus signifies, from the medical angle, solutions of inner difficulties in the realm of representations; only those who for personal reasons *must* create in a definite way ever perform great things. The psycho-analysts themselves furnish the most instructive case in point. Those of their number who have a real call to psycho-analysis are to my knowledge always such men who in analyzing others get rid of their own conflicts by way of reaction. Now it seems to me by no means accidental that all the pioneers of psycho-analysis—*relata refero*—have not been analyzed, or far from completely analyzed, and have the

same dislike for psycho-analysis applied to themselves as have other artists. In this connexion it may be interesting to note that Freud personally exhibits all the marks of a typical Adlerian case, wherefore it is hardly accidental that the first heretic to split away from him was precisely his disciple, Alfred Adler. . . . Is the psychologic type of productive man really to disappear for the sake of confirming the psycho-analysts' dogma? I think not. As ancient a sage as Buddha knew that thinking kills the instinctive. He was to that extent the first psycho-analyst. He certainly was the best epistemologist of all of them, inasmuch as he taught that darkness exposed to light is no longer dark, that is, darkness ceases to exist. So far, then, that Buddha taught men how to remove Man from the Phenomenal by thinking, he may well have preached a higher gospel than that of the artist. The psycho-analyst, however, who analyzes away the higher life in order that the lower may remain all the more emphatically conscious, cannot be said to have the same title to superiority.

A psycho-analysis baring the roots of the instincts is doubtless always an operation which cuts deep; such an operation appears in principle to be justified in the psychic field as in the somatic only when it is really necessary and when the patient is sure to endure it. It is just for this reason, if for no other, that psycho-analysis should never be pushed to greater depths, nor carried on for a longer time, than is inevitable for the re-establishment of the former equilibrium or for the establishment of a new. An operation of the cæcum often means the saving of a man's life; but then one does not cut out the whole intestine, and the abdomen is most certainly not ploughed up for years. This, then, takes me back

to the physician's art. Only he is able to help who himself intuitively and from the beginning feels the new synthesis and disposes his questions, suggestions, and propositions in such a way as to make them bring about the intended synthesis through reaction. *And this, again, can be achieved only by him for whom the creation of the new personality—that is, the spiritual unity beyond and above all the elements, a unity whose mere existence would destroy the ailment—constitutes a conscious goal.* He who fails to exhibit initiative in this field, but only induces consciousness according to Freud's theory, helps no one who would not recover just as well without his help as a physician; for what creates or maintains the ailment is precisely the will unto this ailment, the clinging to the disturbed equilibrium. Nor does any physician really put the theory into immediate practice. By his interpretations he, too, who deems himself purely passive, unconsciously regulates the process, since it is in the end himself who invents his interpretations. Still, many psycho-analysts contend to this day that they suggest nothing whatever to the patients. In doing so they are simply uttering a falsehood, because to refrain from suggestions in the given situation is technically impossible. This is proved by the fact that there is no inducing of consciousness except through implicit interpretations, and that no interpretation can ever be deemed the only possible one, *even from the patient's angle*; the question, therefore, is always one of a selective process. A physician's value is thus entirely dependent on how he induces and carries out this process. His business is to detect which of the infinitely numerous directions toward which the soul directs itself are the essential ones; which images and spontaneous ideas relat-

ing to the past and the future are *significant*. And it follows, furthermore, that it is intuition, however unconscious, which imparts the direction to the queries and interpretations throughout the process; for there is no physician who does not desire success and, therefore, meets (at least theoretically) the above requirement. But he who fails to recognize the right thing, or to know how to express it in such a way as to make it operate as a reactive, can help only accidentally—in the sense of the foregoing considerations of this subject—to the extent that he suggests or surprises *at all* and that the mobilized unconscious accomplishes the requisite processes by itself. It may be that with a physician who aims merely at re-establishing a former psycho-physical state of balance an intelligent following of the unconscious will (which, however, in its turn presupposes intuition, since to understand is to create!) frequently suffices, since the patient, after all, desires his recovery and thus knows, in principle, of what he stands in need, and since all he needs is a helping hand. But where the spiritual and psychic growth is concerned, this certainly never suffices. Here the only help available is what I call the “magic formula”—that my conception has, precisely at this point, met with the second energetic resistance on the part of psycho-analysts I regard, again, as proof of my having laid my finger upon the real sore.

According to the law of correlation of meaning and expression, nothing short of the exactly corresponding expression can bring a new meaning into existence. Even with the right diagnosis, the decisive rôle of which is doubted by none, the question is the same. The same, however, obtains to a much higher degree still in those

cases in which a new meaning is to be made conscious—and to that extent efficient—in another man. I have often called attention to the enormous importance of the appropriate word in the matter of suggestion: the unconscious follows the lead of the conscious with such precision that the slightest mistake of expression entails the gravest consequences. But in “solutions” or “releases” the question is of exactly the same thing. Only he who acts intuitively, indicating for the particular case what should be said in order to call forth in the other’s unconscious a reorganization in the sense of what is aimed at finds the words which release. The psycho-analyst who fails to acknowledge this simply shirks his responsibility. And this is exactly as grave a matter with the psycho-analyst as with the physician who cures by suggestion, because every word acts suggestively if it is accepted at all. Therefore, among other things, the following is true of psycho-analysis: he who, with dogmatic assumptions, would search in the soul of another man for what is not there, or what signifies little or nothing, *creates* its reality. Within a sense-connexion one thing always mirrors the others; therefore, every interpretation is, in principle, possible, and the acceptance of every emphasis necessarily makes a reality of it, at least for a time. That an interpretation appears obvious does not by any means prove its correctness: no interpretation whatever *can* ever be entirely wrong. To that extent many an analyst has actually played the part of Circe. Thus the resistance against psycho-analysis means in numerous cases the resistance against the beast which lurks in the physician; a beast into which he would transform his patient also. The concept of resistance is altogether a peculiar matter: however appropriate it be,

if adequately understood—it is, again and again, employed in such a way as to make the physician appear in the right under all conditions; when a person is unable to acknowledge so-called analytic truths, he is said to resist psycho-analysis; the same holds good when a patient is incapable of conforming to definite suggestions of the physician. Might it not be that the physician pursues a wrong line which the patient must decline to follow from a sense of self-preservation?

THIS brings us *in medias res* for the consideration of the chief danger embodied in psycho-analytic treatment. A synthesis is transferred uniquely by way of suggestion, the concept of which is determined in the chapter, "The Way of Creative Understanding." Inasmuch as the physician, whatever his own assertions, always aims at a synthesis, he necessarily transfers to a lesser or greater degree the particular synthesis determining his own mind along with that which he desires to create in the patient; this is primarily due to the act of transference in the technical sense and to the attitude of surrender every patient naturally adopts when seeing his doctor. Now if the physician's personal influence is unpropitious, or if he misplaces the emphasis in the patient, he evidently *must* induce in him a malformation.

If the patient proves strong enough to get over the physician's influence, this is indeed a result to be welcomed; but it does not mean that the problem undergoes a change, nor is the psycho-analyst relieved of his responsibility. Here, then, the general proposition can be defended *that every psycho-analyst must necessarily work pernicious effects who in his world-conception lays the main stress on the instinctive* and aims at emphasiz-

ing it also in the patient's consciousness. Undoubtedly the instinctive plays the chief rôle not only in the case of all serious ailments, but also in its quality as the root of all higher life; but the latter is not coextensive with the former. It must, conversely, in order to function adequately and in unison, remain where nature has placed its external means of expression—that is, below the conscious and in the recesses of the soul. All civilized nations of all times have regarded the inversion of this relation as a sign of shamelessness and sin. To the extent, then, that the psycho-analyst's influence induces this inversion he becomes downright injurious to the commonwealth.

Now if the psycho-analyst is dangerous—does it follow that he should be shunned? And should one, as some advise, resort to self-analysis, whenever analysis is deemed imperative? It is precisely this which should be avoided, for three principal reasons. The first is well known: the one thing that makes for the Good is ingenuousness, avoidance of stressing the ailment accelerates the healing process. He who, then, puts himself in the position to himself which the psycho-analysts take in their relation to their patients, closely observing his every instinctive movement and every word, delivers himself up to one of the extremest forms of hypochondria. The danger resulting therefrom, however, is greater than any temporary advantage, because even self-analysis becomes a habit almost as easily as the use of morphine. The second reason corresponds to the danger involved in shifting the emphasis in the conscious to the instinctive. He who continually scrutinizes in himself what his spiritual and psychic life signifies from the angle of his instinctive life, of necessity shifts his normal plane

of consciousness to the nether world; and I have as yet seen no man in whom this technique, if adhered to for a sufficiently long time, failed to induce superficiality. The third and most important of the reasons which are adverse to self-analysis, however, is connected with the object of analysis, the establishment of a new synthesis. For the latter is a real process of creation. And such a process presupposes, in the nature of things, two agents. It is true that normal growth takes place without refecundation. But where there is a question of accelerating that growth or, what is more, a change of dimensions, the law of polarity takes effect. There undoubtedly is such a thing as a cosmos of mankind, the individual is essentially not isolated; it is for this reason only that inner isolation induces almost necessarily neurosis, and that this ailment can be healed by merely stimulating the patient's social consciousness. Therefore, every process of creation presupposes stimulation. Accordingly, all deeper systems of self-perfection deem spiritual guides an absolute necessity, and the Catholic Church justly interprets the connexion between the leader and the led as a relationship in the sense of parentage. He who meditates by himself progresses also only in exact proportion to his inner acknowledgment of something higher above or within him with which he connects himself by appropriate means—for the I-and-Thou relation does not only obtain *ad extra*, but also *ad intra*, between the various strata of possible consciousness. Polarization is in this connexion absolutely inevitable. Viewed from this vantage, self-analysis means exactly the same thing as masturbation, which, though not necessarily noxious, is certainly not procreative of new life, since it remains within the sphere of the isolated

ego. With synthesis, too, which arises from an intelligent co-operation of psycho-analyzer and psycho-analyzed, the process is literally the begetting of a child.

No, there is no question as to the indispensability of analysts as masters of definite techniques; and we ought not to refrain from resorting to their help in case of need. The saying, "physician, cure thyself," arises from a fundamental misconception. *But what should be unconditionally demanded of the psycho-analyst, unless he wishes to confine himself strictly to technical operations in the abdominal region*, as it were (which he, in truth, cannot, since there are no isolated organs in the soul) is that he *should personally be above analysis*, and thus furnish in his person the guaranty for the innocuousness of his proficiency. From the standpoint of morality, it must be absolutely impossible for a psycho-analyst to commit errors like those of the confessor who, with Liguori's moral theology to direct him, spoils the penitents' souls by his questionings. From the standpoint of knowledge, it should be impossible for the psycho-analyst to acknowledge only the instinctive as a reality and to degrade thereby those who confide in his powers. The psycho-analyst must be the first to acknowledge that there is no such thing as the psycho-analyst influencing without the help of suggestion, and that he thus bears not less but more responsibility than the confessor because his adjustment is fraught with still greater dangers. This, however, means that: *the present-day type of psycho-analyst must disappear and merge entirely into that type of spiritual guide which mankind has known for thousands of years, and whose fundamental properties all churches have determined throughout as long a period.* What has led me, by way of a result, to so radi-

cal a demand? This demand of mine is unfortunately most urgent, because in these days an extremely large number of people harbour the illusion that the psycho-analyst is the spiritual guide *quâ* analyst, and they even go the length of believing that the Saviour-type is having its contemporary revival in his person. This illusion represents one of the greatest and most pernicious misconceptions of all times. He who has followed my arguments with attention needs only to meditate upon the following brief propositions in order to understand fully the connexion. According to what has been said, a new synthesis can be brought about only by a man who intuitively sees the whole before the parts, who orders the individual on the lines of universality—that is, who is personally *above* analysis. Does this apply to the modern psycho-analyst?—Further: every synthesis of personality is a spiritual connexion. Now can a man possibly create a new synthesis out of his own resources for whom there is no Beyond to the analyzable material, since every spiritual guide necessarily transfers his own belief? Finally: can a man who in life sees and acknowledges as real the instinctive only clear the path for a synthesis whose living centre would be situated in the spiritual? This is impossible, even for no other than technical reasons. The process of integration of the soul which the psycho-analyst is capable of inducing can indeed make for health; it may also broaden the analyzed personality, inasmuch as it reinstates the instinctive within the conscious relations where it had been repressed. But he can, less than all other men, guide beyond the normal consciousness toward depth; this, however, is the only goal that self-perfection aims at. The psycho-analyst as understood in our own time is essentially *not* a spiritual

guide. He is even a downright seducer, whenever he pretends to be more than a nerve doctor. There is no other alternative, therefore, I reiterate the point, than that he should die out as a type. What should survive of the modern psycho-analyst is only the technician pure and simple. Ere long a final state of things should be reached in which only the spiritual guide who has a special calling for such leadership and who employs Freud's instrument in no other sense than the conscientious surgeon uses his scalpel, will be deemed entitled to practise psycho-analysis.

ALL that has been said naturally leaves untouched the immense importance of the enlargement of knowledge we owe to Freud and his successors. But I need not dwell upon this fact any longer, as I have already done so frequently. What mattered to me in this connexion was only the practical question in connexion with the objects the realization of which the School of Wisdom strives after. But in order that no misunderstanding should remain I must, to conclude, take up a purely theoretic consideration bearing on principles; I must with the greatest precision possible outline the range within which psycho-analysis is competent and at the same time conscribe its boundaries. I must, in doing so, naturally take for granted, without going into further explanations, the acquaintance with the basic thoughts contained in my principal works.

The instinctive undoubtedly represents the root of the whole of human life; in the instincts the primary forces are at work. Where the roots of life have become morbid, the instincts appear imperilled most of all; where this root is repressed in the conscious, the lat-

ter fails to dispose of its main forces. On the other hand, the treatment of the roots also offers the best chances for radical treatment of the morbidity infesting the stem and flower, and the induction of force into the root is imperative, wherever any kind of enhancement is the aim. It is for this reason only that the spirit of man can be healed by repose and better nourishment; for this reason only no instinctively weak man ever attained to religious experience. For this reason only and so far, all earthly creation is connected with the earthly Eros. But the root of life is not the whole of life; cosmically considered, it is only its point of insertion into the plane of physico-planetary reality, to which it does *not* essentially belong. Therefore, it means a misunderstanding in principle to seek for the general meaning of life in the instincts or to believe that a solution of problems regarding the instinctive is at the same time a solution of problems of the life of the Spirit and the Soul. It is true that all higher (or lower) problems are also contained in the instinctive; therefore, a reduction of all problems to problems of the instinctive is *seemingly* possible; for which reason the endeavour to induce the solution of higher problems by disentangling the impulses proves, again and again, actually successful. But this state of things should not be interpreted in the sense that all life problems are "nothing but" problems of the instincts, but in the sense that these are in a relation of correspondence to the other and higher ones. In the sense-connection of life all things are mirrored in all the others; it is, therefore, impossible *not* to find the answer ready to any one question on *all* planes of life and in *all* directions, and in correspondence to the levels of the particular case. This relation of correspondence expresses itself

in the normal process of time as the evolution of one thing from the other; what was merely instinctive in the germ in childhood is transformed into the higher with growth. It expresses itself in a particular case of upward evolution in what psycho-analysts call sublimation. But this does not mean that things are such that the higher stages are really the products of the lower, and that, accordingly, these represent the actual reality; the true relation is that the law of correspondence provides for ever newer and higher spiritual powers the possibility of their embodiment in the material of the earth. This is evidenced by the one consideration—which also throws into the sharpest relief the danger of psycho-analysts as spiritual guides—that the analyst as such acknowledges no values and cannot acknowledge them. As a matter of fact, the sense-connexion of individual life has its centre not in the individual instinctive structure, but in the centre of the spiritual cosmos which for the majority is best defined by the concept of God. It is here that all judgments of value have their *raison d'être*; this is the only reason why there are such things as guilt, repentance, higher and lower dignities. Spiritual man feels no contentment when his mere impulses are disentangled for him, no more than he feels such, if his body alone is in order: what he needs is his right adjustment within the sense-connexion representing a reality higher than the individual—the reason, also, why uncharitableness belongs already to the pathologic cases and why the lack of social feeling as such leads to neurosis—his life must not only *be* meaning, but *have* a meaning. Being in tune with the deepest meaning of the cosmos is the only state productive of perfect self-realization. Only as a realizer of values can man feel himself at all to be a fulfiller of

significance. From this, then, follows the conclusion which is decisive from the angle of our present considerations: he who mistakes the instinctive for the essential literally mistakes the excentric for the centre; for the earthly root of life is external in respect to life's true significance. It seems to me that this fundamental knowledge reveals the entire problem of psycho-analysis in its right proportions. However surely psycho-analysis succeeds (its literature proves it beyond the shadow of a doubt) in disclosing the instinctive correspondence of all that is spiritual; however necessary it may be to heal the repressions and entanglements of the impulses in order to release our forces for the higher life—for on earth it is in the impulses that all force resides—not one non-analytic problem can be solved on the basis of psycho-analysis or from the analytic point of view. Actually, psycho-analysis can be useful only in the exact proportion of its correct adjustment to the spiritual cosmos. This decisive truth has been ignored, as far as I can see, by all psycho-analysts down to the present day. This is most primitively expressed in the writings of the Freudians, for whom God is "nothing but" the Father or even the phallus (this one example may suffice for all the others corresponding to it), or in the educational projects of such as assert that self-analysis is the same as a catharsis in the religious sense, or that integration in the sense of Jung creates in and by it the perfectly interiorized and inward man. As psycho-analysis deals exclusively with the instincts, it proceeds in a direction diametrically opposed to that of religious salvation. *The latter strives after the entering of non-earthly contents into the earthbound.* It would realize values the reality of which psycho-analysis does not and cannot take into

account. What many call metaphysically profound in Jung's writings is the generic as opposed to the individual. And indeed, it is at times a relief to return to the "Earthly Mothers" as understood in this sense. Nor need psycho-analysis take values into account, as long as it does not desire to be other than what it actually represents. But in point of fact it is developing more and more into a world philosophy that would embrace all things. This is the reason why it has to be combatted from the viewpoint of the spirit with the utmost energy, until it moderates its claims. The study of August Vetter's *Kritik des Gefühls* (*Critique of Feeling*, edit. Niels Kampmann, Heidelberg) furnishes the best means for showing how completely psycho-analytical prejudice is able to prejudice even the mind of a philosopher of natural gifts. For this author, religion and metaphysics are expressions of a spirit which should be overcome, because they are said to be rooted in over-tensions; he rejects for the same reason the Christian, the Hindoo, and the baroque attitudes of the mind. The only attitude he accepts as valid is the classic Greek, because it signifies for him the highest degree of realized equilibrium. In Vetter's opinion the consciousness of guilt is altogether imaginary, and it should be removed by self-analysis. All this is expounded by him with undeniable psychologic ability and praiseworthy logic. I cannot give here his whole doctrine. But its *meaning* is revealed, according to what has been said, with such clarity by the following paragraph (page 303) that I would not withhold the quotation from my readers:

In order to bring about the radical abolishment of auricular confession and its equivalents, what is needed is that the soul

of man should be sincerely willing to be delivered from its conflicts. For, at this stage, it necessarily gains the knowledge that all sufferings it is heir to are rooted in itself only, and that it can be delivered by itself only. If, then, the religious moralist, exactly like the neurotic patient, fails to gain this consciousness of himself and this purely psychological outlook, he proves thereby that, deep down in his instincts he by no means desires to be rid of the tormenting conflicts, the feeling of guilt and of sin which he displays to make himself interesting. This, then, is the case with the Christian, as also with all philosophers of impersonal ethics. They need the contrast of tensions in order to experience the feeling of personal value. For this reason they seek for, or create for themselves, a selfless ideal or an idol alien from their personalities against whom they can rise in opposition. The pious man thus stands in masochistic self-abasement before his God—and in turn as a saint, in sadistic overweening pride of himself before the sinner. The lingering after-effects of this interrelation of tensions can be felt in the relation between the physician and the patient, who both suffer from the same moral conflict, with the sole difference that the former expresses it as it were in masculine terms, and the latter in feminine ones. For both, however, suffering is stressed as a satisfactory state. They, therefore, play with it. A religion consists in this ambivalence, and so do unpsychologic morals.

What is the reader's opinion? In the world's literature I know of hardly anything more crookedly reasoned and which gives a more superficial result. What all this implies is the negation of *all* values except the one value of happiness. But as Vetter is an intelligent person, and as his book contains many a shrewd observation, his failure is all the more significant: it is the inevitable outcome of the assumption that psycho-analysis can furnish the ground for the solution of any deeper problem, a

prejudice which in turn appears possible only by reason of a complete misunderstanding of the reality of the spirit and the soul. Vetter admits explicitly that for him there is no such thing as an unsensual reality. This means that he knows nothing of the sense-*bestowing* reality. It means that he is in the literal sense *terre à terre*. The same holds good, more or less consciously, of all psycho-analysts whose cases I have observed closely: they are positivists to a man. For them all, whatever they assert, the natural is the only reality. They none of them know anything of spiritual realities and values. And this also holds good of them to the extent that they feel drawn to the psycho-analytic world-conception; for it is a characteristic of its mechanistic character that there should be nothing really new or creative in life. From this point of view, then, the claim of the psycho-analysts that they give life a new sense appears not only senseless, but simply grotesque. All they assert as to the shortcomings of our times is true: that our era has repressed the impulses, that it is necessary to re-establish its relationship to life, and even that this means a task of exactly the same importance as the spiritualization by Christianity after the, analytically speaking, normal classic paganism. But it does not *signify* what they assert. Psycho-analytic knowledge can bear fruit only when, starting from the super-analytic knowledge, which balances *all* the dimensions of spiritual reality, it is rightly adjusted in the general scheme.

Meanwhile, however, every practice which is rooted in the fundamental misunderstanding of the psycho-analysts should be combated without stint. He who undertakes to "liberate" others on the plea that all the

higher aspirations mean only travesties of the instinctive, re-evolves man by his influence back to the animal. He who would take away from man his feeling of guilt on the plea that it is "nothing but" the symbol of unsolved tensions by which he desires to give himself airs in his own estimate, sins against his spiritual vital core. The tensions in question which, it is true, have as such purely psychological reasons are in turn the means of expression of the conflicts between the Ego of experience and the subjective higher strata of spiritual life. He who would equalize all tensions is thereby at variance with the possibility of progress. In this connexion Vetter should be answered that indeed no superior man ever desired to be rid of his inner conflict in *his* sense. He who, fully aware of all the deceit and falsehood which governs our human relations, levels all spiritual intermediate termini and distances so that what remains is only the intercourse "as between man and man," does not in truth, leave only man, but destroys what is specifically human; what is left over is the intercourse between beast and beast. For what else does it signify when a man stresses in the words of another only what they mean psycho-analytically—that is, within the instinctive? Every higher reality is spirit-born; if, then, what appears artificial from the point of view of the instinctive is reduced, spirit is driven from the world; for it realizes itself only through subjects and by way of the subjective. Moreover, objective truths have in principle nothing in common with their emotional roots. True humanity often begins precisely where the psycho-analyst places the beginning of the artificial. This, then, explains the fundamental imperfection of those who proceed from the world-conception here outlined: their deficiency in re-

finement of feeling and in tact attains a degree unequalled as yet in human history. It *means* something, and something extremely vicious at that, when Freudians call the object of every desire precisely the "sexual object," however much they may at times be objectively right. It *means* something, when naturally sadistic natures become psycho-analysts. It *means* something, and at that, a barbaric state of the soul, such as would hardly be met with in any negro, when circles influenced by psycho-analysis cannot understand why one should not proceed by way of analysis even in personal intercourse, that is, by referring every utterance of one's interlocutor to its impulsive root, by respecting no privacy, no reserved rights. Tact does not mean a concession to the other's weakness, but the objectively-correct attitude toward the vital core of his soul. This core lies deeper than all that can be analyzed; what is accessible to psycho-analysis is everywhere only the means of expression of the real man. The real man, however, is something extremely delicate and sensitive; it is unique, essentially secretive and private. For his sake all the various methods which maintain distances customary in social intercourse of all well-bred circles are absolutely indispensable; for his sake it is *not* irrelevant how a truth is uttered and how much one reveals of it. The conviction of so many Germans that they may say all they can substantiate is a direct proof of spiritual barbarity, even as it is a sign of a correspondingly low standard when in actions for insult the question as to veracity is raised. He to whom, in this sense, the "thing" means more than the living man, is in his own person not yet consciously man. I cannot, for lack of space, go into further details on this subject. I would

advise him for whom the matter has not become obvious through these brief arguments to study the booklet *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft* by Hellmuth Plessner (Bonn, Friedrich Cohen, 1924), from page 72 on, where he will find expositions of a remarkable clarity as to the extent to which an "irrealization" of human relations is absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of the soul. And let him furthermore call to mind all that profound minds have preached from time immemorial: that a *reverential* attitude towards the personal secret of one's fellow-being is the only one reasonable. Any truthfulness or frankness or outspokenness injuring that secret is truly a proof that the trespasser is ignorant of the metaphysical living core of man. Whoever feels always "obliged" to inform another how he stands with him thereby proves his inferiority of soul. Also, one need but look at the portraits of the majority of psychoanalysts, which so often are reminiscent of the chimeras of Gothic cathedrals, to recognize what kind of persons they are. This, then, leads me to the final result of all that is to be said for and against psycho-analysis. Complete ingenuousness alone benefits; all the higher and creative impulses well up from the undisturbed unconscious. Today psycho-analysis is necessary for many Westerners, because, their instincts being repressed, they cannot be really ingenuous and because, besides, the task imposed on the period is to build a loftier structure of the soul of man by introducing into the conscious much of what was hitherto unconscious. But the resort to psycho-analysis can by no means be recommended as a permanency; it should in every particular case be a cure of the shortest possible duration, and a cure to be forgotten at the earliest possible date. Psycho-analysis

is a surgical instrument to be used with great care. Only he may use it at all who feels the utmost responsibility. As to the knowledge to be revealed by psycho-analysis, they should as soon as possible become *matters of course*, as a basis for life demanding no further attention. I have recommended the study of the theory and practice of psycho-analysis for no other reason than for the quickening of the process in question. We must in our day come to a thoroughly clear understanding of psycho-analysis in order that our children should be saved the trouble, and that psychically deformed people requiring its use should shortly become extinct. In this respect, too, we should feel pioneers. As is the case with all pioneer work, not a few will, in this field as in others, come to harm for the benefit of later generations. Still, no one dealing with psycho-analysis is in danger of his life if he keeps in mind the following proposition by way of a guiding motif: psycho-analysis cannot bestow on the world a new meaning—it must, rather, adjust itself correctly within the spiritual cosmos: namely, from the human angle as a doctrine of the nether world; from the angle of the cosmos as the doctrine of *that* part of life which is essentially spiritual that creates its connexion with our passing planet.

Spiritual Parenthood

COUNT EDWARD KEYSERLING, the poet, once ridiculed the customary manner of historiographers by quoting the following alleged passage from an imaginary standard work: "In the month of December, 1748, Schiller's parents met for the first time. Nine months later—Goethe was born." The irony here was justified; the relationships into which this world's events are typically arranged by scholastic wisdom are not much truer to reality. Historians almost invariably commit at least the error of attributing what interests *them*, personally, as the paramount motif of world events. How many things, for example, in Germany are referred to "Romanticism"! If what were meant by romanticism were the fundamental disposition of the German, the phrase might be partly correct. But what is meant by it is precisely and exclusively the poetic school of that name, which created this appellation, or for which it was framed. Now the fact is that the works of these poets have been read by only a small number of persons, and that only a few of the creative minds and men of action of the following period were actually inspired by these poets or their legitimate spiritual offspring. Besides, creators, creative minds included, rarely possess what is called "intellectual interests"; they certainly have them to a lesser degree than the men of letters, without ideas of their own, the æsthetes, critics included, and the savants. They *are*, in their persons,

something definite, and this they live. Even where such persons are well read, those particular books from which, according to the critics, they were supposed to have drawn their inspiration, hardly ever were the ones that most influenced them. The most recent case in point is Spengler's, who is altogether unacquainted with Bergson's works, on which he is said to be most particularly dependent; nor did Nietzsche mean anything to me during my early evolution. As a matter of fact, creative minds are organized quite differently from those persons whose profession is subsequently to write about them; while it is but natural that the latter should do so in accordance with the requirements of their own type.

And as it is with the individual creators, so it is with the evolution of humanity at large. Its causal sequence, as appraised by the measures of historians and archivists, is quite irrational. Every direct line of inheritance is finite also in the spiritual domain, so that the actual relationship of humanity within time remains incomprehensible precisely on account of those assumptions which often enable the historian to describe it adequately. But when this connexion is a matter of immediate following or discipleship, that relationship where the opposite was to be expected reaches its climax, because even the second generation is, as a rule, completely destitute of originality and, therefore, of influencing power; for originality means nothing else than the possession of personal vitality; what lacks vitality cannot influence life for good. As to the cumulative knowledge and collective proficiency upon which the learned class lay the main emphasis, they offer no more than a means for life. If, at times, certain things "must"

be known, this means no more than that under definite conditions a definite minimum capital must be available for a man to rise or even to avoid a setback. Novelty in the objective sense is required only to the extent that such capital is expected to bear interest and to increase in order to preserve its significance in the relationship of forces; true originality never depends on novelty.¹

Yet here, too, youth always begins from the egg, from the beginning. Itself chooses in each case what it desires to retain of the knowledge it has acquired; in each case it gives it a particular meaning which the older generation almost invariably feels inclined to stigmatize as a falsification of history. Never indeed has information about the past become the foundation of life for those who amounted to anything in the spiritual field. And it has happened, again and again, that traditional knowledge has been lost altogether without the least detriment to life, in particular to spiritual life. On the contrary: in critical periods spiritual progress was rendered possible only by the pulling down of such structures as were incapable of repair and renovation, a truth which invariably becomes obvious later on. Nay, the concept of a history of culture, as discovered by the learned class, when applied to the past few centuries is not altogether false, and the reason of this exception is that in these periods the learned class actually were the rulers; it was the age of progress in the intellectualistic and mechanistic sense.

But this age, as shown in *The World in the Making*, is now a thing of the past. Its end, moreover, came as suddenly as a natural catastrophe, owing to the World War

¹ Compare the development of this trend of thought in the chapter, "Our Will," of *Creative Understanding*.

and its consequences; and this again has led to an exaggerated expression of the law of historical counterpoint.¹ Those who count as intellectual and spiritual leaders today, namely the creative minds and the young (the historic facts remain the same, whether these determinants are acknowledged or not), are all of them frankly averse to scholasticism. Thus the standards of the age of the learned class have lost even their relative validity. This will become manifest soon by means of the pragmatic test throughout the world. There are still a considerable number of persons who deem intellectual work the highest and hope for everlasting fame on the strength of achievements in this line. But the younger generation of them will personally live to see how all the facts they have learned, as never before in history, will be valued only as material for such as are able to infuse life into the dead matter. This stuff will, of course, retain its value as material. It will soon even be deemed absurd to maintain the false when the true is at hand or within reach. Every true idea will be accepted as a matter of course by every man and passed on by him like good money. But such as collect and select, investigate and ponder, will only be valued as preparatory workers. And those who are at the apex of their age will, once out of school, indulge in learned work no more than we nowadays pride ourselves on syllogistic technicalities by means of which Socrates astounded the Athenians as much as the first motor car astounded the peasants. Independent spiritual values will henceforth, consciously and understandingly, be conceded to those only to whom history has always accorded lasting value;

¹ Compare the chapter, "The Symbolism of History," of *Creative Understanding*.

that is, to those minds that are personally alive, the only objective exponent of whom is their strictly personal style. Such scholarly men as possess an individual style in addition to their respective merits as masters of research, of knowledge and proficiency, continue indeed to live: otherwise we should no longer be reading Kant and Hegel and others in the original, although the objective truths contained in their works have become household words. Artificial immortality, however, has certainly had its day. What I mean by artificial is that immortality which exists, thanks to memory and the mutual consideration among men of letters, apart from living essence.

IN THE chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," of my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*¹ I have dealt at length with the observations that serve as an introduction to the foregoing conclusions, with special regard to the particular problems of the essential vitality of the spirit, the irrelevancy of the scholar, the ultimate decisive significance of personal style, and chiefly of what I call the magician, the creative spirit of the masculine type. What I am about to say here is a continuation of what has been expounded there. I was unable to work it into the book mentioned before, because in the spiritual domain reasons of style are the decisive factors for meaning and value of the subject-matter; here the slightest deviation from the main theme is likely to shift the emphasis; nay, even a train of thought more than necessary can imperil the life of the whole, as a tumor or hyper-

¹ I recommend once again, until an English edition is at hand, the French translation of this book, which is as good as it could possibly be (*Figures Symboliques*, Paris, 1928, Librairie Stock).

trophy does in the physio-organic sphere. But, on the other hand, what has been said above should, for the same reasons of style, be read by such as have not done so, but who desire to understand the meaning of the present chapter. I can, in this place, only briefly recapitulate, suggest, and seldom more than imply. This, then, is what I would point out: the history of culture as presented by scholars is non-existent. What actually exists is an organic process of growth which does not consist in *cumulative* knowledge—the ultimate for the learned class—but in *assimilated* knowledge; that is, in the becoming obvious of what had formerly been problematic. Mere information, then, gets disposed of by every process of genuine understanding. It is digested, transformed into organic form, and the greater the perfection of the process, the more will the conscious of today descend to the unconscious regions—hence the so-called deficient memory, the constant complaint of all creative minds. Thus, what had been explicit recedes continually in the course of progress into the region of the implicit (which may, in so far, appear, without seeming incongruous, as an increasing lack of erudition), just as acts originally performed with an effort of will become automatic through practice and thus clear the way for new problems. In this sense, to mention only two historical instances, paganism and Judaism have vanished. There are no pagans left except those of romantic yearning or bizarre retrogression; and such Jews as have not become unconsciously Christians have no longer as Jews¹ any importance for future developments. For

¹ Once for all I refer the reader to the profoundest and most searching treatment of the Jew problem which has yet appeared: Oscar A. H. Schmitz's essay, "*Der Jüdisch-christliche Komplex*," in the special num-

the problems which gave to their nation that vast importance to humanity are problems no more. Neither are there any longer pagans of the type of the Baal idolaters; nor can the Jewish concept of Law signify any longer a religious ultimate terminus for any except those whose minds and souls are undeveloped. The merging into implicitness of what had originally been explicit problems may even create the impression of downright apostasy, if superficially judged. Thus, many believe that the modern Turks have renounced Islam, and the unbelieving Christians of today to be de-Christianized. Religiously speaking, this may indeed be the case; for what the individual means personally is here what decides. Historically and psychologically speaking, however, this is never so. The modern Turks have been fashioned by Islam as we Westerners have been by Christianity. Thus the Turks are physiologically Mohammedans, as we are physiologically Christians, whether we are individually believers or not. Every deeper research of the unconscious conducted after Jung's methods furnishes proof for this in case after case. In principle, the progress coming to pass in this manner might, one should think, in a steady process, evolve ever higher syntheses; for all assimilated memories of the past continue to live as an integral part of what is actually alive. As a matter of fact, there occur syntheses of an increasing wealth of content wherever evolution is not interrupted by any factor which breaks the continuity. But, unfortunately, such breaks happen in the

ber for 1926 of the periodical *Der Jude* (Jüdischer Verlag, Berlin, Dorotheenstr. 35). I should likewise call attention to the other articles of that number and to those of the preceding year; they all provide the most exhaustive and fair-minded exposition of the Jewish and Christian relationship that I know of.

spiritual field as often as in the bodily sphere, according to a law of which we are but poorly cognizant. First, the recession into a state of latency of definite genes (hereditary traits) can go so far as to make what had been real disappear entirely in the phenomenal world; to this class belongs, roughly speaking, the transformation of species throughout the geological epochs and that dark problem of mutation. For what takes place in that process is not only a gain, but also a definite loss. Also in the spiritual field—that of decisive freedom—there is the possibility of a failure to experience personally the obvious substance of experience. Therefore, I regard human stupidity and obtuseness as the prime cause for our not having reached Doomsday long since: if the nations were aware of the logical consequences of events as acutely as are some specially gifted individuals, the logically possible would be realized speedily enough. But as it is, things remain, again and again, in the same state in spite of all revolutions, because what seemed to be disposed of for good still continues to prove the ultimately stronger power. Furthermore, there is, thanks to freedom, the possibility of renouncing spiritual inheritances. Thus the German Protestant actually represents, in contradistinction to the English, a *homo novus* compared with the Catholic; in him the inheritance of antiquity and the Middle Ages is no longer alive, wherefore it is not to be wondered at that he delves ever deeper into his pre-Christian past for his psychological roots. Finally, again and again, in the spiritual domain as well, there die away without offspring, those possessors of inherited values for whom there is no substitute. But in spite of all this, behind every individual stands his entire spiritual as well as

physical inheritance. If we Westerners compute our history by receding no farther back than to the Greeks and Jews, we are like those people who know nothing whatever of their forebears beyond their grandfathers.

This process of organic growth takes place in the spiritual and psychic as it does in the somatic sphere in the functioning of the interaction of masculine and feminine powers. As a concrete embodiment, the creative spirit of the masculine type is the Magician, the prototype of whom is represented by Jesus, the spermatogenic spirit working transformations and determining new processes; the creative spirit of the feminine type, however, is represented by the artist putting forth the shapes he conceives into the phenomenal world. The difference in question is made particularly clear when we throw a rapid glance at the prototype of the maternal spirit, Goethe's. Goethe was to an extreme degree a child-bearer, as distinguished from the begetter. He not only put forth mature images, mature thoughts, mature works into the phenomenal, wrought to a degree of perfection leaving no room for latent potential evolution, but he even made of his personal life a work of art. Certainly not in the artistic manner, *ab extra ad intra*, but from the depths of an ultimate subjective ripeness of his mentality. Therefore, Goethe will remain till the end of time the prototype of the mother and educator.¹ This is the reason why he is instinctively quoted by everyone, as no other man. But I have yet to meet the man in whom Goethe engendered independent spiritual developments: Goethe's complete influence can but form

¹ In this connexion one should read the essay, "Inspiration and Erziehung," written on the basis of my American experiences, in the fifteenth part of my *Weg zur Vollendung*.

men's souls and minds in the manner of a mother's example and instruction. Goethe's is essentially the articulated spirit, just like—and as remote from the world in the making as—classic Hellenism. In contrast to him, the *transforming* agent is the spermatic spirit which was no doubt also in Goethe's composition, yet, relatively speaking, to an inconsiderable degree. Goethe's volumes, whose numbers keep swelling, are not evidence to the contrary, but rather proofs for what has here been averred: they never contain anything of a prospective character, like St. Paul's, St. Augustine's, and Luther's books on Jesus; they all have the retrospective, or otherwise unrealizing, character pertaining to idealism, the modern German form of apotheosis, the psychologic meaning of which was at all times escape from the sphere of reality. Proof and not counter-evidence of what is here averred is also furnished by the fact that nowadays all moderns, whether their names be Klages or Steiner or Spengler or others, invoke Goethe. They either amplify Goethe's ideas as epigoni, or else they read into Goethe's works what they never contained, for the sake of inner security, as the pious invokes the will of God for all his doings. If these alleged continuators were really Goethe's legitimate children, their relation to him would hardly be conscious to them, and the majority would protest against that appellation. For it is of the essence of the sperm that it should die away in the act of fecundation.

This much on the subject of the difference between father and mother spirits in general. But we have still other things to deal with together with the problem of this chapter. In the matter of the higher evolution of individuals and of humanity the question is, from the

spiritual point of view, of the *paternal* spirit exclusively; for it alone contains the principle of initiative and acceleration, thanks to which the new can spring from what had been. It goes without saying that everyone should educate himself as much as he personally can. Everyone should, as a matter of course—I would not pass this over, either—also attain as many facts as he needs for keeping abreast of his time or within the field of his special profession. Therefore, nothing could be more absurd, from the point of view of what we are here urging, than to oppose the demand that all should be educated to the utmost. For the paramount achievement of the age of progress consists precisely in the fact that a vast number of those things which were formerly considered as a personal or charismatic life-task have proved susceptible of mechanization; and what is at all susceptible of mechanization should, as a matter of course, be mechanized: ¹ only the machine can make of the modern equivalent of the antique slave the modern equivalent of the antique freeman, and all that can be learnt of facts also belongs to the machine world. But this kind of progress, even in the most favorable cases, never brings about more than a new and (in the sense of world-potency) higher *basis* for stating the real problem of life put before every new man in a novel form in everlasting novelty. From this point of view the true significance of the problem of progress has been entirely misconceived by the past centuries. If, then, modern humanity desires to advance beyond the stage reached thus far, thanks to in-born spiritual inheritance and unconscious self-education conducted on the lines of true progress, it must con-

¹ Compare the development of this trend of thought in the New York chapter of my *Travel Diary*.

sciously reconvert itself away from the principle of discipleship and back to that of *spiritual parenthood and childhood*. All the earlier great periods consciously laid the stress on the latter. In the only institution which implicitly preserves the ancient wisdom to this day, the Catholic Church, the concept of the spiritual father and also that of the spiritual mother still continue to live. But it has been lost everywhere else. It is only the School of Wisdom which resumed it consciously and exclusively, because it was the first to understand that at this turning-point of the times what is needed is a true rebirth of humanity, the reason why only a genuine *Μετανοεῖν*, a radical change of mind, can make for the salvation of men. Thus, however necessary the training and education of the mind may be, the problem there involved never posits itself as the ultimate. Nor can it be posited in the sense of that education which is brought about by the example of the maternal spirit. What a spirit is *per se* depends exclusively on the character of its being—that is, on the one hand, on its spiritual descent, and, on the other, on what he succeeded in shaping personally out of the material of his personal spirit. In this case there is absolutely no question of discipleship and education, but only and exclusively of birth and rebirth. Therefore, the problem here is exclusively of spiritual parenthood, as distinguished from discipleship; second, it is spiritual parenthood as related to the Logos, the father principle.

WE HAVE thus consolidated as well as established the correct starting-point for the considerations of this chapter. We can, therefore, forthwith formulate the question a trifle differently, and this

will lead us to far clearer perspectives. Let us give due reverence to all maternal spirits! But it is not they who in the progress of the individual and of humanity really represent the counter-pole to the Lógos Spermatikós; they rather belong with other agents, to the counter-pole of general tradition. Now the latter is situated on the plane of what we do not call spirit, but soul, the plane of what is embodied, of what has come to pass spontaneously and can be renewed only through the fecundation by the Logos. All that is initiative is situated beyond its nature. This relationship has its exemplary symbol in the canonic relation of the Church to the *Creator Spiritus*. The Church is the mother; only he who grows up within its fold participates in spiritual inheritance. Grace beyond this stage, however, can be vouchsafed by God Himself alone. In exactly the same sense the university in its heyday was able to be the *alma mater*; and in the same sense every prevailing tradition also represents the mother whom it is always detrimental not to acknowledge. Just as the German Protestant is organically poorer than the German Catholic, since he disavows the ancient Christian inheritance, so the apostate of any tradition whatever robs himself thereby. In this sense parents of the intelligentsia who do not allow their children to participate in the Christian tradition, or who uproot them in any way, take a fearful responsibility upon themselves; the personal belief of a man will in any case be a matter of his personal decision when the time for it has come. But as none knows the deepest personality of another, he is not entitled to deprive him of his historic foundations, no matter what his personal views of them may be. What has long since happened in the bodily sphere—

that it is fated that the proletarian must die out—holds also in the spiritual realm. Only he who confesses adherence to the past lives in the future. Thus every new culture has recruited itself from the present stock, but never from the proletarianized inhabitants of towns. Only the man who continues tradition *in a new manner and yet in relation to the old*, as the genuine innovator always does; only he in whom a process of mutation becomes conscious—does not destroy himself by disavowing the roots of his being transmitted to him by immediate inheritance. For the fact is that the belonging to a particular Church or the accepted continuance of a tradition is in the first place a collective-psychologic fact. It is in this creation of links with the inheritance of mankind—to mention the most important point first—that is rooted the decisive significance of an exclusive nursery training as against all manner of later education.

As every mother is descended on her side from a father, it is of course impossible to draw an absolute line between the paternal and maternal inheritances, a fact which furnishes the valid basis of principle for the traditional doctrine that there is no salvation outside the Church. But with that kind of spiritual parenthood with which we have exclusively to deal here, the question is only of a personal descent from a masculine spiritual principle or of fecundation by the same. We have thus reached the critical point of our investigation. The deepest and ultimate end in man with which he is able to identify himself personally is *something absolutely unique*; this thesis has, in this volume, been thrown into relief and substantiated so often that I can refrain from going into further details now. As the unique, the deepest and ultimate side of man, belongs

to another plane of being than any conceivable collective entity. Now within all reality which is known to us only like influences like. The consequence is, in principle—and experience shows it to be a fact as well—that the only thing which can reach the personally unique in man is what is itself personally unique, a fact which leads us from a new approach to the recognition, in "*Jesus der Magier*," that absolutely no other spirits than *personal* ones exist, and that, if anything essential is to be gained by their influence, the only relation to them which avails is the personal, which corresponds exactly with what the Church demands for the relation to Christ.

But this recognition is now enriched by a very important qualification: namely, that the only relation which leads to the personal is the relation to such as have a fecundating effect on one's *own* soul. Now this is evidently partly due to the strictly personal compatibility between fecundator and conceiver. Here objectively valid laws going beyond mere typicalness are as much out of the question as in the case of personal sympathies between two individuals. This last consideration should have clearly proved the nature of the relation between the paternal and maternal principles as far as self-perfection is concerned. We said that all that maternal spirits can do is to educate. We can now add: this is so because what matters is that one should be fecundated *personally*, and this is brought about by the husband and not by the mother.

This, then, leads us to the extremest paradox of spiritual life which itself is so paradoxical to the understanding. In the beginning we dealt with the problem of spiritual descent as though it squared with that of

physical descent. It is indeed so to the extent that we are representatives of tradition, which is the psychic equivalent of physical heredity. But as far as we would rise above what we originally were we create within ourselves what had not been actually there. If, according to the results obtained in "Death and Life Eternal," Man the unique belongs on the one hand to a trans-subjective connexion so far as his personal Ego is not his personally ultimate terminus in the upward or backward sense, the same is true of the forward direction. We said at the time, in complete accordance with Buddha's Anatta-theory, that on the phenomenal plane it is *not* the same man who is born and reborn. In exactly the same sense the deepest self within him which every striving man lives for is, empirically speaking, not himself, *but his child*. Man, as the bearer of his strivings, is actually his own mother. The father, however, is in every particular case Lógos Spermatikós, which fecundates. It can, in principle, live inside as well as outside of man. But in the problem dealt with in the present chapter what is of direct moment is only the latter relationship. Thus the result is, as already outlined, a perfect analogy to the process of love. Only the man who is personally congenial can benefit one's inmost being. For this reason, in India, the disciple chooses his Guru, not *vice versa*. In the same sense help is to be had in all cases which demand more than technical skill only at the hands of the physician of one's own choosing, with whom the relation of what is called transference establishes itself spontaneously. For the same reason it is not sufficient that a man should think that the religion by means of which he hopes to achieve his salvation is true; he must believe in it *personally*. Hence,

finally, the indispensability of a personal relation to any spirit who is to fecundate. This holds true even in the case of the briefest abandonment to such influences, which is, again, a matter of personal decision for everyone.

For in the domain of freedom success presupposes our personal co-operation. The "spontaneity" of the creative act occurs only when we make ourselves personally receptive to the fecundating influence. Thus everyone is ultimately responsible for his inward development; he is responsible for the child he creates in his inmost being. He should abandon himself to the influence of the right kind only. Also, the discovery of the right kind is always a matter of personal achievement in the sense that what is required is the adequate and timely understanding of the message conveyed by the innermost echo and the arriving at the appropriate decisions by one's own initiative.

The problem is even more complex: there is no objective canon for what can benefit one. True, there are such things as the absolutely valuable and absolute values. But of all the wondrous ways of God, those which lead to salvation are the most so. A man may eventually be advanced by abandoning himself to the influence of a spirit which seems absurd to others. This is, first, due to the fact that the concrete image which the spiritual father stands for in a man's own mind is always a *symbol* of his own self striving for perfection; in the world of meaning there is no absolute discrimination between the Ego and the Thou; to that extent men always mean something deeper than that to which they can give a name. Second, it is also due to the fact that the character of names and forms depends always on empiric accidents. Just as the personal experience of God comes to

every man within the scope of his innate ideas, just so the actually existing connexions in the unconscious are the decisive factors for the eventual choice of the shortest way to the goal aimed at. Hence the curious fact that a word which may be of little significance in itself can, when it is spoken at a definite moment, achieve really miraculous results, and that valueless books have sometimes had a more stimulating effect than good ones (I personally have derived a marked benefit from detective stories), and that many a man actually needs the circuitous way through his own wickedness. But these accidents and passages through the bad help only him who primarily means them to be the road to deeper significance. In principle they indubitably represent a detour which I mention here only because it cannot be avoided by a great number of men. I had, thus, for the sake of obtaining access to my inmost self, to undertake the voyage; around the world also, I have, again and again, felt driven to abandon myself to the influence of spirits whom I ultimately did not accept. Thus I was *bound* to follow many a path which I knew beforehand to be devious for the sake of making any headway.

But circuitous ways advance him only who is driven to follow them by personal courage and not by indulging his inclinations. Sloth is everywhere the one and only mortal sin. It is precisely this last and repeatedly stated proposition which can be understood better than before from the vantage point we have now reached. Only what is similar can affect its like. Logos is pure initiative, pure ethos; therefore, it seeks to bless him only who is animated by a corresponding ethos. But the fact is that the ethos in question here is not the same in kind, but one of polar correspondence—that of feminine sur-

render. For this surrender, too, is essentially ethos and not pathos; otherwise there would be no essential difference between voluntary surrender and violence.

This, then, brings me to that point which most people still misunderstand in the technique of the School of Wisdom, although it has always been adopted wherever the formation of man's essential nature was the goal. The spiritual self cannot be fecundated and enhanced unless the rays of the light contemplated are totally reflected—in the language of optics—before reaching the depths. The term reflection is the truest; with reflection, as applied to the intellectual domain, the question is, exactly as in the case of physical light, of a projection of rays upon the world of representation; what has once been projected upon it never proceeds to the depth of man, and can, thus, never bring about effects within him. He who, then, would influence the innermost man *must* necessarily take such measures to prevent a detrimental adjustment even in a merely external sense. Of all the external measures, the most reliable and effective is the suppression or the renouncement of discussion. No sooner does a man begin to argue about what he has heard than involuntarily he slides a disk of reflection before his soul, which, it is true, enables him to see what he has been receiving in a manner most favorable to the intellectual assimilation of the hypotheses, but which, on the other hand, deprives him of the benefit of being able to proceed to new and deeper assumptions. Adjustment to discursive thought is pernicious even where the question is not of essence, but of mere facts to be understood. The understanding, too, is rooted in the living spirit. He who fails to feed his intellectual life from that source and

remains persistently on the plane of ready-made ideas, never finds his way down to his deepest being. It is precisely he who never gains the knowledge of what he himself ultimately intends; for this is not a function of the understanding, but of being. And the same ultimately holds good of what another man says to one. He need not be listened to, after all. But if one listens at all, one should from the very outset adjust oneself in such a manner as not only to understand what the other man says or means in his superliminal conscious, *but also the living meaning behind his utterances.*

The one thing that really matters is always this. With this adjustment the other's essence is allowed to penetrate into one's own without hindrance; it thus has a fecundating effect. Where the question is of knowledge, the result is not alien, but *personal* ideas; where a man abandons himself to the influence of another's essence (oh, the misunderstanding of *Imitatio Christi!*) the outcome is not assimilation in him, but personal rebirth. Thus it is precisely pure receptiveness which, in contradistinction to current opinion, is the very shortest way to originality. Let no one be afraid lest he should lose himself by this self-surrender. A man who surrenders himself naturally appears influenced for a while. But sooner or later what has been received by him is transformed into his original and personal property, or sets his personal in motion, an effect never produced when one's thoughts are primarily bent on argument, for the simple reason that one's personal was, then, never involved at all. For the question with this personal is not of something pre-existent, but of something to be created, of one's own spiritual child. *2'

This, then, is the crux of the technical side of the

problem. The reflectively adjusted not only impedes the penetration of the alien into his soul, but also the welling forth of his personal. The intervening disk or lens—to revert to the optical image—stands in the way in both the outward and the inward direction. What I am explaining here holds good of every kind of inner growth. This has always been known in the pursuance of religious goals. But it holds good no less of the pursuit of every world-ward and world-abiding goal, once the increase or enhancement of one's personal being and not a better information about external facts is the ultimate aim. Precisely this underlies the unlimited importance of knowing how to wait and to be silent. With ideas, concepts, and the like what is in question are real organic formations of the kind of physical organs. They must grow up—a process requiring time—in the first place, and, second, the constant tension towards those values to the apprehension of which they are destined to minister. It is precisely this tension which is brought about by non-utterance. And what holds good in one's own person holds good also with respect to others. The fact that all knowledge goes back to Socrates as the ultimate founder is due to the fact that he was the first man who had the courage to acknowledge his ignorance, wherever he was not sure of having completely understood: it is from this inner decision of his that sprang, in the course of time, that entire rich organism of our Occidental concepts.

THE fact and reason why discipleship in the sense of learning—as usually understood—is quite non-existent, if man's personal advance is the aim, should be clear by now. Only the vital spirit of others can advance

a man's inner vitality. Now vital spirit is always personal. Its only objective exponent is its personal style; there is no other. He who makes an object of the originally personal spirit literally destroys it. Only for this reason does the study of the original works of great minds help one onward—the study of the history of metaphysics and the comparing one's "objective" ideas with those of other metaphysicians is mere loss of time for anybody who is at all capable of metaphysical insight. His real object should be to become greater than he was, personally, to reach down into his own depth, to radiate it outward by means of his specific endowments—he cannot strive reasonably for anything else. Precisely because it is only the personal which counts in the matter of spirit, all the really great spiritual impulses known to history go back to the spoken word: its magic power, when infused into the minds of however small a number of disciples, has invariably brought about a more vital and far-reaching effect than any written document, however perfect its accordance with the law of correlation of meaning and expression. For such writings are always open to misunderstandings; they are defenceless against them. But when a man's personal magnetism and radiating power are sufficiently genuine and potent, it works according to its inmost meaning, even through the misunderstandings of the superliminal conscious. Of all documents ever written, those alone possess an indestructible vital force, whose expression has magic power, and, even then, only when read by congenial spirits. In this case the original meaning experienced an original rebirth. For man is, precisely as a spirit, ultimately a personal unique entity, and there is nothing in the realm of objectivity and universal validities the ultimate signifi-

cance of which was not rooted in the personal, sense-bestowing and unique subject.

It is this subjective which alone counts in the last resort. This subjective uniqueness alone is the *true man*. As a man experiences himself personally, as he moulds things and strives in reference to what is unique within him, just that he is and becomes. The problems of the Essential refer to him exclusively. This, then, is ultimately due to the fact that *only* the unique is possessed of metaphysical reality. All the rest belongs to the sphere of the empiric becoming and passing away. The generic and the general are no less relative and perishable than are all phenomena; for the same reason all learning is perishable, and ultimately inessential, too. But with the realization of his uniqueness there is thrown open in man a realm of reality which makes of him a participant in the imperishable and absolutely real. This absolutely real is what gives a meaning to man's ethical, metaphysical and religious strivings. For this striving has its *raison d'être* in the fact that absolute values become the measure for all relativities—a truly paradoxical situation, were it not for man's having his true home within that very Absolute. We thus arrive in the end at the knowledge that man must take his own person a great deal more seriously than he usually does if he would achieve progress. He must take himself in every respect as seriously as Christianity demands in view of the immortality of the soul. For man *is* this immortal soul, here and now. He is that soul in all things he does. Still, its existential dimension does not lie in static being, but in perpetual becoming; in becoming as illustrated by music. For that reason the being of the soul manifests itself only in constant new births out of constant striv-

ings. For that reason the appeal to take one's own person seriously involves at the same time the absolute disowning of all manner of vanity. Only he who is ready at every moment to lose his soul, that is, to renounce the whole of what he was or is; only he who never contends with others for what he is, but only with himself for what he can become in time—this man only is on the way to progress.

ONE question to be answered in connexion with the theme of this chapter—the question as to why the unique needs others at all. The answer is most readily found by referring to a singular inconsequence on the part of Buddha. This sage was, epistemologically speaking, the first pluralist; for him every unique individual was ultimately a solitary being in the phenomenal sphere. He was supposed to attain to all things out of his own resources. *On the other hand, however, he should be able to attain the insight into the right way only in the case and to the extent that he had been fecundated by the Buddha's message towards its conception.* We are thus in presence of the extremest example of the law of correspondence, and we have at the same time come to the extremest boundary of possible comprehension of things spiritual. We established above that the spiritual process of history is not different from the organic process; that is, that it occurs by means of the function of the co-operation of the masculine and feminine principles. But here Spirit, as the Lógos Spermatikós, is the masculine principle, whereas his feminine counter-pole, the conceiving, moulding and child-bearing soul, does not belong to the same plane of existence. The whole process of history is ultimately an

empiric phenomenon, in spite of the fact that it is ever renewed, fecundated, and accelerated by the metaphysical. This obtains of all history of the spirit, that of the religious spirit included. For all forms are terrestrial throughout.

Now the exact insight into the reality of spiritual parenthood and childhood leads us to the recognition of the fact that the metaphysical, too, the essential dimension of which, from the human point of view, is uniqueness, must in turn belong organically to a broader connexion. And this is really true of the spiritual plane. Formally speaking, it is no doubt the soul which receives fecundation; for in this terrestrial sphere the metaphysical expresses itself always in terms of the psycho-physical. But the "meaning" of the urge unto fecundation lies beyond that empiric realm. It is precisely that ultimate metaphysical urge in man which—to employ the extremest example—yearns for its God.

How is this to be understood?—There is no possibility of complete understanding; for that connexion lies entirely outside of the sphere of the Ego in which all possible explanations have their centre of relations. But to what is understandable at all we possess the key in the last considerations included in the chapter, "Death and Life Eternal." From the point of view of nature man's ultimate terminus is his uniqueness. *Beyond* this uniqueness, however, he belongs to an all the vaster whole; beyond the ultimate solitariness true unity begins. It is there that begins what Christianity calls the Fatherhood of God, what the Hindoo sages interpret as the identity of Brahman and Atman. That means that as a unique being, man belongs to a transsubjective connexion which, in turn, possesses the two dimensions of melody

and harmony, where, again, every separate existence receives its full meaning from something higher. Here the personal spirit appears in its turn as a function of other spirits. Here again events occur as function of the co-operation of the masculine and the feminine. Here the cosmic becoming and passing away passes through the unique, as melody passes through the tones. Here, again, what prevails are birth, death, and rebirth—only in a new sense. This is the key to what so many seers have proclaimed as a certainty, namely that the unique can be merged into God without forfeiting its personal existence. The earthly correspondence of this supramundane phenomenon is the phenomenon of spiritual parenthood and childhood.

Love and Understanding

WORDS and concepts are the bodies of meaning, as physical bodies incarnate souls. They live in so far as they are understood, and their practical significance depends on *how* they are understood. These are incontrovertible facts in spite of the existence of Primary Words—the invention of which precedes all theory—and eternally valid concepts. It is true that whoever meditates deeply on meaning, sooner or later finds in them his ultimate terminus. All deeper meaning has its abode beyond the realm of personal choice; and definite phenomena of the intellectual order—not only in the sense of concepts, but even in that of definite connexions of sounds and letters—exist in original accord with it. Herein lies the *mysterium magnum* of language. But the super-personal meaning must, after all, be understood within the phenomenal embodiment originally in accord with it, and such understanding always means a purely personal act. Furthermore, experience shows that man outsteps his personal limits only as an exception. For this reason even what we call the primary words and eternally valid concepts are differently understood by every individual; and as the contemporaries of an epoch resemble one another psychologically, the consequence is a pre-established meaning for all concepts in definite epochs; everyone begins by thinking in tune with the tendency of the *Zeitgeist* and only excep-

tionally breaks loose from its suggestions. The further consequence is that words and concepts also have, within the frame of history, an organic fate. As every man lives personally on the basis and within the framework of a state belonging to the collective unconscious, he is from the outset incapable of experiencing, by means of the same concepts and words, the same things which earlier or other periods had experienced. Thanks to a new interpretation, their early meaning may at times be restored to ideas grown antiquated in appearance—herein lies the immense and almost paramount importance of the creator of language, the poet in the original sense, the *vates*, as Emerson called him; but a new interpretation means an act of creation of which only the rare elect are capable. This means that the eternally True has from time to time to be restated in a new way. The traditional expression inevitably in the long run falsifies it to the point of making it cease to be true.

I have pointed out this state of things repeatedly with regard to two German concepts: that of "idealism" and that of "duty." Idealism was, for Fichte, the authentication of the mind's sovereignty as against the world. Today it generally means one of two things, both utterly at variance with what Fichte intended: either accordance with ideals of the past, especially those of the "German Idealism" of the classic period, the spirit of which has passed completely from the temporal into the eternal, and can no more return than can the spirit of Athens of the Periclean days. Or else it means the policy of shirking the acknowledgment of unwelcome truths. One dubs oneself an idealist in order not to see reality as it is, nor is one afraid of thereby manifesting one's incompetence; on the contrary, one does so for the

sake of exalting oneself in one's own eye and in the opinion of others.—The same holds good of the concept of duty. Kant's idea of a categorical imperative, taken at its true value by worthy minds, has in times past founded the greatness of Germany. Since then the misunderstanding of its conception as being identical with that of a merely external sense of duty has ruined that country; for a sense of duty without a corresponding personal consciousness of responsibility means the worst form of superficiality.—But the very same applies in principle to the concept of *love* which has become, owing to Christianity, the paramount law.

IT IS one of the most interesting of all historic phenomena that love could ever be exalted to the rank of supreme value as it was in its Christian conception. The East of the Hindoo and Chinese from time immemorial was familiar with the full and true value of love. But it never attributed to it the supreme value as *against* all others; nor, above all, did it ever countenance that sad misconception which attributes value to the emotion of love as such. For according to the real nature of the majority of men, this misconception amounts to an apotheosis of a definite form of egoism, if not in regard to oneself, all the more in regard to others. The particular Christian interpretation—not as it was originally and ultimately intended, but all the more as it was universally understood—can indeed be traced back to purely historic-psychologic causes. The world of antiquity had been haughty and uncharitable as no other of equal culture we know of. The same cold- and hard-heartedness which manifests itself today as exploitation, rule by capital and imperialism and, per-

haps most strikingly (indeed so strikingly that I regard the fact as one of the great examples of all ages) in the inhuman treatment of Germany from Versailles to Geneva, found its expression in antiquity in the general conception of life of all freemen and rulers. This heartlessness is obviously due to a specifically Western natural disposition. It thus meant something unheard of when, within the precincts of the Roman Empire and even among Roman citizens, it was taught that to love meant something higher than anything on earth; this gospel could not but radiate a unique power of attraction. Not only all the oppressed, nay, chiefly the thinking and feeling among the oppressors, were inevitably convinced in the long run; for according to a fundamental law of psychology, the cruel turn their rage against themselves most of all. This essentially compensatory significance of the reception of the Christian idea of love explains, furthermore, why it never really came to rule, and why the Christianized ruling classes never, at any rate never lastingly, felt scruples at disregarding in their everyday dealings the Christian ideal: this complex of the soul simply had to be sublimated in a manner bearable to man's nature as a whole. For this reason precisely the individually cruel and, as a class, military men, were from the outset the most sincerely convinced Christians. And, again, in times of the worst forms of capitalistic exploitation it was just the captains of industry who were particularly "good Christians"—which applies on a big scale to the exploiting race *par excellence*, the colonizing Anglo-Saxons. Under these circumstances it is far from astonishing that the colored races reproach the Christians precisely with lack of love and that they feel superior to the white precisely in this

respect. This, of course, implies no judgment as to the value of Christian love. But it is certainly true that the shifting of the emphasis on just that kind of love which corresponds to the current idea, and which has been so historically successful, is a mere psychologic phenomenon without any inherent value. Times which were ignorant of love as the "one thing needful," men who personally felt no love nor inwardly accepted it as a standard have again and again showed the same love as that of the best of Christians, and even a more worthy kind. There is no doubt that Marcus Aurelius, owing to the absence in him of the spirit of resentment, ranked high above the majority of contemporary Christians. And in recent times Nietzsche, the proclaimed enemy of Christianity, was a purer and more loving soul than could be said of the overwhelming majority of his opponents. Nietzsche's *purity* is the true cause of the hatred which he elicited in the beginning; but apart from it the truth of his argument, dimly felt by all, that in the first instance the victory of Christianity in a very great number of individual cases, and historically possibly everywhere, has meant the victory of a lower moral standard over the higher. What is sublime in itself may be understood in a degraded sense at any time. There is no doubt whatever that what knit together most of the early Christians—outside the circle of the primary community—was analogous to the essentially resentment-born solidarity of the proletariat who actually practise the virtue of love to a considerable degree within their own class, while manifesting all too readily, in their treatment of the others, a heartlessness surpassing even that of the ruling classes of antiquity—take the Russia of the peasants and labourers as an example. As for the early Christianity of the

privileged classes—it typically resembled, as a phenomenon, the Rousseau cult of the French nobility of the eighteenth century: it expressed the will unto death of an expiring period.

The sublime message of Jesus was thus, on a large scale, understood chiefly in the light of an existing spirit of resentment, social ambition, and will unto death. Similarly, the power of attraction wielded in India by Buddhism and Islam was chiefly due to the fact that the converts were *ipso facto* delivered from the caste system and became the brothers of all their co-religionists with whom they shared equal rights. Accordingly, when Christianity had become the ruling power and when a new beauty emerged from ugliness, the true intention of Jesus manifested itself with a corresponding increase of clarity. But what is most significant is that the conception of love which had determined its historical victory henceforth receded into the background. The Middle Ages set absolutely no value upon the greatest happiness of the greatest number. To the Middle Ages, love meant by no means universal earthly happiness. Nor did they ultimately aim at the empiric welfare of the individual. It is only in modern times that love is again understood in a manner resembling that of the beginning of our era, with the difference that Christian ideology is mostly discarded; this would seem to prove decisively what an unspiritual thing that love is as the majority mean it. Today love, as understood by the millions, means—I deliberately use an extreme term—the sense for the comfort of others and the acknowledgment of that sense as representing the supreme value.¹ Its

¹ In *America Set Free* my readers will find the proof that the ideal in question is a purely animal ideal.

concept sanctions sloth. When, once upon a time, one of my fellow workers was unable to finish an urgently necessary task at the appointed time, and when I brought pressure to bear on him, he was truly indignant and complained to every man in the street that he was meeting with too little love; by this utterance he thought he had got rid of the spiritual duty imposed on him. Thus nowadays the quality of loving-kindness is as a rule accorded to such as make others comfortable, while such as disturb the interests of others are charged with lack of love. Many leaders of the churches make use of this situation with exemplary shrewdness for their own benefit; they lay all stress on the static moment. They proclaim peace and happiness to be the supreme aims; he who puts any stumbling-block in his brother's way—and whoever disturbs sloth naturally does so—proves thereby, so they say, his un-Christian feelings. Now this conception has been so explicitly disavowed by Jesus Himself, that I need not adduce further proof for the fact that such love does not mean true love. Jesus was fully conscious of His bringing not peace, but the sword. He set the son against his father, the brother against his brother. He commanded His followers to abandon their wives and their children. He disavowed earthly happiness completely; rather, He hoped for salvation from its cessation. Therefore, the recognition of the term "love" standing for the supreme value implies no judgment whatever in regard to the intended meaning. But all depends exclusively on this meaning. This, again, was explicitly proclaimed by Jesus Himself when He laid all emphasis on good *will*.—These brief considerations should suffice to elucidate our argument regarding the fate of words to the extent that its sig-

nificance should appear obvious; and they should also have suggested to my readers the understanding of the fact that it may be wrong today to speak of love when one means Christ's love.

SETTING aside all further preliminaries, explanations, and substantiations, we proceed to the core of the problem. Goethe asserted that man can understand only what he loves; and Leonardo da Vinci held that love was the daughter of knowledge. For Plato, Eros was the father of philosophy. To the philosophical Fathers of the Anatolian Church, again, wisdom and love were ultimately one. All these comparisons have not only the drawback that counter-comparisons can be made with equal right; but, what is worse, there is the disadvantage that their statement is false: in love and wisdom we have to deal with definite qualities which, as such, are unique and not interchangeable. It is wrong to assert that a man loves another just because he understands him completely. It is just as false to credit a man with wisdom merely because he loves. The true state of things is rather that love at first makes blind. With love and with wisdom, we are dealing first and foremost, as pointed out above, with distinctly qualified empiric functions. This is an incontrovertible fact. He who feels no love *has* no love for the very lack of that feeling. He who fails to think "for himself," however to the point and true his utterances may be "in themselves," is no thinker. And whether a man is able to love or to think is a matter of personal dispositions, even as with other original abilities. Here neither will nor wisdom can alter the facts to any appreciable degree. Even as feelings cannot be commanded, neither

can emotions be created in spite of the most skilful attempts, if they had not been inherent in a man's nature. In the same sense no training can ever change a fool into a genius. If we now cast from this point of vantage a rapid backward glance on the historic introduction to this chapter, we clearly perceive why Antiquity and Christianity applied such different gauges to inferiority. For pagan man the weak and the ugly were the inferior types; hence the lack of generosity for all those whom fate and nature had disinherited. From the Christian point of view, however, the man who experiences no love is equally looked down upon. Since the victory of Christianity, therefore, everyone pretends love in some way and grows angry when his assertion is called into question. The Greek Fathers of the Church, Hellenes through their whole psychic inheritance and, accordingly, believers in an ideal of wisdom which was innate in them, identified supreme love and supreme wisdom. The *ecclesia militans* persecuted and burned men at the stake in the name of love. And today it is precisely the dry-as-dust intellectuals who make a point of quoting the words of St. Paul, according to which he who has no love is as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The fact is, no one within the Christian world *dares* not to love "officially." If he does dare, he exaggerates from inner weakness his opposition. This was Nietzsche's heel of Achilles, his weak point. Now it follows from the afore-said that the demands which bring about the feeling of inferiority in question are products of misunderstanding. No man can help his natural disposition. Whoever speaks of a "should" *here* is a false prophet. Many Christian teachers maintain, indeed, that love, given good will, awakes of necessity, thanks to the action of Divine

Grace. But here we have obviously to do with as impious a deceit as in the case of the pretence of the occultists, that every man by adequate training can evolve the organs of clairvoyance.

We have, in this case, confronted antithesis and thesis in strict obedience to method. What, then, of the synthesis? It is located on another plane, on which *neither* love *nor* understanding in the empiric sense can be maintained as ultimate termini. Let us proceed from what can be established by experience. The selfless man is superior to the self-seeking in a sense capable of experimental proof, inasmuch as higher powers of the human being work their influences through him and as such stand the pragmatic test. In the same sense, we know by experience that a man of perfect comprehension commits no ethical errors which have to be atoned for later, according to Guyau's formula: *Celui qui n'agit pas, comme il pense, pense imparfaitement*. It is quite possible, however, that the selfless is utterly unable to understand that he acts sensibly, and that a man whose acts are dictated by intelligence correctly lacks the emotion corresponding to his action. History has proved again and again that it is possible to live in the spirit of the most exalted love without the feeling of love. From this, I repeat, it does not by any means follow that love and understanding are the same; metaphysical subsidiary constructions of this kind may soothe one's conscience, but they are ultimately meaningless. What follows from this is something else, namely *that there is a real higher court within man which demands a definite behaviour. Both a man's understanding and feeling must conform and contribute to it. The development of this higher court and its rule are what ultimately decide the value.*

The question is not of "wisdom" and "love" in themselves.

What is the nature of this court? The shortest way to arrive at its definition is to meditate upon the universally accepted saying that it is more blessed to give than to receive. With natural man the urge unto self-preservation is supreme, and justly so; for if it were in the slightest degree less than it actually is, the human race—given the immense potency of the urge unto self-destruction and the unsatisfactory character of the greatest part of life—would have died away long before the Deluge. Now this urge unto self-preservation is not, as maintained by the psycho-analysts, confronted by the natural urge unto love in the sense of a polar opposition. It is true that this latter urge reaches out beyond man's personal boundaries; but the selfishness belonging to the naturally super-personal manifests itself all the more potently.¹ All natural love is entirely selfish. No one is more egotistic with regard to objects with whom she (or he) identifies herself than the selfless mother, the patriot ready to sacrifice himself, the passionate believer in ecclesiastic dogmas. If this kind of egoism is regarded as justified as against purely personal egoism, this is because Reason has shifted her ground, acting according to her conscience, given the Christian prejudices, since she feels herself to be in her right. And she actually is. The so-called altruism is justified in exactly the same sense and degree as personal egoism, but in no higher degree. He who denies this ignores what today can be regarded as scientifically proved, namely that there is such a thing as a natural urge unto self-

¹ This super-personal reality has been dealt with at large in my *Immortality*.

surrender to others, and that with social emotions we deal with primary natural ties which take precedence over all individual differentiations. Thus natural love as such never is an expression of a "beyond" to selfishness; least of all the mother's love which represents the supremest expression of the generic urge unto self-preservation—a fact which suffices, incidentally, to explain why Christian humanity has been by far the most self-seeking throughout the ages, and why the Orientals appreciate our love the least. Whenever man acts within a collective scheme, the prevailing morality acquits him of any kind of interestedness incompatible with high ideals; this is the reason why his desires assert themselves without any constraint whatever in this case. No individual, from reasons of his own conscience, ever lived out so many selfish urges within the scheme of his personal life, as almost every man does within the scheme of national welfare. The unparalleled Machiavelism, the unparalleled ruthlessness, not to mention the unscrupulousness of all highly organized churches where their interests are at stake, as well as the frequent meanness of the "pious" when they feel themselves backed by their churches or believe themselves to be acting for them, yield a particularly impressive illustration of the same truth. Indeed, the charges that can be brought against the Christians of our day are often the very same as those with which the early Christians upbraided the pagans. Genuine charity is rarer among those God-fearing men and women than anywhere else. The situation of the problem of love remains the same until the ethos of freedom builds itself into the natural impulses. The second chapter after the present will deal with the ethical problem explicitly; I, therefore, request the reader to seek

for further explanations there for what may seem insufficiently substantiated in what follows. I can, however, develop the idea in this connexion to the extent that no principles shall remain obscure.

What expresses itself in the ethos of freedom is the law peculiar to the spiritual part of man. This is the genuine, the complete, and fundamentally so very simple meaning of what early Christianity, with a considerable lack of precision, interpreted as the dramatic conflict between spirit and flesh, and of what Kant formulated as the intrinsic independence of the postulates of duty of inclination. Man is not essentially flesh, nor a bundle of worthless impulses which it is his duty to master somehow because of an external "should"; his deepest nature is spiritual indeed, for which reason his own will unto self-perfection, as well as the law of the Universe, demands that he should rise inwardly superior to his nature. This means, in this connexion, that man's will unto self-perfection and the law of the Universe demand that man's love should be transformed from an expression of dependence, of compulsion, into an expression of freedom. In regard to this point there are the most preposterous misconceptions. Many are proud of "acting under inner compulsion," of "being unable to act otherwise": they thereby fall short of acknowledging a state which lies below the level of the human only when their alleged "compulsion" is an inexact expression for decision out of a spirit of determinant and unconditionally accepted values. And this is hardly ever the case with such as brag of the "necessity" of their actions. On the contrary, they are almost invariably primitive to such a degree that freedom cannot mean for them anything other than arbitrariness of the

intellect; that part of their natures which is open to self-determination is as yet a mere accessory; they are not essentially self-determined; they are actually genuine only to the extent that their life proceeds by compulsion. But this unsatisfactory empiric fact has no bearing on the principle in question. Creativeness, which is the essence of life, is, in the psychic sphere, able to centre itself completely in the free human subject. The realization of values becomes possible in exact proportion to the degree of this kind of centredness; for only that which is performed by man as a *free agent* possesses metaphysical significance.

Thus love, too, has metaphysical value only where it is an expression of freedom. Man can love spontaneously out of inner freedom—not out of the loss of freedom—even as he can think spontaneously. He who has not as yet got so far naturally has a right to limit himself to the lower stages. But he is not as yet entitled to discuss the problem of freedom, nor, therefore, spiritual values in general. This would, then, it seems to me, make definitely clear what Jesus Christ meant by Love. He understood love *exclusively* as a form of freedom. Hence His radical impatience of the bondage of all emotional ties. On him, then, who has rooted his consciousness entirely in the domain of freedom, the commandments of Jesus no longer produce a paradoxical impression. For that essence within him in which his consciousness has taken its definite stand is in its nature not selfish, but selfless. It grows richer instead of poorer, by lavishing itself. Its essence is a pouring-out beyond all limits. Where it becomes definite, it thus naturally transfigures the lower stages in accordance with its own. Next, in this world of inter-correspondencies one sense-

connexion originally mirrors every other. What is called physical vitality is related to tangible life, which supports it, very much as spirit is related to nature: the more "generous" a man's blood is, the stronger will he become by the very act of expending his personal substance. In the realm of the earth-bound soul it is just this which gives to love its divine character: it is impossible to love truly and deeply without being freed thereby from the empiric personal. When, however, spirit grows predominant in man, spiritual law becomes the absolute ruler within him. This is the reason why spiritual consciousness has a vitalizing effect; why men governed by the spirit do not grow older, but younger, as they advance in years; this is the reason why such as are ruled by spirit only, and whose bodies have undergone a corresponding adaptation, can stand an excess of work and a lack of food and sleep which seems to contradict all laws of nature, not to mention miracles of greater import. But the conclusion here reached also makes clear to what extent empiric love can, after all, become spiritually significant: not as an end in itself, it is true, but as a means. Since one meaning mirrors itself in all the others, the law of correspondence makes possible the attunement of the lower stage to the higher corresponding to it, wherever the latter exists at all. Thus, natural love, deeply experienced, actually represents the one way unto spiritual rebirth open to the majority of men—a fact realized by the Hindoo from time immemorial. We said above that it is impossible to love truly and deeply without being freed thereby from the empirically personal. Thus, the emotion of love attunes the soul to what is needful in the profoundest sense. But, let it be repeated, empiric love is never more than a way unto the

goal. Nor is a life wholly devoted to expending its substance from out of super-empiric spirit grown conscious ever identical with love in the usual sense. Such a life is nothing else than itself. It is an expression of man's rootedness in his own and deepest self, of the essence of which it is to give and not to take.

BUT when a man gives, he would, on the phenomenal plane, necessarily give to some one. This, then, shows to what extent it is, nevertheless, a truth that the realm of spirit, conceived from the standpoint of Nature and her categories, can be defined in the most objective sense as the realm of love. There is, indeed, no antithesis between the Thou and the I in the sphere of spiritual life. There a man *actually* does unto himself what he does unto others, and *vice versa*. There the mystery of the identity of the personal and the super-personal is the primary phenomenon. This is necessarily so, irrespective of the truth of any philosophical theory, because when life consists exclusively in the radiation of a man's personal substance, all discussion of the peculiar quality of the radiating agent is theoretically senseless and signifies, practically, self-abrogation. Now, since the law of spiritual life is growth on the empiric plane, it follows from *this* that spiritually conscious man, wherever he deals at all with what belongs to the earth, wishes to be a helper to all other men. That is, he would succour them in spiritual growth.

But this is the only direction in which he would help others. The question as to empiric welfare cannot even arise for him. In this sphere the demands of the emotional soul are ruled out of court. As seen from this sphere, sloth is a mortal sin, and so is its furtherance;

and from this sphere only can earthly life be adequately appraised—adequately, that is, in the sense that the individual can experience it from his *personal* standpoint as the fulfilment of meaning. As the following chapter will show at length, all the abiding happiness attainable on earth presupposes man's renouncing, not his countenancing, the gratification of the urge to possess. Now what is true of the I is also true of every Thou. The natural altruist does not, as such, occupy a position above the egoist: the ruling urge in him is simply that unto self-surrender as against that unto self-preservation, meaning that the naturally-feminine determinants in him are stronger than the naturally-masculine. There never was a grosser misconception than the idea that life for others is, as such, better than life for one's self; if this were true, in the first place, woman would occupy a position absolutely superior to man's, and, second, the genus would be absolutely more valuable than the individual, according to which condition the whole process of individualization of man as against the animal, and the evolution of metaphysical consciousness from out of the collective unconscious would necessarily mean a decline. Just because this is emphatically not so, quantitative points of view are ruled out of court in the matter of love. Jesus Christ, when he commanded love, with a deliberate choice of words, reserved the first place to man's *neighbour*; even so the woman who yields herself up to one man only, that is to the personally beloved, is superior to the whore.

Nor will he who has personally reached the stage when to give is a greater blessing to him than to receive, continue to further other men's desire to receive, provided he understands his own true motives. Hence the stern-

ness, resembling that of the Bolshevik leaders, evinced by so many apostles of love at any kind of weakness. No man ever made fewer personal claims than Jesus Himself. And how great is the cruelty of the very gods and angels, provided the reports of such as claim to have had intercourse with such beings can be given credit! They indeed never obey the urge of what is commonly called love; their actions are restricted to what furthers the growth of man's soul. What, then, is the true nature of the commandment to love which every man instinctively acknowledges to be valid? We know what it is—but now only do we know it understandingly: the commandment in question aims nowise at love as commonly understood in the sense of a definite emotion, *but simply at that state in which selfishness is overcome by the spirit*. In one sense only is there truth in the assertion that the metaphysical-spiritual man manifests love in the empiric sense: he says yea to the other man without stint, and love is indeed, first and foremost, “yea-saying irrespective of value” (Blüher)—provided the proposition in question is understood as it is meant—that is, as the fact that the lover says yea to the uniqueness of the unique individual as an ultimate term. In so far justice can be no ultimate terminus from the point of view of love; for justice makes comparisons. To that extent love is more than justice; for the highest terminus of all belief is its uniqueness, so that he who makes comparisons at all passes by the deepest and ultimate termini. To that extent, no doubt, earthly love alone mirrors the inner attitude of the metaphysically spirit-conscious man. He says yea to the Unique in absolute affirmation. In his eye the unique human soul is the absolute value, the ultimate *point de mire* for all manner of comparisons

and statements as to facts. In that sense there is no doubt that he who wills the good at all must have an unconditionally positive attitude towards the unique individual. Conversely, that man must be looked upon as an unconditional enemy who maintains an impersonal attitude; nor does such a man ever involuntarily influence others or meet with spontaneous discipleship: he is the enemy *par excellence* because he reduces to relativity the only thing which is absolutely incapable of that reduction: uniqueness. In so far it certainly was, for practical purposes, the right thing till now to postulate love, the more so as love can never be commanded. But again, life lived from out of the Spirit of Love is not necessarily identical with empiric love.

LET us now forget all considerations which have to do with the Beyond. Let us rather re-establish the connexion with the psychologic wisdom already gained and endeavour to reach from it a complete understanding of the demands and commandments of the Spirit. We found it illogical to speak of love in the customary acceptance of the term, where other things are in question. Such love can indeed never be the object of a spiritual demand, since it is wholly independent of the spirit, being either a natural disposition or inexistent. Under these circumstances, what can, what should be demanded by the spirit? Provided we have succeeded in stating the case adequately, the only admissible demand is *that every man should raise the centre of his consciousness to the spiritual sphere where pure giving prevails and self-seeking ceases as a matter of course*. Now this demand is in accord with sense and also fundamentally susceptible of fulfilment. Man is ultimately

Spirit: *he* only attains complete self-realization in whom the Spirit has become self-conscious.

It is due solely to this fact that the ideals and demands corresponding to it have been general and obvious at all times. They must be, since every single man, as a spiritual being, seeks either consciously or unconsciously to disengage himself from his egoism. For it betters him personally. Everybody is inclined to think the man who is a slave to his nature inferior to him who has freed himself from his natural "I." And as a fact, every man can be expected to educate himself with the object of such liberation in view, since there is such a thing as freedom, and since it depends on man where he lays the stress in the connexion of his soul-life. The only thing independent of man as a free agent is the extent to which he attains freedom in this life. But he is not responsible for what is, ultimately, independent of him; nor do any of the greater religions thrust this responsibility on him; none demands of man the *achievement* of perfection. They all lay the main stress on good will and perseverance. Even as Master Eckhart puts it: "And if thou failest not in thy will, but only in thy capacity, verily thou hast done all before God." He who, then, has attained spirituality *at all*, has *ipso facto* rid himself of egoism as the ultimately decisive motive. His impulse unto self-preservation as such may appear unimpaired—nay even increased, with strong natures—since only earthly impulses make sense-realization possible on earth, and since the really spiritually conscious man is carried precisely by this consciousness beyond the error of disavowing the earthly on its own plane. *But this impulse is no longer the decisive factor.*

Still, as already pointed out, there is no need that

a man who thus practises love in the divine, the Christian sense—or in that of any higher religious system—and who is proved to be endowed with goodness of any kind, should also have become a real lover. Love, as the word is commonly understood, is bound up with a definite kind of emotion. The possession of it is due to a natural disposition, failing which it does not exist. It is true that what exists can be increased; and any increase of this natural disposition is always to be welcomed since the emotion of love certainly provides a particularly propitious bodily recipient for supernatural meaning. There is hardly a man living who is without that natural disposition. There may likewise be truth in the assertion of occultists that permeation by spirit creates a new connexion between the brain and the solar plexus, and that, on the other hand, this connexion transforms the empiric character so as to increase his capacity for love. But that process does not mean anything essential. Every great man was essentially solitary and self-sufficient. Not one of them was ever “a sociable man.” Because the love of every spiritually great man consisted in the desire to lift up another, the motif of his life was not intimacy, but distance; whereas love in the customary sense of the word values intimacy only. Therefore, the customary demand of love cannot be maintained from the spiritual standpoint. Nor has any religious philosopher really ever urged this demand. The basic virtues of Christian ethics, too, as they appeared at the time when men who understood created and determined them—in the remote past, no doubt—are truthfulness, beauty and goodness—goodness, not love.

What, then, is the consequence of what has been developed for modern practical purposes? It is precisely

the thesis with which we introduced this chapter: that what is eternally true requires a new formula or setting in our days if it is to preserve its validity; and that today a new way must be found if what is eternally worth striving after is to be attained. What Jesus Christ meant by love is no longer called love today. And what in our day is meant spontaneously by love is not the eternally valuable love. The choice of the words of Jesus was due to the fact that He was by natural disposition a man of intuition and feeling and not a thinker. For feelings, too, can serve as organs of understanding; they do so with every woman. If what He meant was adequately understood by his great successors—we have seen that the mass of the people misunderstood Him from the very outset—this was due to the fact that at that time the platonic idea of Eros was a universally accepted premise of all thought. It conceived Love as an objective creative power, and not, primarily, as an emotion; that is, it conceived it more in the sense of Ethos than of Pathos. In our day, however, with their changed conceptions, what had been originally meant in the metaphysical and spiritual sense is understood from the beginning in the flatly empiric sense. Today the command to love is generally understood in a twofold manner, because, owing to the psychic constitution of modern man, it cannot be otherwise: first, in the sense that one should provide for the comfort of the greatest possible number of people, that the masses are superior to the individual, and that qualitative differences are without importance; second, in the sense that the sloth of others is to be encouraged. Metaphysically, too, comfort is the modern shibboleth. This being so, there is little difficulty in understanding why the Christian nomenclature

has stood the severance from the Christian belief as well as it did: broadly speaking, it stands for nothing better today than an adequate expression of a democratic outlook.

LOVE thus means the exact reverse of what is necessary. The demand it implies contains no vitalizing motive. It points out to no one the way beyond his "I," and it confirms every man in his sloth. It proves to be everywhere a terrestrially conservative power. Now, theoretically, its original significance can be easily restored to the word. But this would not imply the least advance in the practical field. The vital significance of a word depends entirely on how it is instinctively understood. Precisely for this reason the profoundly Christian, that is, the—metaphysically—supremely *knowing* attitude of the mind had to be defined as foolishness before the world in the beginning of the Christian era; for the same reason the word *Wisdom* was tabooed for centuries among the Christians, for its recognized use would necessarily have strengthened or restored the pagan attitude. For words are more than letters as employed by the mathematicians. They are themselves substantial, they do not depend for their significance on how they are defined by the learned class. I thus think it impossible that the word Love should recover, for centuries to come, the quality of a vehicle and generator of a dynamic outlook. It can't be helped: Love does *signify* today love of one's fellow-creature in the social sense of the welfare of the greatest number; it *does signify* indulgence with regard to the sloth of the others; it *has*, by reason of modern developments, changed from a vitalizing and regenerating principle to the principle of co-

hesion and maintenance of the old attitude. It has accomplished its organic destiny, as sooner or later every genus does. All forms are finite and underlie the rhythm of birth, maturity, age, and death. Nor are spiritual forms, any more than bodily forms, once they have grown old, capable of rejuvenation from out of their own resources. This being so, how can the eternally true meaning of the *word* Love manifest itself anew as a vital power? *It can, to the extent that it is reborn in the spirit.*

This means today that it can when it is reborn out of the *understanding*. This, then, brings us back to the *Leitmotiv* of the School of Wisdom. In the chapter of the present volume devoted to the religious problem there will be shown more explicitly than heretofore to what extent understanding, measured from the psychological point of view, can achieve the same even as, in the beginning of our era, did faith. The context of the present chapter does not demand such extremes. What had to be pointed out here was only the fact that the reality underlying the Christian idea of love can be reborn only by understanding its true meaning, and that stress has to be laid on new empiric data even though the metaphysical aims remain unchanged. The Spirit of Love as such will not, this time, renew the world; for no quickening motive lives in its still living body. Nor can it, apart from this, achieve this regeneration again, because the new phase of humanity into which we have passed bears the masculine and not the feminine stamp, and because the spirit of pure giving, which is all that matters, must secure for itself a corresponding body of another kind if it would be effective on a large scale. Love, as it is now understood is, with inner justi-

fication, expected to lead to salvation only by partisans of the static and pathic world-conceptions.¹ These, too, must and should exist. We can even by now, without suggesting a misunderstanding, maintain that it is a good thing that there is so much of the static and pathic attitude in the modern world. How very much more satisfactory is the life of the majority of men today than it was in antiquity, owing to its existence! It is indubitably not *only* a misfortune that Christian love has congealed to cohesion: in the process a higher state of cohesion than ever ruled the race has obtained predominance. That is, the realization of what is ultimately imperative can now be approached from a higher basis. Nevertheless, Christian love no longer means a motive of *progress*. In our day progress can be induced only by a deeper understanding. Today the words of St. Augustine, *Ama, et fac quod vis* (Love and do as thou wilt) are things of the past. The word of our time is exclusively: grasp the meaning. It is true that the acceptance of the correct way of stating problems means as little for actual performance as the acceptance of the commandment to love. What is imperative under all circumstances is that the vital organism should be organized throughout from the vantage of deepest meaning understood. But today a reorganization of that description on progressive lines cannot be brought about except by sense-apprehension. He who wars against wisdom today invariably fights for the benefit of his personal sloth and, thus, against Christ's eternal spirit. For the eternal problems require a new statement at every new period.

¹ Compare for the latter concept the Spengler chapter of my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*.

The Problem of Happiness

THE majority of such problems as prove essentially insolvable have been stated incorrectly; an example of this type is the squaring, or quadrature, of the circle. But there are other problems whose meaning consists, conversely, in their very essential insolvability; the example of this type is the problem of happiness. What is the solution of this antithesis? An insolvable problem is wrongly stated at the outset if the possibility of its definite solution colors the wording of the statement. But the solution of the problem can also be intended to signify at the outset nothing more than the satisfactory ending of a restricted stage, implying no prejudice in regard to events which occur beyond its reach. In this case essential insolvability is not contrary to sense. This, then, holds good for all practical problems of life. As life is an uninterrupted process, any definite solution before death is an anomaly.

There is no such thing as the problem of happiness statable in the abstract. Happiness can never be defined otherwise than as a definite way of rendering satisfactory a definite condition of a definite individual. Still, Bentham's practical postulate to the effect that there should be the greatest happiness for the greatest number is still valid; it has only been given, in the traditional wording, a form susceptible of misconceptions. There are no such things as conditions of life more or less happy in themselves, but there are indeed conditions

of various degrees of propitiousness. For man's predicament as a natural being differs in no wise from that of the plants. Their growth is stunted in a poor soil, with lack of manure, of water, and of sunlight; they put forth no beautiful blossoms; only the inferior species among them thrive at all. Thus, marsh plants only are able to survive in a boggy soil. So, then, the "materialism" of the present-day masses is as justified as their demand for the highest possible degree of education for each and all. If up to a certain point, to be dealt with later, the privileged classes have always appeared also as the more noble-minded and capable as compared with the socially inferior strata, this fact is only a particular expression of the general biologic fact that the requirements of the superior classes of beings are of a higher grade as compared with those of the lower. To sum up the situation in the form of a paradox: the idea of an ideal democracy does not demand the abolition of all privileges, but, conversely, the privileging of each and all. External conditions indubitably play the more important part here, as compared with racial heredity. It is true that special qualities such as ability to govern, talents, initiative, are plainly conditional on heredity. But all that can be thought of regarding the perfection of the normal type of man depends, as achievement, by far the most part on the influence of surroundings, as proved beyond doubt—except for the legion of bastards peopling the upper strata under the cover of great names—by the higher level of existence attained by the people at large in countries like Scandinavia and the Anglo-Saxon commonwealths which have been democratized in the positive sense of the term. Also, every possibility is capable of evolution both in the negative and in the positive

sense. The finest hereditary qualities can lead to the worst results amidst unfavourable surroundings. Historical materialism is patently more in the right than any kind of abstract idealism. As there is no such thing as "man in the abstract,"¹ all concepts and demands based on this notion are devoid of import. Man's so-called bodily and spiritual parts are equally close to the principle of Life. The fundamental error of materialism consists merely in its attributing more significance to the lifeless in life than to the living—that is, to the external than to the internal; to wealth than to inner authority; to the economic factor than to the psychic; to knowledge than to understanding. That it proved to be the more potent power, as compared with all traditional idealism, is due to the fact that man *is* essentially earthbound, and that, wherever this is the case, improvement of the earthly conditions represents the *conditio sine quâ non* for inner advance. For, over against isolated individuals like Epictetus or Æsop, who grew to be sages in spite of their slavery, there are millions and millions of others who, under more favourable conditions, would have made more of their lives than they actually did. Also, the wise slave as such is, nevertheless, inferior to the wise master. Napoleon's groom may have been wiser than his master, but he would not have proved his wisdom in another station than the groom's.

THE problem of the favourable conditions of life seems thus correctly stated and marked out as against the sphere of the correctly stated problem of happiness. The latter can be determined only as a func-

¹ Compare for the further development of this trend of thought the chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," in my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*.

tion of man's subjectiveness. Here, then, it is clear from the outset that objective and final solutions do not exist. The first are out of the question because here all depends on concrete impulses and motives which demand their satisfaction and full operation; they may at times be the lowest and most perverse. The latter are impossible because life is essentially a process, because every fulfilment annuls the yearning, because fulfilment, recognized as something finite, inevitably creates the impression of being something less than the yearning which is felt to be infinite; and because, finally, the whole problem of life is stated anew at every moment on the basis of the new data each moment contains. The past as such is always dead and gone; no man benefits by his *having been* happy. It certainly is in accordance with the melodic meaning of life that every man should receive his share in his own time; nor is he who succeeded in apprehending this meaning embittered by unavoidable misfortunes. Also, the past can be drawn into the present by means of recollection. But however intensely a man may live on his glorious past—a hopeless present remains hopeless nevertheless. But even these statements do not suffice for the complete delimitation of the problem. There is no truth either in what all men presuppose, namely, that happiness alone is what man feels positively. He who would state correctly—and solve—the problem of happiness must first of all take into account *that suffering, too, is felt positively by man*.

Let us here set aside the popular technical terms of sadism and masochism—such gibberish has only a soporific effect; he who believes that the possibility of applying them explains anything whatever certainly sees in them only an excuse for not thinking further. And

let us call to mind, in this connexion, the fact of the unceasing interaction of the impulses unto life and unto death (wherefore every vital process can be understood as a function of death as well as a function of the will to renewal) for the purpose of starting from the perception it implies without intending to deal with it at length. We then find that every man feels positively at every moment *only a definite tension between what he has and what he lacks*. What he feels in the most clearly positive style is personal love. But this love, in Plato's words, manifests itself at every moment as the child of poverty and wealth. Yearning, love's veritable body, means suffering. Yet again, precisely this suffering contains the bliss of love. Now things are much the same everywhere. It is true that man yearns in his mind for absolute happiness; in reality he can stand only a definite labile equilibrium not only between objectively favourable and unfavourable conditions, but between happiness and suffering subjectively experienced. Thus, an exactly positive resultant of *feeling* is never brought by the absolute prevalence of the happiness-pole, but by a definite—though indeed never exactly determinable—state of equilibrium between bliss *and* suffering, *in which the suffering-pole, too, becomes clearly conscious*.

Indeed, why are happy people to be found most frequently in narrow—not too narrow—circumstances, to which also belong laborious—not too laborious—professions? That very few men can stand liberty only partially accounts for the fact. The true and foremost reason certainly is that here the pole of voluntary not-having is from the outset expressed in a manner which the intellect can countenance. That things are as described is proved conclusively by the counter-test pro-

vided by such as live in practically unlimited circumstances. Those who, from the standpoint of the jealous onlooker, live under the happiest conditions are as a rule not only less contented than such as have to put up with a narrow range of life—they are, relatively speaking, discontented in a higher degree than their privileged position would warrant. This is due to the fact that they themselves are obliged to create the difficulties which external conditions press upon the others, so that they become, as it were, burdened with two concerns. They have to restore continually their psychic equilibrium—constantly imperilled by the prevalent plus of their situation—by means of yearnings and of disappointments of their own making (though not necessarily of their deliberate contrivance!). In extreme cases they feel that their life is empty. They thus cram it with activities taking up more time than the most engrossing professional work, with activities as unmeaning as the sifting of the Danaïdes. We find here the deepest significance of the fact that society life creates the impression of being so much more full than any other; this explains why the man about town is the one man who should be believed when he complains of having no spare time.

But let us set aside the drones of life and turn to the indubitably competent class living in supremely privileged positions actually suited to their natures, since they were born for them or have acquired them. Such men, provided they do not belong to the static and essentially modest type whose will is bent on preserving things and conditions or on making other people happy—the lives of most of the great of this earth are, to that extent, actually far more humble and self-sacrificing than those of the majority of the jealous—are typically

ambitious, and ever more extravagantly ambitious the more extraordinary their good fortune. Thus, Alexander the Great ultimately desired to become a God. None of his achievements ever affords the man capable of conquering continents the thousandth part of the joy derived by the small man from the little extra holiday trip he manages to take out of his savings. As for the permanent condition of men in high stations, the extravagant plus of these is almost invariably compensated by a correspondingly infinitesimal minus. Men able to cope with great and momentous destinies almost always fail in the presence of small things. The slightest disappointment often means more for the really great than a catastrophe does for the small. Hence the enormous significance of tact in the circles of the worldly-great. That the question is here of a natural connexion is proved by the experience that in the long run every self-made man feels like a king. Here, then, is the root of the idea of *lèse-majesty*. The man of exalted position yearns so immensely for a minus that the slightest unmannerliness strikes him like lightning. As a matter of fact, man, the essentially becoming and growing being whose existence consists of uninterrupted deaths and rebirths, leads a continual seesaw life. This is the reason why inwardly he is more in danger the higher he rises. The life of kings is framed and canalized in so immensely stern and rigid a way because an inner position as beset with perils as is that of a ruler can be maintained in this way only. We find here also the root of the idea underlying all religious cults, in so far as they are addressed to the gods and not intended as a means for furthering human progress. I think I may forego further explanations. Those already given prove, in my opinion, be-

yond doubt that it is quite untrue that man seeks his happiness only. What he really seeks is a state of equilibrium between happiness and suffering appropriate to his nature, a fact serving to explain why so many find contentment only in the very saddest circumstances. I am thinking here less of the poor than of nurses, social workers, doctors, clergymen, and soldiers whose duty it is to kill.

W H E R E are we now? Let us sum up. There is no such thing as an objectively definable happiness. Nobody seeks happiness exclusively. Yet not many will consider these results conclusive. In spite of all the proofs adduced we may meet with the objection that this is all very fine, but somehow every man *does* strive solely after his happiness. And here, in spite of all counter-proofs adduced, our opponents would at first sight seem to be in the right. In the psychologic connexion of things, subjective experience represents the ultimate goal in exactly the same sense as the provable fact does in external connexions.

In order to advance from the point here reached, let us begin by noting that only passive, or static, natures are in the habit of employing the word happiness, whereas active natures hardly ever use it, and great dynamic natures as a type even feel averse to the state of happiness they encounter in others. What is the underlying reason?—With passive and static men the inclination to let themselves be determined outweighs the wish for self-determination; and once they have found an abiding framework suitable to their natures, the permanent equilibrium they desire has been attained; the requisite lability is sufficiently provided for them by the

daily cares. A further addition to the quality of happiness inherent in such a condition is that his destiny somehow or other "falls to the lot" of the passive man, and that, to the consciousness, happiness and chance are closely related. This explains why, after all, more normal women are happy rather than unhappy in their married life in spite of all its shortcomings; this explains also why inferior natures who find a profession and prove their competence therein are as a rule more contented than discontented—however they may assert the latter. For although they keep complaining, like the pothouse squabblers they are, this behaviour actually is their particular way of maintaining the requisite minus in the face of the prevalent plus. But the concept of happiness is hardly ever applicable to the inner condition of dynamic—or rather, creative, natures; hence their impatience of the term. Still, all these men without exception feel their lives with all their hardships to be incomparably superior and more beautiful than that of the lower class. What, then, is the relation between the condition of those who are incapable of happiness and those who are capable of it? In principle there is no difference whatever. With the first, however, the emphasis lies exclusively on the dynamic pole, wherefore for the consciousness it rests altogether on yearning and not on fulfilment.

That this state of things really makes no qualitative difference is proved by the consideration that the static type also does not owe his happiness to unalterable conditions as such, but to the guaranty furnished by them that new experiences are always to be expected; thus love between happily married people remains ever new. Still, this view does not induce us to acknowledge an

equivalence between such as are essentially capable of happiness and such as are not; a great life obviously accords better with the dignity of man than an inferior life. What we have discerned thus far leads us rather to the recognition, *that the idea that happiness can be the goal of life, can be overcome in principle and that, therefore, the rebirth on a higher plane of existence of what underlies it essentially can be prepared.*

This book has shown in many directions and from many points of view that life is essentially a tragedy; accordingly, Buddha alone is in the right if the empiric is to be the ultimate end. It follows in any case that there is absolutely no such thing as lasting happiness, the existence of which the majority of men assert from a fear of themselves and of others until the time when, having advanced in years, they contrive to maintain their ascendancy by pretending to be proud of the loss of all illusions. Compared with this type, the dynamic type who disavows static conditions altogether and, foremost, the inwardly free man who accepts the tragedy from the outset, are in a considerably better position. For they experience a feeling of exaltation of which none and nothing can deprive them, because it is derived from the inner victory over those very conditions and resistances which are the ultimate termini of all questions about misfortune and happiness. That this level of being can be attained by men who do not belong to the extraordinary type is proved by those married people whose happiness is forged as it were out of conjointly borne sufferings. Therefore, the true object in striving after happiness can only lie in man's inwardly attaining a state beyond both happiness and misfortune in the customary sense. For thus only can a plane of existence be reached on

which a life of exclusively positive determination becomes at all possible. We have thus actually determined the object of happiness meant by every man in his heart of hearts when striving after happiness, however rarely he may be aware of it. *What every man means is the Beyond to the polar opposites of joy and suffering.* That this is so is proved by the one fact that everyone invariably seeks for both and yet speaks of happiness alone. That super-polar happiness is in principle actually accessible to each and all. But like all things of a higher order, it is founded on the renouncement of the lower.

IT IS indeed one of the strangest laws of this life that things seem to pursue those who have left off seeking them, and that they flee from him who thrusts himself upon them. There never was on earth a really blessed man who had not renounced his self; not because he was devoid of personal wishes, but inasmuch as, having renounced his self, he was blessed more than he would ever have dared to wish. Next to him the creative type of man who does not ask for happiness and espouses life as a tragedy experiences the highest bliss. But even the happiness of the lowliest life is founded on renouncement—the renouncement, that is, of liberty or of self-determination, or of anything else. There is everywhere only *one* way to secure preponderance to the positive quality in life: *renouncement of happiness.* But before we proceed to determine the positive quality resulting from the renouncement of happiness, we must prevent another possible misunderstanding. We should never, in the name of all the gods, renounce happiness in the sense of desiring *no* happiness! There is no other than the personal life, and a life without personal

aims is a failure from the outset. Therefore, there is, for example, no object of life less worthy of man than that of mere dutifulness. No metaphysical value (the politico-utilitarian usefulness is naturally out of the question here) attaches to the fulfilling of duty, unless it be the expression of man's ultimate self-determination. In any other case it is, as an ultimate terminus of personal experience, never more than the proof of a mechanism unworthy of man. For that reason I personally distrust every man in whose dealings I am unable to discover personal motives: either he is a bloodless fragment or somehow dishonest: the much-blamed English variety of cant with its moral bent is closely paralleled by the German variety with its idealistic features. In Germany the most unscrupulous business man will assert emphatically that his sole object is the "*Sache*," the object pursued for its own sake; and he must do so if he would maintain his reputation. Where the professed idealist is neither bloodless nor dishonest, he is sure to be deficient in personality. This, too, comes within the range of Christ's words, "For he that hath, to him shall be given." He who desires nothing for himself—unless he has succeeded in being "*entworden*"—un-become, as Master Eckhart called it—is also unable to give of himself; for the real focus of his being has not been called into play, and with this "*entwerden*," too, the question is never of a loss of life, but of the referring its totality to a deeper centre. The saint strives with personal fervour for what ruins him in the earthly sense, and is thus much more akin to the naïve egoist than to the unselfish slave of duty.

This must be said once for all. The values of personal satisfaction should not be plucked out from the

total connexion of life any more than should the moral values. It is, no doubt, a fact that man can serve only either God *or* Mammon, inasmuch as the absolutely external, when pursued as an object, leads away from the internal. But duty, too, primitively conceived, belongs to the realm of Mammon. To use once more the Christian nomenclature, one should, it is true, serve God alone, but a correctly conceived ministering to God is at the same time a ministering to oneself and the world. What is wrong is the disruption of the total connexion of life. Thus, if we put the question in the habitually wrong way, then man should indeed strive after happiness; this decision saves him at least from the most imminent danger besetting him in his journey to a higher human state: the loss of personality. But the happiness conceived in man's heart of hearts differs entirely from what the majority believe. We can, on the basis of what has been pointed out thus far, compress the true situation into one sentence. Only that which fulfils man's personal desire can bring him happiness. But as, on the other hand, every satisfaction, as a final state, annuls the happiness brought about, and as nothing finite ever ends well, *only the will increased in its dynamism by fulfilment can create a happiness capable of maintaining itself beyond the opposites of happiness and misfortune.*

This, then, would serve to prove, for one thing, the existence of different floors, as it were, of a striving after happiness not expressive of a mere misunderstanding. As a sensual or sentient being, man strives for satisfaction in the bliss of love, and rightly so; woe to him who frustrates this urge in himself and in others, for frustration embitters and embitterment deforms and panders.

But in order that the bliss of love should last, it must become the recipient of a deeper striving. The same holds good, *mutatis mutandis*, of the professional activities which can *either* mechanize him who exercises them *or* make for his unceasing evolution towards a higher humanity. The same holds good absolutely in all realms. As the cycle "Life and Death" taught us, every man lives simultaneously on several planes of existence, and it is always possible to convert the superficial planes into the means of expressing, and thus releasing, the deeper. He who thus understands adequately the meaning of life can in the end attain a result in which all his striving originally devoted to the finite will have become the body of the will unto perfection, which alone can lead to happiness in the absolute sense. For man is essentially a being in process of becoming whose fundamental feature is the will unto growth. What fails to advance him or even tends to lower his level never affords him happiness for long; what only satiates soon nauseates. But on the other hand, one should never discard finite satisfactions; for all immediate impulses aim at the finite; but for their presence we should never have seen the light. We can thus complete our first definition of the true will unto permanent happiness with the following: *only he who acts in the spirit of the will to perfection, while striving after this goal as meaning personal happiness for himself, progresses and attains at the same time abiding satisfaction.*

This being so, the striving after perfection is actually found wherever life is still in the ascendant. If such life bears the imprint of materialism, the essential trait of the will is, nevertheless, the urge unto attaining a wider range of activity. Thus, to the genius of acquisi-

tiveness, money-making is more important than money itself—and, let people say what they will, this kind of Yoga-practice, however one-sided the evolution induced by it may be, still makes for more progress than mechanical fulfilment of duty. Likewise, lovers instinctively desire to grow closer together. How closely this corresponds to the meaning of existence is proved by the fact that even vanity is naturally subservient to the will unto personal growth. Without consulting the mirror a man would never come to know himself; for the conscious looks outward only, and he would never grow beautiful unless he desired to appear so. Thus the very renouncement of the commonplace ideal of happiness leads us to a consecration of *all* striving after happiness, the most nature-bound included.

BUT our considerations have disposed of the commonplace ideal happiness, nevertheless. Indeed, I hold it to be utterly unworthy of man to hang on to the old illusions any longer. Nay, I believe those leaders of men who, though knowing better, still continue to support them *ex officio* to be nothing short of criminals; for at present there is no man of somewhat more than average intellectual endowments who could not know better. Here lies an immense peril for the value of church and state; I mention the state, too, for the state will, with growing exclusiveness, become an institution of public welfare, and thus assume increasing portions of what had been in earlier times the exclusive province of the Church. In this connexion Dostoyevski's legend of Christ and the Grand Inquisitor signifies for both the state and the church a fateful warning to be taken most gravely into account. There is no doubt that flatly mate-

rial welfare and, along with it, beneficence aiming at the same, are tainted with the satanic spirit. . . . Man today has grown too conscious to continue, except he lie to himself, to believe the spiritually false. He is, moreover, too individualized not to take seriously in the end his inevitable death, which reduces all happiness to absurdity. In our day happiness can no longer be founded on *anything* but the higher plane of accepted tragedy.

I need not in this place develop this trend of thought further. It has been developed in former chapters from the most various points of view and with regard to a great variety of special applications. The coming chapters will develop it further. I shall add only one more thing here. Whether we admit it or not, we all believe in our heart of hearts in a super-terrestrial, unspeakable, and absolute happiness which brings a peace passing all understanding. A happiness absolutely secure from any suffering whatever. Such happiness is represented by the true Christ-*Image*, to which Christ's suffering only furnishes the corresponding framework. Christianity means a gospel of salvation only to the extent that, thanks to Christ, death should have been overcome *even here*, in this life. And there have been human beings who possessed such happiness and peace. How are we to understand this? Bliss in this sense is indeed postulated by all as the attribute of the Absolute. Eternal bliss alone is absolutely positive. Eternal bliss only is man's ultimate goal. And every man instinctively holds such happiness to be attainable: no man who thinks or feels deeply has ever yet looked on happiness as a problem to cause him uneasiness. What disquieted them was always non-happiness. Man has thus always regarded that highest state of bliss, which only one in millions of men

ever attains, as his ultimate and essential due. For to the only one, the unique unquestionably great genius who thought differently, to the Buddha, extinction, after all, meant bliss, and it is hardly accidental that the whole of Buddhism understood Nirvana, howsoever it might be defined in the abstract, in the positive sense. . . . Indeed, *joy* is the highest inner condition. There is such a thing as essential joy beyond all possible suffering. The man who attains to that kind of joy is absolutely superior to the un-joyful, for he is inwardly farther advanced than he. So it is indeed. But, again, this state of bliss can be attained by him only who, originally and in his pilgrim's progress, had the courage to renounce happiness. There is no genuine happiness this side of accepted tragedy. The not wholly primitive man who seeks it there is a case of arrested development. He is to the pioneer of the future as the silurian brachiopod, eking out to this day a peaceful existence in the Pacific, is to man after his fall.

The Ethical Problem

THAT which makes a man a man, as distinguished from all other beings and phenomena we know of, is what has been called *ethos* since the days of the ancient Greeks. The concept of *ethos* in the original meaning of the term implies no definite doctrine of ethics, and *a fortiori* no definite morality: dynamically it means potential formation, static bearing, or rather what the French call "*tenue*";¹ *ethos* thus understood is indeed *the* principle underlying humanity as a specific life-form. All life is a matter of formations and forms; but with man the formative principle lies, on the spiritual and psychic plane, within the subject capable of self-determination; and only where the latter actually follows does human life evolve along the lines of truly human foundations. This is the quintessence of the distinction established by Ludwig Klages between Life understood as vitality and Spirit.² The invasion of the spiritual principle—which in some respects is indeed inimical to the animal principle—is precisely what goes to make man. For this reason it is utterly unreasonable to regard *pathos* as the equivalent principle in the sense

¹ I shall use in future the latter word exclusively because it alone renders adequately what I mean.

² I refer here, once for all, to the most recent publication of L. Klages, his *Grundlagen der Charakterkunde* and *Die psychologischen Errungenschaften Nietzsches* (Leipzig, J. B. Barth). Klages is distinctly one-sided, but precisely for that reason his writings are particularly illuminating.

of polarity, or even as the higher principle. Considered from the point of view of the cosmos, man is obviously not an ultimately decisive agent; he is obviously subject to what may be called Fate or Cosmic Dispensation. But what goes to make man is precisely the fact that self-determination is the ultimate end for his conscious actions and that it should be so. These few sentences should suffice to make clear why the ethical problem was bound to take precedence of all the others ever since the question has been thoughtfully raised; whether we understand, act, suffer, investigate, wish, or create—if these facts are at all experienced as problems or demands, the first problem and demand to arise is that of self-determination. Without an underlying ethos there is no religion and no art. As a personal experience, human pathos, too, rests upon an ethical basis. For Destiny, Providence and Divine Grace are originally experienced as the opposites of freedom, which is the primary datum and in so far an obvious quality. Nor is there knowledge without an underlying ethos. The will unto knowledge must be there before there can be a question of nescience. Thus, any statement of problems presupposes the primacy of ethos. The deepest significance of the myth of man's Fall consists in the first man's conscious decision in favour of self-determination. This means at the same time that the problem of ethos at the root is only that of freedom. Every decision is expressive of some kind of ethos. Nor is there a decision in the specifically ethical sense which would not be, in the first place, a general decision.

These considerations have thus defined the basis of the ethical problem correctly stated. But they have at the same time defined its limits: the ethical problem

exists *only* for man—that is, if we proceed from the objective concept of ethos as knowers and not as believers. For it has a meaning only within the range of the specifically human concept of freedom. Plants and animals are not self-determined. As for superhuman beings, no people nor any period ever conceived of them as bound by the laws of human morality. Thus, man can be called without prejudice the specifically ethical animal. How correct this—at first sight disconcerting—definition is appears from the fact that man's ethos, as appraised from the basis of his natural status, can be determined irrespectively of absolute values. Hence the antinomy that, on the one hand, the most varied specifications of good and evil have prevailed in various places and at various times—so much so that men of deep nature were even led to doubt whether good and evil really exist; while, on the other, there never was nor ever will be a human species which will fail to judge by the standards of good and evil. Their original meaning is simply the same as that of “yea” and “nay.” Some kind of “nay” inevitably delimits every “yea.” Therefore, where form is created out of freedom, there needs *must* exist, as a delimitation of the qualities which are acknowledged as good, disavowed, and, in so far, evil qualities. For, from the point of view of personal experience, the question here is primarily not of metaphysical principles, but of laws of form. For this very reason as recent a thinker as Kant could call his ethics a metaphysics of *conduct*. For the very same reason races are “moral” almost in proportion to their closeness to nature. It is true that the knowledge of the ultimate *meaning* of good and evil presupposes meta-

physical consciousness of a kind possessed only by highly developed individuals. On the other hand, however, man must differentiate himself with particular precision *as* man, if he is to maintain himself against nature which is *close* to him. Therefore, *tenue* means most in the eye of primitive man. This explains why the ethos of heroism has everywhere been the earliest ethos. With cultured nations the original ethos is usually deteriorated by the predominance of specific differentiations and the conflict between the spiritual ethos—manifested in the first place as an imperative asserting itself in the emotional sphere—and the general state of the soul. But all men without exception, of whatever degree of culture, instinctively condemn a lack of *tenue*. For a man without *tenue* lacks the specifically human quality.

Yet, again: every ethical consideration in the sense thus circumscribed fails in the presence of what, in one way or another, lies beyond its range. Therefore, when human laws cannot be presupposed to prevail, and when metaphysical laws are not acknowledged, all ethical considerations naturally merge into the æsthetic. And most justly so. The statement of ethical problems is only possible when self-determination is premised, a concept which has its *raison d'être* in the human consciousness. Form-bestowal "in general" is, under all circumstances, whatever it may be besides, an æsthetic problem. Therefore, every cosmocentric ethics is revealed upon close inspection as a particular kind of æsthetics. Only as an Artist is the Creator who called such sufferings into being and continues to permit them justified in man's eyes. Accordingly, mankind instinctively applies to ex-

ceptional men not the ethical, but, to use Coudenhove's words, hyperethical norms,¹ the ultimate termini of which are Strength and Beauty. Whenever a man, as a part of nature, surpasses the human standard of normality, be he conqueror or sage, the field of ethical judgment in the customary sense is abandoned. The only demands as to form remaining tenable in such cases are such as are valid for the stars and the gods.

LET us now, from this vantage point, survey the field of so-called morality. The knowledge gained thus far implies that what is called moral and ethical must be susceptible of the most varied definitions; that is, that, pending further developments, the most divergent qualities can be deemed "good." For primarily the question is always only of form-bestowal and *tenue* in general which enable man to hold his own, in the natural connexion of things, wherein plants and animals succeed without self-determination. Now this next makes clear the deep meaning of the German saying that "morality is self-understood"—or rather that it should be. Actually, the whole value of a definite morality lies in its obviousness. An offence against existing morals—unless it occurs in the functioning of higher form-laws—means under all circumstances inadequacy of form-bestowal and *tenue* and, to that extent,

¹ I recommend the book, *Ethik und Hyperethik*, by Count Richard Coudenhove-Calergi, the leader of the Pan-European Movement (Leipzig, 1921, Der Neue Geist Verlag) as one of the few works on ethics worth reading that I know of. Coudenhove's purely Japanese mentality is, it is true, of the positivist type; he has no organ for the metaphysical aspect of things. But what lies this side of that aspect he certainly sees with a clearer eye than any other living European I know.

a trespass against a definite type of humanity. For since this type exists precisely in the functioning of these laws, its "morality" circumscribes the very basis from which the problems of life appear to it. Accordingly, then, every articulate humanity has always been essentially moral-minded, and all the more moralistic the more its status was settled. Scepticism as to the value of an existing order was always, as history has proved, a symptom of its disintegration; and a problematic attitude towards morality in general was always a sign of lack of form. In so far the Greeks were justified in regarding Socrates as a corrupter of morals: if he proved to be in the right, then the old Athenian order was doomed to extinction, as it actually was. Also, the vaunted freedom from prejudice of the Russians does not, as used to be maintained by its pre-war admirers, signify that the Russians had overcome all prejudices, but conversely, that they were without such *as yet*. For that very reason there has since then come into power with them a despotism unthinkable in any other European country—that is, a purely external formative principle. For the same reason—to mention one more negative example—the essentially problematic nation of Europe, the Germans, reveal of all nations the greatest lack of *tenue*, a deficiency which is, on the one hand, the ultimate cause of the ever-renewed German breakdowns, of the hatred of the German, of the myth of his moral inferiority, etc., while it underlies, on the other, the predilection of the Germans for external order, drill, and attendance to duty. As opposed to this type, the antique man of the time before disintegration set in was essentially moral and moralistic. For a simi-

lar reason, the same was true of the whole of Europe in the eighteenth century: that was the period of her utmost perfection so far attained. For the same reason those European nations who are still "in form" are each and all moralistic. The most striking case in point are the French, because their mentality is still essentially that of Antiquity, in spite of the fact that they are in appearance, at all periods, the most modern people. Their original idea of morality—*le moral*—is actually still pre-Christian [this is made particularly clear by the fact that the Frenchman is the most loyal friend and patron to those he acknowledges as belonging to him, either a fellow countryman, a naturalized foreigner, an ally, or a guest (ξένος); whereas, with the clearest of consciences, he is capable of an inhumanity towards the foreigner (barbarian) unheard of in any other European country]. His idea of morality thus signifies nothing else than measure and harmony, both individually and socially speaking, and consequently *tenue* in the sense applied to the Roman nobleman (it is, of course, by reason of the Frenchman's divergent natural disposition shaded off towards the æsthetic, a divergence thanks to which he resembles, on the other hand, the Chinese for whom morality means cultured nature).¹

The same is naturally to be observed in a yet more striking manner in the two still older peoples inhabiting our continent: the Spaniards and the Jews. The inner form of the Spaniard dates from prehistoric times. This and none other is the reason why he displays more *tenue* than any other European; for form-bestowal and bearing in general define man's particular place in the

¹ I have explained all this at length in the chapter, "France," of *Europe*.

world.¹ The Spaniard maintains to this day "bearing as such," almost without reference to absolute values. But the very best illustration of what morality means, first and foremost, is provided by the Jews. They are the moral people *par excellence*. Their life has always been determined solely by moral commandments. Even today there is no genuine Jew who is unmoral. Now there are several opinions possible concerning the specific Jewish ethos—it is certainly not of the heroic type and it really corresponded and corresponds at times to the ethos of the intestinal worm—yet there can be no doubt that it is thanks to their ethos that the Jews have succeeded in maintaining themselves as Jews from prehistoric times and through vicissitudes which would have ruined any other people. Owing to their ethos they have, again and again, succeeded in assimilating alien blood; owing to it they are sure to survive many peoples to come. The example provided by the Jews is in my opinion particularly valuable for the purpose of revealing the original meaning of ethos. The Jews always *meant* the metaphysical aspect of it. But they succeeded in maintaining themselves not because they were metaphysically in the right, but because they were "in form" in a definite manner and with a unique tenacity.

A specific ethos primarily never means anything other than the existence of a specific form. This is proved

¹ The same explains why the Latin woman is so superior to the Germanic in point of self-control and seems, therefore, so much less seducible. Only exceptionally will she act against her will; but to the Germanic woman there will "happen," again and again, what she never intended. For the same reason the ever-blundering German is always ready to plead his "good intentions"; but it is only the deficient in *tenue* who protest their good intentions.

directly by the fact that in principle even fictions render the same service. Thus the Englishman's ethos is ruled by concepts of honour which do not, from the cosmic point of view, signify more than the rules of a game and which can be accepted—highly characteristically¹—by the Jews in this particular sense. Fair play and loyalty, and not truthfulness and goodness, are the Englishman's ultimate values. But they, too, make for form-bestowal and *tenue*. The confrontation of this specifically English ethos with that of the Spaniards and the Jews leads to most fruitful speculations which I can only outline here. (I have gone into further details in *Europe*.) The Spanish ethos, the ethos of *tenue par excellence*, lacks, on the other hand, an accelerating motif. This implies unchanging permanence in the same place through all times. The Spaniards do not progress in the European sense of the term, but they also do not degenerate; they are almost as timeless as the Bedouins. The English ethos, on the other hand, means dynamics in the sense of matches. It is, thus, quickening, conquering, world-encompassing, but also essentially imperilled: let England lose her privileged position which allows the Britisher to indulge in play, and there will be an end of that type of Englishman which created England's greatness. This is the reason why the World War wrought considerably greater constitutional changes in victorious England than in beaten Germany.² The

¹ Compare the exceedingly interesting book by Maurice Samuel, *You Gentiles* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co.). I furthermore call attention once more to the two special numbers of 1925 and 1926 of the periodical, *Der Jude*, and to the articles by Oscar A. H. Schmitz therein contained.

² I have explained all this at length in the chapter, "England," in *Europe*.

Jewish ethos, finally, determined as it is throughout by absolute values of metaphysical origin, provides the possibility of an everlasting continuance—but only in the guise of lowliness and homelessness. Hence the myth of the Wandering Jew.

It should have become finally clear by now that, primarily, ethos means nothing else than *an efficient principle of organization in general*, without any original moral qualifications in the absolute sense. If, notwithstanding, all ethics on earth acknowledge as positively valuable either intrinsically the same values, or only a small number of the conceivable specifications of the ethical (for example, the ethos of heroism, sanctity, labour), the reason for it is that only definite “bearings” of individuals and communities have stood in the long run the pragmatic test in the cosmic connexion of things. This can be maintained without acknowledging any metaphysical principle: *experience* provides the proof that only definite kinds of *tenue* and conduct are in tune with the laws of the universe. This obtains *a fortiori* of *tenue* in general. It is a fact established by experience that disregard of the fundamental laws of morality contradicts the meaning of things. The immoral individual who is not determined by higher laws than those against which he trespasses is doomed to ruin. He certainly need not be ruined in an external sense; but he is sure to damage his soul. A demoralized community, however, inevitably decays. Wherefore there never has been a sound community whose members failed to acknowledge in their mutual relations the fundamental laws of a definite morality, whatever their ideas on the

subject of good and evil may have been. Thus, criminals are scrupulously loyal in their mutual intercourse.

WE HAVE thus reached the frontier where the natural order of things and the demands of value join and intersect one another. There is no doubt that they do so, again and again, however little they succeed in achieving permanent agreement. The nearest explanation for the fact is most readily found when we link up these considerations with some trends of thought contained in *The World in the Making*. The result there obtained was that History, however irrational most of her roots, is nevertheless logical, because only the true and the right survive in the long run. For in the empiric domain the true corresponds to life, and the false to death. The same is true in the first instance of the usefulness of the good. In the case of any closed and thoroughly organized community this can be actually proved to be so. None can subsist unless it submits to some kind of moral order; and there are only a few that can maintain themselves. But if it is generally true that in the historical sphere it is never the best possible, but only just "the right in general" which holds its own of its own resources, things are even worse from the moralist's point of view; it is quite out of harmony with the natural trend of the world process that the morally good should triumph. The latter certainly stands the pragmatic test within every closed community, and it does so all the more in proportion to the thoroughness of the latter's organization. For this very reason commercial and political relations become more moral in proportion to the closeness of the system in question; if in primitive conditions all is permitted

against the foreigner; if he is, as foreigner, regarded as the enemy—then moral conduct in an actually unified humanity would prove to be as uniquely expedient as it is within every narrow community. But all truly existing communities have so far been narrow. This is the reason why politics have never as yet been amenable to morality. Accordingly, one must admit, when surveying history at large, that hyperethical values only have not been led practically *ad absurdum*; these values are the same whose standard is likewise applicable to the non-human sphere; among these, strength and beauty stand foremost. The final judgment of history and nature has, accordingly, thus far always been in favour—never it is true of the immoral—but of the ethical, on the one hand, and the a-moral, on the other. For from the natural point of view morality never means more than both condition and form of cohesion. An accelerating or quickening effect is never brought about otherwise than through the interference of some kind of “evil.” For whatever disturbs the existing order *is* in so far an evil; and this it is what the primarily-empiric idea of evil means. This kind of evil cannot, from the natural point of view, be thought of as an absolute evil. From the standpoint of nature, to kill is not worse than to die; and death is an inevitable feature of its course. Only he who values his life more highly than that of others has ever been able to hold his own; and self-preservation through victory ranks naturally higher than self-preservation through flight. This is why at all times, when a positive attitude towards life and the earth existed, the warrior’s ethos was deemed the highest. Indeed, this ethos alone could in the long run stand the pragmatic test as being ade-

quate to human life. Every race which offered no resistance was enslaved. Every race which lacked the urge unto conquest remained powerless. And with the will unto power the question is of a primarily human urge to be appraised unconditionally, in the positive sense, since it represents the natural groundwork of all sovereignty.

Now every initiator must be unmoral in the same sense as the conqueror. In so far as he destroys an existing equilibrium he is a wrongdoer. The order of the cosmos of appearance is certainly not a moral order in the human sense. Morality, from its point of view, is nothing other than a private interest or idiosyncrasy. It is true that justice means in a certain sense a cosmic law; it does so in so far as it gives a particular expression to the universally valid natural law of compensation. But this compensatory justice is not justice in any higher sense. Its only scope is the re-establishment of a disestablished equilibrium *as such*. Now the word "re-establishment" alone suffices to point out that it is not within the province of this kind of Justice to make more of existing conditions than they were beforehand. This is why she proceeds more often in the sense of human jealousy, which delights in seeing the exalted levelled with the ground, than in the sense of misdeeds avenged or virtues recompensed. She decides under all circumstances in favour of the stronger party. If, in one way or another, she frequently caused the downfall of tyrants, the reason was never that the "good" necessarily triumphed, but that the mass of small men is stronger than the biggest individual. There might exist a truly compensating justice in the sense of the Hindoo Karma doctrine. But arguing from it, it cannot be

maintained from the human point of view that the order of the Universe is just: for there compensation works from one life to the next, with centuries of intermittence.

I HAVE done my best in the foregoing to put into relief the concept of ethos in its original purity, because there is no possibility otherwise of stating the problem of ethics correctly. It is as inadmissible to set aside the natural sphere on the plea that it does not lie on the same plane with the demands of the Spirit as it is to reduce the demands of the Spirit to natural laws. It is, on the other hand, imperative to take into account the indubitably existing connexion—in whatever sense this be—of the natural sphere with spiritual values. Now this connexion consists, here as everywhere in life, as a function of the laws of correspondence and of correlation of meaning and expression. Ethos as such already segregates man as a natural being from all the others. The laws of this natural ethos retain their validity throughout all stages because they stand for the grammar and syntax also of such ethics as are superior to nature, as long as these do not directly oppose the former. But they can never do this successfully on a large scale, and never in the long run, since even the most spiritual life conceivable remains inserted into the natural order of things. Even in the process of severance from the world *tenue* and perfection remain the fundamental laws, because it is impossible to live in this world in disagreement with its laws. Thus the monk's asceticism requires as large a share of formative self-determination and *tenue* as the way of the warrior. Consequently, the hierarchy of the hyperethical values pre-

vails also where the First should be the Last. For here the same demands constituting a hierarchy of values are simply applied to converse states, which is easy because the ideals of asceticism originate everywhere in an inversion of the world-ward impulses.¹ The saint, too, is essentially distinguished by strength and beauty. Cowardice, sloth, untruthfulness, lack of loyalty, etc., are purely negative in all cases. But as a fact no world-opposed ethics—save in exceptional cases and conditions—has ever succeeded in maintaining itself, *because the original meaning of ethics is guidance towards the leading of a good life.*

This has led us to a further and very important determination. Ethical endeavours are indeed meaningless unless the bettering of life is aimed at. And if life is to be bettered, the first thing must obviously be a positive appraisal of its existence. The negation of life-values, therefore, contradicts the fundamental meaning of ethics. The individual can of course take his stand at will. By reason of the laws of contrasts ruling psychic life, many a man is liable precisely to an adjustment absolutely contrary to sense. But what he thus undertakes on his own account can never serve as an example for others. Accordingly, the world-opposed ethics of Jesus Christ and Buddha were within a short period reinterpreted into instructions for not only a better, but also a happier life on earth, a change which soon restored the repressed hyperethic values. This was brought about in both cases by means of a direct alteration of the original doctrine. The Buddhism that counts in the history of the world is the Mahayana, which maintains as

¹ Compare the well and lucidly arranged combinations and tables in Coudenhove's *Ethic und Hyperethik*.

positive an attitude towards existence as Brahmanism. And Christianity was even transformed into the religion of the Western conquerors, by which change the ethos of heroism soon enough—and, historically speaking, completely—drove the religion of the weary and the heavy laden into the background.

The ethical problem in its true sense can thus be stated correctly only from the basis of an acknowledged original ethos and of acknowledged hyperethical values. He who fails to do so is inevitably made by the actual happenings of the world to appear just as absurd as a thinker as the idealist is as a practical man. Now without the risk of getting into a blind alley we can turn to the question of the true meaning of good and evil. From what has been said it *seems* to follow that with the morally good and evil the question is of essentially relative things, and that the hyperethical values—conceivable only as æsthetic values—are for spiritual man, too, the ultimate termini. Accordingly, it would not be the wicked who would have to be condemned, but only the malicious; not the slayer, but only the cowardly murderer; not the liar, but only and exclusively the deceiver and calumniator;¹ and even this would be true only in so far as that man belongs to the genus of lions and not of hares. This is, by and large, Nietzsche's idea and, more recently, Coudenhove's, who regards the ethical only as a province of the hyperethical. But things, nevertheless, are not so; *experience* shows that they are different. Whatever may be said by mere "thinkers" (as if thoughts ever could grasp substance

¹ Compare my essay, "*Der wahre Sinn der Lüge*," in the tenth issue of *Weg zur Vollendung*, which in important respects completes the views here expounded.

unless they issue from a corresponding substance!) in the matter of good and evil, it is for such as are endowed with adequate organs a question of personally experienced absolute realities of an ultimately decisive power and efficiency. And not only of an ultimately decisive, but of a primary and elemental effectiveness at the same time. This is why children and primitive men discriminate between good and evil as such with the greatest nicety. Now in this "as such" there is no doubt something *primarily essential*: whatever may be appraised as good or evil in the concrete—the personal experience of *the* good and *the* evil in however deceptive a guise is here the essential. The primary sense-realities personally experienced here prove their primariness precisely by the fact that it is so hard to arrive at an unequivocal estimate of the value of the phenomenal: the standard is here established prior to the object to be measured, although only the latter is empirically and actually given.

What is the nature of these primary absolute realities? We found that good and evil are primarily interrelated as are yea and nay. Some kind of nay represents the necessary boundary to every yea. This much holds good merely formally. But the same definition, when transposed into the key of substantials, means that the good corresponds to creation and the evil to destruction, the good to life and the evil to death. Now as life and death mean on each particular plane different aspects of the same positive process, this one sentence already shows that evil is insuperable in itself, a subject to be dealt with later; hence the idea of the Devil who resists God successfully to the end of time. But also, our train of thought should have already made clear *why* we

only say "yea" to the good: as living beings we can only say "yea" to life and not to death. We thus primarily know of the absolute good and the absolute evil because, in our deepest selves, we desire to live and because we shrink from death; and because we know by instinct that the ultimate meaning of evil is destruction. Death—this was divined by the most primitive of peoples—is the wages of sin. As nobody knows what life ultimately is, and as no man can even think his death objectively, there is no way of defining the absolute good and the absolute evil. It is also impossible for the further reason that the good means life, and that life is the primary premise to which all definitions refer. But for this very reason man measures instinctively every personal experience with life as a *starting-point*. And he does so naturally all the more the nearer he is to the origins—whether he be in the primitive stage, as a child, or a man in the state of nature, or on the threshold of perfection, as a man who knows.

Let us now survey the ethical situation in itself. Here the facts are, for the ethically normal man, as follows. As a natural being called "man" he acknowledges as a matter of course the demands of the ethos corresponding to his type. As a member of the cosmos he does as much with regard to the hyperethical laws. *Still, neither of these are, for himself, "ad intra," ultimate termini.* He who states the problem of good and evil metaphysically, because he cannot help it, since this is how he experiences it personally, need not remain indifferent to good fortune, victory, power, and earthly perfection. Inasmuch as they make such demands, the Stoic, Buddhist, and Christian attitudes only signify the drawing of specific conclusions from the general cer-

tainty of the existence of a super-mundane reality. But the man I mean ultimately intends something different. *He aims primarily at inner growth*, and this irrespectively of how the external course of the world reacts to his striving. Still, it is untrue, however often it may have been maintained, that he strives after the good "for its own sake": with the good thus defined, the question is of a projection without spontaneous life. The fact is that he wants in the first place to become better and to make the world better than it is in itself. He thus intends primarily a life not hemmed in by earthly accidents. His inner life thus proceeds, ultimately, in another dimension than that of natural incidents. It is the dimension of the inner cosmos inbuilt into the external, as well as of the transsubjective determined in the cycles "World Conceptions" and "Life Formations" and "Life and Death." This is the reason why the ethically self-conscious man, in case he understands his own motives, does not, in principle, expect recompenses even in Heaven in the earthly sense: he does good simply because he grows better by doing it. This inner growth is for him the ultimate instance. In this he, too, says "yea" to life and he even goes to further extremes than any earth-bound man is able. Now this process of inner growth is governed by a causal order of the most rigorous description. It cannot be apprehended directly in its true nature from our Western and Christian premises, because from their point of view—which is instinctively shared by all of us—only the external reality appears perfectly real, whereas the spiritual reality is experienced as a postulate. But to the Buddha for whom, as for all Hindoos, a transsubjective sense-connexion stood for the obviously real ultimate terminus

of life, the moral order was so thoroughly analogous to the natural causal order of things, that he could establish its validity without insistence on any imperative, and that his hearers found his argumentations obviously true. He taught succinctly what follows: Inasmuch as the will unto knowledge increases knowledge, and as better acts make a better man, it is in the patent interest of everyone to live up to the ideals which have always been recognized as absolute ideals. If he does, he inevitably progresses; if he does not, he inevitably deteriorates. Buddha's ethics cannot represent the last word in the matter: not only because he failed to recognize meaning as the groundwork of life, but because he regarded the cessation of life as the goal. As pointed out above, ethics which are inimical to life contradict its inmost trend. The meaning of ethical endeavours in general is bound up with the premise that *life can and should become better*; this meaning is thus either positively qualified or else it is not. Yet the Buddha certainly determined the elementary meaning of ethical endeavours more adequately than all Western ethicists when teaching that to become better and to do better are primary aims independent of the course of the world or of any philosophy. In so doing he forestalled the later cognition of Albert Schweitzer according to which ethics require no theory of the universe for their foundation.

WE HAVE thus reached a point at which the ethical problem can be stated with perfect correctness. In so far as man is a special expression of life in general, he is characterized by the fact that with him the formative principle works through the medium of consciousness in the guise of what we call, in the

supreme case, freedom. Therefore, man's ethos and nothing else is what distinguishes man from the animal; therefore, consciously-willed form-bestowal and *tenue* are basic determinations of humanity. But the ultimately decisive formative principle originates with a "beyond" to nature: it does not demand only *tenue* and form-bestowal in general, but *self-realization* by means of these natural functions. Now this self-realization, as shown by experience, can succeed only by means of a striving after the realization of absolute values which are acknowledged as such. And their universal exponent (as Plato first and, for all I know, is the only one thus far to realize with perfect clarity) is the *idea of the good* and not that of the beautiful and true. For the mere demand that æsthetic and logical values should be realized can be formulated only on the basis of an ethical goal implying in its turn a primary ethos. Here, too, the universal law of correspondence prevails. As, on the natural plane, man's ethos and nothing else makes man of him, since man is not man unless he be self-determined—so forever ethos alone leads to the realm of values. This one fact suffices to explain why the ethical problem has been appraised as primary and ultimately final by all men throughout all ages, and by children even more unequivocally than by adults, since they are as yet in the process of creating their whole world. Ethics does not need to be founded on other data; the fact is that the reality of what theoretical ethics strives with difficulties to understand constitutes the actual basis of all spiritual endeavours.

We can now proceed to divest the concepts of good and evil finally of the quality of relativity with which we were at first obliged to endow them. Let us for

this purpose revert once more to the ideas expounded in the third chapter of *The World in the Making*. It has been proved there that it is indeed the right only that maintains itself in the long run, since the true corresponds to life in the ultimate analysis, and the false to death; but *what* particular right thing is realized depends altogether on man's free decision and the particular sense-bestowal that results therefrom. The most worthy as also the most disreputable deeds can, as the case may be, prove to be "uniquely right." In the same sense, only those articulate human states which, as such, embody an ethos are capable of survival. But a state can follow an act in the sense of good as well as an act in the sense of evil. Now there is no doubt that a state due to an act in the sense of evil is as capable of survival on the natural plane as its positive correlative, provided it otherwise embodies the qualities demanded by hyperethics, such as strength and courage; the mere fact that there are beasts of prey and men and peoples preying on others capable of surviving suffices to prove it. Things, as a matter of fact, are much more in favour of evil. The natural process as such is devoid of upward tendencies. It proceeds, figuratively speaking, on the same level plane as long as the driving force remains the same; when it decreases, its own momentum makes for a downward trend. Now this downward trend is obviously the best means conceivable for embodying the spirit of evil. The good is due everywhere to actually-spontaneous well-doing, just as life exists only as function of an unceasing vitalizing process. Therefore, inertia—the principle governing all kinds of routine—is in itself the enemy of the good. But on the natural plane there corresponds also to evil the principle of

death. Now as everything which has become is bound to pass away, inertia and tendency to death conjointly suffice to make from the very outset for the material prevalence of the evil principle. Nor is this all: all kinds of initiative appear on the natural plane as "evil" in one way or another. Every "nay" is a destructive tendency, evil, and so is every disengagement from an existing state of things and every severance from the whole. Now the initiator needs must disengage himself from the existing state of things, he must gainsay it; he disrupts under all circumstances the existing equilibrium. And he obviously derives a far greater personal benefit when he confers upon these evil means also an evil meaning, that is when he lets selfishness decide at the expense of all the others. For a good meaning can be inbuilt into the phenomenal only by unselfishness demanding renouncement of personal benefits. This being so, it would be downright astounding if the Devil were not the Lord of this World. The good has, thus far, only exceptionally held its own against this immense natural pre-eminence of evil. It was all the more difficult to do this because it can only triumph where it uses evil as means in its turn, and such a course is contrary to its own nature. This is the reason why the ideal of the absolutely good man has found its so far only unequivocal and convincing embodiment in the saint who renounces all worldliness. For every challenge to perform only and exclusively the good throws the world if it is fulfilled, into anarchy, which in its turn inevitably ends in Terrorism. Now the ultimate reason for this—a reason which finally disposes of the alleged pre-eminence of the good—is that, as Ludwig Klages puts it, the "moral" man and the "evil" man

are two divergent branches of the same tree, the Tree of Will; a definition confirmed, according to him, by the prevalent theoretical ethics in so far as their central problem is the avoidance of evil.¹ In his work on characterology Klages furthermore shows with great clarity how the personal urges unto an extension of the "I" inevitably lead to malice, hatred, cruelty, will unto destruction, and Satanism, wherever they take effect in the absence of spiritual ties. Indeed, he who would extend his form, that is, his "yea," at the expense of others, must, as a matter of course, say "nay" to these. Now spiritual ties are only exceptionally to be found in those men whose essential characteristic is the urge to self-expansion and who bring about all external "progress." *The ethical problem, morally understood, is thus insolvable in the sense of an externally-earthly realization.* And it is also insolvable in the realm of the soul. He who strives for the good desires to become better and make others better without regard to external success. Translated into the language of the philosophy of sense-apprehension, this signifies, again, that the intrinsically unchangeable alphabet is made the means of expression of a new meaning which is, or need be, no more contained in the former than the significance of a thought is contained in the letters which materialize it. *But it is utterly impossible to confer a good meaning on phenomena without at the same time conferring on them an evil meaning.* A sinless life is an impossibility. I can be very brief here; for the essential ideas on this subject have been expounded in the chapters "History a Tragedy" and "Death and Life Eternal." Every life is

¹ This trend of thought is brought to a close in the following chapter.

carried on inevitably at the expense of other lives. Every yea is delimited as a vital form by a correlative nay, and every nay signifies death and killing. Thus every decision, whatever its result, is productive of guilt in one way or another. He who does not resist evil increases its power at least in the wrongdoer. It is cowardly self-deceit when here the normal sufferer lays claim to the metaphysical forces which are presumed to work all the more positive effects through non-resistance. This is true only with him who renounces resistance on one plane because more important positive powers are at his disposal on another. Now he who resists evil *can* do so only by evil means. It is a sophistry indicative of lowest morality not to regard, given certain conditions, the loss of liberty and the taking of life as evil. The taking of life, as such, is as wrong in the judge and the executioner as it is in the murderer. To that extent the disciples of Tolstoi, the pacifists, and opponents of capital punishment are absolutely in the right as opposed to their adversaries who hold different opinions. Nay, even power in the sense of a claim to maintenance of power by force is evil in itself. And this, again, teaches us from a new point of vantage to see how much easier the Spirit of Evil gains ground on this earth than the Spirit of Good.

This becomes perfectly clear when we look at the same time at all the facts from the premises of the philosophy of sense-apprehension. Self-realization is successful only where it is a function of the agreement of meaning and expression. Now where the peculiar sense of the majority of the possible means of self-preservation is evil, perfection is obviously much easier of attainment on the lines of the evil than on those of

the good. This is the reason why everyone instinctively thinks of a wrongdoer as the symbol of earthly perfection. This applies at any rate to the Christian. It is the most unfortunate destiny of the Christian nature that it lacks the premises for the acceptance of greatness as such; for originally the first were to be the last; it is, therefore, unable to consider greatness impartially. The Greek was able to look upon his beautiful gods as good gods because his concept of goodness was a-moral and hyperethical. Now if the alternative good *or* evil is stated, there is no other satisfactory solution than the early Christian one: to suffer is better than to act, ugliness is better than beauty, humility is more than power.

WHAT, then, do good and evil in the absolute sense mean? The fact, as I would here point out once more, is that their reality in the realm of meaning cannot be shaken. I deliberately refrained from giving a precise definition of what good and evil mean, because the question with them is of basic qualities which everyone finds within his consciousness as determinant norms. Here any attempt at definition which would make it appear that their reality requires to be proved leads into error; for the difficulty is, conversely, the existence of the standard in the face of the prevailing uncertainty as to how it is to be applied to the object to be appraised. It is indeed altogether impossible to find a solution in the realm of the empiric which would even approximately realize the meaning which in his heart of hearts every positively-minded man desires. Therefore, all that can be done is to seek for the solution of the ethical problem in another direction. We can find this direction when we remember that the ethical prob-

lem is stated conjointly with the problem of freedom and that it is intimately bound up with it. Now the problem of freedom is a problem of actuality pure and simple; freedom is expressed in nothing other than *in* the act of decision. This being so, the ethical problem, too, would seem to be intimately bound up with the state of conflict. In other words, *there is absolutely no ethical solution of the ethical problem.*

Not only is there no solution: there can and there should be none. Let us call to mind the results obtained in the chapters "Growth and Decay" and "Freedom and Law." Life manifests itself in the phenomenal everywhere as a labile state of equilibrium; an abiding equilibrium contradicts the very concept of life. It proceeds at every given moment as a simultaneous being-born and dying-away. Becoming and passing away are thus the polar co-ordinates of each moment of vital existence. Now this holds not only for the physical plane: it has become clear to us that good and evil correspond, on the subjective plane, to the poles of life and death. For this reason it is just as impossible to conquer the evil in life as it is to conquer death. Yet, the Life-and-Death polarity is not the ultimate terminus of life. Just as only the joint action of the becoming and dying away of tones expresses the true reality of music—melody—even so empiric life and empiric death are, in their conjunction, the expression of a purely positive quality which, since the question is of a metaphysical order, we are unable to determine in itself, but which we personally experience, and with perfect obviousness, as the ultimate basis of our own life. Death is most assuredly not our ultimate terminus. Nor is, as assuredly, evil. Whoever does not misunderstand his

original self-consciousness knows for an obvious fact that the good is for him an absolutely positive quality and also the ultimately real. This very fact is expressed in one way or another by all religions and all systems of ethics. But this absolutely positive quality lying beyond the empiric polarity belongs both in the case of the good and in the case of life exclusively to the transsubjective sense-connexion revealed in our chapter "Death and Life Eternal," and not to the objectified order of things. Its realm is, in principle, not of this world. He who doubts this should consider two things: first, that good and evil are primarily conceived as absolute qualities, and that every empiric good and evil has a relative character. Second, that it is impossible for statesmen and business men to satisfy all moral demands without impairing their empiric capacities. Practically, the absolutely positive quality manifests itself in the world of objectifications only by way of instantaneous decisions. Here freedom provides the general scheme. Freedom exists only as the point of indifference between the "not yet" and the "no more." In the same sense, life at every given moment is an actual process of enlivening. Likewise, the absolute good visualized by all religions and ethics and experienced by every man from his childhood as the ultimate imperative, *never on this earth consists in anything other than the decision for the good arrived at in the given case.* It is, thus, only in the form of pure actuality and subjectivity that such a thing as the objective good unaccompanied by a correlative and compensatory evil can exist. Hence Kant's doctrine that there exists no true good except good will. Hence the words of Master Eckhart the mystic: "And if thou failest not in thy will, but only in thy capacity, verily thou hast done

all before God." Hence also the rejection of the "just" by all truly ethical minds. For the just believe in an objective good independent of the subjects working it, a good the observance of which is all that is required, where the *only* things that count are actual good acts. He who, then, believes himself a good man only because he observes definite laws is evil in the deepest metaphysical sense. This is the reason why Albert Schweitzer justly writes: "The good conscience is an invention of the Devil."¹

But let no one believe for this reason that what matters is man's good intention in the customary sense. For here, again, another proposition holds in its turn: the way to Hell is paved with good intentions. Psychoanalytic research has established once for all that effects are invariably the true exponents of intention. What the vague expression "good will" really means is actual and positive sense-bestowal; the question is, thus, not of "willing the best," but of inbuilding the clearly recognized positive good will into the phenomenal by means of purely personal initiative. And success is indifferent only in so far as overpowering purely external (not internal) forces stand in the way of the realization of the meaning intended. But let us now proceed to the ultimate determination of the relation of the absolute good, as delineated by now, to the external order of things. We saw that the triumph of the good is incompatible with the sense of the phenomenal cosmos. On its plane good and evil are intrinsically poles of equal potency, and the negative pole practically outweighs the other

¹ Compare *Kultur und Ethik*, p. 249, edit. C. H. Beck. This work should be read by everybody; it is the most "initiated" I am acquainted with in the field of ethics.

because finiteness and passing away are the destiny of all phenomena. Man strives after the absolute good, nevertheless, because his true nature there finds its adequate expression; because his roots ultimately lie in the trans-subjective sense-connexion and not in the objective natural order of things, and because inner growth is his ultimate destination.

From this vantage point we perceive, then, that it is precisely the *insolvability* of the ethical problem which corresponds to the deepest meaning of the life we are capable of apprehending. Just as physical life manifests itself only through the ever-renewed vitalizing of what is dead in itself and by a continual process from one lack of equilibrium to another, *even so precisely the insolvability of the conflict with which every striving man, as an ethical subject, is confronted at every moment of his empiric life is the condition for the realization of the good. For the fact that it is for ever impossible to live without incurring guilt, that it is radically impossible to gain a good conscience, keeps the ethical striving—the only thing that matters—alive.* This is just the reason why every saint has felt himself to be the worst of sinners. This is why even Jesus said of Himself: "Why callest thou me good? none is good, save one, that is, God." Empiric life is an inescapable tragedy. And from here, too, we are able to apprehend the deepest meaning of the commandment to love one's neighbour in its so plastic wording. As it is impossible to bring about the triumph of the good objectively, all that can be done is, in every particular case, to do the good *closest at hand* and to bear with the rest of the world's evil, as Jesus did.

And this also explains the blessedness of suffering,

ranging from suffering in its external sense to repentance and remorse. It is precisely thanks to suffering that the absolute good is realized within the soul. But it is always realizable only *within* the unique individual, in the particular case and *through* him. The ethical problem is always a *purely and exclusively individual* problem. To have seen this is indeed the ethical master-achievement of Jesus Christ. And now the scales fall from our eyes as we look at the riddle contained in the contradictory relation of the inner demand to do the absolute good with the possibilities of social morality. Intrinsically, social morals have nothing to do with ethics.¹ They can be determined only externally, in the spirit of our perception of the meaning of ethos, given in the first part of this chapter. It can and it should be only utilitaristic and eudemonistic. And it even can be nothing other than unethical, inasmuch as the individual is *not* the ultimate terminus with it. Nay, social morality *should* be unethical; for in regard to the individual, no social decision can ever be just, and the community, too, "must" live, for no individual could subsist on earth without it. Today, people endeavour to humanize justice; there prevails, more and more, a precise discrimination between self-seeking criminals and lawbreakers out of conviction. But if these endeavours go too far, jurisprudence will inevitably become absurd. No individual, as such, is to be condemned; here Christianity is always in the right. One can never know whether the good will not, some time, break through the hardened fetters of bad habit. If this point of view is maintained uniquely, along with the will unto the

¹ I have already stated this in my book, *Immortality*, written when I was twenty-six years of age.

absolute good, then ultimately no one will dare punish any man except for the sake of bettering him. And since every punishment of the severer kind is proved to harden the soul of the punished, one would have the right, if ethics ruled jurisprudence, to punish practically only if the house of correction represented a special mansion in Paradise. This is also the issue to which an important modern tendency actually leads. From the social point of view, however, it works as much evil as it works good; for the deterrent character of imprisonment is thereby destroyed. With justice the first thing to be taken into account is the community and not the individual.

Now the inbuilding of the ethical into the socially-moral is possible up to a certain point. It can be brought about in direct proportion to the degree to which the prevailing social morality changes its own meaning so that the community as such is no longer regarded as an end in itself, but the moral justification of the community resides rather in the creation of the best possible conditions for the development of the individual. In this case the norms for individual growth—the truly ethical norms—would become those of morals and law. From here, too, there can be determined which objective ethics alone do not contradict the very meaning of ethics: namely the ethics of the reverence for life for which Albert Schweizer has laid the foundation. For once the individual's self with its good will is recognized as the ultimate terminus of all conceivable good, then there is no possibility of maintaining any other attitude towards every other man than that of reverence pure and simple; for there exists no external standard for the appraisal of the other man's soul. But Schweizer's

ethics, as its author knows better than anyone else, is not capable of empiric objectification beyond a certain point, nor can it ever be. It is proved over and over again that the sacrifice of the individual to quantitative considerations is inevitable. Ethics on Schweizer's lines can, thus, be exalted to the rank of a categorical imperative only in the sense of a *moral attitude of the mind*. And this attitude may indeed some day gain ground to the extent that the individual person as a life-value would, in principle, be acknowledged as the court of the last resort instead of the entire community, so that the harm of the conception that good is determined from the social standpoint would at long last be abolished. And this would lead to a universalization of progress, which today is at least beginning to manifest itself in the fact that sexual intactness no longer decides the value of a woman; that no special sexual practices defame the individual, or that one need not be void of honour who refuses to fight a duel. Every ethics proceeding from *the other fellow* (to use the language of the man in the street) is a misunderstanding pure and simple. Thus, first and foremost, Kant's system of ethics, which is based on the fulfilment of duty. Things should evolve in principle towards the acknowledgment that every individual as such is a sanctum, and that all interferences with private life whatsoever mean a disturbance of the domestic peace. The next step to be taken, starting from this new attitude, would be to correct the commandments of social morality—which are equally necessary on their own plane—according to the nature of the particular cases. But precisely this correction could, according to the meaning of all ethics, be only strictly individualized and intended to apply each time to one particular case; here,

hard and fast rules can never be established. Nay, if the good could, in one single case only, be statically established, its kingdom on earth would be annihilated for evermore, and the Devil's triumph would be final.

Universal rules are applicable only to qualities, belonging to the genus, as defined by ethos and hyper-ethics; and these maintain their validity up to a certain degree, even before the idea of the absolute good, owing to the universal law of correspondence. Hence the *appearance* that there can be such a thing as a universally valid "should" and, consequently, universally valid objective ethics. Still, these rules never maintain their validity throughout: the criminal can become a saint at every moment, a morally reproachable deed can for once signify ethical advance. This, then—to give a richer colouring to our abstract knowledge by concrete illustrations—helps us to understand why the German, who always thinks of his duty as the ultimate end, appears wholly devoid of magnetism as a moral leader, however fundamentally honest and capable he may be, whereas this power is possessed most of all by Spaniards and English. With the first the reason is that they abhor objective justice, that is, justice externalized into law; the man who seeks personal revenge is deemed honourable, the one who condemns another is considered less worthy. This is the reason why in Spain all sympathies go out to the condemned murderer, provided that he has not been guilty of cowardice; why the Spanish prisons have the reputation of being the most humane of all, and why the professional judges are held in moderate esteem by the people. It is true that the question is here of a very primitive form of ethical consciousness. But it is, nevertheless, a million times superior to all German

feeling of equity; for the ethical quality stands and falls with its being upheld *personally*, from personal initiative. And this, again, leads us to the understanding of the unique power of attraction of the English. The Englishman possibly acknowledges the claims of the community within its proper sphere to a still higher degree than the German. No one can be as hard as he when the public welfare requires it. But as an individual he is ready at any time to put his personal honour and the demands of his higher self above duty. This is the reason why his hardness is resented by none. He always does that good which is *closest at hand*; he always remains a *human man*. Therefore, his ethos strictly forbids him one thing—discourtesy. Courtesy is no doubt the first and foremost proof of reverence towards another man's life. Courtesy is more important and means more before God than not to kill, not to commit adultery and not to steal. Let a man be never so objectively well-meaning, if he is discourteous, he is inhuman and thus evil in the deepest sense. Only he who reverences the human quality in man acts in true accordance with the meaning of goodness. Accordingly, he alone possesses power of attraction; only he finds followers.

This, then, leads us to the only true concept of humaneness. The question is, here, not of compassion, of compliance, and the like. *What matters is that the individual should be, for himself and for others, the ultimate terminus—in perfect accordance with the Christian idea.* All humanizing of law and politics rests upon this foundation, and so, to exactly the same degree, does all ethicizing. Precisely this is the meaning of the fact that institutions are being more and more adapted to the betterment of man. For to become good and better is

the ultimate *personal* goal. Yet again: let the communities become as humane and ethical as they may, the conflict between true ethics and the community remains insolvable. No man ever had a right to a good conscience. And this is just as it should be. The insolubility of the ethical conflict is the very meaning of the higher ethos. This insolubility must be experienced personally. This insolubility should be borne as a burden not to be shaken off. We are entitled to say in this connexion: woe not only to the just, but also to him who, because the heavenly door of ethics leads to the hell of despair (Richard Wilhelm), overleaping ethics, seeks his abode straightway in the realm of Divine Grace. Man cannot do this without foregoing his humanity. Man as man is intimately bound up with his ethos. We have often employed the metaphor of the tension of chords requisite for the playing of melodies. This holds good to the highest degree in the field of ethics. He who cannot stand the tension between the inner demand to do good and the impossibility of fulfilling it; he who refuses to take up his cross—this man is truly damned.

HERE it might seem as though the final word on the subject was to devolve on Christian ethics. But this is not so. We are, thanks to the knowledge we have gained, able to go beyond it, and we must, therefore, do so. The immense achievement of the specifically Christian phase of our history (that the following construction strictly applies to the West only does not diminish its value for our purposes) is due to the following perceptions: first, that the individual or rather the super-empiric meaning behind every individual, his metaphysical self, is the ultimate terminus of all his

doings and endeavours, wherefore the communal or social ethos never should be allowed to crush the individual by majority; ethics is, first and foremost, a personal concern. Second, that the need of the soul is pre-eminent in so absolute a sense that no hyperethical value counts beside it. Third, that the Christian ethics were the first to perceive that sin and suffering are not merely negative qualities, but also ways of salvation; these perceptions lead up to our own, according to which it is precisely its insolvability which constitutes the meaning of the ethical problem. Fourth, that the personal relationship towards one's neighbour is of greater import than all objective justice. Indeed, only what Jesus Christ calls Love is that personal relation to one's fellow creature which answers to the ideal of the good. To which there is to be added, as a further wisdom leading to yet deeper results: that his "I" should not be man's ultimate terminus. It should not, because as a matter of fact it *is* not his ultimate terminus, and because he who fails to extend his life beyond his selfish limits cramps his nature. As in the chapters, "Death and Life Eternal," "Love and Understanding," and also in the chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," of my book, *Menchen als Sinnbilder*, I have dealt with the problem of self-seeking and the ego as exhaustively as I am able at present, I can here confine myself to a very brief exposition of the true meaning of the Christian doctrine just considered. Every man belongs *through and notwithstanding his subjectivity*, to a more comprehensive whole of life, a part of which he forms. It is in this larger whole that is rooted his true personal centre. Hence the paradox that only he that loseth his life shall find it; that whosoever would realize himself may not live for his own

sake. This is the ultimate basis for the adequacy of the preference, in ethics of altruism to egoism. The deepest essence is lavish of its substance. It originally belongs to the spiritual cosmos, where there are no barriers between the self and others. Here are the roots of that uniquely true community which begins beyond the ultimate personal solitariness, which is insuperable on its own plane.

All these summarily enumerated and eternally true beliefs were, with Christianity, incarnated in a specifically masochistic phase of humanity. They thus underwent a specification according to which suffering was more than worldly power, lowliness was held to be better than superiority and, above all, man was declared to be utterly unable to overcome evil by his own endeavours: Divine Grace alone, received in humility, could bring that about. With these interpretations Christianity literally spirited away the ethical problem. It ignored its insolubility on its own plane and annulled it in the overpowering sphere of Grace. The pathos of the creature was henceforth the last word. This attitude inevitably made ethics, in the *true* sense of the term, impossible, wherefore it is not to be wondered at that no human species worked more evil than the Christian. It alone, of all other species awarded the intrinsic primacy on this earth to the Devil—and that all ethics since classic days down to the most recent times were in the literal sense pathological. Nor is it to be wondered at that the first attack of a genuine ethical attitude of the mind, conducted by Nietzsche, also took on a pathological form. From what has gone before, there no longer can be any difficulty in stating the problem of ethics in such a way that it will seem to be founded beyond all psycho-

logical contingencies. What is needed is to draw from what has been said all the conclusions implied in the philosophy of sense-apprehension. On the plane of manifested life evil and good are, like death and life, mutually delimited polar co-ordinates. Thus, the triumph of the good over the evil, on this plane, would be opposed to sense. The ethical demands issuing from the primacy of the absolute good do not prevail except in the transsubjective dimension. They cannot be inbuilt into the earthly laws except by the bestowal of a new meaning upon the elements, which are unchangeable as such. Here, then, there comes into play that basic law of life which we have till now disregarded in this connexion, to the effect that in the realm of life significance creates the facts. The consequence is that from every sense-region transformations on the plane of hitherto ultimate termini are possible. This means that, on their planes, the ultimately-terminal good and ultimately-terminal evil can become the means of expression of an unequivocal good or evil quality. Whether a phenomenon is ultimately good or evil obviously depends on the meaning it ultimately incarnates.

Let us now, from this vantage point, look over the entire range of the human essence of life, starting from its instinctive foundation. The basic urges unto power and joy, which no human soul could be without, *would* obviously be evil if they were ultimate sense-termini instead of being a mere foundation; and they also *become* evil in the absolute sense whenever they ultimately dominate man. Now the same holds true of absolutely every impulse. Every nay-saying is liable to develop into the "Ever-denying Spirit." But nay and yea are nowhere hard and fast termini. Let us recall the ob-

servations in the chapters on psycho-analysis which I would not repeat here. The basic law of the soul is its mutability. Dionysos became the Devil when he was regarded under a purely negative aspect; and the Devil, again, was retransformed into Dionysos when a new sense-bestowal had taken place. Thus, the sexual relations do not only appear, they actually *are*, beautiful or ugly according to the way they are regarded. Metamorphosis is made possible by the natural laws of ambivalence and polarity. Fear is joy repressed; asceticism is inverted eroticism. It is the criminal who is most liable to become a saint. Good and evil will ever remain as polar co-ordinates; but the incarnation of the impulses may at every moment take on a new aspect, in accordance with the prevailing meaning. Under these conditions, who is the born criminal? It is he who *deliberately* decides in favour of evil; but such absolute devils are much rarer than saints. As a rule the criminal is he with whom the tensional springs, as it were, are broken; it is he who lacks the necessary force to use only at stated times his empiric evil as a restriction of his good, but is utterly obsessed by it. He is in exactly the same predicament as the madman: the normal man, too, is acquainted with insane states of mind as momentary conditions; what constitutes the madman is that his abnormal state is lasting and insuperable. Thus I hold it as certain that criminals, ethically judged, are—barring the small number of genuine devils—in the literal sense out of health. It is thus indubitably possible to prevent to an unheard-of degree the development of criminals by means of the right kind of education and treatment. For there would seem to exist far fewer incurable patients than the so-called incorrigibles who fill the prisons. This possibility

is proved by the mere fact that in the privileged walks of life, almost exclusively the physically degenerate are likely to become criminals. To that extent *probably* a notable increase in the wealth of mankind would suffice to make the world appear considerably better—an hypothesis which, again, sanctions the so-called "materialism" of the modern masses.

But let us now revert to the personally-ethical problem. If good and evil are polar correspondencies, the shape of which differs with the meaning bestowed on them, then the ethical problem obviously consists in doing good *by means of the synthesis of good and evil attainable in the particular case*. Let us remember the above-mentioned proposition of Ludwig Klages, according to which the evil and the ethical are different branches of the same tree. All ethos demands a nay-saying, every nay means some kind of destruction, and in every nay lies the ultimate decision in favour of the satanic within the range of immanent possibilities. Under these conditions it is absolutely absurd to stop at some statically defined evil as the ultimate terminus. What is required is, conversely, to universalize that which finds its elementary expression in destroying justice. *What is required is to give from the pure subject, to the empiric good and the empiric evil one does, a personally unmixed good meaning—and it thus becomes purely and solely good*. In his magnificent song on the dead heroes of Verdun, Henri de Montherlant looks back with regret on the World War because, as he says, he then experienced, within himself and in others, love and goodness to a degree he never has experienced since. This, on the one hand, is due to the fact that the unrestrained workings of the urge to destruction liberated the polarly cor-

relative positive strivings by way of a proportionately extreme expression: but it is above all due to the fact that the war called forth a spontaneous sense-bestowal which actually transfigured the combatants. So we should apply a transfiguring meaning to all things. Just as the same disposition which makes the murderer appears in a positive aspect in the war hero—and the same holds good of the hangman and the surgeon and hospital nurse, of the torturer and the better kind of psychoanalyst—just so it is possible everywhere to transform what is evil on its own plane into the means of expressing a higher good. This is the true core of the doctrine of “beyond good and evil.” The question is here, no doubt, of a beyond the empiric good and evil; it is only beyond their plane that true ethics comes at all into play. But they do not proceed from the hyperethical sphere—of strength and beauty—but from that of the absolute good; the purely positive quality none need trouble to define for himself, since it lives as an ideal in the heart of hearts of every man. In this sense positive sense-bestowal can overcome the evil again and again.

But it follows from this at the same time that there neither is nor can be such a thing as a system of ethics of universal applicability. It is true that good and evil are, in one particular respect, interrelated as are the objective and subjective spheres; and if the meaning of Kant’s categorical imperative is, according to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, condensed into the proposition “act objectively,” this definition is not intrinsically wrong. But it becomes wrong as soon as the objectivity in question is determined from the point of view of the object itself and not from the super-personal sphere.

The ethics of the fulfilment of duty is an invention of the devil's hardly less perfidious than a good conscience. Law can never be just. There is no such thing as a universally valid sexual morality. Nor is there a canon of truthfulness fixed once and for all. He who would not, under certain circumstances, forswear himself as a matter of course, is a scoundrel. Ultimately everyone must arrive, by himself, at the decision as to how much guilt he must avowedly take upon himself in order to manifest in this life the highest good of which he is capable. The only universally valid moral concept in this connexion would be that of the Hindoo Dharma, which awards to every state its particular ethos.¹ But universally valid ethical norms disagree with the very idea of authentic ethics. The ethical problem which has the same roots as that of freedom *exacts* at every moment *personal* decisions from personal responsibility. And this is the reason why the right decision can be dictated only by *personal* knowledge, an insight so personal that it takes upon itself in every case the risk of absolute error. He who would ask certainty here misunderstands the whole aspect of the problem. But it is true that on the other hand the full understanding of the problem leads to the slow bettering of the Devil's hereditary realm: for it is then coerced more and more into serving as a means of expressing Divine Meaning. This practice cannot but transfigure it more and ever more. True, every kind of eudemonism and hedonism is absurd and will remain so. They are refuted by the mere fact that all must inevitably suffer and die, that all mankind must come to an end. But it is not this that mat-

¹ I have explained the idea of Dharma at length in the chapter, "Hindoo and Chinese Wisdom," of *Creative Understanding*.

ters; the perfection of the earth is not an end in itself, but only the best means for spiritual growth. If the aim to be attained on this earth mattered in the very least, then all ethics would be entirely devoid of meaning. Ethics is deeply meaningful because it represents man's way not to external success nor to the objective good, but to his deepest inner self.

WE THUS perceive that in this instance there is a perfect correspondence between the claims both of nature and of spirit. The same ethos is the natural basis for any realization of values. And the principle of spiritual form-bestowal and decision, the very same thing which, according to the perception attained in the chapter, "Death and Life Eternal," can alone individually outlast the earthly life, is, again, only ethically determinable. The reason for this is that life, on all its planes, is pure actuality, a now and a here. But precisely because ethos means the basis of all human life, there are no objective ethical solutions; and the quality of conflict rules the ethical field from beginning to end. For life, on all its planes, is a labile equilibrium, and the mere idea of freedom would lose its meaning if anything were decided or could be decided beforehand and once for all. Therefore, the tragic ethics outlined here is alone in accordance with the meaning of things. Therefore, it is contrary to sense even to venture to overcome tragedy on the plane of possible ethics. Solutions are only possible beyond the plane of possible ethics. But the human plane of life is precisely the ethical plane and no other. It squares in principle with the historic plane, where man's responsibility is the ultimate terminus. Therefore, man can never abandon the human

plane, would he not fall. Whether he delivers himself up entirely to Nature or to Grace—he disavows his destination, in the latter case no less than in the former. For *only* as an ethical being, that is, as a form of life which not only, like all the others, inevitably both builds and destroys, is ever reborn and ever dies, but which does good and evil, although it feels that it should do only the good, can he fulfil his destination. Every denial of ethos for the sake of pathos is a deadly sin. It is true that the pathic attitude befits man in the presence of what is not of the human sphere. But never should his ethical strivings in the presence of what depends on his free will cease, no more than the body may ever suspend respiration.

The Religious Problem

THE preceding chapter on account of the setting which it gave to the problem and to the aim which it pursued, could deal only with the positive side of ethos and, correspondingly, with the negative side of pathos. Still, the trends of thought which it followed have already shown by implication that the ethical is not man's ultimate problem. It is from here on that we must now proceed; and in order to advance forthwith *in medias res*, it will be better not to begin with abstract arguments bearing on principles, but with concrete experience. Our Occidental history proves with rare directness that a satisfactory solution of the ethical problem does *not* mean a final solution of that of life. Both Paganism and Judaism were superior to Christianity in as far as mere ethos is concerned. Nevertheless, Christianity triumphed. And it did so obviously because it incarnates a form of life representing a deeper adjustment.

There is no doubt that pagan man was superior to the Christian from the ethical point of view. His was the higher form, he was the more sustained, the more perfect, the more sovereign type. In the presence of the pagan type, no one would think of designating man as an ailing animal. Also, antique ethics are superior to the Christian. They are self-sustained, integral, untainted by compromise; they always proceed from the only possible ethical starting-point, that is, the self-

determination of sovereign man; whereas the Christian, as an ethical being, could never feel assured of himself, and for that very reason could never fill *that* life-form completely neither in thought nor in life. Did not his faith teach him that worldly greatness is of no avail before God; that his home is not on earth; that in heaven the repentant sinner takes precedence over the just, and that pride cometh of evil? Yet it is precisely pride which is the normal exponent of all inner *tenue*.

But not only the antique pagan, the Jew, too, appraised from the purely ethical standpoint, was superior to the Christian. We can here forego all abstract arguments since we are in possession of the finally conclusive experimental proof. As the only people of our cultural sphere, whose most essential feature is its mutability, the Jews have preserved their type unimpaired and undegenerated dating from prehistoric times, and they have done so although they proved at all times to be intellectually *rerum novarum studentes*. This can be due to nothing else than their uniquely well-established ethos—rooted as it is in the Absolute—and to their uniquely durable morality built upon it. Whether one is in sympathy with the particular type represented by the Jew or not, *tenue* as such in the sense of a primary ethos, that is, in the sense of the basic determination of man in general, has never been manifested by a race to a higher degree. Thus, their thoroughbred type appears to this very day more firmly rooted and—from the purely ethical point of view—rooted in greater conformity to sense than the Christian type. Nevertheless, all things considered, the best type of Jew is in one way or another inferior to the best type of Christian; here the *consensus gentium* may be safely

regarded as proof positive. Also, history has proved that the most perfect pagan type did not come up to the most imperfect Christian type. For man of classic days did not die out because of the degeneracy of his national representatives: in thinking of the great prestige which the antique type enjoyed, until the end nothing would seem more probable *a priori* than that henceforth younger races should have perpetuated the same type. Antique man died out precisely because these peoples were converted to Christianity. We can take these historic facts as illustrations in support of our thesis, because the meaning of all ethos and of all ethics is the maintenance and uplift of humanity and nothing else. Where ethos or ethics fails to stand the pragmatic test from the standpoint of the increase and improvement of life, it is refuted by life. Not, however, in the sense of pragmatism, or still less, of utilitarianism, but precisely in that of sense-realization. That which is merely expedient has never possessed the power of attraction from one generation to another. How is all this to be understood? It has to be traced back to two causes which I mention conjointly because they admit of no separate treatment. First: man is not, for himself, *ad intra*, the ultimate terminus. Second: the inherent tendency of all objectifications of the ethical principle does not lead to the good, but to the evil.

LET us consider this second cause first, since— thanks to the paradox it implies—it is, if seriously meditated upon, best suited to rouse every man from his dogmatic slumber. The primary meaning of ethos is form-bestowal and *tenué*; the goal of all ethics is to show the way to the realization of values by means

of these functions of the mind and of the soul. Here we are obviously confronted from the outset with two practical possibilities: the vital stress lies either on the creative or on the instrumental quality, either on meaning or on the laws and rules governing its realization. But this also signifies that the emphasis lies either on freedom or on inertia. In the first case the centring of life on ethics leads to supreme perfection, since it leads to freedom. This is the reason why humanity in general has found, thus far, its supreme expression in the highest representatives of antiquity. In the latter case, however, the inevitable consequence of such centring is narrowness and rigidity. Now every universally valid and actually observed ethics has thus far been the product of the spirit of inertia; it could incarnate this spirit only because there can be no freedom except in the functioning of the single-instance unique; for this reason a "system of ethics of freedom" would imply an absurdity. This explains why every objectified ethics had to urge the stressing of will as opposed to the creative powers of the soul. For such ethics demands a delimitation of life, and its principle is, therefore, the "nay" and not the "yea." Now this last sentence alone suffices to render intelligible the assertion that the intrinsic tendency of the objectified ethical principle is towards evil. Once the human being has attained consciousness, it must say nay in order to maintain itself as a particular phenomenon: for with the free it is precisely this willed "nay" which creates the vital form. But he who always says "nay" is a devil; for all positive qualities spring from the spirit of "yea"-saying. The everlasting "nay"-sayer inevitably cramps, devitalizes, and finally kills, however well-meaning he may be.

Thus even the critic who, in positing his "nay," fails to posit personally and implicitly a corresponding higher "yea," is spiritually satanic.

Now every system of ethics is, as a fact, a system of limitations, and thus of the "nay," even where it deals with the "yea" only, for it would be contrary to sense if the "yea" let itself be commanded. Therefore, whenever objectified ethics means a personal ultimate terminus it is necessarily representative of the spirit of "nay." Here a continual series ranges from the ethicist and the just through the egoist to the devil. Let us repeat: this holds good *only* to the extent that an ethos is inspired by the spirit of inertia and not of freedom; whether it expresses the principle of the good or that of the evil depends on where the emphasis lies in the "nay"-and "yea"-connexion. But since all empiric ethos is rooted in will, and since will is not creative but limiting, that is, "nay"-saying, the inevitable consequence, in the presence of the overwhelming power of inertia as against creative freedom, is that the stressing of the ethical principle develops on the *great* scale a momentum towards evil and not towards good. And it has indeed always proved to be so. Hence the stupendous hard-heartedness of antiquity. Hence the equally stupendous rigidity of the Jews. Hence the typical life-stifling tendency of all "Justice," when it ruled, whether of the Church and theology as opposed to spontaneous religiousness, or of science as opposed to original ideas, or of the mentality of the so-called mainstays of society as opposed to the ingenuous child of man wending his own way because his inner "yea" is stronger than all traditional "nay"-barriers. In principle, there is no need that every ethics which stands for an ultimate terminus should incarnate

the spirit of evil. But in the long run it has always been so, simply because of the overwhelming power of inertia as opposed to freedom.

From this vantage point we can revert with a deeper understanding to the psychologic achievements of Ludwig Klages, the most mature expression of which is contained in the fourth edition of his *Charakterkunde*. Klages is, as I would point out once more, the author of the proposition that the Ethical and the Evil are branches of the same tree. The exclusive stressing of what Klages calls "spirit," but which is in truth the ethical aspect of life, leads to the repression and crippling of vitality. He who always wills and acts by the guidance of his will can at the same time neither live out nor develop his emotions. But the man of will, as the stresser of the "nay," is also uncreative. The creative quality springs everywhere from a sphere beyond the Ego—whereas the source of will is to be sought for precisely in the latter; what is commonly called creative will is in truth imaginative power.¹ For this very reason he for whom objectified ethics of any kind is the last word is physiologically unable to do real good. As shown in the preceding chapter, the real good can never be done otherwise than in the form of an unconditionally spontaneous act springing from the metaphysical essence. Now he who accepts as an ultimate end any kind of moral doctrine never really acts spontaneously;

¹ The explicit proof as to the extent to which not will, but only imagination possesses creative power is to be found in the chapter, "The Way," of my book, *Creative Understanding*. In this connexion the graphologic proof furnished by Klages that Napoleon, of all men, was a purely imaginative genius with no predominant will-power is particularly instructive.

nor does his consciousness ever come into contact with his deepest being, since he is fettered to the superficial forms. This is why no law-abiding "just" man can ever be good in the genuine sense. On the other hand, he who is not good in the sense of freedom *ipso facto* delivers himself over to the spirit of evil. Hence, let it be said once more, the terrible hard-heartedness and wickedness of all times of "Justice." I personally find the readiest and best illustration of hell in the conception of a moralistic community pursuing human welfare by means of compulsion.

Now how is a man to get into contact with his deepest creative source, a contact on which all realization of values obviously depends?—This brings us to the real understanding of the extent to which ethos and ethics do not signify man's last word. As considered from the "I," the principle of will, there can be but *one* logical adjustment to the Creative Essence within: the *adjustment of self-surrender*, that is, of pathos. If anyone would be blessed by the flash of a spontaneous thought, he must not draw himself taut, but must unbend. The same holds true of all creative qualities. Original creations originate always in a beyond to the ego. If we now consider from this vantage point the sphere of objectified ethics, we perceive with perfect clarity why the exclusive emphasis on the ethical and its acknowledgment as the ultimate terminus has always led to rigidity and thus to evil: the evil corresponds metaphysically to death. Now wherever creative powers are no longer at work, there the spirit of death already prevails, for in this life of simultaneous becoming and passing away, where destruction and reconstruction co-operate at every moment, every ebbing of the motif of birth gives *ipso*

facto predominance to that of death. Still, these propositions do not mean the last word to be said on the subject. Klages simply parts with spirit and ethos in consequence of his opinions. The explicit proof for the erroneousness of his fundamental metaphysical theory will be given later. But we can, even now, with the results gained thus far in this book to support us, say as much as suffices here for a rectification of his views. Spirit and ethos are not inevitably means of expression of the principle of death; they are so only to the extent that inertia, and not freedom, is their fountain-head. There is truth indeed in what Klages maintains of the intellect and the law-abiding just; both the intellectualist and the moralist are adversaries of life. But he errs in regard to spirit and ethos in the general sense. For all initiative has its root in the Logos, and Ethos shapes this initiative according to the law pertaining to man. If, then, man would not simply disavow his humanity—which would indeed mean espousing the cause of death and, consequently, enmity to life, since nobody can really escape his humanity—personal enmity to ethos and spirit are simply opposed to reason. Still, the error of Klages flows from a correct intention. There is no question as to the necessity of unbending instead of drawing oneself taut, if one would invite creativeness. There is no question that to that extent pathos leads farther than ethos. *But this higher pathos presupposes ethos as its foundation.* This is the crucial point. The case may be stated best as follows: He who is *not even* capable of conscious form-bestowal, of bearing and initiative, has not as yet attained the stage of man on the scale of beings. He who “must” from inner compulsion do a thing on the plane where he

could (or, in the judgment of every inwardly free man, ought to) do better, always reveals his inferiority when laying the emphasis on pathos. For it is his ethos that makes of man what he is, as man. He who disavows from the outset the limitations it entails does not get beyond the stage of humanity, but returns to a lower status. Yet the error into which Klages has fallen leads us straightway to a knowledge of the true facts. *The sphere of possible ethics does not mark out the human maximum, but the minimum.* In the case of morality this is obvious from the outset: the observance of its laws does not mean anything high or great, it represents the lowest grade of correct adjustment in the cosmic connexion. They may be broken by him in whom higher principles of form prevail. Whosoever is not in this situation must at least live morally, unless he would come to grief. But we shall now proceed to the establishment of a positive Beyond to ethics: *the ethically fully developed and controlled man must, in turn, maintain a pathic attitude towards that ultimate quality within him which is not subject to his conscious will and conscious form-bestowal; that quality from which all his spontaneous thoughts and all his revelations spring: thus only can he reach complete integration.* Thus only are his deepest creative powers set free. Thus only can he avoid being cut off from the cosmic connexion, the eternal symbol of which predicament is Lucifer's Fall. This *ultimate* reality alone is the object of religion.

YET already we are brought up here against the principal difficulties, whose clearing up constitutes the main object of all history of religion and mind; it is the hitherto insufficient elucidation of these difficulties

which prevents us from being even now as positive and clear as the solution of our task would demand: Which is the proper sphere of religion? Where must ethical problems reasonably cease to be raised? What constitutes the difference between spontaneous ideas of the artistic genus and religious inspiration? How is pathos, as directed towards the superhuman, to be clearly discriminated from downward trends? Since what has been thought out most recently is always most readily understood, I shall, without dealing with these questions explicitly from the outset, treat them by way of a symbol presented in the persons of three modern investigators: Oscar A. H. Schmitz, Ludwig Klages, and C. G. Jung: the critical sifting and clearing of the material they represent will lead us forthwith to the requisite positive definitions.

For one thing there exists between ethos and pathos, on the plane of the concrete empiric life, a relation of polarity which is characteristic of all vital processes. As every moment of life is simultaneously a becoming and passing away, therefore, any one-sided stressing of either pole is an error and injurious, and as a reasonable adjustment demands a super-polar standpoint of creative indifference allowing freedom always to decide in equilibrium—just so a logical adjustment demands that man should not only take, but give correspondingly; that he should not only act, but suffer correspondingly; in a word, that plus and minus should always balance in him. This has been set forth by Oscar A. H. Schmitz in his essay on a polar ethics (in the *Brevier für Einsame*, Georg Müller Verlag) with such classical succinctness that I can safely refer to it for the purpose of further explanations. But the polarity of ethos and pathos

meant by Schmitz exists *only* on the natural plane to which man belongs as an inseparable part; therefore, the polar ethics of Schmitz holds good *exclusively* to the extent that man desires to maintain himself in the phenomenal world as a creature among others. As appraised from Nature's plane, even the free subject in man is in the truest sense supernatural. For with him self-determination within the framework of nature is essentially no ultimate; all establishment of values, all ideals without exceptions, point beyond that goal. Therefore, the ultimately deciding personal man—that man to whom alone self-consciousness refers—when viewed from nature, is *pure* ethos; he does not represent an equilibrium between ethos and pathos. Man as an ethical being, as he was outlined in the preceding chapter, stands in principle and essentially above this polarity; he must reckon with it only for practical purposes, he must balance against one another the poles of empiric being from out of his absolute ethos, if he would maintain himself. From which it follows that the pathic or passive man who renounces self-determination as a matter of principle, who delivers himself up to nature and fate from the outset—whether he calls this renunciation by the high-flown terms of inner compulsion, *Amor fati*, or confidence in Divine Grace—is not so valuable as the man who stands by his freedom unswervingly from the beginning and who performs of his own strength whatever in him lies, but is even inferior. It is, here, then, that Klages' fundamental error lies, one which teaches as much, because no modern thinker before him has chosen so decidedly the ultimately false, although right in so many preliminary respects; it is, furthermore, highly instructive because this wrong decision has in its

turn a deep significance. Lucifer, too, was no superficial person, as compared with the angels, however much wiser these may have been. Klages discriminates in principle between vitality and spirit, by which, as already pointed out above, he means the principle of ethos; and he regards ethos as the true enemy of life. There is no doubt that ethos becomes inimical to life as soon as it is overstressed. But it need not be overstressed; it is man's free and, thus, ethical decision which decides upon whether there is any over-emphasis or not. But above all, Klages does not understand by life what every metaphysically conscious man understands by the term. *The life which is meant by Klages is the purely earthly life, that living fluctuation which is a part of the cosmic process.* This life no doubt flourishes and blossoms the more the closer to nature a being is. No sophisticated man has ever possessed the natural beauty of an animal or a flower. In consequence of his view of life Klages places the natural man above the spiritually conscious. It is true that he frequently *pretends* to mean an originally higher state in accordance with the myth of Paradise; but in truth he means precisely what has been stated here. This is obviously due to personal causes: as mind, a pronounced intellectualist and highly gifted as such, but bent on minor (as opposed to wide) matters, and of an essentially cramped nature, yet, at the same time extremely vital as man, he is characterized by the pathologic quality of the tensions within him; moreover, having, in his youth, met with ecstatic experiences, Klages yearns for the solution of tensions in the absolute sense. And he is probably in the right for himself, psychologically speaking: he would have to add to his ethos, in the sense of Schmitz's polar ethics, a corresponding

pathos in order to reach true individuation. This explains why to Klages the process of spiritualization appears as an unmitigated and irresistible descent; for if *he* were to proceed in this way, if *he* did not, energetically by means of over-emphasized contrast-ideologies, restrain himself on this road—that is, thanks to extreme ethos—it would lead him to destruction. But the enmity of Klages against Spirit has no deeper causes than the psychologic causes outlined above.

And now let us proceed at once to Jung; for here our object is not the recapitulation of alien doctrines, but exclusively the delineation of a framework which will give plastic relief to our perceptions. By way of a transition, I will make use of a quotation taken from Klages' *Charakterkunde* (page 205), the grandeur of atmosphere and attitude of the mind of which none will deny: "If the world-feeling of the pathic man were raised to consciousness, it would find utterance in the conviction that reality is *a world of irresistible comings and goings of animated primary images*, while that of the man of action would pour itself forth in the persuasion that it is intrinsically a fixed, conquerable, possessible world of facts. The first is turned towards transitoriness and the past, as the maternal foundation of his life, to which he is going to return; the latter—the virile type disdainful of origin—is turned towards the future in which he hopes to continue his existence, either through his offspring or thanks to some claim or other to immortality, or otherwise through deeds and performances by means of which he thinks he will impart direction to coming events. The works of the pathic type of man are, like the pyramids, memorials and sepulchres; the works of the activist type are works

of mere utility like the machines." The ultimate terminus of Jung's doctrine are precisely those primary images to which the part of the quotation from Klages italicized (by myself) refer. But Jung takes a more acute and clear-sighted attitude towards them than Klages. For one thing, Jung has not personally taken sides with pure pathos: his situation, at least as a physician, is at the point of indifference between ethos and pathos, wherefore he succeeds, as a practitioner, in interpreting the same images as well in reference to the past as to the future and in making of them, in the latter case, the pathfinders of what has never been; let the reader call to mind the respective paragraphs of the psycho-analytical chapters of this book. As a matter of course Jung does not, then, participate in the sheer nonsense implied in Klages' assertion that the type which turns towards the future and does his day's work in freedom is only utilitarian and mechanist—which nonsense, in the highly gifted author, can be traced back to personal pathologic causes and is therefore worthy of honour, while with his followers it means nothing less than impotence. Above all, however, Jung has—and this is to his everlasting credit—ultimately divested that reality which Klages actually deals with, though he does not mean it, of its metaphysical character and has proved by experiment that the question with these primary images is not of a higher order, but of the *generic* in man. Jung correctly compares his collective unconscious with Semon's *Mneme*; it is, for him, the psyche of the species which continues to live on through the series of individuals. And he has succeeded in proving thereby that the "psychic in itself"—which is identical here with Klages' "vitality"—belongs from the

point of view of metaphysical reality to the *same* plane as the physical. Under these circumstances the emphasis on pathos in Klages' sense cannot possibly lead beyond man; it can only lead downward to sub-human or at least sub-cultural states. With the primary myths, too, the question is not of metaphysically profound things, but of zoölogic and human concerns. They are "more" than man not in the sense of the platonic ideas, but in the sense that every man is primarily "man in general" and only subsequently unique. If these primary images can mean a road to salvation in particular cases, the reason is that every man, as a part of nature, is the child of that All-mother and seeks for ever to revert to her womb; for the ultimate goal of the mortal is death. Furthermore, the yearning for the "Mothers," as can be readily understood, arises with peculiar universality and potency in highly intellectualized periods, for ethos as intellect is indeed in polar correspondence with the pathos of nature-boundness, wherefore the overstressing of the intellectual pole calls out the other. The latter is here, on the one hand, the pole of blind obedience to the impulses—which explains most of the aberrations of the present-day urge unto living one's self out—while, on the other, it is the pole of Fate in the antique sense, wherefore it is not to be wondered at that during the World War it was precisely the Moira (Fate, as understood by the Greeks) which proved to be the supreme power as it had never been since the triumph of Christianity.

And now we can thoroughly understand the true significance as world-conceptions of Klages' philosophy and psycho-analysis, misunderstood as metaphysics, and this will lead us back to our own theme: they are the

modern equivalents of the Nature religions of later antiquity. At that time, too, man was cut off from the whole of life, because he had developed into a one-sided intellectualist and moralist; accordingly, he yearned for a reunion with the "All-mother." But these times were times of decadence—if not in the sense of degeneracy, then certainly in that of will unto death. And the same holds true everywhere of the circles which today take sides with Klages or the metaphysics of the psychoanalysts. He who seeks his metaphysical salvation in Klages' Pathos, or in the images of the collective unconscious, wishes to renounce his individualized and differentiated humanity for the sake of a more primitive state. I have as yet met none of those who found their salvation on these lines who did not belong to the type of such as life had outstripped. If the opening up of the super-personal world of images through Jung's method introduces many a man to higher stages than he had known till then, this progress never consists in his participating thereby in personal experiences of a superior order, but on the contrary in his consciously disengaging his individuality from the collective, and thus indirectly taking a firmer stand in his uniqueness. Therefore, this treatment as such in no wise induces metaphysical personal experiences. Man stands or falls with determinant ethos. The inrush of the metaphysical does not manifest itself in the passing away of individuation, but in the striking root by the conscious in the ultimate personal uniqueness. Thus, with the pathos which genuine religion means, the question is of a quality essentially different from the states just considered: *it is the question of the surrender of the ethos-determined unique man to an even higher reality, the location of*

which is still higher above the earthly polarities than is the case with ethically central man.

This, then, explains the victory of Christianity. From the ethic point of view it laid the emphasis on the wrong place; hence the ethical inferiority of Christian man to pagan man. In all the forms it has hitherto attained Christianity has never accorded its due to freedom—it either gave it too little or too much; the latter makes the tragedy of Protestantism. Genuine ethos is self-assured; and he alone can be sure of himself who acquiesces in what he really is. Still, in the religious field, Christianity was the first in this our world to place the emphasis on the proper place. It demanded pathic adjustment not towards nature, nor towards the collective psychic, but towards the *spiritual* principle which is superior to the “I.” Over against this there is no way leading from Jung’s position to religion. It is true that we owe precisely to him the most important discoveries of the research into the forms of religion. All meaning must needs manifest itself on earth by means of the earth-alphabet. Thus the data of the individual and collective psyche will remain until the end of time the vessels for all possible religious experience. Thus in the future, too, advanced minds will again and again be reconverted to their hereditary religion. For the form of that religion *actually* determines man’s own unconscious. It is simply ridiculous to undertake to abolish, by means of intellectual refutation, any religion which actually sways the souls of men: their forms continue to live in the soul in exactly as unchangeable a manner as the body is bound to definite organs, as long as it lives, though the mind may have imagined much better ones. Thus, antique paganism has never been discon-

tinued in the West: it has in a general way been preserved in the body of the Catholic Church, and it even wells up ever and anon in its original form on Italian soil.¹ The same holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Nordic heathenism. Nordic Christianity was from the first, by a good half, of Germanic origin; and the real reason why the Reformation has triumphed in certain regions only is probably this, that it was possible only there to disavow the Roman heritage.

Very likely all history of religious forms will some day be understood from premises to which Jung's method first blazed the way. But no knowledge of collective psychology will ever lead to, nor even take part in, the solution of the religious problem. This might succeed only if the inner adjustment which a religious attitude requires were proved to be altogether due to an error capable of being finally overcome, and if it were demonstrated that all metaphysics could be supplanted by psychology. The reason why it has not been generally understood that there is no other alternative is to be found in the particular type of the pathic of our time, as expounded in detail in the chapters "*Spengler der Tatsachenmensch*" and "*Jesus der Magier*," of my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*. First, this type of pathic is still feminine, owing to his Christian heredity and, therefore, psychologically unable to recognize the creative spirit in its manly aspect. Second, this type, from reasons implied in the changed consciousness (explained in the third chapter of my *World in the Making*) is incapable of realizing its own ultimate depth.

¹ Compare my observations on the inherent paganism of the Italian in the chapter "Italy," of *Europe*.

Thus dreaming and art mean, for that type, the ultimate possible revelation of depth. Now there is no doubt that the ultimate depth can be revealed through the artist, even as dreams are once in a while fraught with metaphysical significance. But in himself the artist is only the man who creates normally, as a type, out of his unconscious; it makes no difference whether only the generic (primary images) or the metaphysical expresses itself through him. Usually, the first is the case. Such artists can be called profound only in the sense of nature's profundity. But the fact is that our present time has lost its vital relation to the genuine metaphysical, to the extent that its power of discrimination has disappeared. Art is thus frequently regarded as identical with religion; every poet, by reason of his disposition only, is credited with profundity. All these are errors springing from superficial thinking.¹ Inasmuch as the artist does not acknowledge the most extreme ethos of form, he does not stand above but below other types. This is the reason why his ethos of form has always been the most rigid of all. The reader will perhaps arrive at a better understanding if I add that also with the genuine woman ethos predominates over pathos: that is, the ethos of *voluntary* self-surrender, *voluntarily* born fate, and *voluntary* sacrifice.

THE pathos which is superior to ethos is thus by no means to be understood in the sense of the modern pathics and psycho-analysts. Christianity triumphed over the nature-religions of the later antiquity

¹ Compare the detailed exposition of these ideas in the beginning of the literary review of issue twelve of *Der Weg zur Vollendung*.

for no other reason than because it stood for pathos towards a higher *spiritual reality* and not towards nature. Let us here revert to the ideas of Klages. This most serious anti-spiritualist of our day—he is a most serious adversary of spirit since his mind is the sharpest in his camp—regards spirit as a principle inimical to life. This is, at first sight, not wrong, but true, inasmuch as the ethos of the surface leads by natural tendency into evil and as the disunited intellect maintains the vital forces in a state of repression, in which they work only more destructively. Klages is, at first sight, equally right in maintaining that spirit does not belong to the vital connexion and is thus, from life's point of view, a principle of death. Nevertheless, Klages' emphasis is not only erroneous, but essentially wrong. First, spirit is, as we have seen, only inimical to life where the principle of inertia, and not that of freedom, is predominant; and this, again, applies only to spirit in its most superficial sense, that is, spirit as intellect or morality; the deeper spirit lies beyond possible inertia; it is in its essence pure initiative. Furthermore, however, spirit does not belong to the general connexion of life in so far only as life is understood as what everybody means by the word vitality, and as this is regarded as its essential nature. Now there is no doubt that vitality is not the essence of life. As has been shown in all my writings, again and again, from the most varied points of view and in regard to the most various phenomena, life, to the extent that it can be at all apprehended by us, is, on the contrary, ultimately "meaning." Here meaning—that is, the spiritual reality conceivable—creates and maintains all facts including life in the sense of Klages. This is one reason why Klages' discrimination between spirit and life

proves erroneous as soon as the surface of appearances is pierced. It is precisely in spirit that reside the principle and essence of all life. It is precisely spirit which is Life Original. And it follows from this that Klages' fundamental error (explaining all his individual errors) is implied in the premise that man's ultimate vital terminus resides in his earthly life. Only in so far as it does *not* reside there, can spirit as such, and every world-conception and religion which lays the emphasis on the spiritual in general, appear as inimical to life, for whoever robs a value of its quality of absoluteness by making it relative, becomes the enemy of him to whom it means the ultimate.

Now it must indeed be admitted that many a world-conception and religion beyond and besides the above-mentioned have been inimical to life in a special sense to be dealt with later. But in principle, whoever lays the stress on "spirit" as distinguished from "vitality" is in the right exactly from Life's point of view. For the origin and meaning of Life, as has been proved, does not lie in what is transitory. Only in regard to absolute and eternally-real qualities can the laws be understood according to which we actually live and needs must live, as spirits and souls. Only with reference to a non-earthly or supramundane sphere can earthly life possess any meaning. Every other conception is reduced to absurdity by the mere fact of death. The problem is not whether man has a possible home beyond the earthly sphere, it is—with self-consciousness as a starting-point—how he can be as earth-bound as he actually is. That the question is correctly put thus and only thus, becomes evident through the mere fact that earthly life manifests vitality only where it is rooted in the non-earthly and

supramundane sphere. Hence the spectacular vitality of those ages when religiousness in the sense of spiritual religions was genuinely determinant. Hence the fact that frames of mind resembling that of Klages have ever prevailed only among the degenerate or *morituri*. All values that have to be acknowledged as such, all standards by which we measure as beings of spirit and soul, spring from an unearthly region, however paradoxical this may seem to the intellect. This becomes apparent through the mere negative consideration that these standards can never be realized nor adequately applied in earthly life. Ultimately, man is *not* identical with the flux of becoming and passing away, however earth-bound all his empirical manifestations may be. His ultimate *raison d'être* resides, as expressed in the language used in the chapter, "Death and Life Eternal," in the transsubjective sphere situated above the "I." This knowledge was first revealed to the Western World in all its purity with Jesus Christ. In Him for the first time in our cultural sphere the spiritual origin of life became personally conscious. It was to this purely spiritual sphere, and *not* to Nature, Fate, the minus side of empiric life in Schmitz's sense, that Christian pathos referred. That Christ's death on the Cross made it seem as if this pathos signified compensatory stressing of the earthly minus, as against antiquity's earthly emphasis on the plus can be referred to a mere accident: namely, to the fact that the new spiritual consciousness stood in need of the juncture of a masochistic phase of humanity in order to be able to manifest itself. If Jesus had triumphed on earth, His divine wisdom would never have been understood as differing essentially from the antique and Jewish wisdom. Nevertheless, the pathos

of the Christian was not primarily referred to nature, but to spirit, a point indefatigably stressed by Jesus, and by St. Paul after Him. This, then, is the reason why the genuinely Christian pathos produced from the very outset in man—as soon, as long and as often as it was not misunderstood—an ethos of extreme sovereignty; for it set free on the purely human plane precisely this ethos. There never was, on the terrestrial plane, a more autonomous man than the early Christian ascetic and martyr; he only did not know that this was so, and the discrepancy between being and consciousness spoiled the visible picture. It was, thus, entirely in a line with the logic ruling the evolution of Christianity that the impulse which represented its vital source, once the masochistic phase had been overcome, led to an unheard-of *world-supremacy*. As against this dominance those of antiquity were mere child's play—even as the temples of Greece appear as toys when compared with Gothic architecture.

The fact is that pagan man was exclusively man. Hence his earthly perfection, unique among the cultured nations; the same perfection is otherwise to be seen among animals only. On the other hand, however, no superhuman powers manifested themselves through him. Correspondingly, the whole antique world was intrinsically small-calibred, even in the transitional phase of the Roman age, in which, the Hellenic *Kalokagathia* having been disrupted, individual cases of recklessness and extravagance had become possible here and there; nor was the basic form of this world a macrocosm; it was a microcosm; it was, accordingly, in the concrete, not the *orbis terrarum*, but the city; in the same sense the Divine was minimized in the apotheosized Cæsar. Is it not clear by now why the triumph of Christianity over

paganism was inevitable? Christianity left to man as man his ethos as his ultimate terminus; that this state of things has almost always remained unrecognized is not the fault of Christ's own intentions. He never and nowhere advocated an attitude of pathos towards nature and fate. It was only in order to prevent this misunderstanding of His pathos to which later antiquity was so liable that He—who otherwise made a point of choosing His words in opposition to Judaism—threw into such strong relief the concept of sinfulness. In return, Christ created a *religio*, or otherwise made conscious the dependence on the absolute supramundane spiritual reality. Christianity was thus the first religion, in the higher sense, in the Western hemisphere. Judaism was its germ-cell. Judaism is essentially "law," that is, ethos and ethics. Correspondingly, the Jews were of all Mediterranean races alone proof against a sinking back into the womb of nature. But they could not, as a people, produce a religion of the highest kind, because they were too ethical. In so far they were an extremely antique people. The pathos maintained towards their God was, and always continued, tension and not solution. When all highest religions employ some equivalent or other of the idea of Divine Grace, the last word of Judaism is always *reconciliation*. This is possible only where neither surrenders and yields to the other. Correspondingly, Judaism could not but believe in a world-order implying justice in the earthly sense—which order does not exist; it had to renounce the achievement of the impossible, it could not accept tragedy as the last word of earthly life. What has been roughly outlined here explains sufficiently why, as it seems to me, it is precisely the Jew who never understands the Christian.

The Orient—India, China and Japan—it is true, have known genuine religion from time immemorial. It has always been cosmically centred. This is why the fall of man has never been a problem there. For the same reason, however, there has never existed for the East a religious problem at all. Therefore, the East does not enter into this problem. Problems spring everywhere from conflicts only.

WE HAVE thus reached a vantage point which allows us to give the whole religious problem the right setting. Within the natural connexion of things man's ethos is the ultimate terminus. Every emphasis on pathos degrades him to a sub-human stage. There is no doubt that every man has also to live out the pathic side of his nature, that is, the minus side, as Oscar A. H. Schmitz calls it, which actually exists in the sense that every man's life is bound up with the collective life, on both the physical and the psychic plane. The correct solution of this problem is even of the utmost practical importance; for all harmony of the empiric personality rests upon such harmonization, wherefore educators and doctors should take it as seriously as they can. But it has no importance spiritually and metaphysically; it really is without any importance whatever, since only earthly insufficiency is spiritually productive. What is in question here is uniquely pathos towards what, in the transsubjective region, is situated above the unique free individual. This, then, leads us to the last link in the chain of arguments intended to dispose of the claims to religiousness of Klages' followers and the psycho-analysts. As this book has proved from the most different points of view, the dimension

of the metaphysical sphere is uniqueness. Therefore, it is only when starting from uniqueness that the religious problem can be logically stated. The ultimate meaning of the philosophy of Klages and the psychoanalysts is, as opposed to this, that man's uniqueness is not his ultimate terminus. With this we are face to face with the final and crucial alternative: *If uniqueness is not man's ultimate terminus, then there is most certainly no such thing as a metaphysical reality. Nor can there be, then, a religious problem.* It is a matter of either-or. Whatever is general or collective needs no metaphysical premises for its interpretation.

But there is no man of a profound nature, deeply cognizant of his own essence (nor has there ever been one since the corresponding stage of mental evolution was reached) who would not, as a matter of course, proceed from the premise that what ultimately matters, in every possible respect, is precisely his uniqueness. There is no single problem dealing with essentials to which this very premise does not give its whole meaning. Nor is there any problem dealing with essentials which does not appear susceptible of a solution based on that same premise. There are, as a matter of course, intelligent and genuine persons who fail to see this point: one cannot demand of the blind that he should have vision. But that blindness is blindness and will be so to the end of time, is readily revealed by historic results: Again and again, throughout all the ages, life has disregarded all anti-metaphysicians. And the same holds true of all who deny religious reality. History has *proved*, however individuals may argue against it, that for man the religious problem is the ultimately real problem. I refrain from expatiating on the subject. The very con-

ciseness of this paragraph should make clear how the problem really lies. There is no compromise possible between those who know of a spiritual reality and those others who do not.

LET us now revert to the pathos-ethos question. The pathos of religion belongs to a dimension which differs entirely from that of any other pathos. That in the phenomenal world it often takes on a form resembling that of some other pathos is due to the law of correspondence. If, on the natural plane, surrender to the independent natural process stands for the "minus" corresponding to autonomous activity, surrender to Cosmic Dispensation represents the minus in the religious dimension—and the expression of the two forms of pathos of manifestly divergent directions must indeed be presumed to be identical in view of the restrictedness of the world-alphabet. Humility is demanded towards God; this means merely a pathic attitude: in so far as the same attitude is also the lover's, he, too, shows humility towards the beloved. Now the religious pathos actually is man's ultimate term. As, in the downward direction, he is on the natural plane bound by a process he cannot resist or help, just so his freedom is not the ultimate determinant in the upward direction. This is proved by the empiric fact that he who has failed to comprehend this has, in one way or another, met the fate of Lucifer. There is no doubt that this beyond to the personal "I" is at first susceptible of the most various interpretations. One may stop at the "it" of Groddeck, nay even at the "unconscious" of the orthodox psychoanalysts. But from our own way of stating the problem, aiming as it does at determining the primary intention,

interpretations are primarily unimportant. What really matters for the moment in the field we have chosen is the fact that the profound man *cannot but* acknowledge a power situate above his self in another sense than that applying to external nature. What is essential for the typically religious consciousness is that for it not man, but something above man represents man's true subject. Therefore, what prevails here is not the law of desert, but that of Grace. Nor does this apply only to the religious Christian, but also, in exactly the same sense, to the Buddhist and Confucian. Both explicitly taught ethos only. But this very ethos leads, with the latter, to surrender to the cosmic order, and with the former, as with Lao-tse, surrender—literally appraised—to nihil. Now the latter apparently disconcerting definition makes particularly clear what is *actually* meant: pure surrender to the beyond of the "I." For it is precisely this which takes place in the act of meditation. And this beyond can no longer be determined in function of the "I," which is the primary premise of all concepts. Thus, considered from the "I," the question with the metaphysically-real is *actually* of a nihil, which statement reveals, once more, the immense critical acumen of Buddha's reasoning, and makes clear, on the other hand, why men of a certain disposition not only call the metaphysical into doubt, but positively deny its existence. We stated above that the peoples of the East are unacquainted with a genuine religious problem because for them the reality of the metaphysical sphere is obvious. This is the reason why the East has not produced a Lucifer-myth; this is why it knows of no Fall of Man nor of unpardonable sins. But the East is, nevertheless, regarded as the prototype of religiousness. This is due

to the East's primary pathic attitude towards spiritual powers. Religious experience is impossible except in this attitude. But pathos was also the basic attitude of the West whenever it was religious. If the West has produced no high type of religion, the reason is that its inhabitants, with their essentially worldward tendency and with their disposition considerably more ethic than pathic, realized personally the ultimate spiritual foundation of the world only in exceptional cases. The tragic disposition of the early Nordic man rested on a belief that the last word of the World was some obscure Fatality, the cause and components of which he never succeeded in discerning. Genuine pathos was also the foundation of the religion of the Romans: if their faith appears almost grotesquely flat to the majority of men the reason is that they are incapable of familiarizing themselves with the psychic disposition of so empirical and positivist a people as the modern Italians are even to this very day. In order to understand the religiousness of the Romans and Italians, a member of the Nordic race had better take the *détour* around Japan. The deepest quality of the Japanese is his patriotism. It is, accordingly, of a depth never equalled even by a Frenchman. As for the rest of his traits, the Japanese is so deeply inserted into the body of this world that he is unable to experience the metaphysical quality in itself. Very much the same held true and still holds of the Italian. Fascism is today a real religion, if only in the Roman sense. The Italians and Romans are no religious people from the point of view of the rest of the Europeans; nor have there ever been religious wars among them. But *unconsciously* the Italians are religious, nevertheless; only religiousness has with them a

political body. This is the reason why they so emphatically avow their claim to personal liberty in the surrender to the *Res Publica*, in contrast to the German's sense of duty.

We can now clearly see the reason why the religious pathos truly cannot die; why irreligious eras invariably merge into new religious periods in spite of all intellectual progress; why there have never been absolutely irreligious eras, but only individuals and, as the case may be, social classes which, however, in one way or another always stood for an end. It is true that what has been maintained here does not refer only to a particular confession, but not even to the belief in God. Nay, it does not even refer to religion in the customary sense at all, a point to be dealt with more minutely in a later paragraph. In order to make this clear in the meantime, I would advise the reader to remember the respective trends of thought contained in "*Jesus der Magier*," which only require the supplementary assertion that such religiousness is closely bound up, not only with the primacy of personal experience towards life, but also with that of the *emotional* sphere; he who enters into relations with the Absolute by way of his intellect is nowadays styled a metaphysician in conscious antithesis to the religious man. Even as, from the Christian point of view, all the religious geniuses of India, with the sole exception of those who in one way or another confessed their adherence to emotionalism (the Bhaktas, the Vishnavasects, etc., and foremost of all, Buddha), were "only" metaphysicians. But the eternally real of religion is in principle independent of how it is understood: *it rests entirely upon the reality of its object and on man's essential relation to it, and not on the particular way it is*

actualized; the latter is invariably dependent on empiric accidents. *The eternally real of religion rests, first and last, on the fact that man, as a spiritual subject, is not the ultimate terminus for himself.* Thus Buddhism in spite of its anti-metaphysical adjustment and its Anatta theory, is a much more genuine religion than all Nature-religions: for it asserts with perfect clarity the reality of a transsubjective connexion—essentially different from the objective natural connexion—into which belong the egos living in their own right. Hence the immense influence wielded by Buddhism. For understanding how the spiritual subject is not to himself the ultimate terminus, the results of C. G. Jung's researches render great services to sophisticated modern men, for they express the same truth in a language that is intelligible to him: it can be *proved* that the "I" is psychologically not the ultimate terminus; it can be *proved* that what we call God is at the very least a psychological reality; it can, finally, be *proved* that there is absolutely no possibility of proving a psychological reality to be absolutely devoid of reality.

This should suffice as a preliminary determination. Second, the eternal aspect of religion rests upon the fact that only a *pathic* adjustment puts the "I" in touch with that beyond. The shortest way to understand the historically provable necessity of that particular mode of pathic adjustment which is called religion, is to combine into one view by meditation, the religious polarity Man-God and the empiric polarity Pathos-Ethos, a visualizing combination which is easily possible owing to the law of correspondence. Unique stress on the ethos on the empiric plane has a draining effect, for it cuts off the intellectual side of life from the vital; what could have

become an all-round man is thereby evolved back to a fleshless intellectualist or a flat moralist; correspondingly, in the totally different dimension of the trans-subjective sphere things are as follows: If man avows his own self as man only, which also means exclusive stress on the ethos, he severs himself from the spiritual cosmos and denies all powers beyond the "I." This leads him in his proficient nature to the loss of his creative faculty and, in his being, to ultimate desolation and isolation. His life must eventually grow meaningless to him. The spectre of death as an ultimate vision grins at him in all directions and in all circumstances. This, then, makes clear what the idea of Divine Grace—once its meaning had been divined—must have meant for expiring antiquity; what the personal experience of Grace must, again and again, throughout the ages, have signified to such as, in one way or another, were Luciferian: the isolated individual now felt sheltered; the tragic combatant experienced bliss; the man doomed to death was sure of participating in Life Eternal. For he had attained *religio* towards what is immortal. And man needs this in proportion as his human powers develop: the grander his achievements grow, the more he experiences them as void of meaning; for in the end death in the finite makes all achievements meaningless. It is precisely the highest evolution of ethos which demands, therefore, a correspondingly strong emphasis on religious pathos. This explains why all great men of action were indeed, in one way or another, religious. If they were not so from the outset, they became religious in the course of their lives. It is just the man who takes upon himself the ultimate human responsibility who must somehow believe in Providence by way of compensation if he

would maintain his inner equilibrium. Only he who is from the outset pathically adjusted somehow or other can psychologically dispense with religiousness in this broadest sense. This is the true reason for the "free-thinking craze" of so many thinkers and artists and of such eras as were more reflective than active, as instanced by the eighteenth century. The pathic type is indeed more passive than active; personal experiences and random thoughts which he simply accepts—not conscious decisions—are his true element. Therefore, psychologically, he needs no spiritual minus side by way of compensation. It merely depends on his direct metaphysical consciousness whether he be religious or not. But these psychological causes are not in their turn the ultimately decisive factors. If they were, the object of religion could be always a scheme construed in the psycho-analytical sense of the verb. But all human experience proves in perfect unanimity that the object in question is unconditionally and absolutely real.

HOW far empiric man is not the ultimate terminus for himself, *ad intra*—that is, in the dimension which, figuratively speaking, proceeds at right angles to natural reality—should have become clear by now so far as super-empiric relations can be brought home to the man who has no personal experience in the matter. However, the nature of the reality meant by all religions will never be statable to the satisfaction of science. The Logos Principle corresponds in the spiritual field to masculinity; as opposed to this, every concrete reality is Eros-born and non-rational. A new religion has never been manufactured, it was always born; and it reveals itself as a born reality all the more clearly the more

spermatic-masculine its initiator personally was. Initiators, again, as representing the *Lógos Spermatikós*, never taught a definite faith.¹ Indubitably every religion must acknowledge the results of sense-apprehension, for here sense-bestowing man actually *is* the ultimate terminus. To that extent definite religious ideas certainly are refutable. On the other hand, however, sense-apprehension is bound to halt reverently before non-rational reality as such. Wisdom is never entitled to sit in judgment on what does not belong to the sphere of possible understanding. The living man with his personal experience as compared with the intellectual has here the last word to say. If a non-rational religion becomes obvious truth for a majority of men, there must indeed exist valid non-rational reasons for it beyond the competence of reason. Here again Jung's psychology offers the, thus far, readiest way to a clearer comprehension: new births in the spiritual field always occur in the form of a non-rationalizable unifying symbol. If its effect is thorough, as was the case with the Christian symbol to such an extraordinary degree, there needs must be a most vital reality at the bottom of the phenomenon. As long as a church holds together this material made of symbols, intelligibly and in a form making for ever-new vitalization, it fulfils under all circumstances a task necessary to life. But in regard to the true significance of the Church beyond what has been expounded in the chapters "The Spiritual Unity of Mankind" and "The Ultimate Meaning of Freedom," what must be said is this: For one thing, the church fulfils

¹ Compare for further details the chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," in my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*.

the same function as does tradition in the profane field: that is, it saves the individual the trouble of beginning over again; it supplies him from the outset with the living spiritual heritage. Furthermore, it preserves this heritage, as a homogeneous organism, from dispersal. These two functions, far from being insignificant, are immensely important. Not every man is able to re-discover by himself what his forebears found out; at any rate time would be lost in the process. Nor is every man inventive or even profound. Thus, thanks to existing authoritative traditions—and here is the true root of the idea of authority—even those can participate in the most profound truths who cannot even personally understand them; truth then, nevertheless, bears fruit to the unconscious souls. On the other hand, traditional ties do not rob any man of the possibility of deciding for himself. In principle everyone can at every moment throw off any tie; if he cannot, his freedom did not amount to much. For freedom takes effect under any circumstances from a given basis. Now the wisdom of millenniums is always wiser than all individual knowledge and achievements except those which surpass the ordinary. And if there is no established tradition, then no one ever gets beyond the primary stage. Precisely the second function, however—the preservation of the spiritual heritage from dispersal—has proved, again and again, throughout the ages, to be of the utmost importance. It is only owing to the Church that inferior doctrines did not gain the upper hand again and again—for the man in the street is decidedly in favour of inferior products. I personally even do not hesitate to judge the majority of the various sects which claim independence much in the same way as does the Catholic

Church. For *himself* every man should indeed stand by what he must. But if he is *at all* communally-minded—which always means a transposition of the metaphysical into the collective-psychologic sphere—only the greatest possible breadth of view can preserve him from smallness and narrowness. All Christian communities, both existing and potential, should subordinate themselves to the idea of the One Unified Church which, it is true, would have, in turn, to transform herself so that all her potential children could find room in her.

Whether this will ever come to pass is open to doubt. The idea of a Church is eternally true; but even as historically there has not always been such a thing as a Church, just so it is possible that she will not always exist, at least as a matter of importance. The ruling law of history is that of single-timeness. Nevertheless, as long as there is such a thing as the Church, what we have written about her holds good even where she is seen to be far from fulfilling all the demands which can reasonably be made. And there is much intelligence at work today, in all confessions, not only towards abolishing abuses, but also towards bringing about an absolutely better general condition of things. And here those in whom the principle of inner freedom predominates as against the principle of thralldom should be very generous. It is indeed a sign of Grace to be vouchsafed inner freedom. He who is at all hemmed in by name and form, is also constrained by the laws of form. Religious forms have as much a life of their own, with specific formations depending thereon, as the forms of law and organic nature; often there is little in them that can be changed, as long as one acknowledges form and value at all. And if one does not, one is unwittingly and

all too readily liable to disavow all tradition, which is precisely wherein the true value of the Church consists. Finally, who would ever venture to decide which of the Church doctrines dealing with psychologically and epistemologically inconceivable subjects are objectively true? Significance never manifests itself in the world of phenomena otherwise than by the existing means of expression. These means are provided in every particular case by the personal and collective psychic state. This is why religious inspiration has always taken place within the framework of the pre-existing faith of the inspired—except at turning-points, when new religions were on the eve of being born. The classic example for this is furnished by St. Paul and, to a minor degree, by Luther. The question of absolute value cannot be decided by scientific means. Nevertheless, a few statements on the underlying principle can be made. The confessional question first: from the point of view of pure religiousness, the Catholic adjustment is no doubt truer to meaning than is the Protestant, for it alone implies a purely pathic attitude towards the supernatural. It is true that Luther stressed unmerited Grace even more than any Catholic ever did, but this emphasis was super-compensatory with him. Calvin, on the other hand, over-emphasized the idea of Confirmation to such an extent that his influence has produced a Luciferian effect. Judged by its fruits, the Protestant adjustment has indeed furthered man as an ethical being, in making him conscious of his freedom, but it failed to interiorize and deepen man as a religious being. For the Protestant spirit mainly urged freedom of decision precisely where only self-surrender avails, and where *any* surrender is better than none.

Second, Catholicism in principle excels Protestantism wherever the existence of an objectified belief is required; only where it is not, the inner advantage is with Protestantism. For an objectified belief always means the embodiment of meaning in collective hereditary wisdom; and the latter can never be rich enough. In this respect the Protestant is simply poorer than the Catholic. And if, today, the world seems to be reverting to Catholicism in the only sense which comes into question for a better future of the Church (the same that is shown in the chapter, "The Spiritual Unity of Mankind"), this means nothing else than that the majority of the religiously minded begin to see that it was absurd to disavow even a particle of the human heritage. In this very sense must also be understood the repaganization of our time. The pagan classic heritage, too, embodies eternally valid values which, according to the law of single-timeness and uniqueness, are indeed realizable only with the antique *tenue* to second them. This is the reason why we actually revert even to the primary doctrines of magic.

But let us now approach the question of definite religions in general. We can assert, without fear of being refuted by history, that once religion is acknowledged to mean the last word on the possible relations of man towards the Absolute, as we Christians understand the term, *Christianity stands above all other religions*. For one thing, it alone maintains a purely pathic attitude without ethical or political admixtures. Second, its pathos only is referred exclusively to the spiritual beyond. Judaism had too many ethical components; it believed in a Just God in the earthly sense; it did not accept tragedy; passion was a stumbling-block to it. It

renounced the impossible, adhered alone to the possible (Martin Buber) and thus remained stationary at the threshold of the highest religiousness. Antique paganism, and almost all other religions, mixed up the metaphysical with the naturally-collective. The religiousness of the Persians, so pure in other respects, never attained the outlook beyond the polarity of Good and Evil. It is true that these objections do not apply to India and China. Still, the connexion of man with the spiritual cosmos was so obvious a matter to the Hindoo, as pointed out above, and his personal minus side was so strongly emphasized, that the religious question as a special function did not arise with him. All was religion to him, and at the same time nothing. Similar conditions hold good *mutatis mutandis* of China. If religion is to be at all a differentiated particular function, then there is no doubt that Christianity is foremost. First, it begins with the question of Man's Fall, with which he starts his career as a creature *per se*. Without this Fall there is indeed no possible ascent towards the spiritual. But, second, guilt was not Christianity's last word in the realm of Divine Grace, that is in the Forum beyond the ultimately decisive human ethos, tragedy proves to be an integral part of the supramundane harmony. Small wonder, therefore, that the world, wherever it remains religious, is irresistibly Christianizing itself in this particular sense, within the framework of any kind of doctrines.

DOES Christianity thus mean mankind's last word? To speak of last words in this world, the essence of which is change, is presumptuous. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that it is more than improbable that

in the future there will ever predominate in the long run any religion among men of a higher type of evolution to which what has been said of Christianity would fail to apply. Christianity, as most deeply understood, would thus seem destined to maintain its vitality until the end of time, as the symbol of eternal truth, even if nobody were to believe any longer in its actual dogmas. But there is yet another question as to whether religiousness in the ordinary sense of the term will continue to play the same rôle as in the Christian era.

I would here ask the reader again to recall to mind the results of the chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," in my book, *Menschen als Sinnbilder*, since the knowledge of them must be presupposed. Christianity owes its particular character to a radically feminine phase of man's evolution. The religiousness of the Christian era had decidedly empirical foundations—it would never have triumphed but for an absolutely predominant pathos as an attitude towards life in general. As against this attitude, the fundamental character of the world in the making—as explicitly shown in the book with this title—is emphatically masculine. Now if the signs of the times are not deceptive, this character will become more and more universal and prevalent. The Bolsheviks and Fascists lack all feminine virtues. The chauffeur is a masculine type. The same emphatic masculinity underlies the enmity of modern youth towards tradition and education. To receive, to work out, to continue tradition, is indeed on all planes a characteristic of the feminine principle; to the man his own spontaneous thoughts, his own risk, the personal adventure, mean more than all reinsurance in truth, morality and law. What proves the universal virilization most strikingly

is the growing masculinity of woman. Woman incarnates that particular aspect of mankind which adapts itself from the outset, which instinctively does, and as instinctively is, what is demanded by others: if, then, she decides in favor of the amazon, as she is irresistibly doing in our days to the extent even of surrendering her physical sexual attributes, there can be no doubt that an age of predominant masculine values has already begun. Now that which happens in general cannot but make itself felt in the domain of spiritual life as well. If a world is virilized as compared with its former state, this means a shifting of the emphasis of significance from pathos to ethos. And this again means that the significance of a religious attitude decreases and actually becomes considerably rarer among the leading types. Even today the majority of the typical representatives of the new spirit are not religious from the Christian point of view, if not irreligious. The profound among their class are independent metaphysicians. This shifting of the emphasis of significance from pathos to ethos is now proceeding everywhere all over the globe. This is the ultimate meaning of what, within the Christian cultural sphere, strikes the observer as repaganization. Antique man gives the impression, as compared with the pathetic Christian, of virility in extreme exclusiveness. He was essentially not loving, not believing, not hoping nor suffering, but proficient, active, creative, daring.

Still, he who would believe the key to this turning-point of the times to be de-Christianization, because defeminization, would misinterpret its essential meaning. The mere virilization had indeed set in long ago; and it is precisely this tendency which modern evolution strives to outgrow. Virilization set in with the Renais-

sance and Reformation. For the latter, too, occurred in the name of the triumph of the virile spirit for all its beginning as an endeavour to renew faith: in laying, in its turn, the main stress upon the individual in man and in burdening him with personal responsibility in the matter of spirit and soul it evinced as virile an attitude of mind as the consciously paganly-minded Renaissance; the Reformation thus shifted the stress from pathos to ethos. Therefore, the modern era of progress began as a matter of fact as early as the epoch reaching from the age of discoveries to the eighteenth century. If a purely virile Logos has ever manifested itself, it was during that era of unheard-of initiatives. And the very virility of that early spirit was the cause of the progressive secularization, from century to century, of the Western spirit, in spite of all acknowledged ideas, until the critical point when the Protestant principle, in the nineteenth century degenerated completely into that of materialism. For the spirit of Protestantism is the parent of capitalism, mechanism, and loss of faith, and "by their fruits shall ye know them." The world-revolution is thus only the matured expression of what had been long since in preparation, nay, of what had been for long an historical determinant. With this revolution the shifting of the stress of significance to the masculine pole of humanity has taken place everywhere and this time in the full light of consciousness.

In compensation thereof, it is true, a reanimation of the feminine pole is today in progress, chiefly so in the bodies of the Catholic Church and also of the theosophic and psycho-analytical movements. But this does not change the historical main facts. The feminine principle as such is eternal and universal. As it works in every

single individual, so it worked in the most virile ages, if not publicly, then all the more so in intimate circles. As every great initiator is in one way or another a stout believer in Fate, because he is unable to bear his responsibility alone, just so the Puritans, precisely because they actually took upon themselves the greatest responsibility, were consciously and primarily heroes of faith. In the same sense, precisely because an emphatically non-religious age is beginning, there is also awakening a new religiousness by way of compensation. But this is not the *determinant* factor today. And this fact is of supreme importance. In this bepraised and hailed religious revival during these last years we have to do with a compensatory, and not a primarily determinant, movement. This is proved unambiguously by the character of those who foregather within the precincts of the old and new churches: they are almost exclusively statically-minded, desirous of insurance, tradition-tied, men of the pre-eminently feminine spiritual pole; they are either weak or ailing or rigid. Nor are their leaders in any case incarnations of the new, the higher spirit of freedom, one of the phenomenal exponents of which is world-ascendancy. They are, at best, reincarnations of historically superannuated types of leaders; the most venerable instance of this relation is Ghandi. Therefore, the specifically Christian epoch of humanity is indubitably a thing of the past, even as that of the psychologically similarly adjusted other types of religiousness.

But this does not, let it be repeated, signify that the meaning of this changing of the world is virilization as such: this change, as a critical stage, took place with us Westerners centuries ago. And we Occidentals are

the historic pace-makers. If this change is wholly revealed only now, the reason is that the social and political realization of ideas always appears a long time after their first incandescence in the sphere of thinking and intuitive consciousness. What actually occurs today is something entirely different.—I can be very brief here, for all I need is to insert into the present chapter what I have frequently dealt with in detail in my former writings. The essential change occurring today is a *deepening*, an interiorization, of the masculine spirit, so that man as masculine type comes into conscious contact with his metaphysical root. Today, then, we Occidentals are striving to get precisely over that virility to which we surrendered during these last two centuries, to virility, that is, in the sense of lifelessness, of predominance of the objective side of things over the personal, of the understanding over the soul, of information over the understanding. Now if, nevertheless, this turn of the world is unfavourable to values of Pathos, what is the significance of the fact? It simply signifies that *man*, (the virile type), as surface, would be transformed into *man* as depth. But the profound, the interiorized man is not the religious, but the magic man. Therefore, the world which is being born cannot possibly become a religiously-minded world. But on the other hand, its goal cannot possibly be the irreligiousness of the chauffeur and Bolshevist type. Its goal must needs be a new one.—Its ideal goal is a new, an unheard-of goal indeed. And it is incumbent on us to determine that goal as closely as possible in order to bring about that solution of the religious problem which alone today can be regarded as such. How can we solve this task?—Let us briefly look at it from a new angle the meaning of the Chris-

tianizing of antiquity: this will furnish a background from which we can most readily arrive at an understanding of the meaning of our times.

What may have induced the early Christians to call the founder of their faith precisely "the word incarnate"? The reason was that the main difference between Jesus and the wise men and sages of dying antiquity resided in the concrete, and not abstract, character of His spirit. The Logos of the waning antiquity was essentially reflective and, therefore, uncreative. With Jesus, the Logos became once more the creative principle; He could, thus, work creatively, Prometheanly; He could renew the world from out of the sphere of meaning. But, in accordance with the pathic character of the new time, this did not become manifest in the same manner as in the creative times of antiquity, but in a new way suited to this very character: it did not manifest itself by the direct exteriorization of man's own substance into the world of causes and effects, but in the identification with an entity outside man's self. Thus the fact that Logos had recovered its creativeness expressed itself, with the first leaders of Christianity after Christ, in that the *believer* and not the thinker became determinant; the new type of the fathers of the Church grew to be the prototype. What distinguishes it from the philosophers of dying antiquity was nothing other than that the spiritual functions of these sages, preserved as such—St. Augustine, Origenes, Tertullian, were fully equipped with the mental implements of their epoch—were worked up into a new and living sense-connexion. And it was a question here not by any means of a construed, but of a real connexion: the Christian was actually nearer to Ultimate Reality than the pagan of the last

epoch. Now the Word which had become incarnate in Christ determined the course of historic evolution for centuries. The superannuated old Mediterranean nations as such were past being rejuvenated by the new meaning. It found its real active body among the youthful barbarian peoples, and its empiric character underwent further changes accordingly. Nevertheless, its fundamental character was preserved: the Logos, the spirit determined from within. Men lived, albeit in a feminine form, in the identification with a revered Entity external to the self; they lived from *out* of, and not towards the spirit. Hence the "magic" character of the genuine Christian age, its creative imagination, the inner quality of its art.

But the Christian way of living from out of the spirit is not the only one. It is specifically feminine, dependent. This is why the Christian world, when it grew superannuated, was much more seriously imperilled by the awakening masculine spirit than had ever been a spiritually rooted world. The Christian consciousness of depth had triumphed over antiquity by a psychological attitude of opposition to wisdom. Accordingly, the deep *was to be* henceforth essentially incomprehensible and accessible only to feeling. Now the deepest is indeed incomprehensible; but this is not what really matters: in shifting the stress to the absolute non-rationality of the deep and essential the masculine Logos was from the outset decreed superficial. It thus inevitably became the rebel against depth, which it never became in the Hindoo world, where the ill-omened equation "deep equals non-rational" never prevailed. The result was twofold: first, enmity of spirit as such towards depth, which was manifested with ever-increasing explicitness since the time of

the *Aufklärung*; second, its actual drift towards shallowness. Hence the nothing-but-intellectual, unmagic character of latter-day Western intellectuality. *Now it is precisely this evolution which has come to an end today.* The reality of the deep is again becoming conscious as such. But where it becomes conscious now it does so no more in the form of a belief in the spirit, in its feminine modality, but—in accordance with the latter-day-masculine *Zeitgeist*—by the interiorization of the spirit itself; by the *Lógos Spermatikós* becoming the general determinant. And this means that the historic hour of a new magianism in the sense of the concept deduced in the chapter, "*Jesus der Magier*," in *Menschen als Sinnbilder*, is about to strike. The hour of a new *universal* magianism and no more of an adjustment of faith in *one* particular divinely blessed magician.

This excursion into the historic field takes us to the core of the religious problem as it has to be stated today, and, thus, to the solution of the present-day task. We raised the question as to whether religiousness as such will play the same rôle in future as during the Christian era. We can now assert with certainty *that it will not.* Neither faith as such will presently signify as much as during the last millenniums, nor will the stress on Divine Grace continue to avail. Therefore, the world in the making will bear the imprint of the further development of the Protestant spirit. The stress will be laid more than ever on personal initiative. Personal responsibility will more than ever be the categorical imperative. Whereas no interiorized man whose mind is abreast of his time will continue to doubt the reality of the Realm of Grace, he will nevertheless never again surrender passively to it. "Let things be as the Lord

willeth; I will submit"—no man who really understands will ever incarnate again the internal attitude from which this saying has sprung. It stands to reason that there will be a numerous class of people who will continue to be Christians in the old style, and rightly so from their personal point of view. But they never again will be determinant. And this is *not* a consummation to be deplored: we know today that it needs must induce an increase in depth. The primacy of the religious function which had held since the end of antiquity was wholly due to the prevalence of the feminine principle. If the masculine principle regains the upper hand conditions analogous to those of antiquity must prevail: the stress will no longer be on the religious pathos, but on the ethos of man. On a more deeply rooted ethos, however, than ever before prevailed among men.

This, then, leads us to the definition of the absolutely New which is about to attain historic predominance. The reshifting of the stress from pathos to ethos *will occur on the basis of the achievements of Christianity*. Therefore, Christian wisdom will not be lost: it will be lost as little as any pre-Christian wisdom ever was lost. But it will, exactly like the wisdom of antiquity in the Christian era, recede in a steadily increasing measure and to an increasing degree from explicitness towards implicitness, and *insert itself as a partial expression into a new higher synthesis*. Once again, progress will manifest itself in that over-compensation (in the Christian era it was that of the feminine pathetic principle) will lead to a normal tension on a higher plane. But since there is on this earth no possible concrete and empiric beyond to polarity, the new synthesis must, again, be of a polar character, and it must be so compensatorily towards the

last ruling synthesis. It will thus wear the masculine character. Not faith, not love, not the specifically Christian virtues will predominate; their masculine correspondencies will. The concept of virtue will be understood again akin to the sense of the Roman *virtus*, the *virtù* of the Renaissance. The heroism of action will be again accorded a higher value than that of suffering. The demands of the specifically Christian *caritas* will surrender their preponderance to the ethics of fruitfulness. All this will come about quite naturally, as the specifically Christian types will recede into the background of history, where they will then play the part allotted to woman in antiquity. But now to the main point: the historic stress will lie on the *understanding*. With man in whose psychic structure the intellectual component plays the leading rôle, a non-rational cognitive function like that of Christian faith will no longer be able to produce the same results as with the man of the Middle Ages with his totally different organization. Precisely in order to strike as deep a root as the latter he *must* displace the stress within himself. This displacement can only mean the shifting of the emphasis to the understanding.

Understanding, too, presupposes a pathic attitude. It is in the understanding that there lies the only possible pathos of the mind-centred man towards the higher spheres. It stands to reason that he, too, is a believer in the sense outlined above, the sense of the "yea" in general to what is external to the self—in so far there is absolutely no going beyond belief—but it is not this kind of faith which is implied in the Christian concept of faith. This concept means a particular cognitive re-

lation, and this under the new conditions will be superseded by that of understanding. This, then, leads us to the ultimate comprehension of all teachings of the School of Wisdom up to the present. Man as an understanding subject is, no doubt, pathic. But he is, as opposed to the believer, pathic on the basis of freedom as a determinant. As an understanding subject, man puts himself personally in relation to what he is not. Thus, with the spiritual leader of the future, the stress is also from the religious standpoint, laid exclusively and entirely on freedom. He must forthwith found his relation to the Divine upon a higher basis of freedom. But this can now be achieved only in conformity to meaning through the masculine Logos-principle. With this, then, there is established an historically new and unprecedented relation of equilibrium between ethos and pathos. It can demand as high a perfection and as deep roots as existed during the reign of the equilibrium prevailing in the time of faith. But it will be no longer a religious relationship in the present-day sense. The historic hour of this kind of self-surrender is past. But this is not relevant from the point of view of Divine Reality. It is irrelevant whether a man answers to the definition of "religious" or not; *what matters alone is where he actually stands*. He who, in one way or another, is personally rooted in the Divine cannot indeed be religious in the customary sense; for this concept presupposes his consciousness to have its centre in the relation to something other and higher. With the mage it lies with ethos, even as with the antique pagan, only at a superior, not the pre-Christian, but the post-Christian stage of sense-apprehension; with an unstinted ac-

knowledge of the higher order, the only attitude towards which is that of pathos, but without the emphasis thereon.

This, then, is the true sense of that "irreligion of the future" which Guyau misunderstood because his mind was formed by too early a time and because he was not rooted deeply enough in his own personal insignificance; which Nietzsche, the protagonist of the storm troops of the new masculine era, could not help distorting. This irreligion does not mean disavowal of Christianity nor the discarding of the religious problem as such, but a new adjustment of man within the cosmic connexion to which, indeed, the old concept of religiousness does not apply. It answers to the "Age of the Holy Ghost" which even the earliest Christianity prophetically acknowledged as its *Heres designatus*. It is the age of a new and superior insight and of a life on the strictest personally determined lines. This adjustment was prepared by Protestantism. Yet its sole precursor in the sense of actual realization was no Christian; it was Buddha. Buddha incarnates the highest expression thus far of self-determined and, therefore, spirit-determined man. He was the sole unconditionally sovereign man known to history to this day, the one man who lived unconditionally from out of the spirit, that is ethically, not pathically. He stood by nothing which he had not understood independently. He was essentially neither a thinker nor a believer. He was a third thing, hardly understood and without a name as yet. But in the predominance of that third lies the salvation of the world next in time.

To the Buddha, the Thinker, all religious pathos had become personally conscious. He was no Lucifer, he

was, on the contrary, the man perfectly balanced between ethos and pathos. He laid all conscious stress on ethos; he lived out his pathos, on the other hand, by way of personal understanding. Buddha's example will wield an increasingly grand power of attraction. It will play more and more the rôle of a tuning-fork, throughout the millenniums, for chords identically attuned in themselves. Man will, to an ever-increasing degree, take his fate into his own hands. Life will, in so far, become increasingly lordly. The final goal looming ahead is an age of a new God-man-hood. . . . But, indeed: a time for which the religious problem is no longer as vital a concern as it was to the Christian era, will possibly have no equally deep pathic experiences. To that extent the complaints of those may well be justified who yearn for the lost paradise of naïve religiousness. But is this yearning different from the eternally objectless and yet eternally renewed yearning for lost childhood? Mankind has attained to its virile age. It is, therefore, precluded from a host of experiences. If it would, nevertheless, retain its infancy, it would only appear childish. Nor can a masculine age have perfect feminine experiences. But it can create all the more. The true pathos of the world in the making consists in the development according to which pathos towards the superior order will have become implicit and will, therefore, be experienced less directly than hitherto. Henceforth man, reconverted to the masculine spirit, the *Lógos Spermatikós* within him, out of the spirit of the ultimate religious depth and with its powers to uplift his soul, yet personally centred in pure Ethos, will achieve the perfection of the work the performance of which is the whole and only meaning of his pilgrimage on the earth.

My Own Belief

"The Spirit of Truthfulness will guide you into all truth."
(These words in my grandfather Alexander Keyserling's personal translation of the Gospel of St. John 16, 13 were destined by him to be engraved on his tombstone in the family cemetery at Rayköll.)

I DO not believe that, from the standpoint of understanding, there is any value in what even the most gifted man thinks with his intellect on essential problems: there is value only in the correctly defined and formulated truthful relation; that is the relation, expressed as a function of the individual's real personal disposition, between the real self and the real object. In so far, even the thoughts of a novelist, endowed with the gift of expression, who portrays his own person, are of greater import than the ratiocinations of the most intelligent of scholars. Still, even such thoughts are not as yet unqualifiedly significant: what is vitally important for others are such thoughts only as do not express mere opinions, but real perceptions; I mean thoughts which their authors advocate with that same inner competence which belongs to the perfect eye that mirrors the world in a way true for all men. Such genuine insights—and they alone—stand the pragmatic test for all time; if not at once, then certainly in the long run. No truth which lies beyond the plane of experience open to all men could—nor ever will—be proved according to the

requirements of experimental science and logic. But truth, however impossible to demonstrate, manifests itself by the effects it produces, provided it maintains perfect accordance with the natural laws which prevail on the plane of expression. In the first instance, it strikes as obvious all those who have themselves a genuine personal relationship to the problem, and who are psychologically so organized that they are able to understand its formula without difficulty. Second, really felicitous formulations of thought enable the receiver to reproduce, out of himself, the intrinsic meaning so far as it was already latent within him. Finally, genuine insight quickens and enhances. It inbuilds a new meaning into life. And this meaning has all the more vitalizing effect the more positive and deep it is.

But there never was a man who discovered a universally valid expression for a truth unless he had the inner authority for it. This intrinsic competence is what matters more than anything else. The ear will never see, nor will the nose ever hear. The intellect as such does not compete beyond the sphere of formal logic; it cannot judge whether a thing be real or unreal. I have thus, from my boyhood, declined to take seriously any opinions merely for the reason that they were clever. If, in matters of moment, I was to listen to another or to read another's works, I always asked myself the preliminary question: Has this man more insight into the matter than myself in the sense that the falcon sees farther than the owl? If the answer was affirmative, I gave myself up to his influence. If it was negative, I declined to take any notice of him except when *he* desired to learn from *me*. And if I yielded to his influence by way of experiment, as I often did, since first impressions

are so frequently deceptive, I was not long in finding out whether this self-surrender was worth while. Whenever I open my soul the influence of what I am not myself straightway takes possession of it. Then it operates inevitably within me according to its own nature, whereby, if the other man is capable of expression, it is even immaterial whether I have personal intercourse with him and thus absorb his complete influence, or whether I only meditate on his writings. If, under such conditions, a man has inward authority for what he stands by, I presently become aware of the fact by way of a corresponding personal transformation. If he lacks such authority, his influence is nil, however clever and able he may be. For the soul is an organic reality reacting to other realities as specifically as does the body.

But there does not follow from what has been said above that I have had a smaller number of teachers than the majority: the fact is, I have had more. But I do not feel indebted to any one of my teachers who possessed only opinions and information. But I feel indeed indebted to any man who came into intimate contact with my soul and who was in any positive respect different from me. Now almost all are different from me. Thus, in opening my soul to the man differing from me and in connecting it with him, I have, again and again, participated for a while in his particular being and proficiency—a process which caused me, again and again, to outgrow my actual state. In this sense I have learned most perhaps from animals, because they are so totally different from us in point of being and proficiency. In the second place, I have learned most from women. Among men, on the other hand, the simple and natural type has given me most. The more educated men were,

the more the advantage I derived from them depended on their unquestioned superiority. Therefore, I have learned more from men of enterprise and business than from philosophers and, among the intellectual class, most perhaps from the occultists. What these can see, I have no means to test by myself. But I can know whether they are genuine and authentic and truthful and whether their personal experiences deal with reality or not, whatever its interpretation may be; for the contact with them induces a corresponding change in my own state. There are only two types of man who have never taught me anything at all: the intellectuals and the pious. For these are the types of whose essence it is that they should lack intrinsic authority. The intellectual's thought does not correspond to his being, nor do the belief and actions of the pious correspond to his being.

I THUS believe only in the value of authenticity. Not indeed in the sense of an absolute pronouncement of values such as pseudo-critics who are themselves of little substance are wont to pronounce. In this respect I do not judge. The criminal, too, even the fashionable swindler, can be as authentic as the purest soul provided he shows himself such as he really is; nor can, for that matter, any man help his original being. I believe in genuine reality only in the sense that every man is competent to advocate only what the true relation of the given real subject to the real object expresses in conformity to the law of correlation of meaning and expression. Now the reality of this relation manifests itself in its effect not only on the external world, but also within the man himself. In the latter direction it is expressed in *primary faith*. Faith means the ultimate

psychological end of the relation of the inner reality, as reflected in the sphere of representations, to the sphere-external, because it affirms its existence in general; it is, thus, the subjective correlative of being. It is true that men need not believe in order to experience personally; and wherever the reality of experience is doubted by none, as in the case of the external world, the importance of the function of faith recedes into the background. But it becomes for the same reason supreme in the sphere of inner experience. This sphere exists for the single individual only; all others maintain an attitude as though it were inexistent. Thus the inner reality, where it really means much to the individual, maintains itself in the form of faith emphasized. And it does so in proportion to the importance attached to that reality. With such belief the question is never of an arbitrary act. It is as impossible to believe in what is intrinsically unreal as it is impossible for the unreal to operate in the external world. The fact is that things are even as we represented them in the beginning of this exposition: the degree of possible primary faith corresponds *ad intra* to the degree of possible real effect *ad extra*; the belief in oneself or in a definite personal experience is the inevitable result of the influence of the real on the subjective sphere of representations. It is because things are thus, and not otherwise, that the greatness of a man's mission has invariably proved, from the beginning of historic records, proportionate to the strength of the faith of the individual fulfilling it. That the question is, here, of truly "objective" realities is demonstrated conclusively by the effect operated by such beliefs in the external world. *Faith in oneself* has been in every single case the source

of all primary magnetism, which always is the historic power that ultimately decides.

It is true that the strength of a man's faith does not prove the theoretic truth of what he stands by; the degree of truth depends on the degree to which the law of correlation between meaning and expression has been observed, while the latter degree depends, in its turn, on the existing powers of understanding and expression. But the strength of a man's faith corresponds indeed everywhere to the strength of the (however erroneously interpreted) experience of reality. Here the insane should by no means be adduced as a proof to the contrary. That madmen often believe so firmly in their delusions is, for one thing, due to the causal connection dealt with first: the reflex-like inward maintenance against the unbelief of the others. Then every normal case has its pathologic correlative. But above all, even the insane are in the right against all sceptics and critics as long as their world has not lost all connexions with the world of the sane. The fact is that they *are* insane. They are, accordingly, unable to see the world otherwise than in distorted perspective. Their delusion is in so far a genuine expression of truth. And to the extent that they uphold their particular authentic relation to the world they give proof of more essential reality than those who are unable to believe in anything within them. It is true that even such men are not devoid of inner substance, for there are no creatures who lack substance altogether. But what their consciousness lacks in any case is the contact with their own essence. This cannot, therefore, work itself out. This suffices to explain why history has ever passed by all sceptics, the cleverest not excepted.

Now a man's primary belief may happen to be in agreement with a definite traditional religious faith without detriment to its authenticity. But it is equally possible that a man should be unable to adhere to a truth generally accepted as such without acting a lie. This depends altogether on how he is *actually* adjusted in the cosmos, what rôle the collective-psychologic sphere plays in his consciousness, what the purely individual moment within him amounts to, which dispositions are predominant in him, what kind of spirit determines him *ab intra* and what his life, finally, aims at as a goal. What we can assert here in general is no more than the following: He alone can candidly acknowledge an externalized and generally accepted truth as a truth in whose soul the collective-psychologic sphere predominates over the personal. This, then, takes us back to the problem of man's inner authority and qualification. There must needs exist such a universal qualification also for a definite religious belief. There is a difference in the extent and measure to which men can ask themselves the same questions; nay, in truth all men cannot ask themselves the same questions, since not all problems are a matter of personal concern for every man. Many are genuinely interested only in politics, or they care only for one particular person they love—the man she loves is for many a woman her unique and true god. Now, from the standpoint of the particular salvation of the individual soul, it were indeed to be desired that it should at least, on the authority of such as know better, acknowledge that to which it possesses no originally personal relationship. For there exists an objectively valid hierarchy of essential values, and he who has no personal relation whatever to the foremost of them is indeed an inferior type. Thus,

such as have no personal knowledge of the cosmic dispensation ought at least to believe in it; for the affirmative attitude towards the as yet unknown reality creates in the long run, within the limits of organic possibilities, the corresponding organs of understanding. But all this is a question of private concern and opinion. What counts *for others* is always only the originally genuine—whereby the term “original” is not necessarily to be understood in the temporal sense, but all the more in the sense of being rooted in man’s personal primary source. For only the genuine expresses reality directly and can, therefore, create reality or, at least, attune minds to it. Furthermore, there are spiritual problems only in what points to the beyond of private concerns; only that in man which can stand for a symbol concerning all men incarnates a spiritual interest for others. Personally, I have, thus, since the awakening of my conscious understanding, acknowledged as valuable only what was originally genuine. In essential matters I have never believed in objective truth, objective values. I have reared my whole personal life from an original insight into what has been expounded above. From that insight, and with an outlook towards it, I will now, to conclude, speak of my strictly personal belief. For, a subjective quality obviously underlies all my insights, however generally valid they may prove to be.

I CONSCIOUSLY embody a strictly definite stand in the universe, and no other. I am a unique being endowed with particular dispositions which I accept as such, even as I have to accept every fellow man as he is. It would be as presumptuous on my part to sit in judgment of my original being as if I sat in judg-

ment on others in the same respect: I am not the maker of my individuality, I was handed over to myself. And if I am to feel reverence for others, I also owe reverence to myself. According to the original disposition of my nature, only specific things are personal concerns of mine, and so are only specific problems. And I can discover a truthful relation to these things and questions only on the basis of a specific adjustment, by means of specific functions on which the vital emphasis with me lies. Accordingly, mine are strictly specific tasks and no others. Accordingly, I can believe only what I actually and truly experience both within me and outside of myself.

In this sense, then, I first believe in myself—ever since I was able to think—as in an essentially not-earthly spirit. I have never felt otherwise than as a mere guest on earth. In spite of a superabundant vitality and strong instincts, I never felt identical with my body and nature-bound soul, nor did I ever feel essentially akin to my blood relations. Even joy and sufferings, which, as a human being, I feel as keenly as any other man, never intimately touched that essence within me with which alone I ultimately identify myself. Also, I never felt bound by earthly ties otherwise than as by external shackles. As such, however, they gall me all the more. This applies chiefly to the imprisonment in the process of natural becoming and passing away. My attitude towards death seems strange even to me. I incessantly think of death. I shudder at the thought of it as perhaps no other man does, for I sense it as contrary to meaning. On the one hand, I know myself to be indestructible, but, on the other, I know well enough that by far the greatest part of what my consciousness mirrors is indissolubly bound up with earthly life, and thus

sure to pass away. This produces, for my conscious, an intolerable conflict. It is all the more intolerable because I am personally extremely alive to the pathos of transitoriness. Truth to say, I have no real consciousness of time, but only a consciousness of simultaneity whenever I turn my attention to the images of my inner vision. What I have ever been and what I have ever experienced stand before my mind's eye as a Today with as pronounced a presence, as though there were no such thing as transitoriness. And what thus manifests itself to me is awful in most cases. Every situation in which I have ever seen a man, every word he ever uttered, to my knowledge, are simultaneous experiences with me. And if the movement of his life, thus synthetically visualized, means fall or destruction—then I must make an effort not to turn shudderingly away. . . . Yet, on the other hand, I yearn for death, again and ever again; if not during waking time, then in my dreams. Something within me hopes that death will bring me my ultimate liberation. My deepest self even goes out to death exultingly, deeply conscious that it can never die. . . .

But I not only feel essentially eternal, I also feel essentially free. And if transitoriness is my particular bane precisely because I know myself to be immortal and because I cannot grasp this knowledge of mine with my earthly organs which are all of them phenomena doomed to death, I suffer more than most men, for my very consciousness of freedom, by anything that ties me down. Nevertheless, the consciousness of positiveness outweighs here that of negativeness. I never experienced thralldom or inner serfdom, as so many do, and I am grateful for this. What applies to my essential personal experiences is only the concept of freedom, for what

many call their "inner must," because it coerces them, is primarily willed with me. What I "must"—and indeed I am subject to the "must" in much too many respects, not only socially, but also from reasons belonging to the substance of my mortal nature—I never "must" otherwise than in the sense of the convict, or at best the soldier. For my self-consciousness applies to nothing except my spirit. Body and soul are primarily sensed by me as mere means of expression. As early as at the age of twenty, at a time when I was still entirely unspiritual and philosophically an utter *ignoramus*, I used to delight in regarding my body as an instrument and my feelings as my inner *milieu*. It is, thus, mediately, through representations only and not through personal experience that I am able to understand how the problems of life and soul can stand with any man for essential problems. Here, then, I am face to face with my most important personal delimitation: *Only* the problem of the spirit concerns me essentially. It is only for the dealing with this problem that I am qualified.

But now for the most curious fact of all: the spirit which alone I feel and acknowledge to be myself is, nevertheless, unknown to me. Between that spirit and my earthly nature there is an ultimate incompatibility which prevents the latter from completely apprehending what I know. Not for once has my consciousness been able to mirror the essence and quality of my spirit with that clarity my understanding powers have a right to demand. Never in my lifetime have I experienced even one moment of that certainty of understanding which some Hindoo sages at least seem to have attained. Religious certainty in the customary sense is surely for ever out of my reach: it is obstructed by my particular adjust-

ment and constitution. Nor am I even striving for that certainty; indeed I never did. It is highly characteristic that—as I realize time and again, when meeting clairvoyants—I am even without the slightest curiosity in this respect. I always have the feeling that, on the one hand, I already know, unconsciously, for what reason no alleged revelation means a surprise for me, while, on the other hand, I durst not put too many questions, nor indeed come to a decision in the form of believing assent. During the first thirty years of my life this dilemma frequently tormented me. Now I know at least as much as to enable me to understand *why* I am not allowed to escape this dilemma. My Spirit, my deepest Self, is bent on creating for itself its personal body. But it cannot succeed unless I refrain from accepting anything I have not acquired personally; from believing what I do not know from personal experience; from standing by anything that I am not really and truly at the given moment. Unconditional personal truthfulness is my one categorical imperative. Another personal imperative forbids my ever coming to a stop. For the spirit can, in this world of becoming, manifest itself only by means of personal initiative. For the “I,” too, is a process, wherefore being cannot be realized except by acts of creation. This explains why even in my youth, while on the one hand ingenuously accepting my own nature with all its shortcomings, I still felt it unconditionally incumbent on me to make the most of it and thus regarded sloth as the one sin against the Holy Ghost.

Here, however, a new belief comes in which admits of no doubt with me. I feel perfectly solitary among men, for I have never met any man whose centre of con-

sciousness was exactly where it is with me. But in my inward being I know myself to be primarily at one with all men. This is so obviously, so unquestionably so with me, that the question whether I might freely dispose of my earthly days never arose with me in the same sense as it seems to do with the majority. I feel my own person to be primarily an organ of mankind, and as an organ among others at that. This is why I can hardly understand how a man can be jealous of others, for somehow I feel their personal gifts to be no further removed from my self than my own talents. This is why, on the other hand, I have always stood by what I strove for on my own lines, with the utmost lack of consideration for others, where I thought it necessary, and why I never countenanced the prejudice according to which one should not think well of oneself: if I regard the others as belonging to myself and if, thus, I assent to all their manifestations wherever they show competency, I naturally expect and demand of the others the same for myself. Thus my "will" is primarily also a "should." I know primarily, and I knew as much at a time when as yet not the slightest trace of my vocation had been discernible (for as a child and youth I was quite an average man) that a specific task was imposed on me on earth. What I call knowledge here is, of course, from others' point of view, belief. Yet I do not fulfil what I consider to be my task as a duty imposed upon me, but in freedom, however onerous it may prove to my nature at times. Spirit knows of no "must," of no constraint. To the spirit—and thus also to him, in whose conscious it has struck root—his primary will is essentially one with what spiritually-unconscious man at best experiences as a feeling of inner obligation. I thus live in freedom be-

cause of a kind of obscure knowledge—a perfectly ascertained knowledge, that is, of my essential spirituality; an absolutely sure knowledge of my having a mission as an organ of mankind. And yet, until now, a knowledge which is not perfect comprehension of who I am.

THIS, then, leads me to the precise definition of my particular position, such as I truly realize it to be and such as forms the object of my unshakable belief. I said I believe in myself as an essentially non-earthly spirit. I feel this spirit to be at work within me. It is external to myself from the point of view of my consciousness of facts; yet it is my real self. This very spirit demands that I should not believe anything I do not know in the sense of earthly knowledge. I did not always feel the demands of this fate easy, for as a child I yearned foremost for belief and security, whereas since the time of manhood and since the corresponding basic tones of my natural being have been struck, I have been anxious to arrive at a decision at the earliest possible moment at every occasion. Nevertheless, I can safely say that I have loyally fulfilled my particular destiny. There has perhaps been no man since Socrates who left so many questions unanswered—for himself as well as for others—as I have. There has possibly been none to equal me for patience in waiting, in spite of all appearances to the contrary.

The results have proved to me, at any rate, that I am correctly interpreting the will of my spirit. New certainties have been borne in on me every new year. Certainties, and not only mere thoughts, flashed in on me from the beginning of my career. The earliest works of my youth already contain, germlike, what today I am

able to unfold; nor did a sudden thought the meaning of which I could not at the time really understand, while it was yet accompanied by a feeling of certainty, ever fail to manifest itself later as the germ-cell of a truth intelligible to all. Even today there can be no question of my having found for all that I do know, the formulation demanded by the law of correlation of meaning and expression. But since, with my assertions, the question is of certainties in the sense of expressions of a necessary relation between the real self and the real external world, as opposed to mere thoughts, these certainties manifest themselves to an increasing degree, in spite of all deficiencies in formulation, as universally valid in that they are obvious as elucidations of what others themselves mean, or that they are unwittingly adopted as truths or means of expression by the very men who oppose my views. For my whole capacity for improvisation and, more generally speaking, my being quicker than many others, is due to the fact that in what I say I simply react to specific stimuli in accordance with my own specific being.

But my increasing harvest of certainties signifies also an advance by progressive stages on the road to self-realization. As an empirical being I am still very far from what I hope to become some day. And, what with the considerable resistances my nature throws in the way of the spirit, this hope will not be fulfilled unless I have the advantage of living on to a very advanced age. Even as a man who knows, I am still, from my own standpoint, at the very beginning. At any rate I still know a great deal less, especially in the matter of ultimates, than most of the others pretend to know. As yet I have no complete metaphysical picture of the world; I have no definite religious conviction. Nor do I know for

certain in what respect man is immortal. And where I am ignorant, there my mission forbids that I should believe. It *seems* to me as though certain metaphysical and such questions as refer to the beyond are unanswerable because they can only be put from the point of view of the earthly organism, which passes away with death. But even here I am not sure. On the whole I am still dependent on intuitive hopefulness. This even holds true of much which strikes others as clear and lucid knowledge. What I write I do not—as I have already mentioned—always myself understand at first. All I know from the outset is that thoughts which occur to me must be somehow true, *if* I am able to find the adequate literary expression; I simply cannot put pen to paper before; either no thoughts at all come to my mind or the composition lacks roundness, or else I fall ill before I reach the perfection I strive for. For all my philosophy springs from a source which my consciousness does not as yet fathom. Still, I am steadily progressing, I know it. And this is the proof for me that I am steering the right course.

Now which is my goal? It is self-realization always, and nothing else. I said that I durst believe anything I do not know. I durst not, because such renouncement only makes it possible for my spirit to realize itself entirely in the phenomenal. Therefore, I shoulder my ignorance joyfully. I firmly trust that all will end well provided that I live loyally in accordance with this goal. In so far my belief does bear some resemblance to certain forms of trust in God. Only I bear and I can put up with considerably more uncertainty even than the Calvinist. My consciousness lacks any kind of static security. The will of the spirit which dominates me is

its very ultimate terminus. I know indeed that it does not represent the ultimate terminus in the absolute sense. If there ever was a man who personally experienced the reality of the Cosmic Dispensation, it is I. Every other man in my place would *know* himself to be driven, led and protected by Divine Providence. But I personally will refrain from drawing conclusions from what I experience until the day of perfect understanding has come. I know this renouncement of the drawing of conclusions to be the one way to the understanding of essentials. It is my task to experiment perpetually, untiringly. In the first place, consciously, for my personal benefit. I must start always from my personal problem. What I achieve for *myself* is decisive, for only my real achievement can be of any significance for others. Only from out of my personal needs can the organs of the spirit spring into being which, later, may benefit each and all. I thus also work primarily for my personal benefit in working for others. I learn much more from my disciples than they learn from me. All I say or write in objectified and transferable formulæ is to that extent personal experience transposed. There is no single essential thought to be found in any of my writings which did not spring from an experiment made upon myself.

THIS leads me to the problem of the belief in my particular mission. In so far as I live for others, I do not minister to other people's souls, but I rather act as a statesman. Since I was old enough to think, I have seen myself and, later, my work in historic perspective. This perspective is born with me. There certainly exist spirits which have nothing to do with time; these are the spirits which, at all times, further the single

individual in his pilgrimage. They are furthermore those spirits for which the historic as such is irrelevant, who are interested only in individuals as private persons. I personally can think only historically, in accordance with the law of my nature, when I deal at all with earthly problems. First, it is obvious to me that in this world of becoming and passing away the phenomenal—and thus all particular statements of problems—is conditioned by time. Second, I know that although all collective phenomena ultimately exist and occur for the sake of the unique (wherefore it is always an error if the interests of the many are rated higher than those of the individual) the unique as such, in their turn, belong to a spiritual connexion the higher unity of which evolves as a whole. Therefore, man's life is not only a creature of Chronos, but also of Kairos. What is needed at a definite time are definite impulses appealing to all, if the unique individual is to progress. Now it is of primary importance for the Kairos what it is which makes the historically important and efficient man. He for whom the becoming of history is not, as such, an immediate datum, is unable to direct it. I primarily *live* history, I live my life historically primarily as others live their private personal lives. It is just the privacy of life which means nothing to me. This is due to the particular adjustment in the cosmic connexion which happens to be mine. And as this adjustment is really mine, it is perfectly immaterial to me whether others acknowledge me as an historical figure or not: if I am, I shall necessarily stand the pragmatic test as such.

Long ago I was aware of having a mission—for everybody has some kind of mission—but I knew not which it was to be. Today I know. I likewise know today

why I was allowed to know so little from the outset, and why I was never allowed to believe. My natural disposition permits pure experimentation with my own soul, such as not every man may safely try with his. I am organically able to live as a completely open-minded being, without any premises and inhibitions. I have no religious prejudices which would inwardly obstruct personal experiences. Nor have I any moral prejudices, like Marcus Aurelius. Nor am I a sceptic, like La Rochefoucauld; for scepticism means a decision in favour of uncertainty. But above all, I have been blessed with the power of discarding every yesterday, of rising every morning as a *quasimodo genitus*. The spirit within me is thus enabled with rare ease to create a new body within me. It is for the sake of procuring that opportunity for my spirit that I have been, so I believe, given empiric existence. And my historical task consists in blazing the way by experimentation for a new general status. Still, only the particular results of each case of my experimental work are precise and clear insights. It is by its fruits that I know the nature of the urge which impels me from within. As yet I do not know its essence. All I can say is that I believe in it. It would certainly be the obvious thing for me to do, to work my manifold experiences into a theoretic scheme; every other man in my predicament would long since have become, if not the founder of a religion, then certainly the parent of a well-defined philosophical system. But I am not allowed to profess what I do not know personally beyond doubt. What I merely "think" is absolutely irrelevant.

I am thus a believer, and yet I do not believe in the sense of others. The road marked out for me is that of obtaining self-realization by means of self-creation.

I am both a seeker and a man driven by an inner urge. I am called upon to see, and yet I am blind. My home is certainly not on this earth. Where is it? I know not. Never has a religious or occult revelation the like of which is recorded by others come my way. But if the secret is to be some day unveiled, there is hardly any surprise in store for me: for my spirit was in the whole secret from eternity.

MEANWHILE I give no thought to what may come to pass in later days. One need not know intelligently in order to sense one's life to be full of meaning and to steer it to the right goal. I should like to know whether my comprehension of animals is in part not due to the fact that I feel their unerring reliance on instinct to be more akin to the modality of my own life than that of men. I know, of course, what security in Divine Grace signifies to the Christian. But the certainty from which I live, that certainty which expresses itself in clear-cut knowledge, but which does not, at the same time, originate in clarity, but in an organically-infantile indissoluble connexion with the cosmos, is, nevertheless, a certainty of another kind. And if, of all the concepts of freedom, the Christian of the freedom of the sons of God is that which I can translate more than any other into the terms and form of my own life, ignoring constraint and compulsion, I am none the less aware that it originally involved a different meaning. It means a being free from oneself, which is alien to my personal experience and which I am also unable to acknowledge as an ideal state: one should, conversely, say yea to all empiric data without exceptions, as means of self-realization. I am, at bottom, "free" in exactly

the same sense as animals "must." And when I obtain insights, I still rarely know what I am doing. I often am, in this respect nearer to the bee or the beaver than to man. But precisely in the same sense, I am surer than man generally is; surer both in the matter of the starting-point and the goal. I *know* that I am bound to make the utmost of this short sojourn on earth. I *know* that there is freedom in our sense only here. I *know* that sloth is the one sin against the Holy Ghost. I *know* that what matters foremost, nay solely at this turn of the world process, is the attainment of supreme self-consciousness.

MY LIFE must wear a singular aspect for others. Many think that personally I derive little joy from it. But in this they err. My life, on the whole, is essentially a beautiful thing. In the foregoing I have written about the quality of awfulness implied for me in my curious consciousness of simultaneity: the same gift which enables me to see the temporally evanescent as a simultaneity can induce the experience of supreme bliss. Nay, it is this gift which, again and again, reconciles me to the tragedy of this our earthly life, whenever my sensations and emotions become all too painful. For it is just this gift which makes me see, again and again, how significant the work of the Cosmic Dispensation is. How I pity those others with their narrowness of view, to whom what can be proved to exist today is their only actuality! The vast majority, indeed, live at random and make short work of their random days. And none of these days is replete with its full and proper meaning. They are, therefore, justified in forgetting, from one hour to the next, what has occurred to them, or in

transforming their real experiences in some conventional form or other into delusions. But he for whom all that has passed away is an ever-present actuality—he sees the more clearly, the longer his life lasts, that all co-existent as well as all subsequent things and events belong to a melodious unity supremely full of meaning, supremely full of meaning, that is, because every movement, nay every time of the melody imparts an enhanced meaning to the tones that passed away. This melody is no cheerful performance. But it is a grand performance. And this is more.

But life wears a wholly grand aspect for him who experiences not only in the present, the past, but the future as well. This is indeed possible. Where the sense-connexion of life is a timeless thing which manifests itself only in temporal sequences—even as the sonata is timeless, although it resounds only within the temporal—a man whose consciousness advanced to the insight into its own meaning can indeed experience the future beforehand. That is, he cannot experience beforehand what is to come, but what he wishes to be. There is no fateful exterior event which has not its free interior side. To such a man, then, yea-saying to the actual moment is at the same time yea-saying to the future. If this future is bound to be hard because the meaning of the determinate melody of life would have it so, his will adopts this future and no other. Thus every moment has a background both of the past and of the future. Both backgrounds are boundless. For him who perceives them no momentary mediocrity can rob life of its meaning. And this state of grace is what has fallen to my lot.

I am writing this at Christmas. It is not by mere acci-

dent, I would venture to think, that it is precisely today that I bring to a close one of the most important stages of my life and work. It is at Christmas that the purport of my earthly existence becomes, again and again, particularly clear to my vision. For the remembrance of the birth of the world's Saviour is the symbol for me of that rebirth within me which I experience with ever-renewed and increasing force. No yesterday, although it died away, is lost. It can, by means of the newborn today, receive, again and again, a new meaning transfiguring it. And if this meaning makes for enhancement and uplift, the yesterday is truly reborn from out of the spirit and, thus, allows salvation. And this rebirth—although it is experienced only by him who manifested his freedom indefatigably, who did not omit too many personal decisions, who personally referred all externals back to his inner self—this rebirth is really a rebirth in the realm of grace. For this realm is nothing else than the realm of that vaster melody, of which the individual life is only a single time, and which encompasses and upholds it.

Children are assuredly pace-makers of death. And yet: since I know that I am beyond the meridian of life, that I participate no longer in the ascent in the natural sense, I feel my life to have become daily more replete with meaning and richer in contents. What a marvellous variety of personal experiences has fallen to my lot! I have known the feudal Middle Ages, clear-sighted spirits still belonging inwardly to the eighteenth century have worked their influence on me. I have witnessed generations on the face of this earth such as will never be born again. I have lived to see the end

of an age that has had its day, both East and West. I saw the nation die to which I intimately belong. I have witnessed the birth of new nations. An immeasurable host of the dead have passed by me. I have myself died many deaths. And yet, all dying away proved, again and again, to be the door to rebirth.

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
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